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THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

EDITED BY J. SMITH HOMANS, JR.

ACTUARY OF THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, OF NEW-YORK.

"No expectation of forbearance or indulgence should be encouraged. Favor and benevolence are not the attributes of good banking. Strict justice and the rigid performance of contracts are its proper foundation."

"The Revenue of the State is THE STATE; in effect, all depend upon it, whether for support or for reformation."

JULY, 1861.—CONTENTS.

	Page
ART. I. THE CAUSES OF BANK FAILURE.—1. Overtrading. 2. Neglect of Specie Reserves. 3. Further Legislative Restraints necessary. 4. Official Reports of the Albany Banks,.....	1
II. Bank Note Currency of the Western States—Depreciation—Loss,.....	5
III. The Finances of the United States.—1. Existing Public Debt. 2. Additional Sources of Revenue. 3. Debt <i>per capita</i> , 1816 and 1861. 4. Direct Taxes. 5. Duties on Tea, Coffee and Sugar. 6. British and American Taxation compared. 7. Treasury Notes. 8. Opinions of Secretaries HAMILTON, DALLAS, CRAWFORD, WOODBURY and SPENCER,.....	8
IV. New Banking Law of Minnesota—Amended March, 1861,.....	17
V. Foreign Loans Guaranteed by the British Government,.....	22
VI. The London Stock Market for the year 1860—Lowest and Highest Prices,.....	23
VII. New Bank Law of Missouri, March, 1861,.....	24
VIII. The great Defalcation of M. MIREX, in France,.....	25
IX. Monthly Stock Fluctuations of the New-York Market, and of Boston,.....	31
X. Fluctuations in Bank Shares, 1860-1861,.....	34
XI. Monthly Review of the Stock Market—Lowest and Highest Prices, each month, November, 1860, to May, 1861,.....	35
XII. The Bank of England—Annual Election, April, 1861—List of Governors and Deputy-Governors, 1828-1861,.....	36
XIII. Public Revenue of Great Britain, 1860-1861,.....	38
XIV. New Bank Buildings in the City of New-York, 1861,.....	39
XV. Debate on the Currency Bill of Ohio,.....	41
XVI. The great Leather Bankruptcy Case in England,.....	42
XVII. Transmission of Specie Funds in the Eighteenth Century,.....	45
XVIII. New Views of the Currency, by HAMER STANSFELD, of England,.....	47
XIX. Coins, Coinage and Bullion—Proceedings of the Numismatic Societies of London and Boston,.....	49
XX. The History of Gems and Jewels—Their History, Geography, Chemistry and Ana—From the Earliest Ages down to the present time. By MADAME DE BARRERA,.....	51
XXI. Statistics of Coins and Bullion.—1. New Gold Coins in Spain. 2. Treasure Trove. 3. New Gold Fields in Victoria. 4. Specie Circulation of England,.....	55
XXII. The Post-Office as a Savings Bank,.....	57
XXIII. Bullion Movements.—1. England, 1860. 2. The United States, 1821-1860,.....	64
XXIV. Private Bankers—Changes in Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, &c.,.....	77
XXV. BANK ITEMS—New Banks—Bank Failures—New Bank Laws—Foreign Banks,.....	75
XXVI. Notes on the Money Market and Stock Market of New-York, for June, 1861,.....	78


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- About, M.**, on the stockbrokers, 118.
— on the Mont de Piété, 193.
Alabama, banks of, 994.
— postal statistics of, 587.
Albany, bank failures in, 99.
— banks, financial errors of, 1.
Alchemy, modern, 407.
Alphabetical list of cashiers, 608.
American bankers in London, failures of, 679.
— colonies, coins of, with engravings, 242.
— coinage, history of, 241, 321.
— **Exchange Bank**, origin of, 687, 695.
— **Exchange Bank**, circular of, 647.
— **Geographical and Statistical Society**, New-York, 657.
— report of, 705.
Amsterdam, exchange on, at New-York, 78, 148, 317, 559, 751.
— London, 109, 174, 239, 302, 373.
— exchange on, each week, 1861, 736.
Annual report, molasses trade of the United States, 892.
— sugar trade of the United States, 882.
— statements of the fire insurance companies of New-York, 88.
— of the life insurance companies, 91.
— statements of the marine insurance companies, New-York, 87.
Appleton, N., on paper money, 6, 405.
Arkansas, postal statistics of, 587.
Armies of Europe in 1861, 360.
Assay office, United States, at New-York, 55, 494.
Astor Bank, N. Y., 693.
Atlanta, bank convention of 1861, 71.
Atlantic Bank, N. Y., 688, 694.
— Brooklyn, 678.
Australia, production of gold in, 381.
Austria, army statistics of, 360.
— and the Bank of Vienna, 651.
Bank buildings, new, in New-York, 39.
— cashiers, changes among, 77.
— clerks, the duties of, 633.
— convention, Southern, 71.
— deposits, the law of, 921.
— dividends, Baltimore, 157.
— Boston, 380, 794, 905.
— Kentucky, 157.
— New-York, 157, 236, 646.
— St. Louis, 157.
— failure, the causes of, 1.
— failures, Albany, 99.
— 73, 233, 906.
— for savings, New-York, origin of, 673.
— frauds in London, 257, 300, 644.
— New-York, 697, 703, 829.
— items, 73, 155, 233, 314, 391, 470, 551, 646, 748, 824, 906, 970.
— law, French, 383.
— Pennsylvania, 925.

- Bank laws, new, of Illinois, 351, 539, 797.
 — London and Westminster, History of, 264.
 — national, considerations on the national finances in connection with a, 518.
 — note currency of the U. S., 5.
 — note, form of New-York Colonial, 573.
 — notes, loss on, 553.
 — of America, origin of, 671.
 — of Commerce, N. Y., origin of, 689.
 — of Egypt, 228.
 Bank of England, accusations against the directors of the, 851.
 — analysis of the act establishing the, [781].
 — Anderson on the, 857.
 — annual meeting, 36.
 — artifice of the, 936.
 — bank note paper, 944.
 — branches proposed, 852.
 — bullion in, 1852-1860, 116.
 — condition of, 1851-1861, 69, 148, 373.
 — cash and bullion very low, 955.
 — charter, extension of, 954.
 — charter of the, 781.
 — conspiracy against the, 930.
 — directors of 1861, 37.
 — discounts, 100.
 — during the South Sea excitement, 875, 877.
 — East India annuities under management of, 958.
 — Ewer, Mr., governor of the, 954.
 — establishment of the, 41.
 — extension of the charter of the, 859.
 — first forged note of the, 940.
 — forged notes, 947.
 — forgery made a felony, 851.
 — forgeries of John Mathison, 951.
 — forgeries of Charles Price, 948.
 — fraud by Francis Fenton, 957.
 — Godfrey, Michael, 778.
 — pamphlet of, in regard to, 780, 783, 851.
 — governors of, 1828-1860, 37.
 — Grocers' Hall, 782, 931.
 — Houlblon, Sir John, first governor of the, 932.
 — Heathcote, Sir Gilbert, a director of the, 857.
 — increase of dividend, 954.
 — in danger from a mob, 858.
 — legal decision in the case of forged notes of, 954.
 — lend money on plate, 849.
 — lottery, first, 858.
 — Mathison, John, forgeries of, 951.
 — new site chosen for the, 932.
 — new subscription of, 1708, 857.
 Bank of England note, form of, 573.
 — opposition to the, 779.
 — pamphlets on the, 855.
 — Paterson, William, the founder of the, 773, 779.
 — Price, Charles, forgeries by, 948.
 — purchase South Sea annuities, 929.
 — review of the, 855.
 — rate of interest, 1859-1861, 100.
 — run on the, 859, 930.
 — South Sea Company, rivalry with the, 869.
 — statistics, 231.
 — stratagem to meet the run on the, 936.
 — suspension of the, 849.
 — Tench, Nathaniel, one of the earliest directors of, 855.
 — throw out the paper of Lane, Son & Fraser, 959.
 — try to ruin Messrs. Child, 937.
 — unclaimed dividends, 958.
 — Wilkes, during the attack by the mob on the, 946.
 Bank of France, 1852-1860, 117, 375, 451.
 — plan for the relief of, 383.
 — statistics, 231, 798.
 Bank of Mutual Redemption, Boston, 748.
 — New-York, origin of, 665.
 — North America, origin of, 692.
 — U. S. in New-York, 671, 682.
 — the Commonwealth, N. Y., 694.
 — the Republic, N. Y., 693.
 — the State of N. Y., origin of, 677.
 — the Union, N. Y., 694.
 — the U. S., expiration of charter, 669.
 — 1816-1836, 682.
 — in New-York, 681, 688.
 — plan for, 662.
 — officer on government demand notes, 401.
 — officers, changes among, 556.
 — deaths of, 80, 320, 400, 480, 550, 656, 752, 832.
 — notaries of 1832, 676.
 — presidents, changes among, 77.
 — shares, New-York, 34, 681, 966.
 — stocks, price of N. Y., 34, 382.
 — in 1837-38, 680.
 — fluctuations in Boston, 33.
 — suspensions, 811.
 — swindlers, how they live, 104.
 Bankers, card from Boston, 366.
 — checks, the law of, 536.
 — private, changes among, 475, 557.
 Banking, history of, N. Y. City, 665.
 — laws, Illinois, 351.
 — Massachusetts, 926.
 — Minnesota, 17.
 — Missouri, 25.
 — Pennsylvania, 925.

- Bankruptcy case, the great leather, 42.
 Banks, joint-stock, of London, statistics of, 799.
 — semi-annual report, 1861, 258.
 — Massachusetts, 637.
 — New-York, aid to the Treasury by, 164.
 — New-York City, 622.
 — movements of, while under suspension, 809.
 — overtrading of, effects of, 1.
 Bank statistics:
 United States, 796, 1000.
 Maine, 790, 976.
 New-Hampshire, 977.
 Vermont, 978.
 Massachusetts, 792, 979.
 Boston, 65, 152, 225, 313, 380, 389, 791, 980.
 Rhode Island, 66, 155, 981.
 Connecticut, 982.
 New-York State, 4, 224, 467, 787, 984.
 New-York City, 4, 65, 152, 164, 224, 226, 312, 388, 462, 787, 987.
 New-Jersey, 789, 988.
 Pennsylvania, 925, 989.
 Philadelphia, 66, 153, 226, 311, 387, 990.
 Pittsburg, 66, 151, 225.
 Delaware, 990.
 Maryland, 797, 990.
 District of Columbia, 991.
 Virginia, 991.
 North Carolina, 992.
 South Carolina, 230, 993.
 Georgia, 993.
 Alabama, 994.
 Florida, 994.
 Illinois, 451, 994.
 Indiana, 154, 230, 386, 928, 994.
 Iowa, 311, 995.
 Kentucky, 228, 229, 231, 995.
 Louisiana, 996.
 New-Orleans, 67, 227, 996.
 Michigan, 997.
 Minnesota, 997.
 Missouri, 997.
 Nebraska, 998.
 Ohio, 387, 789, 998.
 Tennessee, 999.
 Wisconsin, 737, 1000.
 Canada, 605.
 Baring, F., on paper money, 6.
 Barker, Jacob, and Fitz Greene Halleck, 672.
 Barrera, history, &c., of gems and jewels, 51.
 Belgium, finances of, 256.
 Belles-lettres of banking, 548.
 Biddle, N., on the ill effects of paper money, 6.
 Bills of credit, 571.
 — form of, 573.
 Bills of exchange in Illinois, new law of, 351.
 Bonnefoux, considerations on national finances, 417, 518.
 Boston, banks of, 791, 905, 980.
 — bankers on the new loan, 366.
 — fluctuations of bank shares in, 33, 297.
 — loans to the government, 164.
 — population and taxation in, 535.
 — stock market, 33, 296.
 — Treasury note committee, 292.
 Bowery Bank, N. Y., 690, 701.
 Bowery Savings Bank, N. Y., 677.
 Brazil, government currency in, 358.
 Bremen, rate of exchange on, 317.
 British peerage, mortality of the, 67.
 — Columbia, gold product of, 364, 846.
 Brooklyn Bank, N. Y., 677.
 Bull's Head Bank, 696.
 Bullion Bank, N. Y., directors of the, 703.
 Bullion and coinage of Great Britain, 304.
 — United States, 304.
 — statistics of, 55, 112.
 — trade of the world, 363.
 Burke, Edmund, on public credit, 10.
 Burton, J. H., on political economy, 94.
 Butchers and Drovers' Bank, N. Y., 676.
 California bonds, fluctuations in, 79, 150, 159, 171, 238, 294, 319, 384, 399, 492, 559, 739, 752, 831, 901, 911.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Calhoun, J. C., on paper money, 6.
 Canada, banks of, 605.
 — loan to, guaranteed by England, 12.
 Cashiers, alphabetical list of, in U. S., 608.
 Causes of bank failures, (on the,) 1.
 Central Bank, N. Y., 694.
 Chamber of Commerce, New-York, arbitration committee of, 921.
 Chamber of Commerce, N. Y., on the assay office, 494.
 — report on taxation, 913.
 Chatham Bank, N. Y., origin of, 692.
 Charleston banks, resolution of, 72.
 Chelsea Bank, N. Y., 688.
 Chemical Bank, N. Y., origin of the, 673.
 Chase, S. P., appeal to the people for a loan, 290.
 Chevalier, on gold and silver, 134.
 Citizens' Bank, N. Y., origin of, 692.
 City Bank and Trust Co., 688.
 City Exchange Bank, N. Y., 688.
 City Bank, N. Y., origin of, 670.
 Clearing-house, N. Y., officers of the, 374.
 — origin of, 695.
 — and the U. S. Treasury, 164, 809, 923.
 Clinton Bank, N. Y., 688.

- Coal Co. shares, N. Y., 35, 150, 171, 384, 492, 559, 911.
- Coffee, duty on, 1789-1860, 15.
- Coinage, early, of America, 454.
- of Massachusetts, 241.
- of Maryland, 246.
- history of American, 241, 321.
- of Great Britain, 56.
- of florins, 56.
- of the colonies, 242.
- early, 332.
- Coin and bullion, exports of, from the United States, 64.
- Coins and bullion, statistics of, 55, 64.
- — exports of, 64.
- — premium on, 1837, 679.
- Coins, coinage and bullion, 49, 287, 493, 840.
- Commercial Bank, N. Y., 677.
- Commercial Code of France on stock brokers, 119.
- Confederacy, (Southern,) currency of, 650.
- Confederation, early coinage of the, 251, 321.
- Connecticut, banks of, 982.
- early coinage of, 253, 455.
- postal statistics of, 587.
- Consols, fluctuations in 1860, 13, 69, 148, 173, 175, 302, 373.
- Constitution, (the,) and the currency, 401.
- Continental Bank, N. Y., 694.
- Copper coinage, early, 249.
- first, in United States, 329.
- Corn Exchange Bank, 694.
- Counterfeits, American, of Turkish money, 223.
- Credit, evils from extending, 378.
- Crowns, coinage of, 56.
- Currency, Hamer Stansfeld's views of the, 47.
- Currency, Mr. Jas. Gallatin on the, 625.
- new pamphlets on the, 547.
- free trade in, 95.
- of Great Britain, 376.
- of Ohio, 41.
- obligations of the government as to the, 96.
- plan for a national, 589.
- pamphlets on the, 547.
- of Treasury notes, 11, 497.
- by Secretary Crawford, 12.
- by Secretary Dallas, 11.
- by Secretary Woodbury, 13.
- by Secretary Spencer, 14.
- by Charles Gould, 660.
- by James Gallatin, 627.
- Dallas, A. J.**, on Treasury notes, 11.
- Dantzic, Pawnbrokers' Bank of, 200.
- Decimal coinage in Denmark, 307.
- Delaware, banks of, 990.
- Delaware, postal statistics of, 587.
- and Hudson Canal Co., 673, 687.
- Diamond market, (the,) 461.
- Discount, probable reduction in the rate of, 348.
- District of Columbia, banks of, 991.
- Double-eagles, first coinage of, 328.
- Duties of bank clerks, 635.
- Ear-rings**, origin of, 53.
- Early mines and coinage of America, 454.
- East River Bank, N. Y., 692, 701.
- Economy, political and social, 94.
- Empire City Bank, N. Y., 693.
- English money market, 69, 148, 174, 302, 369.
- England, a few plain words to, and her manufacturers, 742.
- expenditure out of revenue paid into the exchequer of, 735.
- foreign loans in, guaranteed by the government, 22.
- great frauds of late years in, 298.
- imperial crown of, 377.
- Kossuth notes case in, 177, 310.
- net amount of revenue of, 734.
- English railway capital, 373.
- Entz's suggestions to savings banks, 267.
- Exchanges, foreign rates of, during year 1861, 736.
- Exchequer bills, new plan for, 46.
- fluctuations in, year 1860, 13.
- new, 263.
- Excise licenses in Great Britain, 563, 728.
- Europe, gold and silver in, 113.
- direct and indirect taxes in, 565.
- armies of, 1860, 360.
- taxation in, 561.
- Finance**, A. Hamilton on, 9.
- Finances, consideration on national, 518.
- of Belgium, 256.
- revenues and taxation of the United States, 705.
- Financial crisis in Russia, 641.
- policy of the government, 417.
- review, foreign, 800.
- review of the year 1861, 481.
- scheme for the government, 657.
- Fire Insurance Co.'s of New-York, annual statements of, 88.
- Florida, banks of, 994.
- postal statistics of, 587.
- Foreign items, 232.
- Florins, coinage of, in England, 56.
- Foreign loans in England guaranteed by the British government, 22.
- in London, 240.
- exchange, New-York, 1861, 736.
- in 1837-8, 680.
- Forger, history of a, 512.

- Francis' Bank of England, 753, 849, 929.
 France, army statistics of, 360.
 — bank of, 117, 375.
 — commercial reform in, 128.
 — defalcations in, 28.
 — direct taxes in, 126.
 — life insurance in, 214.
 — maritime ports of, 131.
 — financial and commercial system of,
 post-office in, 128. [124.
 — specie movements of, 60.
 — public works of, 129.
 — railways of, 131.
 — mines of, 132.
 — old silver coins in, 288.
 — railway speculation, in 1859, 343.
 — small coin in, 363.
 — taxation in, 561.
 Franklin Bank, N. Y., origin of the, 672.
 Frauds of late years in England, 298.
 Free bank law of N. Y., first banks, 687.
 Free letter delivery, advantages of, 581.
 French bank law, 383.
 — brokers, M. About on, 118.
 Fulton Bank, New-York, origin of, 673.
- Gallatin, (J.),** on the currency, 625.
 Gems and jewels; their history, geography, chemistry and ana, 51.
 Georgia, banks of, 993.
 — bonds of, 35, 150, 171, 238, 294, 384, 492, 739, 901.
 — early coinage of, 458.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Gold and paper, 571.
 — and silver coin and bullion, 362, 456.
 — exports and imports, England, 112.
 — prices of, 1837-8, 679.
 — and silver, movements of, in England, 60.
 — export to Europe, 78.
 — the production of, 134.
 — production of, in Australia, 381.
 — and the exchanges, 105.
 — in circulation in England, 56.
 — on the Saskatchewan, 289.
 — on the natural dissemination of, 362.
 — *versus* paper in the U. S., 571.
 Gould, (C.), financial scheme for the government, 657.
 Government demand notes, objections to,
 finances, 540. [353.
 — financial policy of the, 417.
 — — scheme for the, 657.
 — taxation, new scheme, 915.
 — Treasury notes and bank paper, 401.
 — loan of 1861, 161.
 — Treasury notes for circulation, 358.
 — obligations as to the currency, 96.
 — army statistics of, 361.
 Great Britain, currency of, 376.
 — Great Britain, excise licenses in, 728.
 — — national debt of, 1691-1860, 81.
 — — imperial crown of, 377.
 — — guarantee of foreign loans by, 22.
 — — expenditures of, 16 years, 735.
 — — estimated amount of money in, 55.
 — — exchequer bills of, 13, 46, 263.
 — — coinage of, 56, 289, 304, 846.
 — — on the foreign exchanges with, 105.
 — — recent bank frauds in, 298.
 — — public revenue of, 38.
 — — finances of, 722.
 — — railways of, 373.
 — — savings banks of, 795.
 — — failures in 1861, 805.
 — — currency of, 403.
 — — shipments of specie from, 60, 112,
 money market of, 173. [304, 576.
 — — revenue of, 16 years, 734.
 — — stamps in, 722, 728.
 — — wealth of, 86.
 — — taxable incomes in, 347.
 — — taxation, excise and stamps in, 728.
 Greece, loan to, guarant'd by England, 12.
 Greenwich Bank, N. Y., origin of, 675.
 Grocers' Bank, N. Y., origin of, 692.
- Hamburg,** exchange on, New-York,
 78, 148, 559, 736, 751.
 — — London, 109, 174, 239, 302, 373.
 Hamilton, Alex., on paper currency, 7, 405.
 — on public debt, 9.
 — principles of finance, 9.
 Hanover Bank, N. Y., origin of, 692.
 Hebrews regarded as compulsory bankers,
 755.
 Hickcox, history of American coinage,
 History of a forger, 512. [241, 321.
 — gems and jewels, 51.
 — the Mont de Piété, 193.
 Hudson River Bank, N. Y., 688.
 Hume on the lending of money, 755.
- Illegal Bank Notes,** law of 1824,
 673.
 Illinois currency—what is it? 450.
 — banks of, 741, 994.
 — new bank laws in, 351, 539, 797, 826.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Importers and Traders' Bank, N. Y., 39,
 697.
 Income tax, by J. R. McCulloch, 279.
 Indiana, banks of, 154, 230, 386, 928, 999.
 — Bank of the State of, 928.
 — proposed suspension in, 352.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 — State loans, fluctuations in value, 35,
 150, 171, 238, 294, 384, 492, 739,
 901.
 Interest, rates of, in London, 30 years, 701.
 Ireland, bank circulation and specie, 403.

- Irving Bank, New-York, origin of, 692.
 Insolvent Bank of Deposit in London, 549.
 Institute of Actuaries, London, 671.
 Island City Bank, 694, 701.
 Iowa, banks of, 311, 995.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Ireland, discovery of gold in, 493.
- Jamaica**, loan to, guaranteed by Eng-
 land, 12.
- Japanese coins, report on, 121.
 Jefferson, Thos., on paper money, 7.
 Jourdan on the foreign exchanges, 105.
 Journal des Debats on the currency, 451.
- Kentucky**, banks of, 228, 231, 995.
 — bank legislation in, 393.
 — bonds of, 79, 159, 319, 399, 559, 752,
 831, 911.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Knickerbocker Bank, N. Y., 692.
 Kossuth's note case in England, 177, 310.
- Lafayette Bank**, N. Y., 677.
 Law of bank deposits, 921.
 Law of bankers' checks, 536.
 Leather bankruptcy case in London, 42.
 Leather Manufacturers' Bank, origin of,
 676.
- Legal Miscellany**:
 Bank deposits, 927.
 Bills of credit, 416.
 Bills of exchange, 213.
 Cashiers' drafts, 536.
 Georgia bank bills, 234.
 Immunity of ambassadors, 213.
 International law, 177.
 Kossuth note case, 177.
 Paper currency, 177, 645.
 Stolen bonds, 101.
 What is money? 186.
- Legal tender**, 643.
 Life Ins. Co.'s, annual statements of, 91.
 — in France, 214.
 Loaners' assoc. in N. Y., charter of, 208.
 Lock, a wonderful, 643.
 London, a new joint-stock bank, 642, 908.
 — bank frauds in, 257.
 — failures in, 1861, 805.
 — insolvent bank of deposit in, 549.
 — joint-stock banks, semi-annual re-
 port, 1861, 258.
 — foreign loans in, 240.
 — stock market for the year 1860, 23.
 — exchange on, each week, 1861, 736.
 — exchange on, at N. Y., 78, 158, 239,
 751.
 — rate of discount in, 348.
 — Times on the bankruptcy cases, 42.
 — and Westminster Bank, 260, 264.
 Louisiana, adoption of Confederate notes
 in, 393.
- Louisiana, banks of, 996.
 — bank suspension in, 393.
 — bonds of, 79, 159, 319, 399, 559, 752,
 831, 911.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Madison, Jas.**, on paper money, 7.
 Maine, banks of, 790, 907, 976.
 — cashier, a, on the duties of bank
 clerks, 633.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Manhattan Bank, origin of the, 666.
 Manufacturers and Merchants' Bank, 702.
 Manufacturers, a few plain words to Eng-
 land's, 742.
- Maryland, banks of, 797, 907, 990.
 — early coinage of, 246, 460.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Marine Ins. Co.'s, N. Y., annual state-
 ment, 87.
- Marine Bank, New-York, 694.
 Market Bank, New-York, 693, 921.
 Massachusetts, bank statistics of, 792.
 — banks, 637, 979.
 — dividends of, 30, 380, 794, 905.
 — early coinage of, 241, 255, 454.
 — manufacturing companies of, 30.
 — bank decisions in, 536.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 — savings banks of, 795.
 — usury law, 926.
- McCulloch, J. R., on paper money, 7.
 — on income tax, 279.
- Mechanics' Banking Association, 702.
 Mechanics and Traders' Bank, N. O., re-
 pudiation by, 76.
 — New-York, origin of, 675.
- Mechanics' Bank, N. Y., charter of, 669,
 696.
- Merchants' Bank, N. Y., origin of, 667.
 Mercantile Bank, New-York, 691.
- Merchants' Exchange Bank, N. Y., origin
 of, 676.
- Merchants' Banking Co., N. Y., 688.
- Michigan, banks of, 997.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Metropolitan Bank, New-York, 693.
- Miles, Pliny, on our postal system, 577.
- Minnesota, banking law of, 17.
 — banks of, 997.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Mint of the United States, 121, 829.
 — report of, 122.
 — first locality of, 331.
 — branches established, 331.
- Mires, defalcation of, 28.
 — the banker, adventures of, 338.
- Miscellaneous, 644, 740.
- Mississippi, banks of, 997.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Missouri, bank law of, 1861, 24.
 — banks of, 235, 997.

- Missouri, bonds of, 35, 79, 150, 238, 319, 399, 559, 752, 831, 901.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Money market, English, 69, 148, 174, 302, 369, 975.
 — New-York, 78, 158, 237, 317, 397, 477, 558, 653, 751, 830, 909, 973.
 Mont de Piété, Paris, defalcation in, 266.
 — description of the, 193.
 Morris Canal and Banking Company, 674.
 Mortality of the British Peerage, 67.
- Nassau Bank**, New-York, 693.
 National bank and national finances, 518.
 — New-York, origin of, 676.
 National currency, plan for a, 589.
 National finances, considerations on the, 518.
 National loan of 1861, 161, 290.
 — list of agents for, 308.
 National taxation and revenue, 561, 913.
 Newark Banking Co., charter of, 667.
 Nebraska, banks of, 998.
 Necklaces, origin of, 53.
 New-Hampshire, banks of, 977.
 — early coinage of, 249.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 New-Jersey, banks of, 789, 988.
 — early coinage of, 254.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 — new bank law of, 969.
 New-Orleans, banks of, 67, 227.
 — repudiation in, 75.
 New pamphlets on the currency, 547.
 New-York State, banks of, 4, 224, 467, 647, 787, 906, 984.
 — banks of 1837, 676.
 — Dry Dock Bank, origin of, 673.
 — banks of, in 1837, 678, 684.
 — free banks, origin of, 687.
 — foreign commerce of, 745.
 — rail-roads of, 92.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 — savings banks of, 902.
 New-York city, bank dividends in, 646.
 — bank presidents and cashiers of, 623, 987.
 — Banking Company, 688.
 — banks of, 65, 152, 224, 226, 312, 388, 462, 787, 665, 906, 923.
 — resolutions of, 647, 923.
 — bank shares, 34, 681, 966.
 — bank notaries of, 623, 676.
 — Chamber of Commerce, memorial of, 494.
 — Clearing House, 374, 923.
 — County Bank, 697.
 — finances of, 603.
 — Dry Dock Company, 673.
 — Exchange Bank, 692.
 — foreign exchange in, 1837, 680.
- New-York City Fire Ins. Co.'s annual statement, 88.
 — fluctuations of stocks in, 31.
 — Life Ins. Co.'s annual statement, 91.
 — loaners association, charter of, 208.
 — loans to the government, 164, 237.
 — Lombard Association of, 674.
 — Marine Ins. Co.'s annual statem't, 87.
 — message of the Mayor of, 603.
 — real and personal property of, 700.
 — specie movements for 1861, 576.
 — stock exchange, 385.
 — Sub-Treasury, 924.
 New-Zealand, loan to, guaranteed by England, 22.
 — gold in, 847.
 North American Trust and Banking Co., 681, 688.
 North American Bank, N. Y., 689.
 North Carolina, banks of, 992.
 — stay law, 97.
 — early coinage of, 248, 458.
 — bonds, 35, 79, 150, 171, 294, 384, 492, 739, 831, 911.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 North Bank, N. Y., 687.
 North River Bank, N. Y., 672, 678, 701.
 North River Banking Co., 688, 689.
 Numismatic Society, London, proceedings of, 49, 847.
 — Boston, proceedings of, 50, 287, 493, 848.
- Ocean Bank**, N. Y., origin of, 690.
 Ohio, banks of, 387, 789, 998.
 — bonds of, 79, 159, 319, 399, 559, 752, 831, 911.
 — on the suspension of specie payments, 352.
 — debate on the currency of, 41.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Oregon, gold discoveries in, 840.
 Oriental Bank, New-York, 694.
 Overstone on the currency, 147.
- Pacific Bank**, New-York, the, 692.
 Paper money, on the evil effects of, 6.
 — the law of, 188.
 Paris budget, the, 636.
 Paris stock exchange, 118.
 — brokers, 119.
 — exchange, 78, 148, 736, 751.
 — on London, 109, 174, 302.
 Park Bank, New-York, origin of, 698.
 Pawnbrokers' Bank, of Dantzic, 200.
 Pawnbrokers of Paris, 193.
 Peerage, mortality of, 67.
 Pennsylvania, banks of, 925, 989.
 — Bank of the United States, 686.
 — bonds of, 79, 159, 319, 399, 559, 752, 831, 911.

- Pennsylvania, postal statistics of, 587.
 — early coinage of, 459.
 People's Bank, New-York, 692.
 Phenix Bank, New-York, origin of, 670.
 Philadelphia, banks of, 66, 153, 226, 311, 387, 990.
 — bank directors, list of, 552.
 Pittsburg, banks of, 66, 151, 225.
 Poet and the banker, 390.
 Political and social economy, 94.
 Population and taxation in Boston, 535.
 — of the U. S. and territories, 606.
 Population, slave, of the U. S., 607.
 Post-office as a savings bank, 57.
 Postal system, our, 577.
 Price, J. M., on stock values, 817.
 Private bankers, 156, 236, 316, 396, 556, 652, 750, 971.
 Prussia, army statistics of, 360.
 Public credit, Burke on, 10.
 — debt, Hamilton on, 9.
 — United States, amount of, 8.
- Quicksilver in California**, 842.
- Rail-roads**, monthly earnings for June, 1861, 173.
 — of the State of New-York, 92.
 — shares, New-York, 35, 80, 150, 171, 238, 318, 384, 560, 739, 752, 831, 912.
 — shares in 1837-8, 680.
 Railway capital, English, 373.
 — speculation in France, 343.
 — shares in England, fluctuations, 23, 173, 373.
 — shares in Boston, 33.
 Redpath, Leopold, failure of, 300.
 Rhode Island, banks of, 66, 981.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 — resolutions by banks of, 648.
 Robson, W. J., fraud of, 299.
 Royal British Bank, fraud of, 299.
 Russia, army statistics of, 360.
 — financial crises in, 641.
- Sadlier**, fraud of Sir John, 299.
 Savings banks of Great Britain, statistics of the, 795.
 — of Massachusetts, 795.
 — of New-York, 902.
 — improvements proposed, 267.
 — reports of, 286.
 — the post-office as a, 57.
 Scotland, circulation of, 403.
 Seamen's Bank for Savings, origin of, 675.
 Secession currency, 828.
 Seventh Ward Bank, New-York, 677.
 Shop bills, an act restraining, 927.
 Slave population of the United States, 607.
 South Carolina, banks of, 230, 993.
 — early coinage of, 248, 459.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Southern bank convention, 71.
 — act to reduce capital of, 27.
 — currency, new, 650, 828.
 Spain, a history of a map of, 642.
 — coins of colonies, 244.
 Specie, last century, transmission of, 45.
 — movement for 1861, at N. Y., 576.
 — reserves, results of neglect of, 2.
 — shipments of, from Gt. Britain, 576.
 Spooner on the currency, 413.
 Shillings, number of coined, 56.
 Shoe and Leather Bank, New-York, 693.
 St. Nicholas Bank, New-York, 693.
 Silver, early coinage of, 61.
 — purchased by the mint, 814.
 — exports and imports of, 60, 64.
 — early use of, 460.
 — production of, in United States, 63.
 — on the price of, 105, 115.
 — ores, duty on, 842.
 Stamps in Great Britain, 563, 728.
 Stansfeld's, Hamer, views of the currency, 47.
- Statistical Society, London, proceedings of, 105.
 Stay laws of 1861, 97. [of, 105].
 State bills of credit, 416.
 States, the ups and downs of, 621.
 Statistics of wages, 379.
 Stock exchange, the, Paris, 118.
 — New-York, 385.
 Stock market, Boston, 33, 296.
 — of London, for the year 1860, 23, 173.
 — New-York, 31, 35, 150, 171, 294, 384, 468, 492, 624, 739, 822, 900, 974.
 — values, 817.
 — New-York, fluctuations in, 35.
 — comparative value of, 817.
 St. Louis banks, loan to Gen. Fremont, 235.
 Stolen bonds, the law as to, 101.
 Streatfield, Lawrence & Co., bankruptcy
 Suffolk Bank, New-York, 693. [of, 42].
 Sugar trade of the United States, 882.
 — duties on, 1789-1860, 15.
- Taxation**, the true grounds for, 561.
 — excise and stamps in G't Britain, 728.
 — in Boston, 535.
 — new scheme of government, 913.
 Taxes on income, suggestions as to, 279.
 Tea consumed, 1801-'60, 565.
 Tenth Ward Bank, N. Y., 688.
 Texas, postal statistics of, 587.
 Tennessee bonds, 79, 150, 159, 171, 238, 294, 319, 384, 399, 492, 559, 739, 752, 831, 901, 911.
 Tennessee, banks of, 999.
 — bank convention of, 71.
 — repudiation act of, 75.
 Tradesmen's Bank, N. Y., new building for, 39.
 Tradesmen's Bank, origin of, 673.

- Treasure trove, 55.
 Treasury loan of October, 1861, 366.
 — of July, 1861, 219.
 — note, a new, 807.
 — act, 813.
 — notes, a currency of, 497.
 — an act to restrain printing of shop bills, &c., similar to, 927.
 — Dallas on, 11.
 — Sub, New-York, 924.
 — the policy of, 571.
 — notes, Secretary Crawford on, 12.
 — Secretary Dallas on, 11.
 — Secretary Spencer on, 14.
 — Secretary Woodbury on, 13.
 Turkey loan guaranteed by England, 12.
- Uniform letter postage**, advantage of, 583.
 Union Bank, N. Y., origin of, 669.
 United States, bank statistics of, 976.
 — Bank of the, 662, 669, 682, 688.
 — assay office, N. Y., 55, 494.
 — bank note currency of the, 5.
 — cashiers in, 608.
 — census of, 742.
 — loan, act of July 17, 1861, 219.
 — coinage of, 304.
 — financial credit of, 705.
 — finances of, 8.
 — revenues and taxation, 705.
 — loans, 509, 964.
 — loans of, fluctuations in value, 35, 79.
 — loan of August, 1861, 161, 964.
 — Secretary Chase on, 540.
 — mint, 121, 829.
 United States, revenue system of, 713.
 — representation of, 743.
- United States, national loan act of the, July 17, 1861, 219.
 — agents for loans, 308.
 — Pennsylvania Bank of the, 686.
 — postal system of, 577.
 — public debt of the, 8, 365, 510, 545, 812.
 — relative position of each, 621.
 — slave population of the, 607.
 Usury law of Massachusetts, 926.
 — laws, proposed modifications of the, [833].
- Vermont**, banks of, 978.
 — early coinage of, 251.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Virginia**, banks of, 828, 991.
 — bank convention in, 233.
 — early coinage of, 248.
 — bonds, 79, 150, 159, 171, 238, 294, 319, 384, 399, 492, 559, 739, 752, 831, 901, 911.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
- Wages**, statistics of, 379.
 Walker, Amasa, on bank currency, 407.
 War taxes of 1812-1815, 563.
 Watts, Walter, fraud of, 298.
 Washington Bank, N. Y., 688.
 Waugh, Colonel, fraud of, 301.
 West Indies, loans to, guaranteed by England, 12.
 What is money? 186, 450. [land, 12].
 Wisconsin, banks of, 737, 1000.
 — postal statistics of, 587.
 Wool Growers' Bank, N. Y., 687.
- Year 1861**, review of, 481, 800.
 — failures in, 805.
 — stock fluctuations of, 806.

ENGRAVING.

VIEW OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

64.

THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

VOL. XI. NEW SERIES.

JULY, 1861.

No. 1.

THE CAUSES OF BANK FAILURE.

- I. *Overtrading.* II. *Neglect of Specie Reserves.* III. *Further Legislative Restraints Necessary.* IV. *Official Reports of the Albany Banks.*

It requires only a cursory glance at the official reports of the banks of the city of Albany to show what were the grounds of the recent suspension of four of them. It was clearly overtrading. An excessive desire of gain and to make large dividends led them to overtask their powers; to extend their circulation too widely, and to encourage speculation on the part of their customers by an undue expansion of loans. The first result of these imprudencies was to curtail their specie to an infinitesimal point; the second was either bankruptcy or winding up. Similar results will inevitably follow similar positions and overtrading. Such management may for a few years be followed by apparent prosperity; large deposits may be secured, whereby extra loans may be granted; a large circulation at distant points may be temporarily gained; large dividends may be declared by means of excessive loans and through violation of a sound rule, which prescribes the maintenance of a large reserve fund by banking institutions. But a day of reckoning **MUST COME** sooner or later. Violations of sound rules of banking, or of sound rules of health, can rarely be committed with impunity. We now see that the four banks that have closed their doors were all badly managed. With a capital of only \$1,576,000, they had deposits and circulation amounting to two and a half millions, all payable on demand; while they had together only **FORTY-ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS** of specie, or less than one and three-quarters per cent., to meet these heavy cash liabilities.

At Buffalo, or Rochester, or Utica, or any other large interior town, such

a state of things would be dangerous; but at Albany, which assumes to be a sort of central point for the country banks, and acting for the redemption of over twenty millions of dollars, this expansion is highly censurable. Bank officers and bank directors, in the management of such institutions, assume a highly important agency in behalf of their stockholders and depositors. The extent of liability incurred to the public demands extreme caution, and *at all times* ample cash funds to meet cases of emergency. Every community and all moneyed institutions are liable to such emergencies. The domestic exchanges sometimes peril the existence of banks in one or more localities, while the foreign exchanges will occasionally (as in 1857) endanger the banks of the whole country.

With a full knowledge of these dangers, it is the obvious duty of bank directors, in justice to their stockholders and to their depositors, to pursue a conservative policy, looking to stability and consistency more than to large profits for shareholders.

Every day's additional experience points more strongly to the urgent need of additional legislative restraints upon banking institutions. The revulsions of 1857, and of other years, were clearly traceable to overtrading; to an undue straining for large dividends. New-York city bankers have at length become convinced of this, and now seek, by voluntary association and by future legislation, to COMPEL a reserve of specie in each city bank equivalent to twenty-five per cent. of its cash liabilities; and by country banks at least ten per cent.

Had the Albany banks adopted this course, it is obvious that they would now be in a comparatively safer condition. With ten millions of cash liabilities to the community, they held only two hundred and twelve thousand dollars in gold and silver; barely enough for one day's unfavorable exchanges.

With the suspended banks the exhibit was extremely unfavorable. The Bank of the Capitol, for instance, had over \$800,000 cash liabilities, professing to be the financial agent of numerous banks of the interior towns; yet held less than ten thousand dollars in specie to meet balances of \$374,000 due them, and \$348,000 due individual depositors. This is obviously the result of gross negligence and wilful mismanagement; and the directors and shareholders are properly liable for any deficiency of assets to meet the aggregate liabilities to the public.

These severe lessons will not serve to correct similar abuses existing among other country banks; nothing but stringent legislation will ensure better results and more caution. Sound legislation will demand that in cases where there are ten millions of cash liabilities, there shall be *at least* two millions (or twenty per cent.) of cash assets. And by cash assets we mean that which the constitution designates as gold and silver.

We present for the consideration of our country friends an analysis of the liabilities and assets of the eleven banks of the city of Albany on the 16th March, 1861, when their last quarterly reports were made public.

This analysis presents not only curious, but extraordinary, features; and we hope will serve as a timely caution to their cotemporaries, as well as to those that have averted the recent storm.

It is true that the four banks named had, in March last, balances due them from other banks amounting to \$479,000; but these balances were obviously too remote to be used in cases of emergency.

CONDITION OF THE BANKS OF THE CITY OF ALBANY, NEW-YORK, MARCH 16, 1861.

	Capital.	Net Profits.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.	Due State.	Other Liabilities.	Total Liabilities.	Due from Directors.
Albany Exchange Bank,.....	\$311,100 ..	\$ 7,029 ..	\$ 65,583 ..	\$ 467,886 ..	\$ 40,843 ..	\$ 5,284	\$ 897,125 ..	\$ 83,764 ..
Albany City Bank,.....	500,000 ..	251,548 ..	121,371 ..	323,955 ..	610,138 ..	83,821 ..	\$ 168,592 ..	2,050,805 ..	161,568 ..
Commercial Bank,.....	500,000 ..	93,812 ..	157,469 ..	658,288 ..	105,794 ..	888,917 ..	2,778 ..	2,406,483 ..	59,355 ..
Mechanics and Farmers' Bank,.....	350,000 ..	135,956 ..	103,935 ..	1,170,956 ..	177,484 ..	104,857	2,043,188 ..	110,159 ..
Merchants' Bank,.....	400,000 ..	26,174 ..	75,846 ..	211,776 ..	417,794 ..	13,098	1,144,648 ..	96,521 ..
New-York State Bank,.....	350,000 ..	101,800 ..	37,211 ..	210,580 ..	640,916 ..	95,816 ..	304 ..	1,436,627 ..	111,553 ..
Union Bank,.....	500,000 ..	37,990 ..	73,034 ..	290,006 ..	16,463 ..	91,542	1,009,035 ..	62,926 ..
BANK OF ALBANY,.....	504,960 ..	42,442 ..	65,673 ..	274,449 ..	52,903 ..	97,487	1,037,864 ..	22,571 ..
BANK OF THE CAPITOL,.....	519,600 ..	30,001 ..	73,449 ..	348,108 ..	374,868 ..	12,486	1,858,512 ..	99,681 ..
BANK OF THE INTERIOR,.....	251,550 ..	29,798 ..	280,155 ..	100,740 ..	296,194 ..	102,960	1,031,327 ..	31,880 ..
NATIONAL BANK,.....	300,000 ..	11,007 ..	64,150 ..	208,747 ..	104,438 ..	85,011 ..	116,221 ..	889,574 ..	111,171 ..
Four suspended banks,.....	\$1,576,110 ..	\$ 113,248 ..	\$ 453,427 ..	\$ 982,044 ..	\$ 828,333 ..	\$ 297,894 ..	\$ 116,221 ..	\$ 4,317,277
Seven others,.....	2,911,100 ..	633,809 ..	634,399 ..	3,333,392 ..	2,008,862 ..	1,238,295 ..	171,644 ..	10,996,501
Total,.....	\$4,487,210 ..	\$ 767,057 ..	\$ 1,087,826 ..	\$ 4,265,436 ..	\$ 2,587,195 ..	\$ 1,651,189 ..	\$ 287,865 ..	\$ 15,813,778

	Loans.	Stocks.	Mortgages.	Real Estate.	Over Drafts.	Due from Banks.	Specie.	Cash Items.	Bills.
Albany Exchange Bank,.....	\$500,510 ..	\$ 123,371 ..	\$ 15,500 ..	\$ 84,000 ..	\$ 51 ..	\$ 175,514 ..	\$ 18,608 ..	\$ 25,511 ..	\$ 3,760 ..
Albany City Bank,.....	1,021,777 ..	51,135 ..	5,000 ..	60,898 ..	2,639 ..	803,445 ..	36,489 ..	46,479 ..	31,583 ..
Commercial Bank,.....	1,341,633 ..	229,803	56,615 ..	1,556 ..	674,381 ..	84,261 ..	49,630 ..	18,604 ..
Mechanics and Farmers' Bank,.....	1,227,820 ..	200,000 ..	48,995 ..	66,880 ..	562 ..	383,079 ..	29,476 ..	84,015 ..	2,361 ..
Merchants' Bank,.....	828,980 ..	95,909	849 ..	133,703 ..	12,723 ..	39,784 ..	32,700 ..
New-York State Bank,.....	1,026,227 ..	105,071 ..	405 ..	27,888 ..	732 ..	195,206 ..	26,075 ..	46,321 ..	8,732 ..
Union Bank,.....	779,718 ..	92,345 ..	1,500 ..	35,000 ..	4,447 ..	75,762 ..	12,418 ..	5,806 ..	2,039 ..
BANK OF ALBANY,.....	702,004 ..	91,250	53,392 ..	4,744 ..	111,607 ..	15,102 ..	56,102 ..	3,663 ..
BANK OF THE CAPITOL,.....	1,042,532 ..	106,591	363 ..	168,612 ..	9,312 ..	24,463 ..	6,624 ..
BANK OF THE INTERIOR,.....	526,234 ..	231,175	160 ..	150,111 ..	11,797 ..	36,220 ..	25,630 ..
NATIONAL BANK,.....	633,338 ..	90,931 ..	19,375 ..	35,135 ..	10,630 ..	49,480 ..	5,751 ..	20,874 ..	3,410 ..
Four suspended banks,.....	\$2,924,728 ..	\$ 569,947 ..	\$ 19,375 ..	\$ 88,577 ..	\$ 15,892 ..	\$ 479,811 ..	\$ 41,962 ..	\$ 137,659 ..	\$ 39,326 ..
Seven others,.....	6,726,965 ..	897,684 ..	71,400 ..	281,251 ..	10,836 ..	2,441,089 ..	170,050 ..	297,546 ..	99,730 ..
Total resources,.....	\$9,651,693 ..	\$1,467,581 ..	\$ 90,775 ..	\$ 869,828 ..	\$ 26,733 ..	\$ 2,920,900 ..	\$ 212,012 ..	\$ 485,205 ..	\$ 139,056 ..

The following table represents the aggregate liabilities and assets of the banks of the State of New-York, according to their quarterly reports, March, 1861, compared with the returns made June, 1859, and June, 1856; also those of the banks of the city and of the interior, according to their quarterly statements, March, 1861:

LIABILITIES.	MARCH 16, 1861.			June, 1859.	June, 1856.
	55 <i>City Banks of New-York.</i>	252 <i>Country Banks.</i>	307 <i>Total State of New-York.</i>	<i>Banks of the State of New-York.</i>	<i>Banks of the State of New-York.</i>
Capital,	\$ 69,914,745 ..	\$ 41,840,746 ..	\$ 111,755,491 ..	\$ 110,605,776 ..	\$ 92,334,172
Net Profits,	7,710,314 ..	5,218,878 ..	12,929,192 ..	13,524,418 ..	12,945,901
Circulation,	8,245,413 ..	19,582,552 ..	27,827,965 ..	26,759,915 ..	30,705,084
Deposits,	84,205,661 ..	33,192,750 ..	117,398,411 ..	99,597,772 ..	96,267,287
Due Banks,	28,219,677 ..	5,787,633 ..	34,007,310 ..	31,598,623 ..	30,762,327
Due State of N. Y.,	253,670 ..	2,355,756 ..	2,609,426 ..	1,439,980 ..	2,254,421
Other Liabilities,	429,184 ..	1,250,149 ..	1,679,333 ..	1,643,320 ..	2,191,812
Total Liabilities,	\$ 198,978,664 ..	\$ 109,228,464 ..	\$ 308,207,128 ..	\$ 285,164,804 ..	\$ 268,461,004
RESOURCES.	55 <i>City Banks.</i>	252 <i>Country Banks.</i>	Total, March, 1861.	Total, June, 1859.	Total, June, 1856.
Loans,	\$ 117,069,553 ..	\$ 69,061,047 ..	\$ 186,130,600 ..	\$ 185,027,449 ..	\$ 174,141,775
Stocks,	13,738,787 ..	16,641,532 ..	30,380,319 ..	26,934,786 ..	23,511,223
Bonds and Mortgages, ..	556,067 ..	6,839,351 ..	7,395,418 ..	8,104,474 ..	8,381,501
Real Estate,	6,408,373 ..	2,564,450 ..	8,967,823 ..	8,481,879 ..	6,724,163
Overdrafts,	63,229 ..	298,982 ..	362,211 ..	369,455 ..	498,978
Due from Banks,	5,574,230 ..	9,037,726 ..	14,611,956 ..	13,158,254 ..	12,255,098
Specie,	37,458,539 ..	1,770,746 ..	39,229,285 ..	22,207,782 ..	18,510,835
Cash Items,	16,640,160 ..	1,474,680 ..	18,114,840 ..	18,616,577 ..	21,350,329
Bills of other Banks, ...	1,474,726 ..	1,539,950 ..	3,014,676 ..	2,264,148 ..	3,087,102
Total Resources,	\$ 198,978,664 ..	\$ 109,228,464 ..	\$ 308,207,128 ..	\$ 285,164,804 ..	\$ 268,461,004

CONDITION OF THE ALBANY AND OTHER COUNTRY BANKS.

LIABILITIES.	Four <i>Albany Banks failed.</i>	Seven <i>Albany Banks.</i>	Total <i>Albany Banks.</i>	241 <i>other Country Banks.</i>	Total, 252 <i>Country Banks.</i>
Capital,	\$ 1,576,110 ..	\$ 2,911,100 ..	\$ 4,487,210 ..	\$ 37,353,536 ..	\$ 41,840,746
Net Profits,	113,248 ..	653,809 ..	767,057 ..	4,451,821 ..	5,218,878
Circulation,	453,427 ..	634,399 ..	1,087,826 ..	18,494,726 ..	19,582,552
Deposits,	932,044 ..	3,333,392 ..	4,265,436 ..	28,927,314 ..	33,192,750
Due Banks,	828,333 ..	2,008,862 ..	2,837,195 ..	2,950,438 ..	5,787,633
Due State of N. Y.,	297,894 ..	1,283,295 ..	1,581,189 ..	774,567 ..	2,355,756
Other Liabilities,	116,221 ..	171,644 ..	287,865 ..	962,284 ..	1,250,149
Total Liabilities,	\$ 4,317,277 ..	\$ 10,996,501 ..	\$ 15,313,778 ..	\$ 93,914,686 ..	\$ 109,228,464
RESOURCES.					
Loans,	\$ 2,924,728 ..	\$ 6,726,965 ..	\$ 9,651,693 ..	\$ 59,409,354 ..	\$ 69,061,047
Stocks,	569,947 ..	897,634 ..	1,467,581 ..	15,173,951 ..	16,641,532
Bonds and Mortgages, ..	19,375 ..	71,400 ..	90,775 ..	6,748,576 ..	6,839,351
Real Estate,	88,577 ..	251,251 ..	339,828 ..	2,194,622 ..	2,564,450
Overdrafts,	15,892 ..	10,836 ..	26,728 ..	272,254 ..	298,982
Due from Banks,	479,811 ..	2,441,089 ..	2,920,900 ..	6,116,826 ..	9,037,726
Specie,	41,962 ..	170,050 ..	212,012 ..	1,558,734 ..	1,770,746
Cash Items,	137,659 ..	297,546 ..	435,205 ..	1,039,475 ..	1,474,680
Bills of other Banks,	39,326 ..	99,739 ..	139,065 ..	1,400,894 ..	1,539,950
Total Resources,	\$ 4,317,277 ..	\$ 10,996,501 ..	\$ 15,313,778 ..	\$ 93,914,686 ..	\$ 109,228,464

In order to exhibit the comparative condition, in March last, of the four suspended banks of Albany, and of the remainder, with those of the

interior towns of the State, we have compiled the preceding summary for future reference.

A radical change in the banking system is demanded in this and particularly in Western States. Massachusetts wisely prescribes a limit of loans to the extent of one hundred per cent. beyond the capital of each bank. This effectually excludes the mushroom concerns which in New-York are dignified by the name of banks, but which have a *bona fide* capital of fifty thousand dollars or less.

THE BANK NOTE CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE recent course of events in the States of Illinois, Wisconsin and Missouri has demonstrated, more strongly than ever, the insecurity of the bank note currency of those States and of other States where bank notes are issued upon the basis of State bonds.

The aggregate bank notes issued by the banks in the United States was reported last year as about two hundred and forty-eight millions of dollars, with a specie reserve of about forty per cent. of this sum. (See *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, October, 1860, p. 258.) A large portion of this paper has been issued upon the basis of State bonds, which at all periods are fluctuating in their market values, and large portions of which, recently, have fallen to rates ranging from 34 to 50 cents per dollar.

The banks, generally, are not called upon by statute to maintain a specie reserve of any sum. It is left entirely at their option, in nearly all the States, to keep on hand, for the redemption of such paper, any sum they please, in gold or silver. The free banking system unfortunately creates inducements for an excessive issue of paper money, the profits from which, in good times, are large; and the community is thus encumbered with a currency rarely convertible into gold, on demand, at par.

The results of the recent depreciation of State bonds are shown in the failures of numerous banks in the States of Illinois and Wisconsin. Their paper no longer circulates among the people, and a heavy loss is thus entailed upon the holders, and also upon the stockholders of the banks, whose securities, in the shape of State bonds, are voluntarily or by compulsion thrown upon the market for sale.

This paper, indeed, should never have had a legal circulation. The State has unconstitutionally made this paper a circulating medium, and it has never been equivalent to par, or convertible into gold and silver, without loss, since the bank laws were passed. The constitutional provision that gold and silver only should be a legal tender is thus evaded; and although every man has the right to refuse such paper in payment of debts, yet the State, by its passage of bank and currency laws, in a measure forces this irredeemable paper upon the community.

England and France, on the other hand, create a paper currency which answers all the ends of its creation, and gives unquestioned

security to the holder of bank bills. The paper of the Bank of England is made a legal tender in England, thus giving ample security to the note holder as long as the government stands.

The bank paper of the several States is unfortunately based upon an unsound foundation. Instead of being issued to meet the legitimate wants of the community, in its ordinary exchanges, it has been created as a source of individual profit to the makers. This inducement to overissue should not be allowed to exist. The community should not be exposed to the losses arising from the injudicious speculations and overtrading of those who have a sort of legal authority to create fictitious paper. We shall never have, in this country, a sound and convertible bank circulation until the government takes the control of the currency, deprives it of all source of individual profit, and stamps upon it the seal of government guarantee.

This is demanded by the ample experience of the past, and by the sound opinions of the most able of our public men and public writers. The constitution provides that "Congress only shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," and that no State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, or make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; yet the paper currency, issued in virtue of State laws, is, in fact, tantamount to bills of credit.

Mr. NICHOLAS BIDDLE, a banker of long experience, acknowledged in 1828, that, "The constant tendency of banks [of issue] is to lend too much, and to put too many notes in circulation."

Mr. CALHOUN, as early as 1816, said: "We have in lieu of gold and silver a paper medium, unequally but generally depreciated, which affects the trade and industry of the nation; which paralyzes the national arm; which SULLIES THE FAITH, both public and private, of the United States."

Mr. FRANCIS BARING, of London, whose judgment is entitled to consideration, said: "I consider the opinion entertained by some, that the bank ought to regulate its issues by the public demand, as DANGEROUS IN THE EXTREME."

Mr. J. R. McCULLOCH examined our paper system, concluding that it was "at present THE MOST GIGANTIC ABUSE by which an intelligent people ever permitted themselves to be DISGRACED and OPPRESSED."

He further said: "The enacting of security [other than the precious metals] from the issuers of paper, would not obviate fluctuations in its amount and value, and could not, therefore, place the currency on a proper footing . . . All LOCAL issues of paper money should be suppressed."

Mr. VAN BUREN, in his message of 1837, following the democratic expansion of the banking system, said: "The history of trade in the United States for the last three or four years affords the most convincing evidence that our present condition is chiefly to be attributed to over action in all the departments of business; an over action deriving, perhaps, its first impulses from antecedent causes, but stimulated to its destructive consequences BY EXCESSIVE ISSUES OF BANK PAPER."

Mr. NATHAN APPLETON, of Boston, a forcible writer, said in 1857: "It is a TREMENDOUS POWER, that of increasing or diminishing the circulating medium of the whole country. It is a deep responsibility, and demands

sound discretion and much wisdom in its regulation. Unfortunately there appears to be no unity of action, NO CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE in the management of this power."

Mr. THEODORE PARKER remarked in reference to the abuses of paper money: "We have tried to make that money which is NO MONEY We wonder that SPECIE does not stay in the land; it is because we think PAPER MONEY is just as good, and France and England do NOT. It rains gold, and we hold our dish bottom upwards—of course it is empty."

We have before recorded the views of Mr. WILSON G. HUNT, whose views are sound, and who said: (BANKERS' MAGAZINE, 1858:) "We want something beyond the power of man to control; some system that is self-adjusting, with checks and balances that will not interfere with the reasonable profits of banking, secure to us A CURRENCY AT ALL TIMES REDEEMABLE IN SPECIE, WITHOUT LOSS TO THE PUBLIC. . . . What has been, may be expected to occur again; and as long as the present system be in existence, we shall be subjected to the calamities of 1837 and 1857."

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, in his financial writings, says, that "the emitting of paper money is wisely prohibited to the State governments."

Mr. JEFFERSON appreciated fully the losses resulting from paper money and said: "Paper money by breaking up the measure of value, makes a lottery of all private property. . . . Shall we ever be able to put a CONSTITUTIONAL VETO upon it?"

Mr. MADISON, in his annual message of December 5, 1815, said: "It is essential to every modification of the finances that the benefits of AN UNIFORM NATIONAL CURRENCY should be restored to the community."

Of the ability of the United States Treasury to manage a government currency, no one conversant with the practical details of that department entertains a doubt. It should be based upon the prospective resources of the country, and at all times convertible into coin.

Mr. JOHN C. CALHOUN, in 1816, said: "There has been an extraordinary revolution in the currency of the country. By a sort of under current, THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE THE MONEY OF THE COUNTRY has caved in, and upon its ruin has sprung up those institutions which now exercise the right of MAKING MONEY in and for the United States."

Mr. TOOKE, the statician, very properly urged that, "In every civilized country, supplying and regulating the circulating medium are functions of the sovereign prerogative."

The *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in its article on *Paper Money*, says: "We must make an end of a plurality of issuers. If one body only were intrusted with the issue of notes, it would be able immediately to narrow the currency when bullion began to be exported, and to expand it when it began to be imported, and it would be easy for the legislature to lay down and enforce such regulations as would effectually prevent the fluctuations in the amount and value of the currency. * * * But nothing of the sort need be attempted so long as it is supplied by more than one source; and it will certainly happen in time to come, as it has invariably happened in time past, that some of them will be increasing their issues when they should be diminished, and diminishing them when they should be increased."

THE FINANCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

I. *Existing Public Debt.* II. *Additional Sources of Revenue.* III. *Debt per Capita, 1816 and 1861.* IV. *Direct Taxes.* V. *Duties on Tea, Coffee and Sugar.* VI. *British and American Taxation Compared.* VII. *Treasury Notes.* VIII. *Opinions of Secretaries HAMILTON, DALLAS, CRAWFORD, WOODBURY and SPENCER.*

THE domestic war expenses of the country, for the present year, will probably exceed those of any former year in its history. The daily expenses at this time are estimated at half a million of dollars, adding, for the present calendar year, about one hundred and thirty-five millions to the previous debt of the United States, which, on 30th June last, was \$64,769,703 08, viz.: \$45,079,203 08 funded debt; \$19,690,500 treasury notes. Hence the necessity that the government shall avail itself of all possible sources of revenue to meet the exigencies of the Treasury. These sources are—1st. Government loans. 2d. Government treasury notes. 3d. Tariff on tea, sugar, coffee, &c. 4th. Direct taxes.

The new six per cent. loan of May, 1861, was taken at 85 @ 90 by capitalists of New-York and other cities. It is thought that, under the present aspects of our foreign trade, without any demand for the export of gold and silver, our banks and capitalists will be able to take forty or fifty millions more of government loans during the year.

The following is an official statement of the amount of the public debt of the United States on the 7th March, 1861:

LOAN.	Rate.	Under what Act.	Redeemable.	Amount.
1842,....	6 per cent., ..	April 15, 1842, ..	Dec. 31, 1862, ..	\$2,883,364 11
1846,....	6 per cent., ..	July 22, 1846, ..	On demand, ..	1,000 00
1847,....	6 per cent., ..	Jan. 28, 1847, ..	Jan. 1, 1868, ..	9,415,250 00
1848,....	6 per cent., ..	Mar. 15, 1848, ..	July 1, 1868, ..	8,908,341 80
1858,....	5 per cent., ..	June 14, 1858, ..	Jan. 1, 1874, ..	20,000,000 00
1860,....	5 per cent., ..	June 22, 1860, ..	Jan. 1, 1871, ..	7,022,000 00
1861,....	6 per cent., ..	Feb. 8, 1861, ..	Dec. 31, 1880, ..	8,006,000 00
Texan indemnity,.....		Sept. 9, 1850, ..	Jan. 1, 1865, ..	3,461,000 00
Texas debt,.....			On demand, ..	181,813 19
Old funded and unfunded debt,.....			On demand, ..	114,118 54
Treasury notes issued under acts prior to 1857,..			On demand, ..	104,811 64
“ under act of Dec. 23, 1857,.....			One y'r after date, ..	4,876,700 00
“ “ “ Dec. 17, 1860,.....			One y'r after date, ..	10,010,900 00
Total,.....				\$74,985,299 28

The available funds in the Treasury, on the 7th of March, when Mr. CHASE assumed the duties of his department, were \$1,716,844; and on the 25th they amounted to \$1,554,780 43; showing a decrease of \$162,063 in eighteen days.

The aggregate debt of the government, in 1816, was \$123,491,000, when the population was less than nine millions, (instead of thirty mil-

lions, as at present,) or less than fourteen dollars *per capita*. That debt was extinguished in less than twenty years, besides the creation of a surplus of \$37,468,859; now the population is officially reported at 31,676,217, and the average debt *per capita*, allowing for extravagant estimates of public expenditures for the current year, will scarcely reach SIX DOLLARS. If the public debt, *per capita*, were the same now as in the year 1816, it would amount, in the aggregate, to four hundred and fifty millions of dollars—a sum which it is not likely to reach in three years, with all the heavy expenditure belonging to a condition of war.

We must not forget that the outlay, although heavy, is not a direct loss to the country. These vast millions that have been expended, and will further be expended, will remain in the country and circulate among the people—there being no drain of gold to foreign countries.

The necessity of maintaining the public credit will readily appear to every mind; and to accomplish this, even with the rapidly accumulating debt of the year, the patriotism of the people, *en masse*, must be exhibited. We can refer with pride to the financial lessons inculcated as early as 1790 by General HAMILTON, who, then at the head of the treasury, urged "*these plain and undeniable truths*."

"That exigencies are to be expected to occur, in the affairs of nations, in which there will be a necessity for borrowing:

"That loans, in times of public danger, especially from foreign war, are found an indispensable resource, even to the wealthiest of them:

"And that, in a country which, like this, is possessed of but little active wealth, or, in other words, little moneyed capital, the necessity for that resource must, in such emergencies, be proportionally urgent. And as, on the one hand, the necessity for borrowing, in particular emergencies, cannot be doubted, so, on the other, it is equally evident that, to be able to borrow upon good terms, it is essential that the credit of a nation should be well established.

"For, when the credit of a country is in any degree questionable, it never fails to give an extravagant premium, in one shape or another, upon all the loans it has occasion to make.* Nor does the evil end here; the same disadvantage must be sustained upon whatever is to be bought on terms of future payment. From this constant necessity of borrowing and buying dear, it is easy to conceive how immensely the expenses of a nation, in a course of time, will be augmented by an unsound state of the public credit.

"To attempt to enumerate the complicated variety of mischiefs in the whole system of the social economy, which proceed from a neglect of the maxims that uphold public credit, and justify the solicitude manifested by the House on this point, would be an improper intrusion on their time and patience.

"In so strong a light, nevertheless, do they appear to the Secretary, that, on their due observance, at the present critical juncture, materially depend, in his judgment, the individual and aggregate prosperity of the citizens of the United States; their relief from the embarrassments they now experience; their character as a people; the cause of good government.

"If the maintenance of public credit, then, be truly so important, the next inquiry which suggests itself is, by what means is it to be effected? The ready answer to which question is, by good faith; by a punctual performance of contracts. States, like individuals, who observe their engagements, are respected and trusted, while the reverse is the fate of those who pursue an opposite conduct."

The people will in 1861 promptly respond to the appeals of the government for financial contributions. The latter may be called upon to pay seven or eight per cent., or more, for such loans, as in 1812-1815, but the

* This observation applies with peculiar force to the public credit of Southern States at present.

rate is a matter of small importance; the people have to bear the burden, first and last. It is now a question of NATIONAL EXISTENCE, and the most vigorous exertions must be used to sustain the national administration.

General HAMILTON urged principles of finance as sound in 1790 as in the year 1860, and maintained that the public debt, in its transfer from hand to hand, WAS A PART OF THE CURRENCY. He said, as early as 1790:

"But there is a consequence of this, less obvious, though not less true, in which every other citizen is interested. It is a well-known fact, that in countries in which the national debt is properly funded, and an object of established confidence, *it answers most of the purposes of money. Transfers of stock or public debt are there equivalent to payments in specie; or, in other words, stock, in the principal transactions of business, passes current as specie.* The same thing would, in all probability, happen here, under the like circumstances."

But General HAMILTON, at the same time, insisted on the creation of a revenue to meet the annual interest on such debt, and its final extinction. He said that he

"Ardently wished to see it incorporated, as a fundamental maxim, in the system of public credit of the United States, that *the creation of debt should always be accompanied with the means of extinguishment.* This he regards as the true secret for rendering public credit immortal; and he presumes that it is difficult to conceive a situation in which there may not be an adherence to the maxim."

"The revenue of the State is the State," said Mr. BURKE; "IN EFFECT, ALL DEPEND UPON IT, WHETHER FOR SUPPORT OR REFORMATION, as all great qualities of the mind, which operate in public, are not merely suffering and passive, but require force for their display—I had almost said, for their unequivocal existence. The revenue, which is the spring of all, becomes, in its administration, the sphere of every active virtue; public virtue being of a nature magnificent and splendid, instituted for great things and conversant about great concerns, requires abundant scope and room, and cannot spread and grow under confinement, and in circumstances narrow and sordid. *Through the revenue alone the body politic can act in its true genius and character, and therefore it will display just as much of its collective virtue as it is possessed of a JUST REVENUE.*"

The government should avail itself of the opportunity now presented of creating a national currency of treasury notes. A circulation of these could be readily maintained to the amount of thirty millions of dollars, or exceeding one-half of the government revenue of the year. An issue of two hundred millions was made by the Continental Congress, when the population was less than two millions, and when there was no specie in the country to support it. Now, in view of the wants of the treasury, and of the need of a national circulation with which to accomplish the heavy expenditures of the country, a government issue of treasury notes, to the extent of thirty millions, not exceeding *one dollar per head*, could be easily and profitably maintained. The treasury would need in specie only one-fourth of this sum to keep them at par throughout the country, and to redeem them, on demand, as fast as presented. The banking institutions of the country, offering less security, are able to keep four or five dollars in circulation with only one dollar of coin to bills issued.

It has been lately asserted, as a novel position, that bank deposits form a part of the currency of the country. This observation applies with force to the large cities. In New-York, for instance, the *daily payments* by drafts upon deposits have exceeded, for some years, the specie

on hand. Secretary DALLAS, in 1815, urged the adoption of treasury notes, when he said:

"The power of the government to supply and maintain a paper medium of exchange *will not be questioned; but for the introduction of that medium there must be an adequate motive.* The sole motive for issuing treasury notes has hitherto been to raise money in anticipation of the revenue."

By the act of February 24, 1815, the seven per cent. stock was created. Treasury notes, not to exceed \$25,000,000, were authorized to be issued. *Such of the notes as were of a denomination of less than \$100 bore no interest;* the holders were allowed to present them at any time, in sums not less \$100, to the treasury of the United States, or to any commissioner of loans, and to receive therefor the amount in certificates of funded stock, bearing an interest of seven per cent. per annum, payable quarterly.

In virtue of said act, the six per cent. treasury note stock was created. Such of the treasury notes as were of a denomination of \$100 or upwards, bore an interest of $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum. The holders were allowed to present them, and to receive certificates of funded stock in amount equal to that of the notes presented, (including the interest due,) bearing an interest of six per cent. per annum, payable quarterly. The seven and six per cent. stocks, created by exchange of treasury notes, might be reimbursable at any time after December 31, 1824. In the same year, the six per cent. stock of 1815 was created by act of March 3, 1815. The President was authorized to borrow a sum not exceeding \$18,452,800. Such treasury notes as had been issued before the passage of this act, and were charged upon the sinking fund, were receivable in payment of subscriptions to this loan. This stock was reimbursable at any time after 31st December, 1815. The sum of \$9,745,745 53 of the six per cent. stock of 1815, was issued at the following rates:

\$8,341,283 77 at 95 per cent.,.....	\$ 7,924,219 59
1,085,851 08 " 96 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1,047,846 30
33,998 44 " 97 "	32,978 49
280,612 24 " 98 "	275,000 00
4,000 00 " par,.....	4,000 00
<hr/>	<hr/>
\$ 9,745,745 53	\$ 9,284,044 38

The war with Great Britain in 1812 gave rise to the treasury note system, and was followed in 1837—1843 and 1846, &c., by similar issues. Between the years 1812 and 1821, and 1837 and 1843, the government raised eighty-four millions by treasury notes and ninety-eight millions by loans, viz:

YEARS.	From loans.	Treasury notes.	TOTAL.	YEARS.	From loans.	Treasury notes.	TOTAL.
1812..	\$ 10,002,400 ..	\$ 2,835,500 ..	\$ 12,837,900	1821..	\$ 5,000,000 ..	\$ 324 ..	\$ 5,000,324
1813..	20,080,635 ..	6,094,800 ..	26,184,435	1837..	2,992,989 ..	2,992,989
1814..	15,080,546 ..	8,297,365 ..	23,377,911	1838..	12,716,820 ..	12,716,820
1815..	14,857,423 ..	20,406,897 ..	35,264,320	1839..	3,857,276 ..	3,857,276
1816..	1,357,586 ..	8,186,849 ..	9,494,435	1840..	5,589,547 ..	5,589,547
1817..	734,542 ..	734,542	1841..	5,665,756 ..	7,993,560 ..	13,659,316
1818..	8,765 ..	8,765	1842..	11,883,405 ..	3,425,329 ..	14,808,734
1819..	2,291 ..	2,291	1843..	11,883,358 ..	1,518,150 ..	13,401,508
1820..	3,040,000 ..	824 ..	3,040,824				
					\$ 98,360,109	\$ 84,611,828	\$ 182,971,947

The disadvantages and the lamentable results of an irredeemable currency were as obvious in the year 1820 as they are now. Secretary CRAWFORD, in that year, said in his "Report on the Currency:"

"The convertibility of bank notes into specie is becoming real wherever it is ostensible. If public opinion does not correct the evil in those States where this convertibility is not even ostensible, it will be the imperious duty of those who are invested with the power of correction to apply the appropriate remedy. * * *

"But the federal government has, by its measures, in some degree contributed to the spirit of speculation and of adventurous enterprise which at this moment so strongly characterize the citizens of this republic. The system of credit, which, in the infancy of our commerce, was indispensable to its prosperity, if not to its existence, has been extended at a period when the dictates of sound discretion seemed to require that it should be shortened. The credit given upon the sale of the national domain has diffused this spirit of speculation and of inordinate enterprise among the great mass of our citizens. The public lands are purchased, and splendid towns erected upon them, with bank credits. Every thing is artificial. The rich inhabitant of the commercial cities, and the tenant of the forests, differ only in the object of their pursuit. Whether commerce, splendid mansions or public lands be the object of desire, the means by which the gratification is to be secured are bank credits. * * *

"In all great exigencies which, in the course of human events, may be expected to arise in every nation, *the suspension of payment by banks, where the circulation consists principally of bank notes, is one of the evils which ought to be considered as the inevitable consequence of their establishment.*

"It has already been said that every attempt which has been made to introduce a paper currency has failed. It may also be said, that of all the systems, during the discussion of this interesting subject, both in Europe and the United States, which have been proposed, none are free from objection. It is possible that no system can be devised which will be entirely free from objection. To insure the possibility of employing such a currency with advantage, it is necessary—

- "1. That the power of the government over the currency be absolutely sovereign.
- "2. That its stability be above suspicion.
- "3. That its justice, morality and intelligence be unquestionable.
- "4. That the issue of the currency be made not only to depend upon the demand for it, but that an equivalent be actually received.
- "5. That an equivalent can only be found in the delivery of an equal amount of gold or silver, or of public stock.

"6. That whenever, from any cause, it may become redundant, it may be funded at an interest a fraction below that which was surrendered at its issue. * * *

"As a paper currency is issued upon the national credit, the whole property of the nation is pledged for its redemption, whenever, by any circumstance, it may become the interest of the community that it should be redeemed. It is, therefore, manifest that it should not issue upon the credit of any individual, or association of individuals. A part can never be equal to the whole. The credit of any individual, or association of individuals, cannot be equivalent to that of the nation of which they form a part. But it may be said that although the credit of individuals is not equivalent to the credit of the nation, yet an equivalent for a particular portion of that credit may be found in the pledge or mortgage of property of equal or greater value than the currency issued upon it. This may be true; but the value of property has been continually fluctuating; it will continue to fluctuate, after giving to the advocates of a paper currency full credit for the superior stability which they suppose will attend its substitution for gold and silver as the standard of value. But this is not the only objection to the acceptance of property as a pledge for the payment, by individuals, of an equivalent for the paper currency which may be advanced upon such pledge. Frauds will be practiced by pledging property which is incumbered, which it would be extremely difficult to detect. The government will be involved in endless litigation with individuals who are interested in the incumbrances by which its right to the property pledged is embarrassed. In such contests the interest of the government is always endangered, even where right is

on its side. It is not qualified to enter into such litigations with an equal chance of success. The feelings of the community are always, except in flagrant cases of fraud, upon the side of an individual supposed to be struggling with the overwhelming influence of authority. Besides, in all contests of this nature, something of the respect for the government which ought to be cherished by the citizen, especially of a free State, will be lost. The situation is invidious, and ought not voluntarily to be assumed by a government jealous of its dignity and purity of character. It is, therefore, believed that a national currency cannot be issued with safety, with a reasonable prospect of success, and with sufficient security against redundancy, but in exchange for gold and silver of a definite standard, or for the public stock at certain fixed rates. When issued in exchange for them, and for them alone, there is, though not the same, yet perhaps an equal security against redundancy, as in the case of a metallic currency. When it is issued in exchange for coin, there is no addition made to the currency. When it is issued in exchange for public stock, commanding previously to the exchange its par value in coin, the party who acquires the currency parts with that which was equal to specie, and is deprived of the annual interest which it produced. Unless the interest of the currency, resulting from its scarcity, should exceed that paid upon the stock, it would not be demanded in exchange for the stock. In either case, the danger of redundancy is extremely remote. By the exchange of specie for currency the active capital of the country will be increased to the amount of the currency; and the capacity of the nation to redeem it, whenever it shall by any circumstance whatever become expedient, will be unquestionable. *

"If these views be correct, the only obstacles to the establishment of a paper currency, by a government having a sovereign right to establish it, is the danger of the instability and want of integrity and intelligence of the government. There is, certainly, just reason to apprehend that emergencies may arise in the affairs of every nation in which their stability may be menaced by foreign force or DOMESTIC INSURRECTION. In such an event a panic might ensue, and the credit of the currency be utterly annihilated."

Secretary WOODBURY, in his report to Congress, December, 1837, also urged the adoption of treasury notes. He recommended—

"That a limited power be granted to issue treasury notes for mere temporary purposes, in cases of deficiencies, when no such surpluses exist; and to redeem them as excesses may happen. Besides other obvious reasons in favor of such a provision, it would enable the department to administer the finances with at least two or three millions less in the treasury, at any one time, than would otherwise be necessary. In fixing the system on a durable basis, the grant of both these powers seems expedient, as a provident arrangement, whatever course may at any future time be pursued in regard to the recall of the present large deposits placed by the general government with the States."

Mr. WOODBURY was also urgent for a more substantial banking currency. He further said:

"Nothing more seems to be necessary to perpetuate the present healthy action of the currency, except a rigid adherence to the system of policy which, by honest and resolute efforts, has produced the improvement. It cannot but be wise, in respect to the circulating medium, for the general government to persevere in a course which prepared the country better to meet and quickly carried it through so fearful a crisis. It would seem prudent, likewise, for the States, profiting by past experience, to insist on reform in their banking institutions, and particularly on greater self-denial in their business, BY IMPOSING ADDITIONAL CHECKS ON OVER-ISSUES and stronger limitations to excessive discounts. The present system, if unchecked, has inherent defects of an alarming character; and, without indulging in timid misgivings or unjust suspicions, it may be said to tend, by its expansions and inevitable contractions, to unsettle frequently the value of labor, as well as of the whole property of the country."

The views on banking in 1840 were more sound than have prevailed in 1850–1860.

"But, independent of that, no changes in the present system, as to banks, seem worthy of strenuous exertions, except those whose direct object shall be to make safer, to restrict, control and regulate better the institutions that already exist, rather than to incorporate more. Above all, should public efforts be directed to strengthen the certainty of prompt specie payments as to all notes out, and of a nearer approach to uniformity in the amount of issues in similar states of trade, and of specie on hand, instead of multiplying them for speculation or cupidity, and thus keeping up a succession of expansions and contractions, which will only inflame the existing disorders, and render the continuance of great fluctuations in all public as well as private affairs unavoidable, endless and ruinous."

Mr. JOHN C. SPENCER, at the head of the treasury, also urged the adoption of treasury notes for currency.

"To prevent treasury notes being made a bank investment, (the amount was to be five millions,) they were issued at one-tenth of one per cent, or one mill per cent. interest, of denominations of fifty dollars or upwards, to be payable on demand, in specie, in the city of New-York, and to be receivable for all public dues."

Direct Taxes.—In the year 1816, with a population of less than nine millions, the government receipts amounted to the large sum of fifty-seven millions of dollars, of which were—

From customs,.....	\$36,000,000
" direct taxes,.....	11,470,000
" public loans and treasury notes,.....	9,494,000

In 1790, Secretary HAMILTON recommended a tax of ten to twenty-five cents per gallon on distilled spirits, and a levy upon each still to the extent of sixty cents for each gallon of capacity, a duty upon green tea, twenty-four cents per pound; Hyson, forty cents, &c.

The Tariff.—However obnoxious such a step may be to the masses, it may yet be necessary to levy again taxes upon coffee, as by all the tariffs from 1790 up to 1828; to be removed hereafter (as in 1828) whenever the public revenues shall have reduced materially the public debt. Five cents per pound were readily paid from 1797 to 1828. The same duty now would realize on the annual consumption of coffee, (an average of 215 millions of pounds from 1851 to 1860,) over \$9,000,000.

According to the Chamber of Commerce Report for 1860-61, (p. 321,) the consumption of tea in the United States is about thirty millions of pounds annually, or an average of nearly one pound per head.

In Great Britain the consumption is officially reported at seventy million pounds per annum. The duties collected on this single article in that country for the past ten years exceed five millions sterling annually. This, too, in a time of comparative peace. Apply the same tax in this country and it will produce one-half of this sum, or (in round numbers) twelve millions of dollars annually. This looks like an enormous tax upon the people; but it is at most only for the year about forty cents per head of the whole population; and we have no doubt it would be readily paid by tea drinkers.

Another prolific source of revenue in England is from the duty on sugar, amounting to six millions sterling annually. The duty levied by the United States in 1859-1860 was 24 per cent. *ad valorem*, which, upon an aggregate importation of \$30,000,000, produced here a little

exceeding seven millions of dollars. Let us compare the leading items of custom duty :

	Great Britain, 1860.			United States, 1860.
Sugar,	£ 6,094,000	or	\$ 30,470,000 *\$ 7,000,000
Tobacco,	5,674,000	..	28,370,000 1,800,000
Tea,	5,444,000	..	27,220,000 1,600
Coffee,	445,000	..	2,225,000 1,700
Spirits,	2,531,000	..	12,655,000
Wines,	1,174,000	..	5,870,000 1,432,000
All others,	1,803,000	..	9,015,000 42,952,210
Total,	£ 23,165,000	..	\$ 115,825,000 \$ 53,187,510

Put the duty on foreign sugar up to three cents per pound, as in 1816—1828, (two cents less than in 1797—1804,) and it will produce on the same consumption, as in the year 1860, for instance, (300,000 tons, or six hundred and seventy million pounds,) \$20,100,000.

The following summary† will show the extraordinary fluctuations in the custom-house duties, levied by the various United States tariffs, on the articles of sugar and coffee :

Coffee.		Sugar.		Coffee.		Sugar.	
1789, ...	2½ cts. per lb.	..	1 ct. per lb.	1824, ...	5 cents.	..	3 cts. per lb.
1790, ...	4 “	..	1½ “	1828, ...	5 “	..	3 “
1792, ...	4 “	..	1½ “	1832, ...	Free.	..	2½ “
1794, ...	4 “	..	1½ “	1841, ...	“	..	20 per cent.
1797, ...	5 “	..	2½ “	1842, ...	“	..	2½ cents.
1804, ...	5 “	..	2½ “	1846, ...	“	..	30 per cent.
1812, †	10 per cent.	..	5 “	1857, ...	“	..	24 “
1816, ...	5 cents.	..	3 “	1861, ...	“	..	¾ ct. per lb.

The additional revenue derivable from fresh duties, from direct taxes, &c., may be estimated at over seventy-five millions of dollars. The ordinary consumption of coffee in this country is 180 million pounds per year; tea, 30 million pounds; sugar, 930 millions of pounds, which would produce—

Coffee, 180,000,000 lbs., at 4 cents duty,	\$ 7,200,000
Tea, 30,000,000 lbs., at 20 “ “	6,000,000
Foreign sugar, 670,000,000 lbs., at 3 cents duty,	20,100,000
Direct taxes, ¼ per cent., on \$11,000,000,000 real and personal property in free States,	27,500,000
Other customs duties,	33,200,000
Add treasury note circulation payable on demand,	30,000,000

The general government has a valid claim upon the individual States for twenty-eight \$ millions of dollars deposited with them in the year 1837, viz. :

* In Secretary Cobb's last annual report the amount of sugar duties for the past year was reported at \$6,943,479. (P. 406.) In another page it was reported at \$7,459,681. (P. 432.)

† *Merchants' Magazine*, May, 1861, p. 564.

‡ Duties all doubled.

§ This is in addition to \$15,000,000 paid for the purchase of Louisiana, and \$5,000,000 for the cession.

In the free States,.....	\$ 25,489,020 39
In the seceded States,.....	11,979,839 58
	<hr/>
	37,468,859 97
Deduct one fourth, not paid,.....	9,367,214 99
	<hr/>
	\$ 28,101,644 98

We do not urge that these claims be now pressed upon the individual States. They (or the free States) are now expending their millions in behalf of the general government, and the current expenditures of the existing rebellion; but the debt is nevertheless a valid one. These deposits were made with the several States in the following sums:

Virginia,.....	\$ 2,931,237 34	Rhode Island,.....	\$ 892,115 71
North Carolina,.....	1,911,676 53	Connecticut,.....	1,019,560 81
South Carolina,.....	1,401,896 12	New-York,.....	5,352,694 28
Georgia,.....	1,401,896 12	New-Jersey,.....	1,019,560 81
Alabama,.....	892,115 71	Pennsylvania,.....	3,823,353 06
Mississippi,.....	509,780 41	Delaware,.....	382,335 31
Louisiana,.....	637,225 51	Maryland,.....	1,274,451 02
Tennessee,.....	1,911,676 53	Missouri,.....	509,780 41
Arkansas,.....	382,335 31	Kentucky,.....	1,911,676 53
	<hr/>	Ohio,.....	2,676,347 14
	\$ 11,979,839 58	Indiana,.....	1,147,005 92
Maine,.....	1,274,451 02	Illinois,.....	637,225 51
New-Hampshire,.....	892,115 71	Michigan,.....	382,335 31
Vermont,.....	1,784,231 43		<hr/>
Massachusetts,.....	509,780 41		\$ 25,489,020 39

The "Bill to Regulate the Deposits of the Public Money," which was passed by Congress in June, 1836, contains the following enactment relating to the surplus revenue:

"That the money which shall be in the treasury of the United States on the 1st day of January, 1837, reserving the sum of \$5,000,000, shall be deposited with the several States, in proportion to their respective representation in the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, which shall by law authorize their treasurer, or other competent authorities, to receive the same on the terms hereinafter specified; and the Secretary of the Treasury shall deliver the same to such treasurer, or other competent authorities, in such form as may be prescribed by the secretary aforesaid, which certificates shall express the usual and legal obligations of common depositories of the public money, for the safe keeping and repayment thereof, and shall pledge the faith of the State receiving the same to pay the said moneys, and every part thereof, from time to time, whenever the same shall be required by the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of defraying any wants of the public treasury beyond the amount of the five millions aforesaid.

"Provided, That if any State declines to receive its proportion of the surplus aforesaid, on the terms before named, the same may, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, be deposited with the other States agreeing to accept the same in deposit.

"And provided further, That when the said money, or any part thereof, shall be wanted by the said secretary to meet appropriations made by law, the same shall be called for in rateable proportions, within one year, as nearly as conveniently may be, from the different States with which the same is deposited, and shall not be called for in sums exceeding ten thousand dollars from any one State in any one month, without previous notice of thirty days for every additional sum of twenty thousand dollars which may be required.

"The said deposits shall be made with the States in the following proportions, and at the following times, viz.: One-quarter part on the 1st day of January, 1837, or as soon after as may be; one-quarter part on the 1st day of April; one-quarter part on the 1st day of July; and one-quarter part on the 1st day of October, all in the same year."

BANKING LAW OF MINNESOTA.

WE give to our readers the important sections of the Banking Law of Minnesota, passed by the legislature of that State March 19, 1858, and amended March 8, 1861. In the present financial condition of the States which furnish the State bonds usually forming the basis of free banking in the West, we presume no new banks will be organized. The Minnesota banking act, however, should have a place on our pages for reference, when a more prosperous state of affairs shall return.

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE AND REGULATE THE BUSINESS OF BANKING, AS AMENDED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF 1861.

Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota :

SECTION 1. It is made the duty of the Auditor of State, on application of any person or association of persons wishing to organize under this act, to cause to be engraved and printed in the best manner to guard against counterfeiting, such quantity of circulating notes in the similitude of bank notes, in blank, of the different denominations authorized to be issued, as may from time to time be needed to meet the demands of those organizations for the purpose of banking; and all necessary expenses in procuring such circulating notes in blank shall be charged to and paid by the banker or banking association for which the same are furnished.

SEC. 3. Such bank notes in blank so procured or placed in the hands of the Auditor of State as aforesaid, shall be of the dimensions usually issued by banks, from one dollar to five hundred dollars; but such notes shall not be of any intermediate number between five and ten dollars, ten and twenty, twenty and fifty, or fifty and one hundred dollars.

SEC. 4. Such blank circulating notes shall be countersigned by such Auditor of State, and numbered and registered in proper books, to be kept for that purpose in his office, by the Auditor.

SEC. 5. Whenever any person or association of persons formed for the purpose of banking, under the provisions of this act, shall duly assign or transfer in trust, to the Auditor of this State, any portion of the public stock issued or to be issued by the United States, or of the public stocks of any State of the United States, on which full interest is semi-annually paid, said stocks to be valued at a rate to be estimated and governed by the average rate at which such stocks shall have been sold in the city of New-York at the stock exchange, within six months next preceding the time when such stocks shall be so assigned or transferred to the Auditor of State, such person or association of persons shall be entitled to receive from the Auditor an amount of such circulating notes of different denominations, registered and countersigned, equal to and not exceeding the amount of public stocks so assigned or transferred as aforesaid; *Provided*, such public stocks shall in all cases be, or be made to be, equal to stocks producing six per cent. per annum; and it shall not be lawful for the Auditor of State to take any such stock at a value above their par

value, nor above ninety-five per cent. of their current market value at the stock exchange in the city of New-York, at the time of such assignment or transfer to the Auditor; and if at any time any of the stocks so assigned or transferred as aforesaid shall depreciate ten per cent. or more in value at the stock exchange in New-York, the Auditor of State shall reduce the rate at which such stocks shall be continued to be held as securities, and shall require such banker or banking association owning such stocks to make up such deficiency with additional stocks, to be assigned or transferred as aforesaid, or such banker or banking association may make up for such deficiency by returning to the Auditor of State such amount of bank bills previously issued to him or them, as shall be equal to the deficiency of security created or caused by the depreciation of the value of such stocks held as security as aforesaid; *And further provided*, that no stocks shall be received by the Auditor of State until the same shall have been submitted to the Governor, and approved by him; and if, in the opinion of the Governor and Auditor, any stocks offered shall be deemed insecure, they shall not be received as such securities under the provisions of this act, nor shall any stocks which have been received as aforesaid, be withdrawn or exchanged, without the joint consent of the Governor and Auditor.

SEC. 6. Before any bank shall receive from the Auditor of State any circulating notes, as provided in section five of this act, the stockholders thereof shall either give to the Auditor of State good and sufficient bonds, to be approved by him, to the amount of one-fourth of the notes that said bank shall receive, or deposit in lieu of such bonds ten per cent. more stock than the circulating notes, to be delivered by the Auditor to such bank, as an additional security to indemnify the bill-holders against any loss that may be sustained in case the other securities deposited with the Auditor of State shall be insufficient to redeem said bills.

SEC. 7. The bills and notes so to be countersigned and registered, the payment of which shall be secured by the transfer of public stocks, shall be engraved upon their face the words, "Secured by the pledge of public stocks."

SEC. 9. The notes and bills discounted or purchased, moneys loaned, and all other property, effects or dues of every description, of all banks and banking associations organized under the provisions of this act, shall be assessed and taxed in the city, ward, village or town where the same is located, for all State, county, town, school and corporation purposes, in the name of [such] bank or banking association, to the same extent and under the revenue laws, the same as the property of individuals.

SEC. 10. Any person or association of persons may establish offices of discount, deposit and circulation, and become incorporated upon the terms and conditions, and subject to the liabilities prescribed in this act, but the aggregate of the capital stock of such establishment shall not be less than twenty-five thousand dollars; *Provided*, that no such office shall be established in any town containing less than two hundred inhabitants.

SEC. 11. Such persons or association of persons, under their hands and seals, shall make a certificate which shall specify—

1st. The name assumed to distinguish the bank to be established pur-

suant to this act, and to be used in all its dealings, which name shall not be that of any other bank in this State.

2d. The place where the business of discount or deposit of such bank is to be carried on, designating the particular city, town or village, and county.

3d. The amount of the capital stock of such bank, and the number of shares into which the same shall be divided.

4th. The name and place of residence of the shareholder or shareholders in such bank, and the number of shares held by them respectively.

SEC. 13. Such person or association of persons shall have power to carry on the business of banking, by discounting bills, notes and other evidences of debt, by receiving deposits, by buying and selling gold and silver bullion, foreign coin and foreign and inland bills of exchange, by loaning money on real and personal securities, and by exercising such incidental powers as may be necessary to carry on such business; may choose one of their number as president, and appoint a cashier and such other officers as their business may require, and to remove such president, cashier, officers and agents at pleasure, and to appoint others in their places; but no such association or banker shall commence the business of banking under this act, until such association or banker shall have deposited with the Auditor of State the securities required by this act.

SEC. 14. The shares to be personal property and transferable.

SEC. 15. The Auditor, upon failure on the part of a bank to redeem their notes, the same are to be protested, and notice given to the banks to redeem within forty days, otherwise the Auditor is empowered to sell the pledged securities, at public auction, at the Merchants' Exchange, New-York.

SEC. 16. The bank shall be liable to the holder of every bill or note for damages for non-redemption of notes.

SEC. 18. It shall be lawful for any person or association of persons organized under the provisions of this act, by his or their articles of association, to provide for an increase of their capital stock, and of the numbers of such association, from time to time, as they may think proper.

SEC. 22. In the event of the insolvency of any bank established under the provisions of this act, the bill-holders thereof shall be entitled to preference in payment over all other creditors of such bank.

SEC. 23. It shall not be lawful for any bank formed under the provisions of this act, to make any of its bills or notes, to be put in circulation as money, payable at any other place than the office where the business of the bank is carried on and conducted, nor to issue of the same at any other place; and said bills or notes shall be made payable on demand and without interest.

SEC. 25. Two years public notice of final redemption of notes is required from a bank.

SEC. 26. Any banking association or banker wishing to withdraw any of the securities by them deposited with the Auditor of the State, may do so by depositing an equal amount of the circulating notes which may have been issued to said association or banker by the Auditor of State, in sums of not less than one thousand dollars: *Provided*, that the amount of securities thus withdrawn by deposits of said circulating notes shall

not reduce the amount of stock securities remaining in the hands of the Auditor of State to less than twenty-five thousand dollars.

SEC. 27. The securities to be deposited with the Auditor of State in trust by any association or banker, shall be held by him exclusively for the redemption of the bills or notes of such bank, put in circulation as money, until the same are paid and returned to the Auditor of State, as provided in this act, but the Auditor of State may assign said securities to said association or banker, transferring the same upon receiving therefor equivalent securities or an equivalent amount in circulating notes issued by such bank, as provided in section twenty-six of this act.

SEC. 32. The officers or agents of any banking association or banker who shall pay out, to be put in circulation as money in this State, any bill, note, certificate of deposit or other paper having the similitude of a bank note, knowing the same to have been issued otherwise than by the authority of this or any other State of the United States, of the Congress of the United States or of the British Possessions, shall, for each offence, upon conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars, or by not less than three nor more than twelve months imprisonment, or both by fine and imprisonment.

SEC. 33. Such bank or banking association may demand and receive for loans on real and personal security, or for notes, bills or other evidences of debt discounted, such rate of interest as may be agreed upon by the parties, not exceeding fifteen per cent. per annum, subject, however, to such general laws regulating and fixing the rate of interest as may hereafter be passed by the legislature; and it shall be lawful to receive the interest in advance, according to the ordinary usage of banking institutions, and in general do all things and have all the privileges incident to banking associations or corporations.

SEC. 34. Every bank or banking association shall, on the first Monday of January, April, July and October in every year after having commenced the business of banking, as provided in this act, make and transmit to the Auditor of the State a report, which shall be made on oath of the president and cashier, which shall contain a true statement of the exact condition of the bank.

SEC. 37. All plates, dies and such like materials of and peculiar to any individual bank or banking association which shall have closed business, either by its own voluntary act or by operation of law, under the direction of the Auditor of State, in presence of the Governor or Treasurer of State, shall be destroyed; and such destruction, specifying the articles so destroyed, shall be officially certified to by all the three aforesaid officers.

SEC. 39. Every officer, agent or clerk of any banking association or banker authorized by this act, who shall wilfully and knowingly subscribe or make any false statement of facts, entries in the books of such person or association, or shall knowingly subscribe or exhibit false papers with the intent to deceive any person authorized to examine as to the condition of such bank or association, or shall wilfully and knowingly subscribe and make false reports, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall be subjected to imprisonment at hard labor in the State prison

for such term not less than one year nor more than ten years, as the court trying him shall designate. And likewise any commissioner, examiner, master in chancery or judge, wilfully and knowingly subscribing or making any false report, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and be subjected to like penalties.

SEC. 40. The Auditor of State shall, within twenty days after the passage of this act, give to the State of Minnesota a bond in the penal sum of fifty thousand dollars, with not less than five sureties, to be approved by the Governor and Secretary of State, conditioned for the faithful discharge of all the duties of his office, provided for and incumbent upon him under this act, and deposit the same in the office of the State Treasurer; and the Auditor of State shall not be directly nor indirectly interested in any bank or banking association, or as an individual banker.

SEC. 44. The act entitled "An act to authorize the business of banking," approved March nineteen, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, together with all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed.

SEC. 45. This act shall take effect and shall be in force from and after its passage.

Approved July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight.

AN ACT TO AMEND AN ACT ENTITLED AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE AND REGULATE THE BUSINESS OF BANKING, APPROVED JULY 26, 1858.

Enacted by the legislature of the State of Minnesota :

SECTION 1. That section five (5) of an act entitled "An act to authorize and regulate the business of banking," approved July 26th, 1858, be and hereby is amended as follows, to wit: It shall be lawful for the Auditor of State to receive all stocks or securities issued or to be issued by the United States, bearing interest at a rate not less than five per centum per annum, as securities under this act, said stocks or securities to be valued at a rate to be estimated and governed by the rate at which such stocks or securities are sold in the city of New-York at the time of their assignment or transfer to the Auditor.

SEC. 2. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved March 8th, 1861.

FOREIGN LOANS IN ENGLAND GUARANTEED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

A RETURN of the liabilities of the imperial government of Great Britain for guarantees on foreign and colonial loans and telegraphic and other undertakings, moved for by Mr. HUBBARD, has just been published. The manner in which it has been prepared is not complete or explicit, but the following table, with the help of information from other sources, has been compiled from it. Although it is termed a return of "unexpired" guarantees, it contains one item, the Canada loan, of £1,500,000, which appears to have been extinguished. Under the head of Submarine Telegraph guarantees the document, instead of giving a concise detail of the leading conditions, simply refers the inquirer to other parliamentary papers:

GUARANTEED LOANS.

1. TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

LOAN.	Original Amount.	Amount Outstanding.	Amount paid by Great Britain under its guarantee liability.
Russian Dutch 5 per cent. of 1816, with sinking fund of 1 per cent.,*	£ 2,088,888	.. £ 1,145,888	.. Nil.
Greek 5 per cent. of 1883, with sinking fund of one per cent., proportion guaranteed by England, (Russia and France being liable for similar amounts,)	793,500	.. 896,000	.. £ 780,795
Turkish 4 per cent. of 1855, with sinking fund of one per cent., guaranteed jointly by England and France,	5,000,000	.. 4,898,000	.. Nil.

2. TO COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS.

Canada 4 per cent.,	£ 1,500,000	.. Nil.	.. Nil.
West India 4 per cent.—loan of £500,000, apportioned as follows:			
Trinidad,	125,000	.. £ 96,842	.. Nil.
British Guiana,	250,000	.. 191,711	.. Nil.
Jamaica,	100,000†	.. 88,879	.. Nil.
St. Lucia,	18,000	.. 17,083	.. Nil.
Grenada,	7,000	.. 6,435	.. Nil.
Jamaica 4 per cent.,	500,000	.. 443,103	.. Nil.
New-Zealand 4 per cent.,	430,000	.. 411,233	.. Nil.

3. FOR PUBLIC WORKS.

Metropolis Main Drainage.

Loan which the Metropolitan Board of Works may contract, and the Treasury may guarantee, under the Act 21 and 22 Vict. c. 104,	£ 3,000,000
Sum actually borrowed to this date,	350,000
Of which there has been repaid	280,000
Bonds outstanding for	70,000
Rate of interest,	3¼ per cent.
Sum paid under the guarantee,	Nil.

* This loan will be extinguished by the Sinking Fund in June, 1915.

† Of the Jamaica portion, £50,000 remains to be issued.

THE LONDON STOCK MARKET FOR THE YEAR 1860.

ANNEXED are the stock and share fluctuations during the twelve months of 1860. Throughout the whole period the extreme range of Consols was $3\frac{5}{8}$ per cent., that of the preceding year having been $8\frac{5}{8}$, while in 1858 it was 5 per cent. The highest price, $95\frac{1}{8}$, was touched on the 4th of January, and the lowest, $92\frac{1}{8}$, on the 1st of December. The difference between the opening and closing quotations of the year shows a decline of $3\frac{3}{8}$. In railway shares the average range of fluctuation has been about 15 per cent., while, instead of a decline being established, as in Consols, there has been an average improvement of about 10 per cent. As regards the bank bullion, its amount at the beginning was £16,460,824, it reached £16,552,030 on the 27th of June, and declined to £12,798,119, its lowest point, at the end of the year. At the Bank of France the total at the commencement was £23,200,000, while it is now £17,300,000, showing a loss of £5,900,000 during the year. On the Paris bourse the fall in French rentes has been $1\frac{3}{8}$ per cent. With respect to the declared value of our exportations the Board of Trade tables thus far, which comprise only 11 months of the year, show a total of £123,714,276, against £119,613,185 in the corresponding period of 1859, being an increase of £4,101,091, or $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., while it exceeds by $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. the total of 1857, the great year of inflation. The changes in the bank rate of discount, which were five in number in 1859, have been 11. On the 1st of January the rate was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., whence it was gradually advanced to 5 per cent. It then went back to 4 per cent., but reached 6 per cent. on the 15th of November, and is now again at that point, after a temporary reduction to 5 per cent. In the cotton market there has been great steadiness. The price of fair Orleans at the commencement was about $7\frac{3}{4}$ d. per lb., and, after ranging between that price and 8d., it has closed at $7\frac{1}{4}$ d. to 8d. In the wheat market the movement has been large, and almost constantly upwards, Norfolk, which was quoted 41s. to 42s. in January, having advanced to 64s.—*London Times.*

FLUCTUATIONS IN THE STOCK AND SHARE MARKETS DURING THE YEAR 1860.

	Price on 1st Jan., 1860.	Lowest Price, 1860.	Highest Price, 1860.	Price 31st Dec., 1860.
Consols,.....	$95\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$..	$92\frac{1}{8}$..	$95\frac{1}{8}$..	$92\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$
Exchequer bills,.....	80s. pm. ..	6s. dis. ..	33s. pm. ..	2s. dis.
RAILWAYS.				
Brighton,.....	$111\frac{1}{8}$..	$109\frac{1}{8}$..	$118\frac{3}{8}$..	118
Caledonian,.....	95 ..	80 ..	$99\frac{1}{8}$..	$97\frac{1}{8}$
Eastern Counties,.....	$58\frac{1}{8}$..	$50\frac{3}{8}$..	$58\frac{1}{8}$..	$58\frac{1}{8}$
Great Northern,.....	$107\frac{1}{8}$..	103 ..	119 ..	108
Great Western,.....	70 ..	$59\frac{1}{8}$..	$75\frac{1}{8}$..	$78\frac{1}{8}$
London and North-Western,.....	99 ..	$95\frac{1}{8}$..	$104\frac{1}{8}$..	$101\frac{1}{8}$
Midland,.....	$110\frac{1}{8}$..	$105\frac{1}{8}$..	$136\frac{1}{8}$..	$135\frac{1}{8}$
Lancashire and Yorkshire,.....	$100\frac{3}{8}$..	$97\frac{1}{8}$..	$121\frac{1}{8}$..	$118\frac{3}{8}$
Sheffield,.....	$39\frac{1}{8}$..	$37\frac{1}{8}$..	$57\frac{1}{8}$..	55
South-Eastern,.....	$84\frac{1}{8}$..	$82\frac{3}{8}$..	$89\frac{1}{8}$..	$87\frac{1}{8}$
South-Western,.....	$98\frac{1}{8}$..	$91\frac{1}{8}$..	$98\frac{1}{8}$..	95
North-Eastern,—Berwick,.....	$95\frac{1}{8}$..	$91\frac{1}{8}$..	$105\frac{1}{8}$..	$104\frac{1}{8}$
do. York,.....	$79\frac{1}{8}$..	$75\frac{1}{8}$..	$95\frac{1}{8}$..	95
Lombardy-Venetian,.....	$2\frac{1}{8}$ pm. ..	$1\frac{1}{8}$ dis. ..	$2\frac{1}{8}$ pm. ..	$1\frac{1}{8}$ dis.
East Indian,.....	$101\frac{1}{8}$..	$98\frac{1}{8}$..	$103\frac{1}{8}$..	$98\frac{1}{8}$

MISSOURI BANK LAW OF 1861.

THE legislature of the State of Missouri has recently passed an act for the relief of the banks of that State; first, to relieve them from the penalties resulting from the suspension of specie payments; and secondly, to provide for the payment of the semi-annual interest on the State debt, due July 1, 1861. The Bank of Commerce, of Boonville, is also incorporated, with three branches. The important sections of the act consist chiefly in the repeal of certain provisions of the law now in force; and as the stability of Missouri currency has its basis upon this law, we reprint for our readers these and other important sections of the new act. It will be noticed that one section refers to savings banks and private bankers. The Missouri banks have gained such a high character for conservatism and stability that we trust the reliance by the West upon their currency is justly placed; and with like faith the holders of Missouri State bonds put their chief reliance for the ability of the State to pay its July interest in the prompt response of the Missouri banks to any call to sustain the credit of the State.

AN ACT FOR THE RELIEF OF THE BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI, THE MERCHANTS' BANK, THE MECHANICS' BANK, THE EXCHANGE BANK, THE SOUTHERN BANK, THE UNION BANK, THE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE FARMERS' BANK OF MISSOURI, AND THE WESTERN BANK OF MISSOURI. APPROVED MARCH 18, 1861.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. All the provisions of an act entitled "An act to regulate banks and banking institutions, and to create the offices of bank commissioners," approved March 2, 1857, which subjects the said banks to any penalty by way of forfeiture of charter, because of a failure to pay the liabilities of said banks in specie on presentation; and all provisions of said act which authorize or direct any proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted against said banks, or which authorize or direct any proceeding by any officer against said banks, because of the suspension of specie payments by the same, be and the same are hereby suspended, subject to the conditions and restrictions herein contained, until the first day of May, 1862; and if, on or before the day named aforesaid, the said banks shall fully resume the payment of all their debts and liabilities with gold and silver coin, then the said banks shall have all the rights, benefits and advantages granted by the charters, except in cases where its provisions conflict with this act, and shall be exempt from the penalty of forfeiture as if no suspension of specie payment had taken place.

SEC. 2. No person receiving or taking, as the owner thereof, from the banks, after the passage of this act, any note or bill of said banks, issued

for circulation, shall be entitled to receive thereon the amount of interest prescribed by the ninth section of said act, or any interest whatever, in consequence of the suspension herein named. Said banks may receive the notes of the specie-paying banks of other States upon deposit, in payment of debts or for exchange, but shall take no bank note of a less denomination than five dollars; and said banks shall not be allowed, directly or indirectly, to pay out or circulate said notes in this State; and should any of the banks of this State pay out the notes of the banks of other States, within this State, their charters shall be thereby forfeited.

SEC. 3. The forty-third section of the first article of said act is hereby so modified in its operation, until the resumption of specie payments, according to the first section of this act, as to permit all the banks chartered under the said act, and other chartered corporations that have not forfeited their charters, in this State, during the period aforesaid, to take in payment of debts, or receive on deposit the notes of the banks of this State: *Provided*, that no parent bank, either during the suspension of specie payment or afterwards, shall receive the notes of their branches at a discount in payment for sight exchange; and, after resumption, no bank or branch bank, savings institution, savings association, banker, broker, exchange dealer, or any person or persons, incorporation or association, doing a banking business, shall keep any account of deposits with any person in bankable funds or in currency, or otherwise than in cash; and all sums deposited with them, or any of them, in current deposit account, shall be subject to be drawn by the depositor in cash. The term "cash," as used in this section, means gold and silver coin, or the notes of the specie-paying banks of this State, as the holder of such check may elect.

SEC. 4. Provides that the penalty for violating the preceding section shall be a forfeit of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars.

SEC. 5. During the period of the suspension of said banks, the board of directors, in order to afford relief to debtors, shall renew and extend the time of payment of debts due them upon the payment by said debtors of ten per cent. of the original amount due by them at each renewal or extension, when said debtors shall fully secure the ultimate payment thereof, and such renewal or extension shall be for the same length of time as the original loan.

SEC. 7. And the bank commissioner is hereby required to cause the notes paid out after the passage of this act to be stamped in such manner as he may direct, so as to distinguish them from the notes now outstanding.

SEC. 8. No person who shall be under protest, in any bank of this State, shall at any time, while so protested, be eligible to or hold a place of director in any bank chartered by this State.

SEC. 9. So much of section five of article one of said act as requires the banks located in the city of St. Louis to publish a weekly statement of coin on hand, bills maturing and the amount of circulation outstanding, be and the same is hereby repealed.

SEC. 11. So much of section thirty-three of article one of said act as restricts said banks to six and seven per cent. interest, is hereby repealed;

and said banks are authorized to receive, by way of discount, any rate of interest, not exceeding eight per cent. per annum; and eight per cent. per annum shall also be the rate of discount (including all exchange and re-exchange) on bills of exchange other than sight exchange. No bank shall be allowed to issue hereafter more than two dollars in its notes for one dollar of gold and silver paid in on its capital stock.

SEC. 12. Provides that no bank is to be taxed over one per cent.

SEC. 13. And after the resumption of specie payments, whenever a demand shall be made at the counter of any bank for the redemption of its notes, the same shall be promptly paid in gold and silver coin, without unnecessary delay.

SEC. 14. No parent bank shall send to any of its branches any other notes to be issued and put into circulation by such branch, except the notes prepared by the bank commissioner for the circulation of such branch. That, in order to provide the means for the redemption of the revenue bonds due 1st June, 1861, and for paying the interest due on the 1st July, 1861, the Governor of this State is hereby authorized and empowered to sell three thousand two hundred and fifty-three shares of the stock owned by the State in the Bank of the State of Missouri, and deposit the proceeds thereof in the State treasury to the credit of the fund commissioners. The president and directors of each and every bank incorporated in this State shall, within three months from the date of the passage of this act, pay into the State treasury, to the credit of the fund commissioners, their *pro rata* share of five hundred thousand dollars, to be apportioned according to the capital stock of said banks paid in: *Provided*, that for the amount paid by each bank as aforesaid, the Governor is hereby authorized to issue revenue bonds, payable in three and five years, bearing interest at the rate of nine per centum per annum, with coupons attached; and for the payment of the principal and interest on said bonds, the revenues of the State are hereby pledged. The bills or notes of the Merchants' Bank, the Mechanics' Bank, the Southern Bank, the Union Bank, the Bank of St. Louis, the Exchange Bank, the Farmers' Bank and the Western Bank, shall be receivable in all payments due to the State, so long as the said banks shall redeem their liabilities in gold and silver on presentation.

SEC. 21. Provides that the Mechanics' Bank may establish two branches—one at Carthage and the other at Shelbyville.

SEC. 22. Provides that the Farmers' Bank, at Lexington, may establish a branch at Neosho.

SEC. 23. The present stockholders of the Bank of St. Louis, incorporated by act approved March 2d, 1857, are hereby incorporated under the name of the Bank of Commerce, to be located and established in the city of Boonville, the capital stock of which shall be one million of dollars, and in accordance with the provisions of the "Act to regulate banks and banking institutions, and to create the offices of bank commissioners," approved March 2d, 1857.

SEC. 28. The bank hereby created shall have three branches—one at Kirksville, one at Versailles and one at St. Louis; capital of each, \$100,000.

SEC. 33. After the first day of January, 1862, no savings institution,

savings association, banker, broker, exchange dealer, or other person or persons, incorporations or institutions, doing a banking business in this State, shall be allowed to pay out or put in circulation, either directly or indirectly, any bank note other than the notes issued by the banks of this State; and should any such savings institution, savings association, banker, broker, exchange dealer, incorporation or institution, violate the provisions of this section, they shall forfeit and pay to the State of Missouri a sum not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars, to be recovered by action in any court having competent jurisdiction; and it is hereby made the duty of the bank commissioner, upon information, to prosecute said institutions, associations, incorporations or persons, and to pay one-half of all such sums as he may recover to the informant, and the remainder into the State treasury. And section ten of "An act respecting savings institutions and other corporations doing a banking business," approved February 28, 1859, is hereby repealed.

This act to take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved March 18, 1861.

AN ACT REDUCING THE CAPITAL OF THE SOUTHERN BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows :

SECTION 1. The capital stock of the Southern Bank of St. Louis is hereby reduced and limited to the aggregate amount of stock now taken and subscribed, and said bank is authorized and directed to close the books against further subscription of stock in the parent Bank of St. Louis.

SEC. 2. The capital stock of the branches of said bank is hereby fixed permanently as follows, to wit: The capital stock of the branch located at Independence at two hundred thousand dollars; at St Charles at one hundred thousand dollars; at Savannah at one hundred thousand dollars; and all subscriptions heretofore made of stock in said Southern Bank of St. Louis and its said branches are hereby legalized and made valid and effectual.

SEC 4. The capital stock of the Farmers' Bank is hereby increased one hundred thousand dollars. Nothing in this act shall be so construed as to exempt said banks from any forfeiture of their charters.

This act to take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved March 8, 1861.

DEFALCATIONS IN FRANCE.

THE GREAT DEFALCATION OF M. MIRES.

From the Correspondence of the London Times.

PARIS, February 21, 1861.

NEITHER the Syrian question, nor the fall of Gaeta, nor the American question, nor the Roman question, which is getting worse, nor even M. LAGNERONNIERE's pamphlet, now occupies the attention of the public. Everything is forgotten in the great event of the day—the arrest and imprisonment of M. MIRES, and the consequences which it will probably lead to. On Monday he was transferred to the prison of Mazas, after having been closely watched for some time previous by the agents of the police. The transfer to Mazas, and the commencement of proceedings which will follow, if not arrested by extraordinary agency, were hastened by the strong terms used by him since the first steps were taken against him, some weeks ago, and which I noticed at the time.

Finding that the protection on which he thought he could rely for a settlement *a l'amiable* of these complicated transactions would not or could not stop investigation, he is said to have used the language of despair, to have bid his prosecutors, or, as he would term them, his persecutors, defiance, and to have declared that, if driven to extremity, he would make disclosures of such a nature as to implicate persons whose names are not yet known.

It is said these threats were communicated in a letter, after the reception of which, all further temporization was, of course, morally impossible, and that letter was sent to the proper authority, with a peremptory order for M. MIRES' arrest and imprisonment; but whether in writing or by word of mouth, it is certain that these menaces were repeatedly and publicly uttered. It was yesterday rumored that his arrest was followed by that of several others said to be gravely implicated in the same transactions. The rumor, however, was unfounded. Domiciliary visits took place and papers were seized. The *Moniteur* announces to-day the sudden death by apoplexy of the Viscount de RICHEMONT, collector of taxes in Paris. It is reported, however, that he committed suicide, as he had been either threatened with or apprehended arrest. Besides his official employment, M. de RICHEMONT was a member of the committee of superintendence of M. MIRES' establishment, the Caisse des Chemins de Fer. Five or six other persons were expected to be arrested to-day. Nothing is spoken of, among high or low, but this catastrophe. It would be affectation to deny that the most painful impression has been produced by it, and people's minds revert to the time of the Teste and Cubieres scandals. There is, perhaps, much exaggeration in what is said about these transactions and the parties implicated in them; but it is affirmed on all hands that defalcations to a large amount have been discovered in the matter of Roman railways, and that these defalcations, in all or in part, arise from the large sums paid in gratuities to promote the enterprises in which M. MIRES was engaged, or for obtaining impor-

tant information necessary for their success. Sums varying from £6,000 to £20,000 are said to have been disbursed in this way. If M. MIREs persists in his menace that he will not fall without bringing disgrace and ruin on many others, people expect some extraordinary disclosures. One or two persons are said to have managed adroitly enough to get out of these transactions since M. MIREs' difficulties attracted public notice. It is remarked as strange that, though the public has talked of hardly any thing for the last few days but this affair, not a single Paris paper has made the slightest allusion to it. The papers are nearly as silent now as they were on the Turkish loan, beyond publishing the *reclame* of its support.

PARIS, Feb. 22, 7 A. M.

The numerous arrests reported yesterday and the day before, in consequence of the MIREs' affair, are for the most part, if not all, imaginary. Indeed, I only know of one well-authenticated arrest, and that is of M. MIREs himself. I have already observed, that up to the last moment M. MIREs believed, or affected to believe, that no one would venture to take proceedings against him, owing to the protection of powerful parties supposed to be implicated in the transactions which led to the catastrophe. He has been grievously disappointed. Since I first mentioned, more than six weeks ago, the fact of one of the former associates of M. MIREs having denounced him, of the matter being discussed at the Council of Ministers several times, and the efforts to stop all further pursuit, nothing new occurred until eight or ten days ago, and the protected and the protectors alike seemed to think that the affair would be allowed to drop. Such, however, was not the Emperor's intention. At a late Council the Emperor, to the surprise of all, suddenly asked the Minister of Justice when he should be ready to commence proceedings in the MIREs' affair. The Minister, I believe, said that he was occupied in obtaining the necessary information; but he was informed that the report which had already been prepared was more than sufficient to justify immediate action. The Emperor said, however, sufficient to show that his mind was made up, and that a matter which was productive of so much scandal should not be allowed to drop. Soon after the order to have M. MIREs closely watched and subsequently arrested was issued. It was reported yesterday that several persons had absconded, among them a member of the Senate. Whether it be true with respect to this latter person I cannot say, but as for one or two, at least, of the other supposed fugitives, I know for certain that they were in Paris last night, and I do not believe that they have quitted it to-day, or will do so.

It is curious that when things occur of the description of those for which M. MIREs is in prison, certain other names almost invariably occur to the mind of the public; for the public cannot account for sudden changes from comparative indigence to wealth which, according to appearances, ought to be enormous. The time, however, will probably come, when it will be seen how little such appearances are to be trusted. You hear it observed as you pass along the street, that were M. MIREs convicted of all he is charged with, there are those holding their heads high who are not better than he is.

The public seem to be persuaded that the more guilty will continue to enjoy immunity, and that those whose offences are light in comparison will only be reached. Those who say so are unjust, as people mostly are in the first moment of indignation. I believe the Emperor is resolved that such things shall be stopped; that justice shall be done without respect to names or persons, and that a system which, if continued, would affect the prestige of government itself, shall be arrested, *coute que coule*. This is a wise resolve, and the sincerest friends of the Emperor heartily desire that it will be carried out.

SEMI-ANNUAL DIVIDENDS.

WE are indebted to JOSEPH G. MARTIN, commission stock broker, No. 6 State-street, Boston, for the following statement of dividends and interest money to be disbursed at the dates given, in that city, except that of the Dedham Bank, at Dedham, and the New-York Central Rail-Road bonds, as mentioned in a note. The month of May is the usual period for other dividends, not yet declared, among which are the Bartlett, Globe and James Mills, of Newburyport, Lowell Machine Shop, Mercantile Marine Insurance Company of Boston, and the Stony Brook Rail-Road. The Great Western Marine Insurance Company of New-York pays, May 8th, the scrip of 1857, amounting to \$325,000 and interest accrued, a considerable portion of which is held in this city and vicinity. The Model Lodging House Company, whose building is located in Pleasant-street, corner of Osborne place, has proved a success, and pays regular semi-annual dividends of three per cent. The investment is partly of a benevolent nature, the object being to give the tenants the advantage of all profits over 6 per cent., by keeping their rents as low as they can possibly be afforded, and yet attain that result.

May	Name of Companies.	Capital.	Dividends.		Amount,
		May, 1861.	Nov.	May.	May, '61.
1 ..	Boott Cotton Mills,.....	\$ 1,200,000	.. 4	.. 2	.. \$ 24,000
6 ..	Boston Wharf Company,....	600,000 3	.. 18,000
1 ..	Concord Rail-Road Company,.	1,500,000	.. 4	.. 4	.. 60,000
1 ..	Columbian Manufacturing Co.,	280,000	.. 3	.. 3	.. 8,400
6 ..	Dedham Bank,.....	300,000	.. 4	.. 4	.. 12,000
1 ..	Maine Town and City Bonds,.	Interest abt.	.. 3	.. 3	.. *15,000
1 ..	Manchester & Lawrence R. R.,	966,400	.. 4	.. 4	.. 38,656
10 ..	Model Lodging House Co.,...	69,000	.. 3	.. 3	.. 2,070
1 ..	Nashua & Lowell Rail-Road,.	600,000	.. 4	.. 4	.. 24,000
1 ..	N. Y. Central R. R. 6's, 1883,	Interest abt.	.. 3	.. 3	.. †60,000
1 ..	Otis Manufacturing Co.,.....	500,000	.. 6	.. 4	.. 20,000
1 ..	West Roxbury (Horse) R. R.,	40,400	.. 4	.. 4	.. 1,616
1 ..	Wilmington R. R. Imp. 6's,'63,	119,000	.. 3	.. 3	.. 3,570
1 ..	York Manufacturing Co.,....	1,200,000	.. 5	.. 5	.. 60,000
Total,.....					\$ 347,312

* This includes coupons on the Augusta, Bath, Brunswick, Gardiner, Hallowell and Topsham bonds, payable at the Washington Bank.

† Of the interest on the \$8,000,000 of New-York Central bonds, although payable in New-York, it is estimated that \$60,000 is circulated among bondholders in the vicinity of Boston.

STOCK FLUCTUATIONS IN NEW-YORK FOR APRIL.

THE following tabular statement presents the course of leading stocks of the New-York market through the month of April, giving the highest and lowest actual sales, with the date of each, and gain or loss as compared with prices then and one month previous :

NAMES OF STOCKS.	Highest sales.	Day mo.	Lowest sales.	Day mo.	Value Mar. 30.	Value April 30.	Gain.	Loss.
United States (1874) 5's,...	89½	1	75	26	89½	75¼	14¼	
U. S. coupon (1880) 6's,...	94	3	84	2	92½	85½	7	
California (1877) 7's,.....	87½	1	73½	29	87¼	73¼	14	
Kentucky (1871) 6's,.....	95	8	65	22	81	70	25	
Missouri (1872) 6's,.....	66	2	37¾	26	66¼	40	26¼	
North Carolina (1873) 6's, 81	2	45	20	95	58	23		
Ohio (1886) 6's,.....	105	15	95	22	105½	97½	8	
Tennessee (1890) 6's,.....	75¼	3	41	21	75	50	25	
Virginia (1890) 6's,.....	76¼	2	36	22	76¾	48	28¾	
Erie R. R. 2d mtge. 7's,...					100½	98	2½	
“ 4th “ 7's,...	94	3	78	22	93	85	8	
Hannibal & St. Joseph 7's, 50	4	30	29	47	30	17		
Hudson River 1st mtg. 7's, 106	24	104	8	105½	105½			
“ 3d “ 7's, 88	13	85	20	90	85	5		
Illinois Cent. 1st mtg. 7's, 98*	2	85	20	*98½	88	10½		
Mich. Cent. 1st (1882) 8's, 100*	3	92*	22	*98	95	3		
New-York Cent. (1883) 6's, 96	8	95½	16	97	95	2		
“ (1864) 7's, ..		100	24	102¼	100	2¼		
Chic. & Rock Isl. R. R., 58	2	34	20	57½	36½	21		
Chic. Burling. & Quincy, 74½	2	51	20	73¾	56	17¾		
Cleveland & Toledo,.....	36½	2	22¼	20	35¼	23¼	12¼	
Cleveland, Col. & Cin., ..	95	19	90	22	100½	92	8½	
Erie,.....	32½	2	17	20	32	20½	11½	
Galena & Chicago,.....	73¾	2	55	20	73	57	16	
Harlem preferred,	16¼	2	11½	22	40¼	30¾	10	
Hudson River,.....	45½	2	33	20	45¼	36¼	9½	
Illinois Central,.....	81¼	2	55½	20	81½	58	23½	
Michigan Central,.....	58¼	1	40	20	58	44	14	
Michigan Southern,.....	17¾	1	12¼	20	17½	13	4½	
“ “ pref., 39½	2	26	20	38¾	29	9¾		
New-York Central,.....	78¾	2	68	20	78½	72¾	6¼	
Panama,.....	116½	4	97½	22	117	102	15	
Reading,	44½	2	29½	20	44½	31	13½	
Canton Company,	14¾	12	8	24	14	8¾	5¼	
Del. & Hudson Canal,....	90	2	82	26	89½	82½	7	
Pacific Mail Steamship,...	86	1	50	28	85¼	65¼	20	
Pennsylvania Coal,.....	81	4	72	29	80	72	8	

* Ex-interest and dividends.

The marked depreciation of stocks in New-York, during the month of April, is doubtless familiar to many readers who have access to daily papers. The table annexed includes nearly all the speculative and other prominent stocks of the market, which sell readily from week to week. The quotations are based upon regular or cash sales, while in some instances a difference of several per cent. was made on seller's option, and this on very short time, too. Kentucky 6's sold at 65 April 22, and same day at 60, seller 10. Tennessee and Virginia 6's both sold one per cent. less, seller, the day they are quoted lowest for cash. New-York Central Rail-Road sold at 67, seller 30, and for $68\frac{3}{4}$ cash, same time. In Panama Rail-Road the sales on the 22d were very peculiar, showing a very strong disposition to "bear" the stock, owing to rumors of anticipated seizure of some of the steamers of the California line. The stock opened at 98, regular, then sold at 96, seller 3 days, 94, seller 10, and 93, seller 30, closing at 97, seller 3 days. The cases cited were the most marked instances, but the same disposition prevailed, to a greater or less degree, all through the month.

MONTHLY STOCK FLUCTUATIONS.

Reported by Mr. J. G. MARTIN, Boston.

THE general features of the stock market for the month of April are quite plainly shown by the annexed table of fluctuations, which includes nearly all the speculative class, and a good portion of the sound rail-roads, and other stocks most sold in this market. The tendency has been downward since the first week of the month, but as a general thing dividend-paying rail-roads have kept up much better than was anticipated under the unfavorable circumstances of the times.

Bank shares have fallen off largely, and are now the least in favor of almost any class. Holders press their stocks for sale, and reduced prices are the natural consequence. Our list is a fair average of the Boston banks, and shows a remarkable depreciation. Some stocks not quoted often are difficult to price accurately.

Mining shares have been flat enough, but are recovering a little from their great depression. Some of them are very cheap at present prices, and cannot fail to attract the attention of buyers.

The following tabular statement presents the fluctuations for the month of April, in sixty-three different stocks sold at the Boston Brokers' Board, showing their highest and lowest points, and the date, with the present market value, and gain or loss as compared with prices then and one month previous :

STOCKS IN APRIL, 1861.

STOCKS.	Highest sales.	Day of mo.	Lowest sales.	Day of mo.	Value April 30.	Value Mar. 30.	FROM MAR. 30.	
							Gain.	Loss.
Boston and Lowell R. R.,	107 1/4	6	105 3/4	13	107	105	2	
Boston and Maine,	115 1/4	6	109	25	115 1/4	109	6 1/4	
Boston and Providence,	111 1/4	3	109	20	111	109 1/4	1 1/4	
Boston and Worcester,	114 1/4	3	108 1/4	30	113	108 1/4	4 1/4	
Cambridge,	110	5	109	18	110*	109	1	
Concord, (par \$50,)	60	12			58 1/2	54*	2 1/2	
Eastern,	72	2	55 1/2	29	71 1/2	56	5 1/2	
Fitchburg,	102 1/4	10	95 1/4	27	101 1/4	96 1/2	4 3/4	
Malden and Melrose,	63 3/4	16	60 1/2	10	68	60	8	
Manchester and Lawrence,	109 3/4	6	108	10	108 1/2	100*	4 1/2	
Metropolitan, (par \$50,)	9	1	54 3/4	26	59	55 1/2	3 1/2	
Michigan Central,	57	1	52	10	57 3/4	45	12 3/4	
Middlesex,	99	5	92 3/4	30	97 3/4	92 3/4	4 1/2	
Northern, (N. H.,)	54 1/2	5	49	17	54 1/2	50	4 1/2	
Old Colony,	108 1/2	13	105	25	107	105	2	
Portland and Saco,	100	8	99	20	99 1/2	100	1/2	
Vermont and Canada,	90 1/2	13	80	20	90	87	3	
Vermont and Mass.,	17	3	12	30	16 1/4	12	4 1/4	
Western,	116	9	112	27	116	112	4	
Wilmington, (par \$50,)	36 1/4	1	25	23	36 1/4*	27 1/2	8 3/4	
Boston Water Power Co.,	33 1/4	3	22	20	33 1/2	25	8 1/2	
Cary Land Co.,	5 1/8	3	3 3/4	20	4 3/4	3 7/8	7/8	
East Boston Co.,	11 3/4	1	11	12	11 7/8	10	1 7/8	
Essex Co.,	65 1/2	3	60	2	66	57	9	
Blackstone Bank,	105 3/4	6	100	29	105 1/2*	100	5 1/2	
Commerce Bank,	106 1/4	2	100	29	106 1/2*	100	5 1/2	
Eliot Bank,	103 1/2	17	103	16	105 1/2*	98	7 1/2	
Exchange Bank,	121 1/2	20	110	27	125*	110	5	
Hide and Leather Bank,	103	8	95	27	101*	95	6	
Howard Bank,	103	13	102 1/4	1	102 1/2*	95 1/2	7	
Maverick Bank,	101	12	99 1/4	24	99*	98	1	
Merchants' Bank,	108 1/2	5	98	27	97 1/2*	93	4 1/2	
National Bank,	100	10	95	27	100*	95	5	
North America Bank,	105 1/4	3	105	1	105*	99	6	
Safety Fund Bank,	102 1/4	13	100	24	101 1/2*	99	2 1/2	
Shoe and Leather Bank,	120 1/4	20	120	24	125 1/2*	120	5 1/2	
State Bank, (par \$60,)	67 3/4	6	62 1/2	27	67 1/2*	62 1/2	5	
Suffolk Bank,	127	12	126 1/4	6	127*	123	4	
Tremont Bank,	117 1/2	13	109	27	117*	109 1/2	7 1/2	
Webster Bank,	106 1/2	5	100	29	105 1/2*	100	5 1/2	
Bohemian Copper Co.,					2	1	1	
Central Copper Co.,	6 3/4	2	5 3/4	12	6 5/8	3 1/2	3 1/8	
Copper Falls,	7 1/4	5	3 1/2	29	6 3/4†	3 3/4	3	
Franklin,			20	18	26 1/2	20 1/2	6	
Hancock,	4 1/8	2	3 3/8	13	4 1/2	2 1/2	1 3/4	
Isle Royale,	10	1	5 3/8	27	9 7/8	6 1/4	3 3/8	
Mesnard,	2 3/8†	15	1 3/4	27	1 7/8	1 1/8†	1	
Minnesota,	73	3	59 1/4	29	71 1/2	60 1/2	11	
National,	32	2	31	8	32	30	2	
North Cliff,					1	1		
Petherick,	2 3/4	8	2	13	2 3/8	1 1/2	7/8	
Pewabic,	38	3	25	22	39 1/4	25 1/4	14	
Pittsburg, (Cliff,)	52 1/2	9	48	27	54	46	8	
Pontiac,	1 5/8	1	1 1/2	6	1 5/8	3/4	7/8	
Quincy,	30 1/4	1	19 1/4	20	29	21	8	
Rockland,	19 3/4	1	14	25	20	14	6	
South Side,					7/8	5/8	1/4	
Superior,	3 7/8	5	3	17	3 1/2	2 1/2	1	
Toltec,	2 1/2	3	1	22	2 3/8	1 1/2	3/4	
Ogdensburg 1st mtg. 7's,	72 1/2	10	67 1/2	27	72	67 1/2	4 1/2	
Rutland 1st mortgage 7's,					38	35	3	
Vermont Central 1st 7's,					16 3/4	15	1 3/4	
Vermont & Mass. 6's, 1865,	94 1/4	11	94	8	93 1/4	93 1/4		

* Ex dividend.

† Mining stocks, assessment paid.

FLUCTUATIONS IN BANK SHARES, 1860-'61.

From the monthly Circular of Messrs. SATTERLEE & Co., 49 Exchange Place.

NAME OF BANK.	JAN., 1860.		JULY, 1860.		OCT., 1860.		JAN., 1861.		JUNE, 1861.	
	Off'd.	Ask.	Off'd.	Ask.	Off'd.	Ask.	Off'd.	Ask.	Off'd.	Ask.
American Exchange Bk.,	98½	98½	100¼	101¼	104½	104¼	92	93½	76	76
Atlantic Bank,	72	80	65	70	67	70	—	70	—	—
Artisans' Bank,	80	90	96	98	15	40	—	—	—	40
Bank of America,	111	112	111	112	112	113	106	108	95	96
Bank of Commerce,	99½	99½	100	100½	101	101½	92	93	79	79½
Bank of New-York,	99½	100	102	102½	102	103	92	95	79	81
Bank of North America,	108	110	106	108	108	109	85	95	—	80
Bank of Commonwealth,	93	95	96½	97	96	97	—	92	60	65
Bank of Republic,	127½	130	129	130	125	128	110	112	85	95
Bank State of New-York,	96½	98	99½	100	101½	102	90	91	—	74
Broadway Bank,	130	135	137	140	140	145	—	135	120	—
Bull's Head Bank,	98	101	100	105	100	105	80	—	—	—
Butchers and Drovers' Bk.	113	120	120	125	125	130	115	120	100	—
Chatham Bank,	91	92	96½	98	101½	102	85	90	—	95
Chemical Bank,	410	440	400	—	400	—	400	—	—	—
Citizens' Bank,	102	104	102	105	103	106	—	100	—	—
City Bank,	123	125	123	125	128	130	—	125	100	—
Continental Bank,	97	97½	100	101	104	104½	88	90	60	—
Corn Exchange Bank,	98	98½	101½	102½	—	98	85	90	75	75
East River Bank,	92	96	95	97	97	99	90	95	—	—
Fulton Bank,	130	136	140	145	140	145	125	135	—	145
Greenwich Bank,	—	122	150	—	150	—	—	—	—	—
Grocers' Bank,	90	95	94	96	98	100	—	95	—	—
Hanover Bank,	85½	86½	94	96	92	94	80	81	—	75
Importers and Traders',	106½	107	110	112	115	115½	104	105	70	90
Irving Bank,	90	95	—	96	96	97½	80	95	—	—
Leather Manufacturers',	138	142	140	145	135	150	120	140	—	—
Manhattan Bank,	136	143	—	140	140	150	125	130	109	—
Marine Bank,	80	82	85	87	84	85	75	85	—	—
Market Bank,	100	100½	100	102	100	102	95	100	—	—
Mechanics' Bank,	115	116	116	118	116	117	104	106	75	84
Mechanics' Bk'g Assoc'n.,	99	99½	102½	103	103	104	90	100	—	90
Mechanics and Traders',	—	110	108	110	110	112	100	105	—	—
Mercantile Bank,	118	125	120	125	125	—	112	—	—	—
Merchants' Bank,	104½	105½	106	107	107½	108	100	101	82	85
Merchants' Exchange Bk.	95	98	97	98	100½	101	80	88	—	83
Metropolitan Bank,	107	107½	110½	111	112	113	103	105	82	82
Nassau Bank,	100	100½	101	102	105	107	—	98	70	70
National Bank,	101	101½	105	106	106	108	95	98	—	90
New-York County Bank,	—	103	104	—	105	—	85	—	—	—
New-York Dry Dock Bk.,	110	114	110	114	108	110	103	108	—	—
New-York Exch. Bank,	—	105	—	103	—	103	—	98	—	—
North River Bank,	—	94	93	96	96	100	80	90	—	80
Ocean Bank,	98½	94	98	99	97½	98	81	82	—	78
Oriental Bank,	96	98	—	100	100	—	90	—	—	—
Pacific Bank,	112	120	120	125	120	125	115	125	—	—
Park Bank,	105	105½	110	112	113	114	104	106	80	85
People's Bank,	95	100	100	102	105	—	—	98	—	—
Phenix Bank,	104½	105	107	107½	109	110	91	100	85	—
St. Nicholas Bank,	93	98½	90	94	—	92	75	85	—	68
Seventh Ward Bank,	120	130	130	135	130	135	121	130	—	120
Shoe and Leather Bank,	109	110½	107	109	—	108	99½	100	—	80
Tradesmen's Bank,	105	106	109	112	106	109	102	—	—	95
Union Bank,	99	99½	102½	103½	105	107	94	97	—	83

REVIEW OF THE STOCK MARKET OF NEW-YORK.

Lowest and Highest Cash sales from November 1, 1860, to May 1, 1861, and closing quotations, May 31.

BONDS AND STOCKS.	NOV., 1860.		DEC., 1860.		YEAR 1860.		JAN., 1861.		FEB., 1861.		MARCH, 1861.		APRIL, 1861.		MAY, 1861.		Closing Quotations, 31 May, '61.
	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	
United States six per cent, 1863,...	95	103	95	100	95	109½	97	100	94	100	95	95½	89	95	80	95	..
U. S. five per cent, 1874, coupon,...	85	104½	92	97	85	93½	85	90	75	89½	76	79½	..
Indiana State five per cent,	83	98	87½	..	85	88	85	87½	83	93	80	..	84
Virginia six per cent. bonds,	77	92½	73	80½	73	95	74½	77½	72	80	74	51	26	76½	43½	51½	46
Tennessee six per cent. bonds,	74	88	64	79	64	93	72	76½	67	76½	72	77	41	75½	40½	47½	41½
Georgia six per cent. bonds,	102	105	94	60	60½	..
North Carolina six per cent bonds,	76	95	71½	82	76	100	74	82	74	82½	78	82	45	81	53	62	54
California seven per cent. bonds, ..	85	94	85	89	82	93	86½	88	86	88	87½	88	73½	87½	71½	75	..
Missouri six per cent. bonds,	66	78	61	71	61	84½	67	72½	64	70½	63½	69½	87½	66	35	42	40½
Canton Company shares,	14	19	14	15	14	23½	14½	15	14	15	14	15	8	14½	8½	10	..
Cumberland Coal Co., preferred,...	8	11½	8	9	8	17½	8½	9½	7	8½	7	7½	6	7½	4	5½	5½
Pacific Mail Steamship Company,...	70	91	74½	85½	70	107½	84½	94	80½	88	82	88½	50	56	60½	71	64½
New-York Central Rail-Road,	70	84	69	76½	70	92½	75½	82½	75½	80½	75½	80	68	73½	71½	73½	72½
Erie Rail-Road shares,	26	34½	23½	29	8½	43	34½	40½	30	36	30	35	17	82½	19½	23½	23½
Hudson River Rail-Road,	40	60	36	45	36	66	44	49½	40½	48½	43	47	83	45½	84	87½	85
Harlem Rail-Road shares,	13	18	12	14½	8	24	15	16½	14	16½	15½	16½	11½	16½	10½	12½	10½
Harlem Rail-Road, preferred,	32	41	27	35½	27	55	36	43	34	43	33	41½	28	41½	25½	31½	26
Reading Rail-Road shares,	31½	42½	30	36½	30	49½	37	45½	38½	47½	39	46	29½	44½	40	46	42
Michigan Central Rail-Road,	45	64	41	50½	34½	73½	51½	61½	49½	60½	54	60	40	55½	40	46	41½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana R.R.,...	12½	19	10½	15	5	25	18½	16½	12½	15½	14½	18½	12½	17½	10½	13½	12
Michigan S. & N. Indiana, guar.,...	26½	42½	23	33	19½	50½	33	38	27½	34	33	39½	26	39½	24½	29½	23
Panama Rail-Road shares,	106	123	106	121	106	146½	112	117½	112	116	115	117½	97½	116½	99	107	108½
Illinois Central Rail-Road shares, ..	51½	74½	51½	75	51½	89½	74½	89½	69	94½	75½	83	55½	81½	57	71	69½
Galeua and Chicago Rail-Road,	55	78	53	67½	55	82½	63	74½	66½	74½	63½	74	55	73½	55½	61	57½
Cleveland and Toledo Rail-Road,...	24½	35½	20	31	18½	49½	31½	37½	27½	38	33	37	22½	36½	20½	25½	23½
Chicago & Rock Island Rail-Road, ..	50	66	42½	54	42½	54½	52½	62	52½	61½	56	61	34	53	30½	35	34½
Illinois Central Construction bonds,	81	95	83	91	81	100½	94	97	95	97	97	102½	85	98	89	92½	90½
Pennsylvania Coal Company,	75	81	73½	76	73½	87	77	80	76	80	76	80½	73	81	75	77	77½
Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.,...	33	94	30	80	30	101½	85	92	57	92	83	90	82	90	80	84	83½

THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

- I. *Annual Meeting, March, 1861. Election of Governor, Deputy-Governor and Directors, April, 1861.* II. *List of Governors, 1828-1861.* III. *Directors for Year 1861-2.*

THE half-yearly court of proprietors of the Bank of England was held on Thursday, March 14, the Governor, Mr. BONAMY DOBREE, presiding. The usual statement of the proceedings of the past six months was read, by which it appeared that the profits during that period were £720,215, making the rest on the 28th of February, £3,728,710, out of which a dividend was proposed for the half year of 5 per cent. free of income tax, leaving the rest at £3,001,060. The discussion opened with an inquiry as to the amount of bullion and reserve of notes, which were stated to exceed twelve millions and seven millions respectively. In answer to further questions, it was explained that the apparent decline in the rest arises from the deduction of the rebate of interest on bills not yet due, which always takes place at the end of the financial year. With regard to the publication of the weekly accounts earlier than on Friday night, the directors have had the question under their consideration, and are desirous of furnishing every information to the public that can be given with propriety. At present, however, no decision on the subject has been come to. A proprietor complained that, with the present high reserve and stock of bullion, the rate of discount should be kept at the extreme rate of 8 per cent., which pressed severely upon commerce generally and the small trader in particular; when it was urged in reply that the discussion of the rate of discount is not desirable at a general meeting. The directors give the matter their anxious attention, and whenever they think it prudent to reduce the rate will not hesitate to do so. The question that the dividend be at the proposed rate of 5 per cent. was then put and carried unanimously. Mr. BONAMY DOBREE, the Governor, retires from office on the present occasion, and a special vote of thanks for his valuable services was carried by acclamation. Alderman Solomons, M. P., the mover of the resolution, in the course of his remarks especially referred to the great and serious responsibility which had been thrown upon the governors of the bank by the events of the last three years, and especially eulogized the care and ability with which the affairs of this institution have been managed during that critical period.

II. THE GOVERNORS, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

Governor—ALFRED LATHAM. *Deputy-Governor*—KIRKMAN DANIEL HODGSON.

On Tuesday, April 9th, 1861, Mr. ALFRED LATHAM was elected Governor of the Bank of England, and Mr. KIRKMAN DANIEL HODGSON, Deputy-Governor. On Wednesday, the 10th, the following gentlemen were

elected directors of the bank, with the dates when they were first elected directors :

	Elected.		Elected.
Thomas Baring, M. P.,.....	1848	*James Alexander Guthrie,.....	1858
H. Wollaston Blake,.....	1848	†THOMSON HANKEY, M. P.,.....	1835
*Henry Hulse Berens,.....	1849	†JOHN BENJAMIN HEATH,.....	1823
John William Birch,.....	1860	†JOHN GELLIBRAND HUBBARD, M. P.,	1838
Travers Buxton,.....		George Lyall, M. P.,.....	1849
Stephen Cave, M. P.,.....	1860	Thomas Masterman,.....	1848
*Arthur Edward Campbell,.....	1843	Alexander Matheson,.....	1848
†WILLIAM COTTON,.....	1822	†James Morris,.....	1827
*James Pattison Currie,.....	1855	†SHEFFIELD NEAVE,.....	1830
BONAMY DOBREE,.....	1855	†George Warde Norman,.....	1848
*Benjamin Buck Greene,.....	1850	*Edward H. Palmer,.....	1859
*George Joachim Goschen,.....	1858	*Thomas Charles Smith,.....	1838

GOVERNORS AND DEPUTY-GOVERNORS OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND SINCE 1828, WITH THE DATES WHEN THEY WERE FIRST ELECTED DIRECTORS.

Year Elected.	Governor.	Deputy-Governor.
1828,	SAMUEL DREWE, 1806.	JOHN HORSLEY PALMER, 1811.
1829,	do.	do.
1830,	JOHN HORSLEY PALMER, 1811.	A. A. THOMPSON, 1811.
1831,	do.	do.
1832,	do.	RICHARD MEE RAIKES, 1812.
1833,	RICHARD MEE RAIKES, 1812.	JAMES PATTISON, 1813.
1834,	JAMES PATTISON, 1813.	TIMOTHY ABRAHAM CURTIS, 1820.
1835,	do.	do.
1836,	do.	do.
1837,	TIMOTHY ABRAHAM CURTIS, 1820.	SIR JOHN RAE REED, M. P., 1820.
1838,	do.	do.
1839,	SIR JOHN RAE REED, 1820.	SIR JOHN HENRY PELLY, 1821.
1840,	do.	do.
1841,	SIR JOHN HENRY PELLY, 1821.	WILLIAM COTTON, 1822.
1842,	WILLIAM COTTON, 1822.	JOHN BENJAMIN HEATH, 1823.
1843,	do.	do.
1844,	do.	do.
1845,	JOHN BENJAMIN HEATH, 1823.	WILLIAM R. ROBINSON, 1825.
1846,	do.	*do.
1847,	JAMES MORRIS, 1827.	HENRY JAMES PRESCOTT, 1835.
1848,	do.	do.
1849,	HENRY JAMES PRESCOTT, 1835.	THOMSON HANKEY, JR., 1835.
1850,	do.	do.
1851,	THOMSON HANKEY, JR., 1835.	JOHN GELLIBRAND HUBBARD, 1838.
1852,	do.	do.
1853,	JOHN GELLIBRAND HUBBARD, 1838.	THOMAS MATTHIAS WEGUELIN, 1838.
1854,	do.	do.
1855,	THOMAS MATTHIAS WEGUELIN, 1838.	SHEFFIELD NEAVE, 1830.
1856,	do.	do.
1857,	SHEFFIELD NEAVE, 1830.	BONAMY DOBREE, 1835.
1858,	BONAMY DOBREE, 1835.	ALFRED LATHAM, 1838.
1859,	do.	do.
1860,	do.	do.
1861,	ALFRED LATHAM, 1838.	KIRKMAN DANIEL HODGSON, 1840.

* Those with a star were directors in the year 1859—1860.

† Those with a dagger were directors in 1859-'60, and also in 1860-'61.

Those in SMALL CAPS have occupied the positions of Governor and Deputy-Governor.

BRANCHES OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

Agents.		Sub-Agents.		Agents.		Sub-Agents.	
MANCHESTER.	John Reid,	J. S. Kipping.	PLYMOUTH.	R. Morris,	C. K. Lee.
BIRMINGHAM.	W. Chippendale,	Geo. M. Brown.	PORTSMOUTH.	H. J. Dorrien,	J. Henney.
LIVERPOOL.	Wm. Fletcher,	T. L. Whitehouse.	LEICESTER.	T. C. Turner	Thos. T. Wright.
BRISTOL.	J. Saunders,	F. Ritchie.	LEEDS.	C. E. MacCarthy,	R. B. Turner.
NEWCASTLE.	Robt Anderson,	D. H. Goddard.	LONDON.	R. R. Pym,	H. E. Elsdale.
HULL.	G. A. Shea,	E. A. D. Brooshoof.	BRANCH.			

THE PUBLIC REVENUE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Abstract of the gross produce of the Revenue of the United Kingdom, in the undermentioned periods, ending March 31, 1861, compared with the corresponding periods of the preceding year.

	QUARTERS ENDED				YEAR ENDED
	June 30, 1860.	Sept. 30, 1860.	Dec. 31, 1860.	Mar. 31, 1861.	Mar. 31, 1861.
Customs,	£ 5,732,777	£ 5,888,000	£ 5,861,000	£ 5,824,000	£ 23,305,777
Excise,	5,114,000 ..	5,089,000 ..	4,350,000 ..	4,873,000 ..	19,435,000
Stamps,	2,068,242 ..	2,053,000 ..	2,036,000 ..	2,191,170 ..	8,348,412
Taxes,	1,354,000 ..	166,000 ..	1,293,000 ..	314,000 ..	3,127,000
Property tax, . .	1,088,816 ..	2,281,000 ..	3,530,000 ..	4,024,000 ..	10,923,816
Post Office, . . .	825,000 ..	800,000 ..	880,000 ..	895,000 ..	3,400,000
Crown lands, . .	66,000 ..	65,568 ..	83,000 ..	76,000 ..	290,568
Miscellaneous, .	570,339 ..	315,598 ..	228,348 ..	338,816 ..	1,453,101
Total income, .	£ 16,819,174	£ 16,658,166	£ 18,270,348	£ 18,535,986	£ 70,283,674

	QUARTERS ENDED				YEAR ENDED
	June 30, 1859.	Sept. 30, 1859.	Dec. 31, 1859.	Mar. 31, 1860.	Mar. 31, 1860.
Customs,	£ 6,108,418	£ 6,576,866	£ 6,225,000	£ 5,550,618	£ 24,460,902
Excise,	4,945,000 ..	5,549,000 ..	5,360,000 ..	4,507,000 ..	20,361,000
Stamps,	1,960,582 ..	1,937,000 ..	2,018,000 ..	2,128,016 ..	8,043,598
Taxes,	1,349,000 ..	146,000 ..	1,424,000 ..	313,000 ..	3,232,000
Property tax, . .	782,106 ..	1,874,000 ..	938,300 ..	6,002,000 ..	9,596,106
Post Office, . . .	785,000 ..	780,000 ..	830,000 ..	915,000 ..	3,310,000
Crown lands, . .	64,500 ..	61,979 ..	83,000 ..	75,000 ..	284,479
Miscellaneous, .	497,650 ..	339,931 ..	234,830 ..	729,173 ..	1,801,584
Total income, .	£ 16,492,256	£ 17,264,776	£ 17,112,830	£ 20,219,807	£ 71,089,669

Increase and decrease in the quarter and year ending March 31, 1861, as compared with the corresponding periods of the preceding year.

	QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1861.		YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1861.	
	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
Customs,	£ 273,382	£ 1,155,125
Excise,	366,000	926,000
Stamps,	63,154	£ 304,814
Taxes,	1,000	105,000
Property tax,	£ 1,978,000 ..	1,327,710
Post Office,	20,000 ..	90,000
Crown lands,	1,000	6,089
Miscellaneous,	390,357	348,483
Totals,	£ 704,536 ..	£ 2,388,357 ..	£ 1,728,613 ..	£ 2,534,608
Net decrease,		£ 1,683,821		£ 805,995

NEW BANK BUILDINGS IN NEW-YORK.

I. *The Importers and Traders' Bank.* II. *The Tradesmen's Bank.*

I. THE IMPORTERS AND TRADERS' BANK.

THE Importers and Traders' Bank have erected a building on the southwest corner of Broadway and Murray-street, of white marble, from the East Chester Quarry Company. It is 25 feet front on Broadway and 103 feet on Murray-street. There are five stories, also a sub-cellar and vaults. The first or basement story is well lighted and ventilated, and the floor is but two feet below the sidewalk. It is admirably arranged into four apartments, suitable for banking, insurance or other offices. The office fronting upon Broadway is already secured by Messrs. TAYLOR BROTHERS, bankers and brokers, who have a branch office at the corner of Wall and Pearl streets.

The first floor will be used by the bank for its own business. The President's and Cashier's room is placed in front on Broadway and the Directors' room in the rear. The vault is a model in its way. It is built by Messrs. HERRING & Co., of this city, and no labor or expense has been spared to make it impenetrable to burglars or heat. It rests upon a heavy stone foundation, built up from the ground. It is thirteen feet long, six feet wide, fifteen feet high and divided in two parts or stories. The outside is of what is called heavy boiler iron; next to this is placed five inches of composition, which is considered nearly as perfect a non-conductor of heat as science or art has yet developed. Then follows another plate of heavy boiler iron. Then a heavy wide plate of cast steel, expressly tempered for this purpose. Then a plate of Franklinite iron, or oxide of zinc—which is impenetrable to a drill of any kind—indeed, so hard is it that a piece broken off will show the crystals sharply defined, and the point of which will cut glass like a diamond. Lastly follows another plate of heavy boiler iron; thus making several inches of iron, steel and Franklinite, all riveted and screwed together in the strongest manner.

It would seem as if such a vault would be amply sufficient to protect whatever might be placed within, but, as if to make security doubly secure, a large safe is placed within, made in the same burglar-proof manner as the vault itself. The doors of this inside safe are fastened by one of LILLIE's and one of ISHAM's locks. The inside door of the vault is supplied with two locks—one of LILLIE's and one of BUTTERWORTH's. The outside vault door be secured by one of CRUYGIER's locks. The public will appreciate how few the chances are of all these locks being picked, as they must be before the money can be reached by any person who does not know the combination upon which each lock was set as it was locked up, when we inform them that there are *several millions of combinations* or changes in each lock. The outside of the vault has a fine architectural finish quite unusual for a bank vault. Taken

as a whole, it is indeed, as its manufacturer, HERRING, the veteran safe-builder, calls it, a masterpiece of safe or vault building.

The bank counters are made of black walnut, richly panelled and finished with brackets. The second floor is rented by Messrs. BRADSTREET & SON, for the business of their mercantile agency. The third and fourth floors are arranged for lawyers' offices, and well constructed for light, heat, ventilation and other conveniences. The greatest care has been taken amply to ventilate and light each apartment throughout the building. GOLD's patent low-pressure steam-heating apparatus will be used in warming the building.

This attractive building is from the plans of Mr. GRIFFITH THOMAS. It is in the modern Italian style of architecture, surmounted with a handsome cornice, brackets, medallions, &c. The whole cost, including heating apparatus, bank vault and furniture, is less than sixty thousand dollars. It was first occupied on the 1st day of April, 1861.

II. TRADESMEN'S BANK.

On the northwest corner of Broadway and Reade-street a building has been erected for the Tradesmen's Bank, and was completed by the 1st of May, 1861. The size of the building is 33 feet 2 inches on Broadway, and 98 feet 9 inches on Reade-street. There are a sub-cellar, basement and four stories, surmounted by an enriched Corinthian entablature, with frieze windows, forming an attic or fifth story. The Reade-street front has a pediment over the centre. Both the fronts are built of white marble, and in the Palladian Italian style of architecture. The first story, to be occupied by the bank, is built of fire-proof materials, with iron beams and brick arches. This floor is approached from the street by a wide flight of marble steps, with ballustrades and pedestals. The stairs to the second story are also of white marble. There is a back staircase of iron from the basement to the fifth story, to be used in connection with the hoistway, or in case of fire. All the stories above the bank have been already leased by a large importing firm, to be occupied for mercantile purposes, &c., and are built as fire-proof as can be made with timber beams, and well deafened. The basement floor is six steps below the sidewalk, and will be leased either as a store or as offices. The building throughout will be heated by steam, and will cost about \$80,000, or, including the lot of ground, about \$200,000. The architect for the above building is Mr. MARTIN E. THOMPSON. The new building was first occupied by the Tradesmen's Bank on Monday, June 24th.

THE CURRENCY OF OHIO.

DEBATE IN THE OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 26, 1861.

MR. VINCENT, from the Finance Committee, made a report upon the resolution directed to that committee, inquiring what legislation, if any, is necessary to protect the monetary interests of the State, and for the relief of the banks of the State, in which he said :

Upon this resolution the Finance Committee unanimously report—

“That, in their opinion, no legislation is necessary; that the banks of the State are in a very strong condition; and, so far as the committee can ascertain, desire no legislation in their behalf; but would greatly deprecate the passage of any act tending to impair the present obligations of banks to redeem their notes at sight, or in any way screening them from the consequences of a suspension of specie payment.”

I will simply add, that this resolution was prompted by the highest motives, and, as its author states, not with a belief that legislative aid to the banks was necessary, but to obtain the opinion of the proper committee of this House on the subject, to quiet any doubts or inquiries of our citizens on the subject. In the midst of all the warlike preparations around us, with the whole male population of Ohio capable of bearing arms rushing from their homes to the service of the country, it naturally occurs to the observing men that business will be disturbed, and the finances of the State should be guarded for the emergency. But it is a great mistake to interpose legislation, thinking to strengthen the banks by it.

You pass an act allowing banks to decline specie payment of their notes at sight, and you destroy the bank. It is not longer entitled to credit, and is not, in commercial strictness, a bank. If we should interfere with the obligations and liabilities of our banks to redeem their notes, we should sacrifice the high credit they now deservedly have, and place them on a par with the irredeemable trash of some of the other States.

We should produce the very results we desire to avoid, and the banks could well ask to be delivered from their friends. But it is sufficient for us to know that the banks of Ohio ASK NO RELIEF. The sworn statements show why they do not need relief; they are sound to the core, and never since we were a State was there so much real strength in these institutions. Though the whole capital in the banks of our State is comparatively small, we have met all emergencies. In 1857, with one-fifth of their whole capital tied up by the Trust Company, they met the storm successfully, and we had reason to be proud of the banks of Ohio and of the efficient men having their control.

Other States sanctioned the blunder of suspension, and from that day to this their banks have been without credit and their people without a reliable currency. No, sir, it is a mistake, which has often been made, to allow banks to issue notes, and not compel them to redeem; expecting thereby that the banks could issue largely and make money plenty. But

the trouble is, the people don't want *such* money. It, in fact, ceases to be money, and instead of increasing money facilities by enlarging the circulation, it destroys what good money we have.

Now let bankers manage the banks, and let us keep up all the restrictions of speedy redemption. It is the life-current of these institutions that they must and do *redeem* their notes; and you can have no healthy banking without it. Bankers of the business talent of ours in Ohio know this, and hence they deprecate any action in their behalf. I am authorized to say, for the State Bank and others, that they desire no legislative action. They regard it as unnecessary and its effect injurious.

THE GREAT LEATHER BANKRUPTCY CASE.

From the London Times.

THE mysteries of money-raising are becoming gradually clear. How to live on nothing a year is a mere joke of a problem. The modern feat is, how to be rich, generous, influential and benevolent, with nothing a year; how to carry on a splendid business, exhibit large profits and emulate the grandest capitalists out of this slender stock. Does the reader wish to know the secret? He had better not apply it, for, like the gifts of wicked fairies, it tends to mischief in the end; but, as a mere indulgence of natural curiosity, and for an agreeable piece of amusement, there will be no harm in studying the history of STREATFEILD & Co., as now explained by a principal of that famous firm. Mr. LAURENCE himself has appeared in Basinghall-street, and, under the insinuating guidance of Mr. LINKLATER, has imparted a good deal of interesting information to the outside world. We can now trace the fortunes of the great leather house from a comparatively remote period up to its final catastrophe; and, what is more to the point, we can follow the financial operations which Mr. LAURENCE directed through ten critical years. It is desirable to observe at the outset that the firm of STREATFEILD & Co. was of long standing; Mr. LAURENCE himself had been a partner in it for nearly forty years, so that it enjoyed the advantages of an ancient and well-known establishment. The partners had been four in number—Mr. STREATFEILD, Mr. LAURENCE, Sen., the present Mr. LAURENCE and Mr. MORTIMORE; but by the year 1846 the firm was reduced to the two last named gentlemen. At the end of that year the capital of the house is said to have been some £40,000; but the financial troubles of 1847 cut the amount down to £20,000; and by the close of 1850 affairs had become worse still. At that epoch, Mr. MORTIMORE's capital was on the wrong side of the account, he being actually indebted to the business; and, though Mr. LAURENCE's share had not undergone so radical a transmutation, it could not be reckoned at more than £6,786 of positive value. But here it was that "financial ability" came into play. When capital was gone and spent, then knowledge proved most excellent. Mr. LAURENCE himself compressed the history of the

case into a single sentence: "Having so small a capital, he got the money by discounting;" and not only borrowed himself, but borrowed to lend again.

The amount of "business done" by STREATFEILD & Co. in this awkward year of 1850 was between £300,000 and £400,000. The amount of "paper floating" during the same year eluded all exact computation, but it was more than £100,000; and the firm was "in the habit" all the while of "assisting customers by large advances." That is what was done. There is the exploit, the performance, the accomplished feat, which are all the more miraculous as having been sustained for ten years together. STREATFEILD & Co. not only carried on handsomely through 1850, but flourished in the same style up to the present year. But how to do it? There is the mysterious problem. That the success was attributable to the management of Mr. LAURENCE is admitted; but that gentleman modestly disclaims all the praise. He declares that greatness was thrust upon him. The money dealers, bankers and bill discounters insisted upon his taking their money; the cash was forced down his throat; it required no trouble at all. It was "ask and have," or rather it was having without asking, for the dealers came laden with coin, and only begged for acceptance. According to this explanation, nothing could be easier than the work. The only instruments were "bills." STREATFEILD & Co. "drew" upon their customers in the trade, and their customers "accepted." A draft and an acceptance together make a bill, and in exchange for a bill so constituted, a bank or a discount house will furnish money. In the more regular course of such operations it is understood that a substantial value forms the basis of the transaction, so that in the case before us, for instance, STREATFEILD & Co. should have "drawn upon tanners against hides." But the grand secret of these transactions consisted in dispensing with the ingredient of value. There were plenty of leather dealers in the affair, but there was mighty little leather. The firm drew and the customers accepted bills, regulated by convenience rather than substance; and these bills, after being altered to pattern, were then cashed as promptly and as easily as if they had been absolute securities. For example, there were customers of the house named DRAPER & Co., the genuine purchases for whom had, in the course of three years and a half, amounted to some £30,000, but whose "acceptances" for STREATFEILD & Co., during the same period, had exceeded £450,000. Of course so long as two people can make a bill, and a third person will "discount" it, there can be no difficulty in raising money. The process is far easier than coining.

What puzzles ordinary persons is the method of getting so much credit, and the source from which all the money can come. If we are to accept Mr. LAURENCE's bashful disclaimers, it really was only half his doing, if so much. He had but to "arrange" the bills, and money-lenders were ravenous to swallow them. The "channels" through which those instruments could be floated were infinite. Mr. LAURENCE told glibly off on his fingers some fifteen or twenty houses into which his streams had been poured. It was "a pretty good list," as he acknowledged, but he added what made the story better still. "Scarcely an instance occurred in which they have not come to us first. They were

eager for our bills. We could scarcely supply them fast enough." In fact he ought to have an implement like the envelope-cutting machine, to turn out so many bills a minute. Bank after bank, he declares, came and pressed him to open accounts with them. He had really no necessity for so many offers. He was embarrassed with facilities. He had to assume a lofty air, and regulate his favors, lest they should become too cheap. One discount company waited on him through its manager, and begged sorely for an allotment of STREATFEILD & Co.'s bills; but STREATFEILD & Co. were inexorable to such solicitations. They went upon hard, business-like principles. Mr. LAURENCE returned answer to the suitor that "it was a question of rate; the cheapest shop was their shop;" and the poor money-lender retired abashed and crestfallen. After, however, the firm relented, and the manager was fortunate enough to secure a little of their produce for the establishment under his care. Enchanted with the article, the company "were continually writing for bills." They used to send regular orders for them, and say they wanted "so many thousand pounds" worth. It is clear enough that such a disposition as is here alleged on the part of the money-lenders must have materially facilitated Mr. LAURENCE's operations, and have deprived those proceedings of the distinction which they would otherwise merit. But there is another side to the story, and it has not been left without a narrator. Mr. MATTHEW MARSHALL, JUN., Manager of the Bank of London, since its establishment in 1855, was examined as to his view of the transactions in question, and gave them rather a different complexion. He repudiated the craving for bills imputed to his class, and "most distinctly" affirmed that if his bank had known the character of STREATFEILD & Co.'s paper it would not have discounted it. Mr. LAURENCE, he declared, "generally spoke highly of his paper," saying that there was "leather at the bottom of every shilling of it," and asserting, with reference to the joint fabricators of the instruments, that the bills "were as good at one end as at the other," an estimate which was doubtless pretty near the truth.

It was on the faith of all this that the bank discounted the bills as regular and legitimate paper of commerce. Now, we are certainly not inclined to suppose that the Bank of London or any other bank would wittingly have found hard money for STREATFEILD & Co.'s acceptances. Self-interest would have deterred them from that kind of business. Banks, as Mr. MARSHALL said of his own, "do not lose their money if they can help it." But when we look broadly at the transaction before us, we cannot avoid concluding that some people or other must really have been almost as anxious to lend as Mr. LAURENCE was to borrow. Mr. MARSHALL denies that there is any superabundance of money in the market, or any "excessive competition" among bankers; but he admits that he himself "had solicited bills, and received £40,000," while he could not state whether STREATFEILD's account in particular had been solicited or not. However, we are now regarding this affair not from any single point of view, but in its broad general aspect; and as we know the enormous sums which STREATFEILD & Co. did raise, and the vacuum on which they raised them, we do not see how the result is to be explained, unless the money-dealers were very willing parties to the proceedings. Whatever exaggeration we may suspect in Mr. LAURENCE's

descriptions, the broad fact remains that he got the money, as much as he wanted, and for years together. STREATFEILD & Co. actually rolled in cash created on bills. They had cant names for tens of thousands. The sum of £5,000—not a flea-bite when a man comes to earn it—was called in their vocabulary a “teaspoon,” and Mr. MARSHALL used to send the message, “Send me down a tea——.” The unit of notation was multiplied in regular form, a “dessert spoon” being £10,000; a “table spoon,” £15,000, and a “gravy spoon,” £20,000.

Now, could such a game be carried on if money had been hard to come by, if capital had not been cheap and money-dealers as anxious for custom as any other tradesmen? We think there is but one answer, and that answer is a natural one. When lenders are as numerous as borrowers, borrowers must gain. When discount companies are multiplied, discounting must become easier, as Mr. LAURENCE found it.

TRANSMISSION OF SPECIE LAST CENTURY.

I LEFT London on the 25th of May. Mr. DONALDSON, the bookseller, being informed of my intended journey, called upon me, and, after expressions of kindness, told me that he had it in his power to obtain for me a free and safe conveyance to Edinburgh, on the condition of my taking charge of a valuable parcel to be sent there in a few days. I accepted this offer, which appeared to me so reasonable, with my best thanks; but how much was I surprised when, upon my arrival in the city on the day I was to begin my journey, the value of the parcel committed to my care was made known to me, and a pair of loaded pistols put into my hands for defending it, with a paper of instructions relative to the plan of my journey. The parcel was a portmanteau covering a chest, which contained eight or ten thousand guineas for the old Bank of Scotland. The substance of the directions given me was, to write twice every day while on the road to Mr. INNES, Edinburgh, and Mr. HENDERSON, London—to make only a short stop at every stage—not to travel after eight o'clock in the evening—not to lodge during the night in any of the large towns—never to lose sight of the portmanteau, to be deposited in my bedroom and the door to be locked.

The following is a copy of the route and instructions with which I was furnished: “25th May, 1769. From London to Barnett, 12 miles; Hatfield, 9; Stevenage, 12; Biggleswade, 14; Bugden, 16; Stilton, 14; Stamford, 14; Witham Common, 11; Grantham, 10; Newark, 14; Tuxford, 14; Barnaby Moor, 14; Doncaster, 14; Ferrybridge, 15; (between Doncaster and Ferrybridge is a very steep hill, which it is better to walk up, for fear of the traces giving way;) Weatherby, 16; Bourroughbridge, 12; Northallerton, 19; Darlington, 15; Durham, 18; Newcastle, 15; (it is now best to walk down the steep hill going into Newcastle, and if there is a drag-chain to the chaise, cause the driver to fix it;) Morpeth, 14; Whittengam, 19; Woollerhaughead, 11; Cornhill, 14; Greenlaw, 12; Norton Moor, 12; Blackshiels, 10; Edinburgh, 14; total, 385.

"It is requested that you keep the portmanteau always in sight, and have it in the room where you sleep, which it would be proper were a two-bedded one. Please to write from Stilton, from Doncaster, North-allerton, Morpeth and Edinburgh, or so calculate it that we may receive a line by each London post you meet on the road. When you arrive at Edinburgh, please drive to the bottom of the Fishmarket Closs; and if one of you will be at the trouble to step up the closs to the Royal Bank, and acquaint Mr. CAMPBELL or Mr. INNES, the cashiers, of your having a portmanteau for the bank from WILLIAM TOD & Co., of London, they will send two porters with you to bring it up. Please leave the pistols at ARBUTHNOT & GUTHRIE's, in the Exchange."

My journey was not by any means an agreeable one. Apprehensions of personal danger were revived at every stage of my route; for as the weight of the parcel required the exertions of two porters to remove it from one carriage to another, the nature and value of the contents were palpable, not only to the bearers, but to the many idle hangers-on, often of suspicious aspect, always to be found about the gates and stable-yards of inns, and who did not spare their jeering but significant remarks on the subject—as, "I wish to God, Jack, you and I had a corner of this box;" "The gentleman has need to be well armed." The landlords, too, cursed and complained of the weight of the clandestine burden, endangering the bottom of their carriages; and, in order to pacify them, I was under the necessity of driving with four horses in some of the long stages. Haunted with dreams of robbery and assassination, I enjoyed no quiet refreshing sleep between London and Edinburgh. I arrived in the bank close at one o'clock, 29th May, and delivered my parcel safe to Mr. INNES at the expected hour. Of twenty guineas allowed for the expenses of my journey, one remained in my pocket.—*My Own Life and Times*, 1741–1814. By THOMAS SOMERVILLE, D. D.

EXCHEQUER BILLS.—The following suggestive remarks relative to the new footing upon which exchequer bills are about to be placed, are from Mr. J. A. FRANKLIN, the professional auditor:

The new era which is about to be inaugurated for exchequer bills foreshadows the following results:

1. They will become a constituent of the currency for home purposes, *e. g.*, those for which bullion is not essential. (The note issues of Scotch banks have long been, in fact, based upon exchequer bills.)
2. They will be available for foreign exchanges within the limits to which inferior State bonds and coupons are now employed.
3. They will afford to capitalists in foreign markets, when interest is low, a higher class of negotiable securities than has heretofore been made acceptable for their permanent investments.
4. They will be available for post-office savings bank investments, with minimum risk of depreciation.

Differences of opinion exist as to whether the rate of interest should be expressed per annum or per diem. Bankers prefer annual rates; smaller holders prefer the more simple index of accumulation. Both parties might be accommodated by printing on the back of every bill a table which has been devised for any rate of interest. And seeing that the rate of interest may vary from time to time while the bill remains current, the table facilitates variations of the rate either by decimal or any other fractional progression.

NEW VIEWS OF THE CURRENCY.

COMMUNICATION FROM HAMER STANSFELD, ESQ., OF ENGLAND.

SIR,—Another artificial monetary pressure in the face of abundance of money, and possibly another monetary panic, is at hand; which will yield a rich harvest to the owner of money, but great loss to the owners of all other kinds of property and to the sons of labor. When will our land-owners, merchants, manufacturers and operatives awaken to the direful action on their interests of our monetary laws, and especially of the act of 1844?

Let them look upon money of all kinds, from cowrie-shells to bank notes and sovereigns, simply as “a security for the transfer of capital,” and regard it as perfectly distinct from capital, insomuch as money *of itself* cannot add to products of the world, whilst capital can. Money, so long as it is retained as money, and not exchanged for capital, cannot increase wealth, for although one person receives interest for its use, another person pays it, and the general wealth remains the same.

Let them consider further, that the true meaning of raising the rate of discount is the stoppage of trade, the interchange of their respective commodities by making money, the instrument for carrying on trade, dearer; that the effect is precisely the same as when the directors of a railway, by raising their fares and rates, diminish traffic.

To restrict the supply of money, of “perfectly sound securities for the transfer of equivalent values of capital,” is surely as absurd as it would be to limit the number of trucks and carriages on a railway. Should not the sound rule be, to take care of the quality of the circulating medium and leave the quantity to take care of itself?

On this principle the business of the Bank of England was conducted prior to the act of 1844, the directors being subject to no other restriction than that which their liability to pay their notes in gold on demand imposed on their discretion.

The market rate of discount then depended upon the demand and supply of the various kinds of ready money, viz.: deposit money, bank notes and gold, but since the act of 1844, the rate depends on the demand and supply of *gold alone*; as the notes of the Bank of England are made to increase and decrease with the gold in the issue department of the Bank of England, and their amount governs the bank rate of discount, and the bank rate regulates the market rate.

For one hundred and forty years previous to the act of 1844, the rate of discount of the Bank of England never fell below 4 per cent. nor exceeded 5 per cent., excepting for a few months in 1839, whilst, since the act, the fluctuations have been incessant and often violent, ranging from 2 to 10 per cent.; from the 8th to the 15th of November last the variation was from 4 to 6 per cent., a rise of 50 per cent. in eight days.

And into whose pockets does the extra rate go, and from whom is it taken? Is it not transferred from land-owners, merchants and manufactur-

ers, to bankers, money dealers and depositors; from productive to non-productive classes; for although bankers are most valuable and essential in providing money, the means of obtaining capital and carrying on production, they do not themselves produce any thing.

Whence comes it that these powerful bodies of land-owners, merchants, manufacturers and operatives so tamely submit to the gross injustice of our monetary laws; and more especially, how comes it that Chambers of Commerce, the appointed guardians of the interests of the commercial community, are so supine on the subject? Is it that the members are so much engrossed with buying cheap and selling dear that they neglect the due consideration of the laws which so often upset their calculations; or is it that they are so little acquainted with the science of money, the most important branch of political economy, that they shun the discussion of the currency? Or is it, that the majority of the members are under such obligations to their bankers that they dare not protest against the monopoly in the manufacture of bank-note money which their bankers possess, that as borrowers they cannot well contend with lenders?

Are they not aware, that as the value of money rises, the value of their property (capital) falls, and that all fluctuations in the value of money, not proceeding from the natural law of demand and supply, but artificially created by unsound laws, are most prejudicial to their interests?

Are they insensible to the fact that our laws, by restricting the supply of money, makes it dearer to them than to their foreign competitors; that the difference to their disadvantage with France was lately $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the rate of the Bank of France being $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and of the Bank of England 6 per cent., and that at the same time the market rate of discount in Brussels was 3 per cent., and at Hamburg, only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.?

If these influential classes will not bestir themselves to obtain emancipation from the thralldom of the moneyed interest, how can we expect that any government, unsupported by public opinion, will undertake the task?

The moneyed interest in the House of Commons is more powerful than the landed interest; from the latter we did obtain the abolition of the monopoly which the corn laws gave them, but the monopoly still remains which the money laws create, a reproach to all free-traders. It is strange, but true, that no deference is paid in the House of Commons to the opinion of a member on the subject of money unless he be a banker, the party most interested, and that the more money he possesses the more sound and disinterested his opinion is considered to be; in the Committee on the Bank Acts, the evidence of Lord OVERSTONE, a millionaire, was preferred to that of J. S. MILL, Esq., the first political economist of the age.

What ministers, be they whig or tory, dare go down to the House of Commons and grapple with the overwhelming influence of the Bank of England and moneyed interests there, by proposing that the powers of issuing upwards of £30,000,000 of bank notes, given by the act of 1844 to certain privileged bankers, should be taken from them, and transferred to a National Bank of Issue for the good of the nation?

Were a National Bank of Issue now in action, where all could have legal tender notes payable in gold upon demand, on depositing one-third of the amount in gold, and two-thirds in government securities, these

drains of gold to France and America would be comparatively little felt; the value of gold would rise naturally, according to the law of supply and demand, and the rate of discount would be raised proportionately, but there would be no diminution of our domestic currency, nor apprehension of a deficiency of legal tender money, the real cause of monetary panics; both of which evils are created by the act of 1844.

Verily we are the slaves of the moneyed interest, and with little chance of emancipation, unless bankers are high-minded and patriotic enough, and many are, to prefer their country's good to their individual advantage, and will themselves move for an amendment of our monetary laws; or a third dreadful monetary panic be inflicted upon us, as in 1847 and 1857.

These convulsions are the certain results of the conflicting principles at work of free-trade in commodities and restrictions on the quantity of money requisite to pay for them. Nature's offended laws will eventually vindicate themselves.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

HAMER STANSFELD.

The Grange, Burley, near Otley, 6th December, 1860.

P. S.—Were the public aware that the writer of the city money article in the *Times* is the Secretary of the Treasury Committee of the Bank of England, the giant monopolist, they might account in some degree for the support given to the act of 1844 by the leading journal.

COINS, COINAGE AND BULLION.

Proceedings of the Numismatic Society, London, January 24, 1861.

W. S. W. VAUX, Esq., President in the chair. W. ALLEN, Esq., was elected a member. Dr. NAMUR, Secretary of the Archæological Society of Luxembourg, was elected an honorary member. Mr. J. EVANS read a short paper, communicated by S. EVANS, Esq., "On Modern Art and the New Bronze Coinage." Mr. EVANS read a communication from T. BATEMAN, Esq., descriptive "of some British gold and Roman silver coins found at Lightcliffe, near Halifax, in 1827." There were three of DUMNOCOVEROS, and several family coins, but nothing later than the reign of CALIGULA, and none of TIBERIUS. Mr. VAUX read a short account "of three barbarous imitations by Merovingian kings, of Byzantine solidi, found, with a Saxon brooch, at Sarre, in the Island of Thanet." There were two of MAURICIUS TIBERIUS, one of HERACLIUS, and the fourth, a gold solidus of CHLOTAIRE II., which fixes the period of their fabrication. Mr. VAUX read a communication from W. WEBSTER, Esq., "On an Unique Piece of Lady GREY," with the motto, "Justitia Virtutum Regina," being the motto of this unfortunate lady, and the only proof (if any) that it belonged to her. Mr. ROACH SMITH exhibited casts of some ancient British coins in gold, found in a field called the "Golden Piece,"

near Ryarsh, Kent, and now in the possession of the Rev. L. B. LARKING. Mr. ROACH SMITH remarked that he suspected that prior discoveries of the same nature in the same field gave it the name of "Golden Piece." The Rev. Prof. HENSLOW exhibited an impression of a small gold coin of PANORMUS. Mr. EVANS exhibited a drachma of PHILIP ANDRÆUS, struck at Mitylene, in Lesbos, which had been given to him at Aldborough, Suffolk, as having been found beneath the roots of an oak which had been grubbed up in Rendlesham Park, a few miles from Aldborough. There was little doubt that it had been found in the manner stated, but how it came there it was impossible to say. These two cases, *if true*, prove that Greek coins are found in England. Mr. AKERMAN exhibited a photograph of a silver coin of CARAUSIUS, found in digging for the railway at Abingdon, and in the possession of H. B. GODWIN, Esq.

Proceedings of the Numismatic Society, London, February 21, 1861.

W. S. W. VAUX, Esq., President, in the chair. The Rev. H. J. B. NICHOLSON, S. EVANS, S. BIRCH and A. W. FRANKS, Esqs., were elected members. The Hon. LEICESTER WARREN read a short account of a "Jetton of Perkin Warbeck," being a translation of an interesting notice by M. ADRIEN DE LONGPENE in the "Revue Numismatique," T. vi. p. 384, and giving a short historical sketch of this semi-mythical personage. Mr. MADDEN read a short paper "On an Unpublished Variety of a Coin of ÆTHELSTAN the First, King of East Anglia, A. D. 825-852." Communications were read from Mr. MICKLEY, of Philadelphia, relative to a coin of JOHN of Brittany, and from Mr. A. W. FRANKS, relative to a find of coins of ELIZABETH, JAMES the First and CHARLES the First, at Josworth, near Horndean, Hants.

Proceedings of the Boston Numismatic Society.

The monthly meeting was held on Friday, March 1st, and was an unusually large and interesting one. After the ordinary business of the meeting, Mr. BRYANT presented VAILLANT'S Work on Roman Coins, which was published at Paris, 1694; and Mr. DAVENPORT presented a set of the new Canadian silver money. Mr. COLBURN read a description of the medal on the destruction of Kittaning, which was referred to him at the last meeting, and an account of the circumstances connected with its origin.

The President, Dr. LEWIS, exhibited a curious old medal of ANDREW SANTIO, and a beautiful and extremely rare shilling of HENRY III., bearing the numeral Septim.

Mr. LAMB exhibited a coin of FERDINAND II., of Naples, on which the words OLIM and BOMBA were artistically stamped, and a seal or die, which so much resembled the ancient coins of Nismis, that he supposed it must belong to that city.

Mr. DAVENPORT exhibited some beautiful German medals, lately struck in honor of LUTHER and the Conference of Augsburg.

On motion of Dr. SHURTLEFF it was resolved, that the Boston Numismatic Society will do all in its power to expose those who alter the dates of coins, and those who make a trade of selling such as have been altered, thereby deluding the unsuspecting and destroying confidence in rare specimens. The immediate cause of this resolution was a cent which was exhibited at the meeting, and which had been remarkably well altered from a commoner date to the rare one of 1799.

THE HISTORY OF GEMS AND JEWELS.

Their History, Geography, Chemistry and Ana. From the Earliest Ages down to the present time. By Madame DE BARRERA. (BENTLEY.)

WHEN POPE brought into one line the sparkling diamonds and the dirty linen of Lady MARY, he suggested to the reader the value of two very distinct things—namely, costly gems and pure water. What the poet thus effected has been more prosaically done by one of the most prosaic of men—namely, ADAM SMITH—whose statistics and whose style possesses, indeed, all the brilliancy and more than the truth of poetry. How neatly does that good old ADAM, (who is better worth reading than any novelist, living or dead,) how neatly does the acute and profound philosopher demonstrate this fact. Nothing is more useful than water, he tells us, but it will purchase scarcely any thing. Scarcely any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarcely any value in use, but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it. In something after the above fashion does the author of "The Wealth of Nations" demonstrate the difference between "value in use" and "value in exchange."

A cup of water in the desert would be paid for with all Golconda by a wretch dying of thirst—provided he were possessor of that glittering estate. In capital cities and fashionable drawing-rooms it is otherwise; gems and jewels then go up, and what will they not, what have they not purchased? The faith of kings, the good name of women, the honor of men! TARPEIA betrayed her country for a few bracelets. Diamonds and a cashmere shawl are said to be talismans among the "Demi-Monde." Everywhere we hear of the potentiality of precious stones. There is only one instance—and that only authenticated by an Irish bard—of a "girl who gave to song what gold could never buy."

St. AMBROSE in vain pointed to the ring on the finger of the rich man, declaring that the stone which it contained might be made to feed a famished city. The fine gentleman still carried his gem, and did not exchange it for food for the hungry. There is said to be a sympathy between precious stones and their wearers; and as the turquoise is reported to be affected by the emotions of its owner, so are diamonds said to communicate their hardness to the hearts of those who ostentatiously display them.

In all nations have these pretty bits of earth found honor. Jews have kissed and infidels adored them, as the poet suggestively intimates of the

diamond cross "which sparkled on his heroine's breast." In India, in Judea and by the rivers of South America, from Archangel to Caffraria, the potentiality of gems and jewels has for ever been confessed. Greek and Roman worshipped them; CLEOPATRA and HELIOGABALUS flashed in the sun and looked godlike by their aid; Gaul and Goth and Frank, by their means, added to their dignity. So sacred is even the Christian jeweller's art, that a saint in Paradise is provided by the Romish authorities for his inspiration, and the good St. ELOI, who had such a tailor's or valet's eye for the nether garments of King DAGOBERT, superintends those arrangements of ring, broach, bracelet, tiara and necklace which give to men the aspect of mountebanks, and are supposed to add lustre to female beauty.

MADAME DE BARRERA has written a really charming volume on this sparkling subject. The learned and lively lady goes thoroughly into the general history of gems from the earliest to the present times. She explains alike the geography and the chemistry of precious stones, illustrating their qualities, properties and virtues, adds some exquisite gossip on historical jewels of every age and description, and concludes with accounts of precious stones which have been pawned and brilliant caskets which have been stolen. The volume, in short, is as amusing as it is instructive, and is, in its graceful "getting up," worthy of a place in every locality where useful books are as highly valued as carcanet or ruby. A few extracts will afford evidence that we "speak by the card."

"Among the fatal results to which the extravagant mania for jewels of that day led, may be quoted the case of MADAME TRIQUET, whose bridal-bouquet cost her her life as well as her fortune. CARLIER, a bookseller in the reign of LOUIS XIV., left at his death, to each of his children—one a girl of fifteen the other a captain in the guards—a sum of 500,000 francs, then an enormous fortune. Mdlle. CARLIER, young, handsome and wealthy, had numerous suitors; one of these, a M. TRIQUET, a councillor of the parliament, sent her on her fête-day a bouquet, in which the calices of the roses were of large diamonds. The magnificence of this gift gave so good an opinion of the wealth, taste and liberality of the donor, that the lady gave him the preference over all his competitors. But sad was the disappointment that followed the bridal. The husband was rather poor than rich, and the bouquet that had cost 45,000 francs (£1,800) had been bought on credit, and was paid out of the bride's fortune. The revelation of the deceit practiced upon her was not likely to ensure domestic peace; the lady, moreover, found that in lieu of living in the style she had expected, she would have to diminish her own expenditure to provide for her husband's. She soon solicited and obtained a separation and the use of her own fortune. The husband retaliated by bringing a charge of undue intimacy between his wife and M. MONGEORGE, a captain in the guards; and obtained from the king a *lettre-de-cachet* to confine her in a convent. Unfortunately for his plans, he could not forbear triumphing over his victim by exhibiting to her the fatal order; the lady sprang forward, snatched it from him, and threw it in the fire! Here was an end of his vengeance; forewarned is forearmed; the other side had probably partisans in power, and when he solicited a second *lettre-de-cachet*, it was refused. During these little bickerings the loving

couple continued to reside under the same roof, but in separate apartments. This state of things was finally brought to a climax in a tragical manner; M. TIQUET one night received five stabs, of which, however, he did not choose to die—probably to spite his wife. The assassin was arrested, and confessed that he had been instigated to the deed by Madame TIQUET. The wife was beheaded! the servant, who had been the tool of her vengeance, was hung.”

The neck-chain was a mark of distinction among the men of old Gaul; only in later times did the ladies there adopt the fashion:

“In France, necklaces were not worn by ladies until the reign of CHARLES the Seventh. That Prince presented one of precious stones—some say of *diamonds*—to his fair mistress, AGNES SOREL. The gems were probably uncut, perhaps unskillfully set, for the lady complained that they hurt her neck; and, comparing it to an instrument of punishment, she denominated the ornament her *carcan*, *i. e.*, carcanet. However, as the king admired it, she continued to wear the jewel, saying, that one might surely bear some little inconvenience to please those we love. The fashion was immediately adopted by the ladies of the court, and soon became general. From that time the necklace has been more or less worn. Sometimes, as in the reign of CATHERINE DE MEDICI, pearls were all the fashion; and the pictures of that queen, of the celebrated DIANE DE POITIERS, her rival, and of the fair MARY STUART, show how *recherchées* were those ladies in this respect. Under MARIE DE MEDICI pearls continued in favor, not only for necklaces, but every other ornament; dresses were covered with them, and fillets and strings of pearls were mingled with the tresses left to flow loose on the shoulders. Under LOUIS the Fourteenth diamonds superseded pearls, and were used with like profusion. Diamond *rivières* took the place of the strings of pearls.”

The origin and signification of the ear-ring are of equal interest:

“The Rabbis assert that EVE’s ears were bored when she was exiled from Eden, as a sign of slavery and submission to man, her master. If so, the slaves have since found a way to make their masters atone for this humiliation; the latter must pay dearly for the diamond badges of their wives’ servitude. Since then, not money alone have these pretty baubles cost; blood has been poured forth in torrents to procure them for some capricious fair one, while the sacrifice of them has, at other times, been attended with the most fatal results. The golden calf was made entirely from the golden ear-rings of the people—probably the same they had borrowed of the Egyptians, and neglected to return—and three thousand men paid with their lives the unworthy use to which the jewels were put. We find, also, that the ephod, made of the ear-rings of the Princes of Midian, ‘became a snare unto GIDEON, and to his house.’ Among the Arabs, the expression, *to have a ring in one’s ear*, is synonymous with *to be a slave*. When one man submits to the will of another he is said to have placed in his ear the ring of obedience.”

The chapters on rings, like that on crowns, are full, without, however, being complete. The origin of the crown, under NIMROD, is not alluded to; and the question of the rings of the sergeants-at-law, which the latter present, on their nomination, to the Queen, who possesses a curious collection of these posies or mottoed circlets, is not entered on. Neverthe-

less, here is a good story of a ring in the days of FREDERICK the Second, of Prussia :

"M. DE GUINES, ambassador of France at Berlin, had greatly mortified the Prussian nobles, and especially the other foreign ministers, by the ostentatious pomp which he displayed. Those whose limited means he thus eclipsed longed for some opportunity to wound the vanity of the proud man who daily humbled theirs, and excited their envy. At this crisis, a Russian ambassador, who was returning home to present at his own court his newly-married bride, stopped on his way at Berlin. Prince DOLGOROUKI, the Russian ambassador there, did the honors of the Russian court to his countryman, and gave him and his wife a dinner, to which were invited all the corps diplomatic. M. DE GUINES was seated next to the bride. The lady, who had been initiated into all the court gossips, had enlisted under the banner of the malcontents, and taken upon herself the task of vexing the magnificent Frenchman. She had placed upon her finger a ring of very exquisite and very curious workmanship, to which she called the attention of her neighbor during the course of the dinner. As he stooped to examine the jewel the wearer pressed a spring concealed on the side of the ring within her hand, and jerked a small quantity of water into the eyes of the ambassador. The ring contained a syringe. The minister wiped his face, jested good-humoredly on the diminutive little instrument, and thought no more of it. But his fair enemy had not yet accomplished her purpose of mortifying the ambassador. Having refilled the squirt unperceived by him, she called his attention to herself and again discharged the water in his face. M. DE GUINES looked neither angry nor abashed, but, in a serious tone of friendly advice, said to his foolish aggressor: 'Madame, this kind of jest excites laughter the first time; when repeated it may be excused, especially if proceeding from a lady, as an act of youthful levity; but the third time it would be looked upon as an insult, and you would instantly receive in exchange the glass of water you see before me; of this, Madame, I have the honor to give you notice.' Thinking he would not dare to execute his threat, the lady once more filled and emptied the little water-spout at the expense of M. DE GUINES, who instantly acknowledged and repaid it with the contents of his glass, calmly adding: 'I warned you, Madame.' The husband took the wisest course, declaring the ambassador was perfectly justified in thus punishing his wife's unjustifiable rudeness. The lady changed her dress, and the guests were requested to keep silence on the affair; an injunction obeyed as is usual in such cases."

The pages devoted to pawned and stolen jewels might have been usefully extended. The authoress does not notice the jewels left in Holland by LOUIS BUONAPARTE, which were subsequently claimed by LOUIS NAPOLEON in his poverty, which were ultimately obtained for him by LOUIS PHILIPPE, and with the proceeds arising from the sale of which LOUIS NAPOLEON fitted out his expedition to Boulogne in order to dethrone the king who had rendered him so signal a service! Such errors of omission, however, are scarcely worth recording; we are thankful for what the authoress has showered before us in sparkling heaps, and we cheefully recommend her pretty volume to the general public.—*Athenæum*.

STATISTICS OF COINS AND BULLION.

New Gold Coin in Spain.—The Spanish government recently decreed that, as soon as the arrangements are made at the new mint in Madrid, new gold coins of one and two dollars each will be coined, for the purpose, chiefly, to replace the silver coin, which is nearly all carried away from Spain and her dominions, owing principally to the purity of the silver and the intrinsic value of the Spanish coin compared with that of other nations.

Treasure Trove.—An inhabitant of the High-street of Hounslow, when enlarging a cellar, found, imbedded in the loam, just below the foundation on which his house stands, an earthen vase or cup, containing about 800 silver and a few copper coins; silver groats of HENRY IV., struck at Norwich, York, Bristol and London; others of EDWARD IV., RICHARD III., and Burgundian pieces of silver of CHARLES the Bold, brother-in-law to EDWARD IV. In the troublous times of the Wars of the Roses, much treasure was hidden, and, from the dates of the coins, ranging from 1406 to RICHARD's short reign, 1485, it is possible that the owner of the treasure may have fallen at Bosworth.—*London Times.*

United States Assay Office.—GEORGE F. DUNNING, Esq., has been appointed Superintendent of the United States Assay Office in this city, as successor to Hon. S. F. BUTTERWORTH, who resigned on the 5th of March last. Mr. DUNNING was recommended by all the bullion dealers and bankers in the city. He has been chief clerk of the Assay Office ever since it was organized, and has spent seventeen years of his life in the mint.

New Gold-Field in Gippsland, Victoria.—The *Melbourne Argus*, by the last mail, states that the report of Mr. ALFRED HOWITT, the son of WILLIAM HOWITT, who was appointed to head one of the two parties sent into Gippsland to search for fresh gold-fields, had been published by the government. It is stated that a new and paying gold-field had been discovered by Mr. ALFRED HOWITT on the Crooked River, in Snowy Mountains; that it had attracted a large proportion of the population from South Gippsland; that many miners were engaged, with remunerative results, and amongst them were the principal portion of the men who had accompanied both Mr. A. HOWITT and Mr. NICHOLSON, the leader of the other party, who had been to the eastward of Gippsland, but without success. The best road to the new gold-field was said to be from Port Albert and through Sale, fifty miles from the place, and onward by the Wanangari River. The government prospecting party had not only discovered the new field, but had made a passable track through the mountains, blazing the trees through the forests, cutting sideling roads along the hills, and building up hollows with logs and stones. This is good news for Victoria, whose gold-fields have for some time been falling off.

Amount of Money in Great Britain.—As so much interest exists at present in regard to the coinage of the British empire, says the *London Mechanics' Magazine*, we have been at some pains in obtaining reliable data as to the quantity of gold, silver, copper and bronze coin at present in circulation throughout Great Britain and Ireland. The facts and figures resulting from our inquiries it is now our purpose to give to our readers. In 1816–17, a complete re-coinage of the silver currency of the United Kingdom took place, and as most of the gold coins of a date anterior to that period have become of light weight, and found their way back to the crucibles of the Royal Mint, it will be well to commence our general statement from 1816. It appears, then, from official accounts, that there have been issued from the British Mint, since that year, and up to the present moment :

Double sovereigns,.....	16,119
Sovereigns,.....	136,071,897
Half-sovereigns,.....	26,092,903

By far the larger proportion of the two last-named denominations of money (double-sovereigns having long since become obsolete) were coined during the reign of her present majesty. The years 1853 and 1855, indeed, were pre-eminently prolific. In the first, no less than eleven millions nine hundred and fifty-two thousand three hundred and ninety-one pounds sterling of sovereigns and half-sovereigns were pressed into being; and in the second year, 1855, nearly ten millions sterling came forth from the mint, in the shape of gold coins. The united productions of these two years thus give a total equal to rather more than one-seventh of the entire gold coinages of the whole forty-four years in question!

Taking into account the continual influx of light gold coin to the bank, and its subsequent transference for re-coinage to the sister establishment on Tower Hill, and allowing for the efflux from the bank of gold coin on its way to the continent and other parts of the world—taking these and other circumstances, we say, into account, it may be inferred that the number of pieces of gold bearing the “image and superscription” of royalty, and circulating in this, the second week of 1861, among her majesty’s lieges in Great Britain and Ireland, amounts to at least one hundred millions! Taking the population of the islands to be thirty millions, it is clear that, equally distributed, the gold coinage would be of sufficient magnitude to supply every inhabitant, young or old, with the sum of £3 6s. 8d.

Of the silver coinage of the realm, it results from the testimony of official documents, and from evidence adduced by Dr. GRAHAM, F. R. S., Master of the Mint, before the Decimal Coinage Commission, that there are also in circulation, among the subjects of the Queen, of

Crowns,.....	2,320,027
Half-crowns,.....	37,516,343
Florins,.....	10,000,000
Shillings,.....	112,554,106
Sixpences,.....	76,132,578
Fourpences,.....	20,142,034
Threepences,.....	7,572,437

In all forming a total of 266,237,525 pieces of silver money. The coinage of crowns, half-crowns and fourpences has been suspended for many years,

and it is more than doubtful whether any more of either denomination of coin will ever again be struck at the Royal Mint.

Coming now to the inferior metallic currency, that of copper, and drawing upon the same unimpeachable sources of information, we find that there are no less than five hundred millions of pence, half-pence and farthings doing active duty amongst us. Their total current value reaches to a million and a quarter sterling, and their weight, avoirdupois, is six thousand tons!

Of the new bronze money, there have been issued several hundred tons, or perhaps twenty millions of coins, and in time, no doubt, the entire copper coinage, battered, worn, unsightly and heavy, as it is, will be superseded by its more graceful and convenient rival. If six thousand tons of the "mixed metal" be converted into pence, half-pence and farthings, of 48, 80 and 160 to the pound weight, the proportions of the new money, instead of coins weighing 24, 48 and 96 to the 1 lb., the proportion of the old, why it is evident that the public will get nearly double the number of coins, or a current value from the same weight of metal of two and a half millions of pounds sterling, instead of one million and a quarter sterling.

From these statistics we deduce the fact, that the grand total number of coins of gold, silver, copper and bronze now in circulation throughout the British isles, leaving the colonies out of the question, is undoubtedly not much less than nine hundred millions, or almost one coin to each inhabitant of the globe!

THE POST-OFFICE AS A SAVINGS BANK.

ONE of the merely useful measures upon which it is difficult to deliver a telling speech—and which, consequently, pass quietly through Parliament—is the bill in the British Parliament for instituting post-office savings banks. In every village throughout the country there are people in the humbler ranks of life who will save, and another and larger class who would save if they were encouraged to do so. The difficulty is to find an investment for a few shillings or a few pounds; for there is not a savings bank in every village, or even in every town; and there never can be, as the cost of management would in many cases absorb more than the capital of the deposits. But in every village there is a post-office, and in every post-office there is an official who must have acquired some notion of business transactions, whose honesty is more or less guaranteed, and who is daily in direct communication with the great establishment in St. Martin's-le-Grand. No department of the State enjoys a larger share of public confidence than the post-office. Of late years—thanks to the exertions of ROWLAND HILL—its sphere of usefulness has been greatly extended. It is no longer a mere deliverer of letters; it carries our parcels, our papers and our books, and enables us to make small remittances by means of money orders. It is now proposed that in connection with the post-office there should be founded a national bank, which is to receive deposits of one shilling and upwards, and pay $2\frac{1}{2}$ per

cent. interest upon them—principal and interest being secured by a parliamentary guarantee. There is no necessity to place the new scheme in opposition with that now in operation. They are not competitors; they address themselves each to a separate public; there is plenty of room for both; and as the existing savings banks offer more than two and a half per cent. interest, we have no fear that their present clients will abandon them. The only questions, therefore, which we have to discuss are, "Is the new scheme required?" and, if so, "Can it be worked by the machinery provided by the bill now under our consideration?"

In advocating his measure for the reduction of the borough franchise, Mr. BAINES, M. P. for Leeds, delivered a speech brimfull of statistics, collected to prove that the people of England are becoming richer and more prudent every year. So, no doubt, they are; but not at the speed which Mr. BAINES' figures taken separately would seem to indicate. Thus, there has been a great increase in the number of depositors in savings banks, and in the value of deposits, during the last thirty years; but there has also been a great increase of the population and the general wealth of the country; and, considered in relation to this, the books of the savings banks do not reflect an advance in habits of thrift and providence which is a subject for congratulation. On the contrary, there is every reason to fear that all classes are spending more and saving less out of their income and earnings in the present day than they did in the year 1831, at which Mr. BAINES commences most of his calculations. But this is not all. Returning to the books of the savings banks, we find that they do not indicate the spread of habits of thrift, but only the increase of a class well known to be thrifty. It will be found that nine-tenths of the depositors are mercantile and law clerks, governesses, butlers and upper servants, housemaids, cooks, and others whose daily wants were provided for them, and who are in a great measure removed, by the nature of their avocations, from the temptation to spend their money.

It is a fact worth noting that the funds in the savings banks were but slightly affected by the great severity of last winter. From this alone we may almost infer that the artisan and laboring classes—the very people for whose benefit savings banks were instituted—do not patronize them; for thousands of these classes were reduced to utter destitution a few days after the frost put an end to their employment; and if we turn to the reports we shall find that the inference is a just one. The artisan and laboring classes are but faintly represented amongst the depositors, and the agriculturalist is a curiosity in the books. We have no occasion to investigate here the causes which have produced this state of things. It is enough for our present purpose to find that it exists. There is, then, a large class—many of the members of which are highly paid—which ought to save, and might save, but which, for some reason, does not save. It is only fair, therefore, to conclude that existing facilities for saving do not meet all the requirements of the age, and the institution of another class of savings banks follows as a matter of course.

We have said that the post-office enjoys the confidence of the people. It does so amongst the lower classes to an almost ludicrous degree. The old story of the anxious mother who posted a letter addressed "to my

son in Bermuda," does not convey an exaggerated idea of the omniscience which this department is supposed to possess. The most implicit trust is placed in its honesty and its carefulness. In defiance of all warning, the public will persist in sending money, trinkets, fragile ornaments, and even valuable watches, by post in perishable envelopes. In vain are they recommended to register such valuables; they pop them into the box, under the very words of the printed warning against doing so. In vain are they recommended to get money orders, instead of sending coin by letter; they will enclose the half crown, the half sovereign, or the five pound note, and their confidence is but rarely betrayed. The post-office, then, has a *prestige* to start with that the savings banks have not all succeeded in gaining after many years. At present, it is not intended to make every office into a branch of the great bank, but only those at which money orders are now issued. In these there is a staff already at work, receiving sums of money from the public, and giving them in return a document in favor of a third person, enabling him to draw the amount in some other place. What is more simple than that a man should be enabled to pay in a sum of money in his own name, to be withdrawn at some other time? And this is the pith of the post-office savings bank scheme. Of course it is not faultless. What scheme is? But every objection that has as yet been opposed to it applies with equal force to the money-order system; and this we know to be a great boon to the public, and highly remunerative to the State. Under this £330,000,000 have been safely transmitted, and the total of defalcations has only reached £6,000!

The deposits in the post-office banks are not to be less than 1s. or more than £30. The money is to be remitted to the chief office in London, and an acknowledgment returned thence under the hand or seal of the postmaster-general, which will give the depositor an absolute right to his money, secured upon the credit of the State. This acknowledgment will be returned as speedily as possible; and, in the interval between its receipt and the payment of the deposit which it secures, the depositor is furnished with a receipt from the local postmaster which will stand good for ten days; and should the superior security not arrive, by any chance, in this interval, the depositor, by writing to demand it, obtains a further ten days title, and so on, till its arrival. It is well to make savings bank transactions as simple as possible.

The laboring classes mistrust all proceedings which they do not understand. We are told that what we have called the "superior security" will always arrive within ten days of the deposit, and that it is not safe that the public credit should be pledged to repay money until it is safely lodged in the bank. This may be so, but the public credit is pledged for ten days. It can readily be perceived how this precaution will act as a check between the postmaster-general and his subordinates, and discourage fraud by making its detection certain; but it will not give extra security to the depositors, because their title is already indisputable. It is not fair, however, to criticize so beneficial a scheme too closely, and no doubt experience will suggest means whereby the State will be protected against the chance of dishonesty, at the least inconvenience to the respectable and prudent.—*Times*.

GOLD AND SILVER.

THE following statements respecting the bullion movements of the past half year of 1860 are from the circular of Messrs. PIXLEY, ABELL & LANGLEY, London :

STATEMENT OF IMPORT OF BULLION INTO LONDON FROM UNDERMENTIONED PLACES DURING SIX MONTHS ENDING 31ST OF DECEMBER, 1860.

1860.	Gold.	Silver.	Total.
Belgium,.....	£ 31,460	£ 40,500	£ 71,960
France,.....	289,972	1,441,355	1,731,327
Hanse Towns,.....	8,970	80,550	89,520
Holland,.....	4,500	300	4,800
Russia,.....	56,400	800	57,200
Spain and Portugal,.....	71,400	85,570	156,970
Gibraltar,.....	180	2,400	2,580
Malta,.....	11,696	12,452	24,148
Alexandria,.....	1,200	4,030	5,230
Cape of Good Hope, } Cape Verd and Sierra Leone, }	65,100	65,100
United States,.....	2,464,900	138,000	2,602,900
Mexico, Central America, West Indies, &c.,.....	426,200	2,264,065	2,690,265
Brazils,.....	92,339	92,339
Australia,.....	8,616,000	8,616,000
Total,.....	£ 7,140,817	£ 4,020,022	£ 11,160,839
Amount imported during the six months ending June 30, 1860,.....	6,051,833	5,780,169	11,782,002
Total imports, 1860,.....	£ 13,192,150	£ 9,750,191	£ 22,942,341
Total imports, 1859,.....	£ 25,969,350	£ 17,150,463	£ 43,148,843

STATEMENT OF EXPORT OF BULLION FROM LONDON TO UNDERMENTIONED PLACES DURING SIX MONTHS ENDING 31ST OF DECEMBER, 1860.

1860.	Gold.	Silver.	Total.
Belgium,.....	£ 50,600	£ 1,750	£ 182,350
France,.....	6,922,676	541,133	7,463,809
Hanse Towns,.....	12,510	104,160	116,670
Holland,.....	3,450	29,400	82,850
Russia,.....	800	800
Spain and Portugal,.....	1,084,780	1,084,780
Gibraltar,.....	115,900	115,900
Malta,.....	50,000	50,000
* Alexandria,.....	196,805	196,805
* Aden,.....	100	100
* Ceylon,.....	3,000	3,000
* Bombay,.....	361,127	535,140	896,267
* Madras,.....	46,673	34,243	80,916
* Calcutta,.....	18,142	301,466	319,608
* Singapore,.....	10,115	237,600	247,715
* Penang,.....	5,060	5,060
* Hongkong,.....	20,560	1,202,728	1,223,288
* Shanghai,.....	555,962	555,962
* Foo-chow-foo,.....	29,861	29,861
Cape of Good Hope, Cape Verd, Sierra Leone,.....	55,000	200	55,200
United States,.....	1,723,000	1,723,000
Mexico, Central America, West Indies, &c.,.....	11,300	14,000	25,300
Brazils,.....	84,600	29,600	114,200
South American States,.....	1,000	2,000	3,000
Total,.....	£ 10,772,068	£ 3,703,903	£ 14,475,971
Amount exported during the six months ending June 30, 1860,.....	5,871,649	5,661,540	11,533,189
Total exports, 1860,.....	£ 16,643,717	£ 9,365,443	£ 26,009,160
Total exports, 1859,.....	£ 23,869,242	£ 17,177,612	£ 41,046,854

* The following amounts have been exported from Marseilles and other Mediterranean ports to India, China, Reunion, Mauritius, &c., between January 1st and December 12th, 1860: Gold, £621,680; silver, £2,546,440; total, £3,168,120.

Silver Coin.—Silver was first coined by the Lydians, some say; others, by PHIDON, of Argos, 869 B. C. At Rome it was first coined by FABIVS PICTOR, 269 B. C. Used in Britain 25 B. C. The Saxons coined silver pennies, which were $22\frac{1}{2}$ grains weight. In 1302 the penny was yet the largest silver coin in England.

The scarcity of silver in Western Europe, including Great Britain and in this country, has given rise to the question, "Where does the silver go?" In connection with this question, we make the following extract from a paper read by Prof. R. H. WALSH, of the Dublin University:

At the time when PLINY termed it the sink of the precious metals, silver was a favorite article of export to the East. It has continued so since, but the trade of late has assumed an extraordinary magnitude. In the five years prior to 1856 over \$110,000,000 worth of silver have been exported to the East through England alone, and from other countries a similar movement has been in operation. The export in 1825 was \$32,000,000, and this year (1856) it is proceeding at the rate of over \$45,000,000 per annum, judging from the returns that have been published for the first four months. Unlike the old movement, the present cannot be permanent. The former was seldom more than might be accounted for as the distribution of silver to some of its chief consumers—the nations of the East—according as new supplies were raised elsewhere. It was, in fact, the ordinary movement from the producer to the consumer. HUMBOLDT estimated the annual production of silver in Mexico at 1,184,000 lbs., or about \$25,000,000.

But now silver goes faster to the East than it is produced throughout the world. Hence the process cannot be permanent, but must come to an end as soon as the re-distribution of the old stock has been effected; for the annual production of silver is only about \$40,000,000; and since the export to the East through England alone is at a rate of over \$45,000,000, it follows that it cannot be the new supplies of silver which meet that demand and all others for the same metal, but that there must be some auxiliary fund to be drawn upon. Such a fund is furnished by a cessation in the demand for silver in several countries which before employed it most largely, but now use gold instead. Silver, which used to be coined in France and the United States at an average rate of \$20,000,000 per annum, is now little employed, while much of the old coin of that metal is melted down and exported. In France it is said that in one year (1853) so much as \$60,000,000 were disposed of in this manner, and that the operation has been since proceeding at a still greater rate. In Mexico there are eight or nine mints, one of which is national, having one general law of coinage, but independent of each other, and subject to no general control. There are some characteristic differences in respect to grades of fineness and accuracy, but they seem not sufficient to call for a distinction, as the only external means of identifying is in the mint mark.

Silver Mines of Mexico.—It is not generally known in this country that the silver mines of Mexico, which yielded to the Spaniards, between the conquest by Cortez and their expulsion by the Mexicans in 1827, \$2,028,000,000, as shown by the records of the mints, have since that period steadily and rapidly increased their product, until from an annual

yield of about \$20,000,000 it has risen, according to some authorities, to upward of \$40,000,000 in 1856. We have no official data upon which to affirm or deny this. This vast product is from the working of a very small number of mines, while that portion of Mexico north of latitude 24° , and on our own frontier, which, according to Baron HUMBOLDT and others, contains the richest veins—often beginning near the surface and above water level, and sometimes yielding vast quantities of pure native silver—have lain for many years entirely unworked and neglected. This has been in consequence of the inability of the few Mexicans scattered over those regions to cope with the wild Apache and Camanche Indians, who have held free scope there until within a few years past. They are now kept out from the States near the lower part of the Rio Grande by the filling up of the country, and by the vicinity of our newly-established military posts. Up to this time the only foreigners who have availed themselves of the opportunities of amassing fortunes from these mines are the English and a few Germans; and they have confined themselves principally to the poorer veins of the thickly-settled Central and Southern parts of Mexico. But they are now meeting with the rewards of their enterprise.

Recently several companies have been formed in the United States for working mines in Northern Mexico and Arizona. One of these is composed, in part, of the officers of our army, who have seen and examined the localities, and some of whom have resigned their commissions for the purpose of devoting their time to the opening of these mines. Those in Arizona are so far distant, and in a country so uncultivated and so beset by Indians, that it may be the work of time and of much expense to overcome these obstacles. But that American enterprise will finally overcome them, none can doubt. On the Lower Rio Grande, however, in the State of Nuevo Leon, within forty-five miles of steamboat navigation, and but forty-five miles from the Texas line, and but four days' sail from New-Orleans, are some of the richest mines in the Republic of Mexico. One of these is being re-opened by a very strong New-York company, called the Vallicillio, and with good prospects of large returns.—*Letter from New-Mexico.*

Extracting Silver from its Ores.—A new process, originally suggested by Dr. PERCY, F. R. S., of the British government School of Mines, has lately been carried out upon a large scale by HERR VON PATERA, one of the most celebrated metallurgical chemists of Austria. This process is analogous to the fixing operation in photography, in which the chloride of silver not acted on by light is removed by alkaline sulphites. The ores which contain the silver, in combination with sulphur, or with sulphur and arsenic, are first roasted with copperas and common salt, and by this means a chloride of silver is produced which may be dissolved out with a solution of hyposulphite. The silver is then precipitated by sulphide of sodium, and falls down as sulphide of silver. All that is necessary to be done, then, is to heat the sulphide in a muffle exposed to the air, when the sulphur escapes in the form of sulphurous acid and the silver remains in the metallic state; it is then melted in plumbago crucibles, and cast into ingots ready for minting. The ores which have been subjected to this process, as stated in the *Society of Arts Journal*, contain from two to ten per cent. of silver; the hyposulphite is used weak and cold; its dissolving power is great. This solution may be used over and over again, as it is

continually renewed, and this is a peculiarity in the process. The precipitation of the silver from the hyposulphite is by the sulphide, or rather a polysulphide, which is prepared by calcining soda with sulphur, then boiling it with sulphur. In this manner a polysulphide of sodium is formed, which, when it is brought into contact with the atmosphere, some hyposulphite is generated, so that, when it is used to precipitate the silver, it also refreshes the bath of hyposulphite, and can be used repeatedly for the same purpose. By this process HERR VON PATERA extracts 3,000 lbs. of silver per annum from ores at Joachimsthal, in Bohemia. The expense of extracting a pound of silver from the ore by this method is \$2 07; by the old method of smelting it cost \$3 52.—*Scientific American*.

Silver of domestic production, including Silver parted from California Gold, deposited at the Mint of the United States, its Branches and the Assay Office, New-York, from January, 1841, to June 30, 1857. (That for 1857 being six months only, to June 30.)

Years.	Value.	Years.	Value.
1841,.....	\$4,300	1851,.....	\$389,471
1842,.....	6,453	1852,.....	404,404
1843,.....	8,640	1853,.....	417,279
1844,.....	30,847	1854,.....	328,199
1845,.....	4,769	1855,.....	333,053
1846,.....	3,066	1856,.....	321,938
1847,.....	6,407	1857,.....	127,256
1848,.....	6,191		
1849,.....	39,112	Total,.....	2,700,728
1850,.....	269,253		

Statement of amount of Silver coined at the Mint of the United States, and the Branch Mints at San Francisco and New-Orleans, under the Act of February 21, 1853. (Six months only, 1857.)

Years.	Mint of the United States, Philadelphia.	Branch Mint, San Francisco.	Branch Mint, New-Orleans.	Total.
1853,.....	\$7,517,161	\$1,137,000 ..	\$8,654,161
1854,.....	5,873,270	3,246,000 ..	8,619,270
1855,.....	1,419,170 ..	\$164,075 ..	1,918,000 ..	3,501,245
1856,.....	3,214,240 ..	177,000 ..	1,744,000 ..	5,135,240
1857,.....	1,427,000 ..	50,000	1,477,000
Total,.....	\$18,950,841 ..	\$391,075 ..	\$8,045,000 ..	\$27,386,916

The product of silver at different periods of the present century is estimated as follows:

	1800.		1850.		1856.
America,.....	\$32,891,000	\$29,120,000	\$30,500,000
Europe,.....	4,000,000	7,280,000	8,000,000
Asia,.....	4,100,000	5,000,000
Africa,.....	400,000
Total,.....	\$37,291,000	\$40,500,000	\$43,500,000

In regard to the production of silver in Mexico, it appears that the amount of coinage in that country in 1851 was \$23,166,000, of which \$2,004,000 was in silver. From the year 1690 to 1800 the production of the gold and silver mines of Mexico is estimated at \$1,354,000,000, and from 1800 to 1856 at \$160,000,000, as the production of the silver mines alone.

COIN AND BULLION.

EXPORTS OF COIN AND BULLION FROM THE UNITED STATES.

Statement exhibiting the amount of Coin and Bullion imported and exported annually from 1821 to 1860, inclusive, and also the amount of importation over exportation, and exportation over importation during the same years. (Official.)

COIN AND BULLION.				
YEAR ENDING—	Imported.	Exported.	Excess of im- portation over exportation.	Excess of ex- portation over importation.
September 30,.....1821,	\$ 8,064,890 ..	\$ 10,477,969 \$ 2,413,079
"1822,	3,369,846 ..	10,810,180 7,440,334
"1823,	5,097,896 ..	6,372,987 1,275,091
"1824,	8,379,835 ..	7,014,552 ..	\$ 1,365,283
"1825,	6,150,765 ..	8,787,659 2,636,894
"1826,	6,880,966 ..	4,704,533 ..	2,176,433
"1827,	8,151,130 ..	8,014,880 ..	136,250
"1828,	7,489,741 ..	8,243,476 753,735
"1829,	7,403,612 ..	4,924,020 ..	2,479,592
"1830,	8,155,964 ..	2,178,773 ..	5,977,191
"1831,	7,305,945 ..	9,014,931 1,708,986
"1832,	5,907,504 ..	5,656,340 ..	251,164
"1833,	7,070,368 ..	2,611,701 ..	4,458,667
"1834,	17,911,632 ..	2,076,758 ..	15,834,874
"1835,	13,131,447 ..	6,477,775 ..	6,653,662
"1836,	13,400,881 ..	4,324,336 ..	9,076,545
"1837,	10,516,414 ..	5,976,249 ..	4,540,165
"1838,	17,747,116 ..	3,508,046 ..	14,239,070
"1839,	5,595,176 ..	8,776,743 3,181,557
"1840,	8,882,813 ..	8,417,014 ..	465,799
"1841,	4,988,633 ..	10,034,332 5,045,699
"1842,	4,087,016 ..	4,813,539 726,523
9 mos. to June 30, 1843,	22,390,559 ..	1,520,791 ..	20,869,768
Year end. June 30, 1844,	5,830,429 ..	5,454,214 ..	376,215
" " 1845,	4,070,242 ..	8,606,495 4,536,253
" " 1846,	3,777,732 ..	3,905,268 127,536
" " 1847,	24,121,289 ..	1,907,024 ..	22,214,265
" " 1848,	6,360,224 ..	15,841,616 9,481,392
" " 1849,	6,651,240 ..	5,404,648 ..	1,246,592
" " 1850,	4,628,792 ..	7,522,994 2,894,202
" " 1851,	5,453,592 ..	29,472,752 24,019,160
" " 1852,	5,505,044 ..	42,674,135 37,169,091
" " 1853,	4,201,382 ..	27,486,875 23,285,493
" " 1854,	6,958,184 ..	41,436,456 34,478,272
" " 1855,	3,659,812 ..	56,247,343 52,587,531
" " 1856,	4,207,632 ..	45,745,485 41,537,853
" " 1857,	12,461,799 ..	69,136,922 56,675,123
" " 1858,	19,274,496 ..	52,633,147 33,358,651
" " 1859,	6,369,703 ..	63,887,411 57,517,708
" " 1860,	8,550,135 ..	66,546,239 57,996,104
Total,.....	\$ 340,161,876	\$ 688,646,608	\$ 112,361,545	\$ 460,846,277

BANK STATISTICS.

NEW-YORK.—54 Banks—Capital, June, 1861, \$69,907,000.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Weekly Clearings.	Sub-Treasury.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 129,625,465 ..	\$ 24,839,475 ..	\$ 8,698,288 ..	\$ 86,454,430 ..	\$ 95,994,858 ..	\$ 3,645,500
Jan. 12,....	129,125,515 ..	26,460,988 ..	8,357,198 ..	88,148,883 ..	123,306,183 ..	2,584,400
Jan. 19,....	126,034,520 ..	29,598,788 ..	8,067,570 ..	89,658,696 ..	121,218,782 ..	2,166,000
Jan. 26,....	123,935,153 ..	28,968,941 ..	7,920,298 ..	87,886,046 ..	123,070,934 ..	5,751,300
Feb. 2,....	121,907,024 ..	31,054,509 ..	8,099,376 ..	87,879,743 ..	122,188,525 ..	4,328,000
Feb. 9,....	120,268,050 ..	34,655,645 ..	8,861,805 ..	88,988,681 ..	121,525,631 ..	3,664,900
Feb. 16,....	119,880,371 ..	37,119,000 ..	8,273,840 ..	91,547,158 ..	111,387,663 ..	3,356,000
Feb. 23,....	119,236,290 ..	38,044,229 ..	8,128,702 ..	91,628,626 ..	118,142,167 ..	3,336,700
Mch. 2,....	121,893,963 ..	34,480,407 ..	8,290,755 ..	89,635,298 ..	126,728,832 ..	9,166,080
Mch. 9,....	122,705,094 ..	38,892,768 ..	8,535,783 ..	88,711,448 ..	129,303,550 ..	7,524,000
Mch. 16,....	122,649,925 ..	36,219,676 ..	8,392,347 ..	90,520,779 ..	119,500,573 ..	6,720,000
Mch. 23,....	120,750,455 ..	39,430,784 ..	8,345,011 ..	91,940,228 ..	120,133,015 ..	6,240,510
Mch. 30,....	120,953,165 ..	41,408,808 ..	8,484,344 ..	93,611,898 ..	119,040,819 ..	6,092,841
Apr. 6,....	122,113,496 ..	41,705,558 ..	8,930,141 ..	94,859,810 ..	123,277,671 ..	8,486,494
Apr. 13,....	123,108,885 ..	41,764,748 ..	8,801,429 ..	96,626,078 ..	124,231,307 ..	10,441,278
Apr. 20,....	124,701,259 ..	40,620,720 ..	8,825,057 ..	97,804,763 ..	124,020,087 ..	11,058,653
Apr. 27,....	124,817,154 ..	38,991,683 ..	8,840,476 ..	96,788,759 ..	106,948,819 ..	10,773,106
May 4,....	124,610,166 ..	38,054,251 ..	9,296,399 ..	94,977,881 ..	106,418,816 ..	9,761,752
May 11,....	125,132,298 ..	38,801,545 ..	9,304,241 ..	94,879,967 ..	104,163,420 ..	8,588,902
May 18,....	120,007,806 ..	39,557,980 ..	9,061,181 ..	93,179,526 ..	98,102,519 ..	7,867,542
May 25,....	118,141,856 ..	39,622,791 ..	8,793,882 ..	91,334,877 ..	94,155,277 ..	6,886,008
June 1,....	118,290,181 ..	37,502,402 ..	8,683,780 ..	90,197,459 ..	88,847,249 ..	11,468,789
June 8,....	117,509,075 ..	36,837,025 ..	8,963,007 ..	87,656,760 ..	95,465,614 ..	10,758,608
June 15,....	115,494,821 ..	38,280,211 ..	8,707,818 ..	87,992,791 ..	86,467,176 ..	9,488,884
June 22,....	118,667,640 ..	39,480,189 ..	8,444,830 ..	87,602,343 ..	88,183,062 ..	8,004,656

BOSTON.

42 Banks—Capital, January, 1859, \$35,125,433; June, 1861, \$38,231,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due to Banks.	Due from Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 62,025,734 ..	\$ 4,204,610 ..	\$ 7,032,018 ..	\$ 18,719,190 ..	\$ 7,663,862 ..	\$ 8,371,804
Jan. 12,....	62,720,067 ..	4,199,155 ..	6,825,325 ..	18,422,650 ..	8,082,942 ..	7,605,680
Jan. 19,....	63,275,167 ..	4,425,256 ..	6,706,045 ..	18,366,511 ..	8,346,141 ..	7,094,433
Jan. 26,....	63,237,796 ..	4,532,019 ..	6,374,476 ..	18,185,128 ..	8,477,340 ..	6,714,029
Feb. 2,....	63,264,318 ..	4,629,068 ..	6,247,643 ..	18,184,009 ..	8,485,680 ..	6,568,176
Feb. 9,....	63,434,332 ..	4,773,614 ..	6,387,552 ..	18,074,598 ..	8,318,692 ..	6,299,117
Feb. 16,....	63,113,532 ..	4,651,803 ..	6,216,299 ..	17,795,444 ..	8,312,101 ..	6,791,101
Feb. 23,....	62,765,038 ..	4,738,981 ..	6,334,383 ..	17,833,065 ..	8,451,939 ..	6,822,815
Mch. 2,....	62,725,101 ..	4,751,291 ..	6,372,201 ..	17,951,201 ..	8,111,201 ..	6,921,107
Mch. 9,....	62,649,600 ..	4,836,600 ..	6,345,600 ..	18,132,000 ..	7,978,000 ..	7,082,600
Mch. 16,....	62,511,727 ..	5,367,722 ..	6,166,253 ..	18,126,034 ..	8,269,601 ..	6,550,262
Mch. 23,....	62,359,922 ..	5,601,871 ..	6,059,548 ..	17,811,827 ..	8,611,882 ..	6,450,362
Mch. 30,....	62,666,800 ..	5,605,400 ..	6,108,600 ..	18,629,000 ..	8,845,500 ..	7,269,900
Apr. 6,....	62,561,820 ..	5,809,425 ..	6,996,996 ..	19,918,855 ..	9,193,022 ..	8,596,667
Apr. 13,....	62,734,600 ..	5,875,600 ..	6,900,500 ..	19,697,500 ..	9,388,000 ..	8,167,000
Apr. 20,....	62,396,500 ..	5,780,700 ..	6,733,000 ..	19,440,700 ..	9,482,000 ..	8,210,500
Apr. 27,....	61,507,897 ..	5,632,790 ..	6,610,860 ..	18,571,856 ..	9,640,246 ..	8,131,220
May 4,....	61,884,400 ..	5,832,000 ..	6,875,000 ..	18,846,700 ..	9,223,000 ..	8,163,400
May 11,....	61,156,500 ..	5,997,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,309,600 ..	8,660,000 ..	7,625,600
May 18,....	61,206,000 ..	6,172,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,616,600 ..	8,351,000 ..	7,299,500
May 25,....	60,525,000 ..	6,402,700 ..	6,280,800 ..	18,586,000 ..	8,300,800 ..	7,144,500
June 1,....	60,213,500 ..	6,461,800 ..	6,133,700 ..	18,536,000 ..	8,206,000 ..	7,135,800
June 8,....	60,625,600 ..	6,013,800 ..	6,460,800 ..	18,204,500 ..	8,093,000 ..	7,198,000
June 15,....	60,074,100 ..	5,458,700 ..	6,452,500 ..	18,293,000 ..	8,000,000 ..	7,203,000
June 22,....	60,180,500 ..	5,831,000 ..	6,322,800 ..	18,240,300 ..	7,758,600 ..	7,428,000

PHILADELPHIA.

19 Banks—Capital, June, 1861, \$11,810,520.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 26,891,230 ..	\$ 4,020,266 ..	\$ 2,689,812 ..	\$ 15,261,925 ..	\$ 3,593,785 ..
Jan. 12,....	26,555,986 ..	4,151,824 ..	2,694,217 ..	15,001,591 ..	3,464,167 ..
Jan. 19,....	26,172,473 ..	4,268,105 ..	2,754,315 ..	14,750,882 ..	3,416,292 ..
Jan. 26,....	25,892,265 ..	4,443,781 ..	2,737,638 ..	14,891,200 ..	3,143,795 ..
Feb. 2,....	25,801,981 ..	4,588,054 ..	2,778,318 ..	15,295,453 ..	2,699,627 ..
Feb. 16,....	25,844,076 ..	4,881,426 ..	2,809,865 ..	14,904,783 ..	2,864,874 ..
Feb. 23,....	25,146,864 ..	4,901,704 ..	2,795,113 ..	14,835,806 ..	2,873,996 ..
Mch. 2,....	25,085,310 ..	5,006,938 ..	2,811,491 ..	14,868,736 ..	2,811,491 ..
Mch. 9,....	24,626,563 ..	5,295,314 ..	2,896,492 ..	14,501,214 ..	2,788,978 ..
Mch. 16,....	24,627,504 ..	5,533,320 ..	2,802,414 ..	15,018,566 ..	2,897,500 ..
Mch. 23,....	24,603,903 ..	6,059,320 ..	2,764,090 ..	15,464,754 ..	2,776,645 ..
Mch. 30,....	24,973,496 ..	5,200,063 ..	2,811,263 ..	15,800,147 ..	3,010,776 ..
Apl. 6,....	25,413,186 ..	6,452,093 ..	3,070,220 ..	16,006,115 ..	3,135,734 ..
Apl. 13,....	25,415,442 ..	6,675,122 ..	2,820,813 ..	16,453,833 ..	3,543,153 ..
Apl. 20,....	25,309,955 ..	6,796,011 ..	2,641,055 ..	16,633,231 ..	3,332,073 ..
Apl. 27,....	25,296,942 ..	6,250,187 ..	2,546,305 ..	15,749,292 ..	3,273,704 ..
May 4,....	25,438,065 ..	5,898,802 ..	2,716,603 ..	15,671,997 ..	3,107,893 ..
May 11,....	25,715,318 ..	5,738,048 ..	2,607,421 ..	15,523,151 ..	3,017,655 ..
May 18,....	25,496,580 ..	5,553,551 ..	2,435,552 ..	15,549,797 ..	2,798,670 ..
May 25,....	25,091,226 ..	5,643,220 ..	2,408,513 ..	15,410,522 ..	2,554,885 ..
June 1,....	24,671,294 ..	5,718,826 ..	2,317,067 ..	15,806,666 ..	2,491,024 ..
June 8,....	24,585,244 ..	5,767,994 ..	2,294,862 ..	15,267,675 ..	2,543,406 ..
June 15,....	24,282,443 ..	5,927,466 ..	2,193,037 ..	15,379,559 ..	2,477,029 ..
June 22,....	24,240,983 ..	6,336,744 ..	2,147,212 ..	15,740,672 ..	2,460,557 ..

PITTSBURGH.

7 Banks—Capital, \$4,464,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 7,254,136 ..	\$ 1,856,392 ..	\$ 2,699,006 ..	\$ 1,891,947 ..	\$ 217,103 ..
Jan. 12,....	7,164,457 ..	1,400,357 ..	2,609,056 ..	1,927,290 ..	208,148 ..
Jan. 19,....	7,215,916 ..	1,400,485 ..	2,662,671 ..	1,733,946 ..	233,853 ..
Jan. 26,....	7,173,312 ..	1,425,592 ..	2,686,706 ..	1,637,037 ..	242,595 ..
Feb. 2,....	7,099,421 ..	1,449,036 ..	2,642,821 ..	1,701,427 ..	233,634 ..
Mch. 2,....	6,929,720 ..	1,583,104 ..	2,832,981 ..	1,614,658 ..	248,033 ..
Mch. 9,....	6,847,153 ..	1,611,121 ..	2,857,021 ..	1,666,118 ..	259,739 ..
Mch. 16,....	6,966,490 ..	1,654,416 ..	2,893,191 ..	1,703,449 ..	234,589 ..
Mch. 23,....	7,161,834 ..	1,663,240 ..	2,919,311 ..	1,662,043 ..	183,967 ..
Mch. 30,....	6,370,905 ..	1,697,560 ..	3,024,751 ..	1,635,558 ..	186,069 ..
Apl. 6,....	6,906,519 ..	1,741,545 ..	3,120,256 ..	1,680,975 ..	185,705 ..
Apl. 13,....	6,863,931 ..	1,788,595 ..	3,045,446 ..	1,707,703 ..	145,015 ..
May 1,....	6,962,898 ..	1,795,678 ..	3,175,181 ..	1,831,785 ..	188,152 ..
June 1,....	7,107,820 ..	1,896,394 ..	3,526,582 ..	1,715,579 ..	240,413 ..

PROVIDENCE.

38 Banks—Capital, June, 1861, \$15,592,550.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Feb. 2,....	\$ 19,528,031 ..	\$ 382,417 ..	\$ 1,820,553 ..	\$ 2,601,679 ..	\$ 861,000 ..
Mch. 2,....	19,203,054 ..	401,195 ..	1,824,928 ..	2,660,316 ..	1,021,769 ..
Apl. 1,....	19,169,417 ..	406,289 ..	1,916,663 ..	2,551,124 ..	949,374 ..
May 6,....	19,514,443 ..	448,487 ..	1,945,105 ..	2,836,495 ..	1,337,027 ..
June 3,....	19,105,634 ..	437,921 ..	1,768,093 ..	2,624,063 ..	1,108,831 ..

NEW-ORLEANS.

18 Banks—Capital, January, 1861, \$24,674,844.

1861.	Short Loans.	Exchange.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Distant Balances.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 17,229,569 ..	\$ 6,969,916 ..	\$ 14,244,084 ..	\$ 6,204,884 ..	\$ 17,443,181 ..	\$ 1,285,375
Jan. 12,....	16,756,558 ..	7,017,014 ..	15,584,142 ..	6,377,069 ..	18,315,680 ..	1,202,132
Jan. 19,....	16,318,118 ..	7,356,586 ..	15,721,856 ..	6,664,554 ..	17,745,829 ..	1,469,546
Jan. 26,....	15,987,904 ..	8,987,904 ..	16,289,892 ..	6,988,081 ..	18,443,144 ..	1,263,532
Feb. 9,....	15,177,057 ..	9,846,136 ..	16,839,370 ..	7,404,926 ..	20,243,062 ..	1,440,016
Feb. 16,....	14,962,121 ..	10,615,597 ..	17,200,559 ..	7,528,141 ..	21,221,695 ..	1,486,860
Feb. 23,....	14,453,354 ..	10,749,661 ..	17,194,836 ..	7,599,521 ..	22,499,116 ..	1,481,108
Mch. 2,....	14,566,354 ..	10,501,496 ..	17,580,606 ..	7,945,461 ..	22,668,676 ..	1,532,484
Mch. 9,....	14,451,322 ..	10,560,005 ..	17,698,164 ..	8,112,711 ..	22,591,021 ..	1,653,898
Mch. 16,....	14,251,298 ..	10,632,419 ..	17,636,844 ..	8,175,656 ..	21,101,036 ..	1,650,659
Mch. 23,....	14,157,930 ..	10,619,296 ..	17,630,095 ..	8,286,386 ..	21,359,753 ..	1,677,292
Mch. 30,....	14,264,745 ..	10,426,488 ..	17,520,839 ..	8,456,746 ..	23,025,182 ..	2,100,694
Apl. 6,....	14,120,533 ..	9,972,205 ..	17,089,630 ..	8,776,616 ..	22,291,464 ..	1,740,632
Apl. 20,....	13,797,768 ..	8,518,500 ..	16,315,891 ..	8,509,266 ..	20,658,925 ..	1,375,133
Apl. 27,....	13,879,595 ..	7,328,354 ..	15,926,572 ..	8,170,161 ..	19,696,181 ..	1,208,536
May 4,....	13,413,744 ..	6,754,333 ..	15,384,300 ..	8,005,471 ..	19,835,633 ..	1,030,133
May 11,....	12,801,922 ..	6,257,454 ..	15,129,473 ..	7,565,796 ..	18,154,763 ..	889,764
May 18,....	12,379,731 ..	5,848,520 ..	15,095,458 ..	7,298,896 ..	18,263,349 ..	727,253
May 25,....	11,906,050 ..	5,565,064 ..	15,084,531 ..	7,132,211 ..	17,903,822 ..	739,112
June 1,....	11,604,523 ..	5,094,177 ..	15,303,887 ..	6,998,851 ..	18,370,435 ..	886,731
June 8,....	11,116,964 ..	4,505,527 ..	15,237,431 ..	6,904,881 ..	16,927,592 ..	822,864

MORTALITY OF THE BRITISH PEERAGE.

Proceedings of the British Institute of Actuaries, April 29th, 1861.

C. JELlicoe, Esq., President, in the chair.—J. MESSENT, Esq., was elected an Official Associate.—A paper, "On the Mortality among the Families of the Peerage during the Nineteenth Century," by Mr. A. H. BAILEY and Mr. A. DAY, was read by Mr. BAILEY. The paper referred to some investigations on the same subject by the late Mr. FARREN, Mr. EDMONDS and Dr. GUY, pointing out certain defects in them, and remarking that some of the conclusions heretofore arrived at were not to be relied upon—the observations having been made on the ages at death only, without any regard to the numbers living. The present observations had been made on peers, sons and daughters of peers, and sons and daughters of peers' eldest sons; and, in order that the results might be compared with other modern tables of mortality, the time over which the observations extended had been limited to the present century. The number of cases brought under observation was 7,473—4,221 being males and 3,252 females; and tables were exhibited showing the results for each sex separately, and for both combined. Mr. EDMOND's observations had been made upon 675 peers (omitting 32 who died violent deaths) during the possession of their titles only, and in 243 cases the ages were not stated.

Dr. GUY had worked upon a collection of 2,291 male lives who died above the age of 21, from the thirteenth century to the year 1830. This was the first occasion, therefore, upon which female lives had been observed at all; and in the case of the males, so large a number of facts, extending over a limited period, had never been treated before. The results showed that the families of the peerage are an unusually long-lived class—a conclusion directly contrary to that arrived at by the previous writers upon this subject. Amongst the males, the mean duration of life, at all ages under 73, exceeds not merely that of the general population, but even that of the selected lives of the Equitable Assurance Society. In old age it is rather less than that of the government annuitants, but coincides very nearly with both the former tables. With the females of the general population, the comparison is still more to the advantage of the aristocratic class. The females under observation show a mean duration of life throughout greater than that of the females of the general population; and they agree very closely with the government annuitants at all ages under 55, and actually surpass them in old age. In short, the female table prepared by Mr. BAILEY and Mr. DAY indicated a more favorable mortality than any other table in ordinary use. The following table, which shows the mean duration of life of both sexes of the Peerage families combined, as compared with the Carlisle table, and a table prepared by Dr. FARR from the healthy districts of England, will exhibit, in a more striking manner, the extraordinary longevity of the aristocratic class:

<i>Age.</i>		<i>Peerage Families.</i>		<i>Carlisle Table.</i>		<i>Healthy Districts.</i>
0	52.62	38.72	49.00
10	49.39	48.82	51.08
20	42.21	41.46	43.45
30	35.96	34.34	36.64
40	28.86	27.61	29.64
50	21.95	21.11	22.44
60	15.16	14.34	15.37
70	9.61	9.18	9.61
80	5.45	5.51	5.51
90	3.54	3.28	3.05

Reference was then made to some characteristic features of particular periods of life. In infancy and childhood the mortality is only about one-third of that prevailing among the general population; but this remarkable advantage is, to some extent, counteracted on arriving at the age at which the first introduction into society usually takes place. Amongst the males between 20 and 30, and the females a few years younger, the mortality exceeds that of the general population at corresponding ages; the excess being greater in the case of the males, but being distinctly marked in both sexes. Comparing the present with other observations on the comparative mortality of the sexes, reasons were given for arriving at the conclusion, that in early life and in old age the mortality of the female sex is less, and in middle life greater, than that of the male, the mean duration of life being at all ages greater for the female. The writers concluded by remarking on the importance of these results to life assurance and reversionary interest societies, and by pointing out the practical application which might be made of them.

THE ENGLISH MONEY MARKET.

SUBJOINED is a reliable table affording a comparative view of the Bank of England returns, the bank rate of discount, the price of Consols, the price of wheat and the leading exchanges, during a period of four years, corresponding with the first week in June, as well as ten years back, viz., in 1851 :

	1851.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
BANK OF ENGLAND—					
Circulation, post-bills,.....	£ 20,081,000	£ 20,586,000	£ 21,882,000	£ 21,948,000	£ 20,485,000
Public deposits,.....	7,488,000 ..	5,648,000 ..	7,219,000 ..	7,752,000 ..	7,219,000
Other deposits,	8,726,000 ..	13,754,000 ..	15,942,000 ..	12,180,000 ..	10,714,000
Government securities,.....	13,544,000 ..	10,578,000 ..	11,281,000 ..	9,759,000 ..	9,916,000
Other securities,	12,558,000 ..	14,626,000 ..	19,049,000 ..	19,463,000 ..	19,862,000
Reserve of notes and coin,..	8,828,000 ..	12,703,000 ..	11,293,000 ..	9,170,000 ..	6,550,000
Coin and bullion,.....	13,886,000 ..	13,020,000 ..	17,957,000 ..	15,963,000 ..	11,940,000
Bank rate of discount,.....	3 per ct. ..	3 per ct. ..	3 per ct. ..	4 per ct. ..	6 per ct.
Price of Consols,.....	93 ..	96 ..	94 ..	95½ ..	90½ ex-d.
Average price of wheat,.....	39s. 6d. ..	44s. 9d. ..	53s. 5d. ..	53s. 4d. ..	55s. 5d.
Exchange on Paris, (short), ..	25 0 ..	25 2½ ..	25 5 ..	25 12½ ..	25 35
Amsterdam, " ..	11 16 ..	11 15 ..	11 13 ..	11 14½ ..	11 18
Hamburg, (3 months,)	13 7½ ..	13 7 ..	13 4 ..	13 5½ ..	13 9

The first week of May, 1851, the principal feature was the opening of the Great Exhibition on the first of May. As a contrast to this memorable event, a great protectionist demonstration had taken place on the occasion of the second anniversary of the "National Association for the Protection of Industry and Capital throughout the British Empire." The reactionary system was making further progress abroad, especially in Austria, where the plan of Baron BRUCK for an Austro-German customs union was being opposed to the utmost. Prince METTERNICH was about to return to Vienna.

In the last week in May, 1851, news had arrived that the Southern Rights Convention, sitting at Charleston, had passed a resolution to the effect that "the State of South Carolina cannot submit to the wrongs and aggressions perpetrated by the Federal government and the Northern States without dishonor and ruin, and that it is necessary to relieve herself therefrom with or without the co-operation of other Southern States."

Another resolution expressly asserts the right of secession to be essential to the freedom and sovereignty of the States of the confederacy. It does not appear, however, that any action came of these proceedings; the Liverpool cotton market had, notwithstanding, been depressed, owing to over-speculation. In London the Great Exhibition was achieving a daily increasing triumph.

The first week in June, 1851, the money market was easy, and the bullion at the bank was steadily increasing. Large quantities of gold were being exported from California. The advices from the Cape reported a continuance of the Caffre war, but no important operations had taken place on either side.

In the first week in May, 1858, the condition of the money market was very easy. The discount business of the bank dwindled to a trifling amount, the rate in the open market having fallen to $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. Consols were verging upon 98, notwithstanding the uncertainty as to the course in Parliament on the Indian bill.

At the close of May, 1858, the supply of money was exceedingly large, and the rate of discount in the open market did not exceed $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. The Brazilian four and a half per cent. loan of £1,526,000, at $96\frac{1}{2}$, had been announced, and commanded 1 per cent. premium; since then, however, a decline has taken place to $88\frac{1}{2}$.

In the first week in June, 1858, the rate of discount of the Bank of France was from 4 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the bullion having augmented two millions and three-quarters sterling within a month.

In the first week in May, 1859, the report of a Franco-Russian alliance against England having been contradicted, the public were beginning to view with comparative calmness the outbreak of the Italian war. Nevertheless, great sensitiveness remained, and the rapidity with which the banks and other money-lenders were calling in their resources and throwing out stock deposited with them, exercised a most severe effect on the stock exchange. Sixty members of that establishment had been declared defaulters. Turkish stocks, which in the previous week fell 20 to 22 per cent., had experienced a fresh decline of 5 per cent. The English funds, however, after falling $5\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., had rallied to the extent of $1\frac{1}{4}$. The new Indian debenture loan stood at 3 per cent. discount. The bank rate of discount had been raised from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., making a rise of 2 per cent. within a fortnight. France had announced a 3 per cent. loan for a sum equal to £20,000,000, at the low price of $60\frac{1}{2}$. At Vienna, the great house of ARNSTEIN & ESKELES had stopped payment. There was a panic in every market for Austrian securities on the Continent.

At the close of May, 1859, although the Bank of England's minimum was kept up at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the rate for the best bills in the open market had fallen to 3 to $3\frac{1}{4}$. The question whether coal should be considered contraband of war engaged discussion. Since the outbreak of the war in Italy, numerous financial and commercial disasters had occurred in Germany and other parts of the Continent.

In the first week in June, 1859, the Bank of England had just reduced their rate of discount from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent. The French and Sardinian armies in Italy fully maintained their advantage over the Austrians. The disruption of the Derby ministry was considered imminent, and the general appearance of politics was disturbed.

In the first week in May, 1860, King VICTOR EMANUEL was making a triumphant progress through his new central Italian dominions. Encouraging advices had been received from Japan, where a very large trade was expected to be gradually formed. From America, the news had arrived of the stoppage of the Bank of Tennessee, an establishment with a capital of £740,000. The Reform bill continued to be discussed in the House of Commons at great length. The committee of London bankers had carried a resolution to close at three o'clock on Saturdays.

At the close of May, 1860, uneasiness respecting the future course of continental politics still prevailed, but not to an equal extent as for some weeks previously. The Bank of England had just reduced their rate from $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 per cent. The committee of the Stock Exchange had suspended several brokers for transacting speculative business for PULLINGER, the fraudulent cashier of the Union Bank of London.

In the first week in June, 1860, the Italian question was absorbing attention, and in most quarters was regarded with much uneasiness. In the discount market money was easy, and obtainable at a fraction below the bank minimum of 4 per cent. The committee of the Stock Exchange had just published their report upon the transactions of PULLINGER, the fraudulent cashier of the Union Bank.

SOUTHERN BANK CONVENTION.

ATLANTA, JUNE 3, 1861.

THIS important financial convention, called by the Tennessee legislature, met at Atlanta on the 3d, and, after a very interesting session, adjourned to meet at Richmond on the 24th of July. Thirty banks were represented by delegates, and the Virginia bankers responded by letter, giving as a reason for their absence the war *status* of the State, and saying that they are impressed with the importance of arrangements to put the currency of the Confederate States upon a footing, as near as practicable, of equality. They are prepared to acquiesce in any any judicious measures to that result, and may be expected to assent to any arrangement sanctioned by the convention, and concurred in by the banks of the other Southern States.

Mr. TRENHOLM presented the following communication from Secretary MEMMINGER, which was ordered to be entered on the minutes:

CHARLESTON, MAY 31, 1861.

To the Convention of the Banks of the Confederate States, Atlanta:

Gentlemen,—I regret that the exigencies of business prevent my attending your meeting. I am not informed as to the objects which are contemplated, further than by the statement in the published call of the convention. Desiring greatly to forward the object stated in the call, I have concluded that the best mode of furthering it is to inform some members of your body of the views and fiscal plans of the government, and endeavor to harmonize your action with those plans. To this end I have conferred fully with Mr. GEORGE A. TRENHOLM, of Charleston, and have requested him to present those views; and I feel confident you will find your wishes, if not anticipated, at least essentially promoted by the arrangements already made by the government. It will be in your power to forward those plans and to add to the financial credit of the government, and I feel assured that you will use every effort to advance this great object. Permit me to add my assurances that you may rely with

equal confidence upon the government for a hearty co-operation in every plan which you may advise for securing the public and private interests of our people. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. G. MEMMINGER, *Secretary of the Treasury.*

Mr. RAVENEL announced that each of the banks of Charleston had passed the following resolution :

Resolved, That this bank will credit the Secretary of the Treasury with the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, at the rate of six per cent. per annum, secured by large treasury notes, to be redeemed by small treasury notes, and to be convertible into eight per cent. bonds of the Confederate States, at the option of the holders.

Mr. TRENHOLM, from the business committee, reported the following resolutions, which were read, and separately unanimously adopted :

Resolved, That this convention do recommend to all the banks in the Southern Confederacy to receive, in payment of all dues to them, the treasury notes of the same on deposit, and pay them out again to customers.

That until the said treasury notes can be prepared and issued, it be recommended that all the banks do agree to advance to the government, in current notes, such sums severally as may be agreed upon between them and the Secretary of the Treasury—the said advance to be made on the deposit of the banks of treasury notes of large denominations, on eight per cent. stock or bonds.

That all the banks in the Southern Confederacy are earnestly urged to take immediate action on the foregoing resolutions, as a measure of the greatest importance to the government and the people, and communicate the same, without delay, to the Secretary of the Treasury at Richmond.

That it be recommended to all the rail-road companies in the Southern Confederacy to receive the treasury notes in payment of fares and freights.

That the legislatures of the several States do make it lawful for their tax collectors and other officers to receive the treasury notes in payment of all taxes and all other public dues.

That all the States, cities and corporations having coupons payable in the city of New-York or elsewhere, in the enemy's country, be requested, during the continuance of the war, to appoint some place of payment in the Confederate States, and to give their creditors notice of the same.

Mr. ROBERTS offered the following :

Resolved, That a copy of the proceedings of this convention be sent to each bank within the Confederate States, with a request that they co-operate with this convention.

Adopted unanimously.

Mr. RAVENEL stated that the banks of Charleston, Savannah and Augusta had already adopted the recommendations of the second resolution.

BANK ITEMS.

NEW-YORK.—A meeting of the creditors of HOLLIS WHITE & Co.'s Bank was held at Niagara Falls in June, when a committee was appointed to investigate the affairs and report at an adjourned meeting. A Receiver has since been appointed.

Suspended Banks.—The securities deposited by the Bank of Albany to protect its circulating notes, were sold at auction, under direction of H. H. VAN DYCK, Esq., Superintendent of the Bank Department. There was a good attendance, and the stocks brought the following prices:

\$ 5,000	New-York State 5's,	1875, . . . 86	2,000	New-York State 6's,	1864, . . . 100
21,000	do. do.	5's, 1874, . . . 85	15,000	United States 5's,	1865, . . . 83
3,000	do. do.	5½'s, 1861, . . . 99½	10,000	do. 5's,	1871, . . . 73½
2,000	do. do.	5½'s, 1865, . . . 91½	5,000	do. 5's,	1871, . . . 73
12,000	do. do.	6's, 1862, . . . 99½			

Bank of the Capitol.—The securities deposited by the Bank of the Capitol, of Albany, to protect its circulating notes, were sold at auction to-day by S. DRAPER, under direction of H. H. VAN DYCK, Esq., Superintendent of the Bank Department. The sale went off briskly at prices showing an advance upon those obtained at the sale on Wednesday, as follows:

\$ 10,000	New-York State 6's,	1865, . . . 98½	5,000	New-York State 6's,	1873, . . . 99½
6,000	do. do.	6's, 1865, . . . 98½	5,000	United States 5's,	1865, . . . 83
45,000	do. do.	6's, 1872, . . . 99½	2,000	do. 5's,	1871, . . . 80½
10,000	do. do.	6's, 1873, . . . 98½	2,000	do. 5's,	1871, . . . 85½

Medina.—An injunction has been issued in the case of the Medina Bank, and W. W. POTTER, of that place, has been appointed Receiver. The failure of this bank took place just as negotiations were about concluded for its sale, but before it had been transferred to the new parties. The circulation of the bank is yet received on deposit at the Metropolitan Bank, and is protected by Mr. D. W. POWERS, of Rochester, who has long been its redeeming agent. The Medina Bank was owned exclusively by Mr. O. R. BROWNE.

Albany.—Mr. J. M. LOVETT has resigned the cashiership of the Exchange Bank at Albany.

Bank Notes.—The Superintendent of the New-York Bank Department gives notice that he will redeem at par the notes of the Bank of Albany, the Bank of the Capitol and of J. W. RUMSEY & Co.'s Bank, of Tarrytown.

Whitestown.—We have received a copy of a pamphlet containing a statement of the Hon. PHILO WHITE, of the management, condition and prospects of the Bank of Whitestown. It is completely exhaustive of the subject, and is the most searching and thorough document of the kind which we ever examined. It probes, dissects and analyzes, and shows up the history of the institution in a plain unvarnished tale. The conclusion reached is, that the bank is sound; but that to make money for its stockholders it must in the future make less for its managers and customers.

MASSACHUSETTS.—The receivers of the People's Five Cents Savings Bank, Boston, announce an additional dividend of 10 per cent., making now 80 per cent. divided to holders of certificates.

The receivers of the Grocers' Bank have declared a dividend of \$12 per share, (on 6,549 shares,) payable on demand. The bank failed November 30th, 1855, and has redeemed its bills and paid all debts against it. The original capital was 7,500 shares, (\$750,000,) but has been reduced as above by certain offsets in settlements. A further small dividend is yet to be paid as final.

CONNECTICUT.—The Hartford *Courant* furnishes the annexed list of the subscribers in that city to the late government loan:

Hartford Bank, \$50,000; Phoenix Bank, \$50,000; Farmers and Mechanics' Bank,

\$50,000; City Bank, \$25,000; Aetna Bank, \$25,000; Mercantile Bank, \$20,000; Exchange Bank, \$20,000; State Bank, \$20,000; Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank, \$20,000; Hartford County Bank, \$10,000; Charter Oak Bank, \$5,000; Aetna Insurance Co., \$50,000; A. S. BECKWITH, \$50,000; HOWE, MATHER & Co., \$10,000.

ILLINOIS.—The bank commissioners of Illinois have made another call for additional securities from twenty-three banks. Their present circulation in the aggregate is \$2,484,084, and the estimated value of their securities \$2,112,755. This leaves seventeen banks which are not under call as follows:

1. Alton Bank. 2. Bank of America. 3. Bank of Bloomington. 4. Bank of Indemnity. 5. City Bank of Ottawa. 6. Cumberland County Bank. 7. Tinkham & Co.'s Bank. 8. Highland Bank. 9. International Bank. 10. Mahaiwe Bank. 11. Marine Bank. 12. McLean County Bank. 13. Mechanics' Bank. 14. Merchants' Bank. 15. Pittsfield Bank. 16. Reapers' Bank. 17. Union Bank.

The circulation of these seventeen banks is \$1,470,207, and the estimated value of securities \$1,514,605. The basis of valuation of the stocks of all the banks is: Northern State stocks par; United States stocks at eighty-five cents; Tennessee's at \$35; Virginia's, 42½; Kentucky's, 77; North Carolina's, 51½; Missouri's, 38, and Louisiana's, 54. The following banks are in voluntary liquidation, their circulation amounting to forty-one thousand six hundred and fifty-three dollars; Bank of America, (Chicago,) Bank of Northern Illinois, Bank of Ottawa, Bank of Peru, Chicago Bank, Exchange Bank of Tucker, Kane County Bank. Notes of these banks are redeemed by the auditor at par in gold. The *Chicago Tribune* says:

Banks whose circulation shall be secured by United States stocks at eighty-five cents, or their market value, or Northern State stocks at par, on the first of July, and who will enter into central redemption on the terms specified in the late bank law, will not be subject to call. In estimating the value of securities, discrimination will hereafter be made by the bank commissioners in favor of Illinois stocks, and every encouragement consistent with the public interest will be given to banks entering into central redemption. This policy, it is believed, will increase the value of Illinois bonds, and at the same time secure a healthy circulation.

Illinois Currency.—The bank commissioners have made a call on a further list of Illinois banks for additional securities; holders of the currency are informed that the auditor is now delivering the bonds deposited by sixty-seven of the banks in exchange for their notes. Messrs. N. H. RIDGELY & Co., bankers, Springfield, receive the paper and convert it into bonds for a small commission, and can furnish bonds for mixed lots of it in which there may not be enough of any one bank to pay for a bond. The paper yields more when converted into money in this way than any other. For a list of the banks, kinds of bonds, rates, &c., apply to that firm.

Gold for Money.—Every day is removing the injury inflicted upon this city by the downfall of stump-tail currency. The stuff is rapidly disappearing from circulation and good money is taking its place.

The express companies are bringing, on an average per day, \$100,000 of the solid coin, which is disbursed among the farmers in payment of grain and cattle. The wild-cat currency is passing away as fast as the coin comes in to fill the vacuum.

Business is now transacted by the specie standard in this city. Bank notes are taken at what they will bring in gold.

Wisconsin stump-tail is treated as merchandise worth 90 or 93 cents on the dollar, or at whatever it can be converted into money. This rule of treating bank notes at what they will bring in gold and silver is the true principle. And by sticking to it our merchants and manufacturers will be enabled to undersell all competitors who receive Wisconsin or any other stump-tail at par, in payment for their wares.

The gold standard gives our merchants some 8 per cent. the advantage of their up-lake neighbors. The self-interest of country merchants in Wisconsin and Minnesota will impel them to seek the best and cheapest market in which to make their purchases. A Milwaukee wholesaler must of necessity mark up the prices of his goods 6 or more per cent., if he takes stump-tail in payment. It needs no argument or elucidation to prove that he must do so. And this one fact overturns all the fiddle faddle uttered by the Milwaukee papers about Chicago merchants fearing a loss of trade from adopting the gold standard, while their up-lake neighbors do business on stump-tail.—*Chicago Tribune*, June 7.

OHIO.—The Board of Control of the State Bank of Ohio has agreed to take the remaining \$300,000 of the State Loan of \$1,000,000, for military purposes, at par. The \$2,000,000 has not been put upon the market, not being needed as yet.

WISCONSIN.—The Wisconsin Legislature has made provision for a war loan of \$1,000,000.

Southern Repudiation.—The legislature of Tennessee has passed the following repudiation bill:

"SEC. 1. *Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee.* That no person in any non-slaveholding State, their agents or attorneys in this State, shall have power to sue or collect any moneys owing to or any property claimed by the citizens of any such State in Tennessee during hostilities between Tennessee and the federal government.

"SEC. 2. *Be it further enacted,* That it may and shall be lawful for such debtors to pay such moneys into the Treasury of the State, which sums shall be receipted for by the Treasurer, and shall be refunded, with interest, upon the cessation of hostilities."

A similar bill has been passed by the legislature of Arkansas. Georgia adopted a similar course of dishonesty a month ago.

LOUISIANA.—The Southern Bank of New-Orleans gives notice, that henceforth transfers of the stock of this bank, belonging to non-resident stockholders, and payments of dividends thereon, can only be effected in New-Orleans.

Southern Bank Shares.—The following letter, by the Attorney-General at New-Orleans, is written in answer to an inquiry made by a bank president in that city:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE, *New-Orleans, June 6, 1861.*

From the note, power of attorney and statement of facts submitted to me, it appears that Mr. W. E. LEVERICH, a citizen of Louisiana, domiciled in New-Orleans, desires to transfer to himself thirty shares of the capital stock of your bank, standing on the books of the bank in the name of HENRY S. LEVERICH, a person domiciled in the State of New-York. The power of attorney under which Mr. W. E. LEVERICH desires to make the proposed transfer was executed in New-York on the 22d of May, 1861; that is to say, since the commencement of the present war, and the recognition of its existence by the Confederate States.

My opinion is that the power of attorney is a nullity, and the proposed transfer of stock illegal and void, and therefore the bank, as a matter of public duty, should refuse to recognise the power of attorney, or permit the transfer to be entered on its books.

No principle of international law is more firmly established than that the declaration of war arrests all intercourse between the belligerents. War puts every individual of the respective governments, as well as the governments themselves, in a state of hostility to each other. There is no such thing as a war for arms and a peace for commerce. The existence of civil contracts and relations is contradictory to a state of war, and hence it has been held that commercial partnerships existing between the citizens of one country and those of another are dissolved by the breaking out of a war between the two countries. Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, one of the most profound jurists of his age, repeatedly declared in numerous cases adjudged by him, that by war all communication between the subjects of the belligerent countries is suspended; that no intercourse can be legally carried on without a special license from the government; "that a state of war was a state of interdiction of communication."

After citing further authorities in support of this position, the Attorney-General proceeds:

It is clear, therefore, that the acceptance of the power of attorney by Mr. W. E. LEVERICH from Mr. H. S. LEVERICH is illegal, and he has no lawful authority to act in pursuance of its mandate. The transfer of the stock, or agreement to transfer the stock, between W. E. LEVERICH and H. S. LEVERICH, is illegal and cannot be tolerated. Mr. H. S. LEVERICH, being domiciled in New-York, is to be regarded as an alien enemy, and no person domiciled within the Confederate States can hold any intercourse or communication with him during the war; and if such intercourse result in a negotiation, agreement or contract, such negotiation, agreement or contract is illegal and absolutely null and void. It is time that the law on this subject should

be well understood, for no intercourse whatever, without special permission of the government, can be lawfully carried on between enemies, except that of a hostile character. The remittance of money for any purpose, the making of contracts, the acceptance of trusts, the creation of any civil obligation or commercial relation whatever, is unlawful and unbidden, simply because it is inconsistent with the hostile attitude of the parties. The belligerent governments have placed their respective citizens in an attitude of hostility towards each other, and no relation inconsistent with hostility can be lawfully created by the acts of individuals without the express permission of the government. Respectfully,

THOS. J. SEMMES, *Attorney-General.*

WALTER G. ROBINSON, Esq., *President Mechanics and Traders' Bank, New-Orleans.*

CANADA.—The Canada Central Railway bill, introduced in the Canadian Parliament by Hon. WILLIAM F. POWELL, has passed both Houses. Four million acres of land have been granted by the government to the road. Its route is from Montreal to French River, which takes its rise in Lake Nipissing, and empties into Georgian Bay as its head. The distance from Montreal to French River is about four hundred miles, running in a direct line due west from Montreal.

Bank Notes.—There is very little doing in uncurrent bank notes at present. Southern money has ceased to find its way to the northward since the mails have been cut off, and western currency being in a state of liquidation, it does not seek this market. The following are the quotations for bank notes furnished by the Wall-street brokers :

	Discount.		Discount.
New-York State,.....	— @ $\frac{3}{8}$	Mobile, Alabama,.....	30 @ —
New-England,.....	— @ $\frac{1}{2}$	New-Orleans, La.,.....	15 @ —
New-Jersey,.....	$\frac{1}{4}$ @ $\frac{1}{2}$	Wisconsin,.....	15 @ 20
Philadelphia,.....	$\frac{1}{2}$ @ —	Ohio and Indiana,.....	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ —
Interior Pennsylvania,....	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 2	Missouri,.....	15 @ —
Baltimore,.....	$\frac{1}{2}$ @ —	Free Indiana and Kentucky,	4 @ 5
Maryland,.....	2 @ 3	Tennessee,.....	25 @ —
Virginia,.....	15 @ 20	Michigan,.....	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ —
North Carolina,.....	20 @ —	Canada,.....	$\frac{1}{4}$ @ —
South Carolina and Ga.,..	30 @ 50		

RECENT CHANGES AMONG PRIVATE BANKERS.

State.	Place.	Name of Firm.	Remarks.
New-York,	New-York City,	Clark & Williamson,	Dissolved.
"	"	Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt,	Suspended.
"	"	Atwood & Co.,	Suspended.
Pennsylvania,	Philadelphia,	Charles H. Fisher,	Suspended.
"	Franklin,	R. Lamberton,	New firm.
Virginia,	Alexandria,	Corse Brothers,	Suspended.
"	Richmond,	Isaacs & Taylor,	Dissolved.
"	"	William B. Isaacs & Co.,	New firm.
Illinois,	Kewanee,	George A. Morse & Co.,	Relinquished business.
"	Chicago,	Hoffman & Gelpcke,	Suspended.
"	Naperville,	J. Jassoy & Co.,	Suspended.
"	Monmouth,	Gregg & Hubbard,	Suspended.
Iowa,	Dubuque,	Theo. Gelpcke & Co.,	Suspended.
Kentucky,	Louisville,	A. D. Hunt & Co.,	Relinquished business.
"	"	Curtis & Warren,	Dissolved.
"	"	C. N. Warren & Co.,	New firm.
Minnesota,	St. Paul,	Dana & White,	Dissolved.
"	"	N. J. T. Dana,	New firm.
Louisiana,	New-Orleans,	E. C. Benedict & Co.,	Dissolved.
Michigan,	Detroit,	O. C. Thompson,	Relinquished business.

Messrs. HOFFMAN & GELPCKE, bankers of Chicago, have issued the following card :

To our Depositors.—We beg to inform our business friends that we have concluded, for the protection of our creditors, especially those of the poorer classes, to liquidate our business. During the last three weeks we have paid over \$300,000 of our liabilities, and have yet sufficient cash means at our disposal to enable us, under ordinary circumstances, to sustain ourselves during the present crisis.

We have made provisions by which we are enabled to pay immediately all small amounts, deposited in the savings department. Though our losses have been heavy, our books still show a handsome surplus, and though under the circumstances many of our bills receivable will necessarily fall short, we trust to have the ability, as certainly we have the honest intention, of meeting all our liabilities at no remote time.

Believing that we can far better and far more economically adjust our own affairs than others, and trusting that we are entitled not only to the sympathy, but also to the confidence of our creditors, we desire to avoid the necessity of an assignment, and would ask the patience of our heavy depositors for a short time, assuring them, that under all circumstances, in liquidating our affairs, we shall be governed by the strictest honor and integrity.

HOFFMAN & GELPCKE.

BANK PRESIDENTS AND CASHIERS.

The following is a list of recent changes among bank officers in the several States :

<i>Place.</i>	<i>Bank.</i>	<i>Appointed.</i>	<i>In Place of</i>
Portland, Maine,	Merchants' Bank,	Rensselaer Cram, <i>Pres.</i>	W. Woodbury.
Irasburgh, Vermont,	Bank of Orleans,	W. B. Denison, <i>Cashier,</i>	I. N. Cushman.
Montpelier, "	Vermont Bank,	H. W. Heaton, <i>Pres.</i>	R. Robinson.
Rutland, "	Bank of Rutland,	John B. Reynolds, <i>Cash.</i>	N. Kellogg.
Ashaway, R. Island,	Ashaway Bank,	N. K. Lewis, <i>Cashier,</i>	J. L. Spencer.
Providence, "	Bank North America,	Seth Padelford, <i>Pres.</i>	E. Harris.
" "	Westminster Bank,	Sullivan Fenner, <i>Cashier.</i>	R. G. Place.
Hartford, Conn.,	Merch. and Manuf.	E. D. Tiffany, <i>President,</i>	Geo. Beach, Jr.
Mystic River, Conn.,	Mystic River Bank,	N. G. Fish, <i>President,</i>	Charles Mallory.
Norfolk, "	Norfolk Bank,	K. J. Munson, <i>President,</i>	E. T. Butler.
Stamford, "	Stamford Bank,	H. M. Humphrey, <i>Cash.</i>	Francis R. Leeds.
Batavia, New-York,	Bank of Genesee,	A. N. Cowden, <i>Cashier,</i>	M. L. Babcock.
Brooklyn, "	Central Bank,	Jno. K. Pruyn, <i>Pres.</i>	E. Copeland.
" "	" "	Jno. L. Spader, <i>Cashier,</i>	Jno. K. Pruyn.
" "	City Bank,	Albert G. Allen, <i>Cashier.</i>	Robert P. Perrin.
Clyde, "	Briggs Bank,	Aaron Griswold, <i>Cash.</i>	W. H. Coffin.
Deposit, "	Deposit Bank,	A. J. Wheeler, <i>Cashier,</i>	R. Raderer.
Elmira, "	Elmira Bank,	Wm. F. Corey, <i>Cashier,</i>	Anson C. Ely.
Keeseville, "	Essex County Bank,	Samuel Ames, <i>Cashier,</i>	A. Thompson.
Kingston, "	State of New-York,	H. Brodhead, Jr., <i>Pres.</i>	J. Burhans.
Monticello, "	Union Bank,	J. P. Tremain, <i>President,</i>	A. C. Niven.
Mt. Morris, "	Genesee River Bank,	J. E. Robinson, <i>Cashier,</i>	Wm. Mills.
Newark, "	Bank of Newark,	E. W. Hayes, <i>Cashier,</i>	A. F. Williams.
Rhinebeck, "	Bank of Rhinebeck,	Wm. M. Sayre, <i>Cashier,</i>	J. T. Banker.
Setauket, "	Setauket Bank,	H. Day, <i>President,</i>	Jno. Elderken.
Syracuse, "	Merchants' Bank,	Jefferson Freeman, <i>Pres.</i>	J. D. Norton.
Troy, "	Farmers' Bank,	E. T. Gale, <i>President,</i>	J. T. McCoun.
Utica, "	Oneida Bank,	James Sayre, <i>President,</i>	E. S. Barnum.
Weedsport, "	Weedsport Bank,	Charles Covell, <i>Cashier.</i>	S. J. Mack.
Whitestown, "	Bank of Whitestown,	F. B. Henderson, <i>Pres.</i>	Jos. Bruce.
Lock Haven, Penn.,	Lock Haven Bank,	L. Mussina, <i>Cashier,</i>	Philip Krebs.
Lawrenceburg, Ind.,	Branch State Bank,	J. L. Kennedy, <i>Cashier,</i>	C. B. Burkam.
Louisville, Ky.,	Southern Bank,	J. G. Barret, <i>Cashier,</i>	W. Garnett.
St. Joseph, Mo.,	Western Bank,	J. L. O'Neill, <i>Cashier,</i>	B. M. Hughes.
St. Louis, "	Merchants' Bank,	G. L. Stansbury, <i>Pres.</i>	J. A. Brownlee.
Memphis, Tenn.,	Union Bank,	W. B. Waldran, <i>Pres.</i>	Samuel Mosby.
Iowa City, Iowa,	Branch State Bank,	T. J. Cox, <i>Cashier,</i>	C. W. Fracker.

Notes on the Money Market.

NEW-YORK, JUNE 24, 1861.

Exchange on London, at sixty days' sight, 105½ @ 105¾.

THE money market during the month of June has varied but little compared with the previous month. Loans on call have been made on strictly first class collaterals at 4 @ 5 per cent. These are exceptions to the bulk of the business done. We may safely quote the favored loans at 5 @ 6 per cent. on call, ranging thence up to 7 @ 10. The lowest rates for prime and short paper, well endorsed, this month have been 6 @ 7 per cent; for longer paper, 4 to 6 months, 7 @ 9 per cent. The volume of business paper in the market is essentially reduced, all parties aiming, under the present lamentable circumstances of the nation, to curtail their own liabilities to the smallest possible amount. There has probably never been a half year in the history of the country when there was such a rapid extinguishment of business liabilities as since the first of January last.

We annex the ruling rates for business paper at this date, compared with the last week in March, April and May:

	March 23.	April 20.	May 22.	June 24.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Loans on call, State Stock securities,.....	5 @ 5½ .. 5½ @ 7 .. 5½ @ 7 .. 5 @ 6			
“ other good securities,.....	6 @ 6½ .. 7 @ 7½ .. 8 @ 9 .. 6 @ 7			
Prime endorsed bills, 60 days,.....	5½ @ 6 .. 6 @ 7 .. 7 @ 10 .. 6 @ 7			
First class single signatures, 4 to 6 months, ..	6 @ 6½ .. 7 @ 8 .. 8 @ 10 .. 8 @ 12			
Other good bills,.....	8 @ 9 .. 8 @ 10 .. 10 @ 12 .. 12 @ 15			
Names less known,.....	12 @ 24 .. 12 @ 24 .. 15 @ 30 .. no sale.			

The rates of foreign exchange remain in favor of buyers—sterling bills for the steamer of this week having closed at 105½ @ 106, sixty days. The exports of domestic produce continue heavy, and specie is arriving by every steamer from Liverpool. On Paris, the rate for bankers' bills is 5.40 francs per dollar; in some instances, 5.35 @ 5.30 have been paid. On all the Continental points the rates are more favorable to remitters. We annex the current quotations, compared with the closing rates of March, April and May, for bankers' sixty day bills:

	March 23.	April 20.	May 22.	June 24.
London, bankers' bills,.....	107½ @ 107¾ .. 106¾ @ 106¾ .. 105½ @ 106¾ .. 105½ @ 105¾			
Do. mercantile bills,....	106½ @ 107½ .. 105 @ 106 .. 105 @ 106 .. 104½ @ 105			
Do. with bills of lading, ..	106 @ 107 .. 105 @ 105½ .. 103½ @ 104½ .. 102½ @ 104			
Paris, bankers' bills,.....	5.28½ @ 5.25 .. 5.35 @ 5.30 .. 5.45 @ 5.25 .. 5.40 @ 5.37			
Amsterdam, per guilder,....	40 @ 40¼ .. 39½ @ 40 .. 39 @ 40 .. 39 @ 39¾			
Bremen, per rix dollar,.....	77½ @ 78 .. 76¼ @ 77 .. 77 @ 78 .. 75¼ @ 76¼			
Hamburg, per mare banco, ..	36 @ 36¼ .. 35½ @ 35¼ .. 35 @ 35¼ .. 34¼ @ 35¼			

The entire shipment of gold from this port to Europe this year has been (from January 1st to 15th June) only \$3,024,000. The comparative shipments for other years were as follows:

1852,.....	\$10,518,000	1857,.....	\$20,056,000
1853,.....	7,918,000	1858,.....	11,870,000
1854,.....	14,364,000	1859,.....	31,431,000
1855,.....	15,696,000	1860,.....	18,429,000
1856,.....	12,360,000	1861,.....	3,024,000

The general government will require large loans under authority of the new Congress which will meet on the 4th of July next. These loans are variously estimated at one hundred to two hundred millions of dollars for the calendar year 1861. Government bonds are quiet, and the sales of 1881 are offered at 84 @ 86. The fives are firm at the quotations. We annex the current rates of this week:

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Six per cents,.....	90	91	Sixes, 1881, (registered,)....	*84 84½
Six per cents, 1862, (coupon,)..	91	Sixes, 1881, (coupon,).....	83¾ 83¾
Sixes, 1867,.....	..	90	Treasury notes, 12 per cents, 101¾	102
Sixes, 1868,.....	*..	91	Treasury notes, 11 " 101	101¾
Sixes, 1868, (coupon,).....	..	90	Treasury notes, 10¾ " 100¾	101
Fives, 1865,.....	86	87	Treasury notes, 10¾ " 100¾	101
Fives, 1874, (registered,)....	*73½	Treasury notes, 10¾ " 100¾	..
Fives, 1874, (coupon,).....	76½	76½	Treasury notes, 10 " 100¾	..
Fives, 1871, (registered,)....	*73½	Treasury notes, 5 "
Fives, 1871, (coupon,).....	76	77	Treasury notes, 6 " new, 96	97

The State loans proposed in this market are as follows:

Indiana State loan, six per cent.,.....	\$1,500,000	repayable 1881.
Illinois State loan, six per cent.,.....	1,000,000	do. 1879.
Michigan State loan, seven per cent.,.....	500,000	do. 1886.
Iowa State loan, seven per cent.,.....	400,000	do. 1881.
New-York State loan, seven per cent.,.....	700,000	do. 1870.

Bids for the Michigan bonds will be received at Detroit until the 8th of July, and for the Iowa bonds until the 13th. The bonds will be issued of four different denominations: \$50, 100, \$500 and \$1,000. It is expected that the bonds of less than \$500 in amount will be taken in Michigan. The legislature, in authorizing this issue of bonds, has limited the amount to a sum not exceeding one million of dollars. Of this amount it is not expected that more than the sum now offered (\$500,000) will be issued. The rate of interest is seven per cent., to meet which a tax has been authorized, and a sinking fund provided for the gradual payment of the loan. The funded debt of the State is only about two and a quarter millions of dollars, and beyond this it cannot be increased, except in case of rebellion or war.

The bids for the Maine State loan of three hundred thousand dollars were opened at Augusta on the 20th inst., and amounted to four hundred and forty-five thousand, ranging from par to five per cent. premium. Will the State authorities of Mississippi, Arkansas and Tennessee make a note of this?

The Connecticut legislature has passed the "Loan Bill," which authorizes the issue of bonds to the amount of \$2,000,000, at the rate of six per cent. per annum, with semi-annual coupons attached, with the principal payable in twenty years from date, or at an earlier date after the expiration of ten years, at the pleasure of the General Assembly.

The stock market presents features unknown in this city at any previous period; government six per cents ranged in May from 80 @ 95, and are now quoted 83½ @ 85. The bonds of the seceding States are down to ruinously low figures. North Carolina sixes, since the first of April, have dropped from 81¼ to 44½; Tennessee, from 75½ to 36; Louisiana, from 78 to 51; Missouri, from 67 to 35; Georgia, from 80 to 53. This decline is also a marked one in the border and other States. Ohio sixes have dropped from 106 to 96; Kentucky, from 95 to 80; Indiana fives, from 89 to 76; Pennsylvania fives, from 89 to 77. Notwithstanding this heavy decline in current values, we hear of no suspension of importance at the brokers' board.

We annex quotations of the Government and leading State securities in this market for the past eight weeks:

	May 4th.	11th.	18th.	25th.	June 1st.	8th.	15th.	22d.
U. S. 6 per cents, 1867-8,....	83½	89	88½	88	86½	83¾	83¾	83½
U. S. 5 per cents, 1874,.....	76	76	76	79	78½	77½	75¾	76½
Ohio 6 per cents, 1886,.....	105	95	94	95	95	96	90	86
Kentucky 6 per cents,.....	80	76	77	77	76	76	78	80
Indiana 5 per cents,.....	68	84	82	80	79	80	78	76
Pennsylvania 5 per cents,...	77	74½	75¾	73	76½	77½	76¾	77¾
Virginia 6 per cents,.....	46	45¾	46	47½	45½	41¾	42	39
Georgia 6 per cents,.....	60¾	60	55	55	60	53
California 7 per cents, 1877,.	71½	78¾	74	75	75½	76¾	76	77
North Carolina 6 per cents,...	56½	58½	53½	56	53	51½	52	44½
Missouri 6 per cents,.....	39	38¾	38½	40½	40½	37½	36½	37½
Louisiana 6 per cents,.....	46	..	50	51	54	55	54	51
Tennessee 6 per cents,.....	47	46¾	43	43½	41	37¾	34¾	36

* Ex-interest.

In rail-road shares the decline has been less marked than in State loans. The business on the leading rail-road lines continues active in freight, with diminished revenue only from passengers. Since the first of April the decline in New-York Central shares has been 5 per cent.; Erie, 10; Harlem, 7; Reading, 12; Hudson River, 13; Michigan Central, 15; Michigan Southern, 5; Panama, 8; Illinois Central, 16; Cleveland and Toledo, 13; Chicago and Rock Island, 23; Galena and Chicago, 12; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, 16.

The market for rail-road stocks was more buoyant until last week, when the advance was checked. The earnings of the various roads compare very favorably with those of last year, and the movement for an advance in prices was based upon this circumstance. The public, however, seems at present indisposed to speculation, and the task of getting up a successful and permanent rise in stocks seems just now to be a hopeless one.

We annex the ruling cash rates for leading rail-road shares in this market during the past eight weeks:

	May 4th.	11th.	18th.	25th.	June 1st.	8th.	15th.	22d.
N. Y. Central R. R. shares,.....	72 $\frac{1}{4}$	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	72 $\frac{1}{4}$	71 $\frac{1}{2}$	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	71 $\frac{1}{2}$	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$
*N. Y. and Erie R. R. shares,...	21	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{4}$	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{4}$	23	22 $\frac{1}{4}$
*Harlem R. R. shares,.....	12 $\frac{1}{4}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	10	9 $\frac{1}{4}$
*Reading R. R. shares,.....	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{4}$	32	32 $\frac{1}{4}$
*Hudson River R. R. shares,....	36 $\frac{1}{4}$	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	34 $\frac{1}{4}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{4}$	32 $\frac{1}{2}$
Michigan Central R. R. shares,.	45 $\frac{1}{4}$	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	44 $\frac{1}{4}$	41	42	40	42	42
*Michigan Southern R. R. shares,	18 $\frac{1}{4}$	18 $\frac{1}{4}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	11 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{4}$
Panama R. R. shares,.....	102	100	100 $\frac{1}{4}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	104	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	108
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. shares,	43	42	36	40	45	40	40	42
*Illinois Central R. R. shares,...	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{4}$	65 $\frac{1}{4}$	66 $\frac{1}{4}$	69	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$
*Cleveland and Toledo R. R.,...	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{4}$	23 $\frac{1}{4}$	20 $\frac{1}{4}$	22 $\frac{1}{4}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago and Rock Island R. R.,	38 $\frac{1}{2}$	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	36	31 $\frac{1}{4}$	34 $\frac{1}{4}$	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Galena & Chicago R. R. shares,	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	59 $\frac{1}{2}$	59 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	57 $\frac{1}{2}$	56	59 $\frac{1}{4}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy,	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	58 $\frac{1}{4}$	58	56	55	53	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	56

The re-organization of the Erie Rail-Road progresses, and scrip is now being issued for preferred shares. The time expires on the 28th of July for assenting to the new arrangement, and holders of coupons and unsecured bonds must present them to the company before that day, and receive preferred shares. Messrs. WILLIAM and JOHN O'BRIEN, 29 Wall-street, are purchasing the past due coupons of the fourth and fifth mortgage bonds, as well as those of the unsecured bonds. They also purchase fractional preferred share scrip.

DEATHS.

AT PAWTUCKET, R. I., Friday, May 24th, aged eighty-five years, General CHRISTOPHER RHODES, President of the Pawtucket Bank. General RHODES was for sixty years in active business, and during most of the time identified with that branch of manufacturing which so prominently distinguishes the State of Rhode Island, and which has contributed so greatly to its prosperity. He was one of the original members of the Rhode Island Society for the Encouragement of Domestic Industry, and in its early days did much to advance its interests and usefulness. He was for many years President of the Pawtucket Bank, filling that office at the time of his death.

AT ORANGE, N. J., Monday, June 17th, in the seventy-third year of his age, JAMES WILLIAM McCULLOH, Esq., Cashier of the Branch Bank of the United States at Baltimore, from the year 1816 to 1819, and first comptroller of the United States Treasury from the year 1842 till 1849.

NAMES OF PRIVATE BANKERS

AND OTHERS,

Whose Cards (with their references) may be found on the cover of "The Bankers' Magazine," or "The Merchants and Bankers' Almanac" for 1861.

New-York,.....**Mut. Life Insur. Co.**
 ".....Guardian Life Insurance Co.
 ".....New-York Life Insurance Co.
 ".....Mutual Benefit Life Ins Co.
 ".....Bk. of British N. A. (Agency.)
 ".....National Bank Note Co.
 ".....American Bank Note Co.
 ".....Bradstreet's Reference Guide.
 ".....D. Plumb & Co's Ref. Guide.
 ".....Coleman & Co., Wm. T.
 ".....Duncan, Sherman & Co.
 ".....Samuel Hallett & Co.
 ".....Peters, Campbell & Co.
 ".....E. Morrison, 17 Nassau.
 ".....Schuchardt & Gebhard.
 ".....Merklee & Thatcher.
 ".....Locke & Craigie, Plumbers.
 ".....Taylor Brothers, Bankers.
 ".....Wm. A. Wheeler.
Geneva,.....Schell & Hemlup, Bankers.

Mass.—Boston,..**Burnett, Drake & Co.**
 ".....Chickering & Sons.
 ".....Walker, Wise & Co.

Conn.—New-Haven, **W. W. Bacon.**

Pa. Philada.,....**Davis & Birney.**
 ".....Work, McCouch & Co.
 ".....Peterson & Brothers.
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 ".....C. W. Purcell & Co.

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 Ottawa,.....Eames, Allen & Co.
 Quincy,.....Quincy Savings & Ins. Co.
 ".....Moore, Sherman & Co.
 Rockford,.....Lane, Sanford & Co.

Springfield,.....**N. H. Ridgely & Co.**
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Ia.—Cedar Rapids, Carpenter, Stibbs & Co.
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 Fort Dodge,.....Charles Sherman.
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 Muscatine,.....Green and Stone.
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Ky.—Louisville,..Tucker & Co.

Mich.—Battle Ck., **Loyal C. Kellogg.**
 Ann Arbor,.....Hale & Smith.
 Grand Rapids,.....Daniel Ball & Co.
 ".....William J. Welles.
 Niles,.....R. C. Paine.

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 St. Louis,.....Allen, Copp & Nisbel.
 ".....Barlow & Taylor.
 ".....Geo. H. Loker & Bro.
 ".....Tesson & Danjen.
 ".....National Insurance Co.
 ".....St. Louis Building Association.
 ".....State Savings Association.

Ohio.—Cin......Gilmore, Dunlap & Co.
 ".....Homans & Co.
 Dayton,.....Harshman & Gorman.
 Sandusky,.....Moss Brothers.

Oregon.—Portland, **Ladd & Tilton.**

Tenn.—Mem.,....**Gayoso Sav's Instit'n.**

Tex.—Galveston, **R. & D. G. Mills.**
 ".....E. P. Hunt.
 Houston,.....John Dickinson.
 Palestine,.....John G. Gooch.
 San Antonio,.....John C. French.

Wis.—Fond du Lac, Exch. Bk. Darling & Co.
 Milwaukee,.....Marshall & Hsley.

London,.....**Bank of British N. A.**

Canada,....**Commer. Bank of Canada.**

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THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

EDITED BY J. SMITH HOMANS, JR.

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AUGUST, 1861.—CONTENTS.

	Page
ART. I. THE NATIONAL DEBT OF GREAT BRITAIN, FUNDED AND UNFUNDED, EACH YEAR, 1691 TO 1860, AND THE ANNUAL INTEREST EACH YEAR,	81
II. Annual Statements of the Marine Insurance Companies of the City of New-York,	87
III. Annual Statement of each Fire Insurance Company of the City of New-York,	88
IV. Annual Statement of the Life Insurance Companies of the City of New-York,	91
V. Condensed Statement of the Rail-Road Reports of New-York, 1860,	92
VI. Political and Social Economy. By JOHN HILL BURTON. 1. Productions of Industry. 2. The Departments of Labor. 3. Laborers <i>versus</i> Drones. 4. Co-operation in Labor. 5. Freedom of Trade in the Currency. 6. Permanency or Stability in the Currency. 7. The Obligations of Government as to the Currency,	94
VII. The North Carolina Stay Law of 1861,	97
VIII. Albany Bank Failures in May, 1861,	98
IX. The Bank of England—Bullion, Circulation and Rate of Discount, and Price of Consols, April, 1859, to May, 1861,	100
X. Stolen Bonds—Decision of the Supreme Court of California,	101
XI. Gold and the Exchanges—The Effect of the Gold Supplies on the Foreign Exchanges between the United Kingdom and Foreign Countries, and on the Price of Silver. By FRANCIS JOURDAN. <i>Read before the Statistical Society of London, 19th February, 1861,</i>	105
XII. The Paris Stock Exchange—Those Rogues of Stockbrokers—Ces Coquins d'Agents de Change. Par EDMOND ABOUT. <i>From the London Athenæum,</i>	118
XIII. Report of the United States Mint on Japanese Coins,	121
XIV. The Financial and Commercial System of France—The Official <i>Exposé</i> of the Situation of the French Empire, made to the Senate and Corps Legislatif, 1861—Their System of Direct Taxes, Public Works, Registry and Domains, Forests, Commerce, Agriculture, Commercial Reforms, Maritime Ports, Railways, Mines, &c.,	124
XV. The Production of Gold and Silver, and its Effects upon Labor and Prices. By M. CHEVALIER, Member of the Institute of France, &c., &c. Translated by RICHARD CORDEN, Esq.,	134
XVI. Monthly Review of the English Money Market, June, 1861,	149
XVII. Monthly Review of the New-York Stock Market,	150
XVIII. Private Bankers—Changes in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, &c.,	156
XIX. BANK ITEMS—New Banks—Bank Failures—New Bank Laws—Foreign Banks,	155
XX. Notes on the Money Market and Stock Market of New-York, for July, 1861,	158

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ISSUE LETTERS OF CREDIT ON EUROPE.

July, 1861.

COLLECTIONS IN THE SOUTH AND WEST.

Several new banking houses have commenced operations lately. The cards of these may be found on the cover of this work, or in the Bankers' Almanac for 1861, and a complete list of all the banking houses, as well as of all the banks in the United States, may be found in the "Merchants and Bankers' Almanac," for 1861. The cards of bankers in the following places may be found on the cover of this Magazine, or in the Bankers' Almanac, for 1861:

MASSACHUSETTS.—Boston.—NEW YORK.—New York City, Geneva, Phelps.
PENNSYLVANIA.—Philadelphia, Scranton, Bradford, Towanda.—MARYLAND.—Baltimore.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.—Washington.
VIRGINIA.—Fredericksburg, Richmond.
CALIFORNIA.—Sacramento, San Francisco.
ILLINOIS.—Chicago, Carlinville, Moline, Ottawa, Rockford, Quincy, Springfield.
INDIANA.—Richmond.
IOWA.—Cedar Rapids, Clinton, Fairfield, Davenport, Fort Dodge, Iowa City, Keokuk, Muscatine, Sioux City, Washington.
KENTUCKY.—Louisville.
MICHIGAN.—Ann Arbor, Battle Creek, Grand Rapids, Niles.
MINNESOTA.—Minneapolis, St. Paul.
MISSOURI.—St. Louis.
OHIO.—Cincinnati, Dayton, Sandusky, Toledo, Zanesville.
TENNESSEE.—Memphis.—TEXAS.—Galveston, Palestine, San Antonio, Houston.
WISCONSIN.—Milwaukee.
CANADA.—Kingston, &c.
KANSAS.—Leavenworth City.

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THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

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THE NATIONAL DEBT OF GREAT BRITAIN.

THE origin of the debt of Great Britain in its present shape of public stocks, upon which interest only is payable, and the principal of which is not returnable, dates from the reign of WILLIAM III. The sovereigns of England had, indeed, previously felt the need of occasional supplies of money. The practice of anticipating the revenue dates back to the Norman Conquest. The money thus borrowed was repaid by the lender himself collecting the tax of some particular branch of the public revenue. Indeed, the monarchs were sometimes obliged to have recourse to other means of borrowing when the revenues were all pledged. In the time of HENRY VI. there appears a record of the king having pledged his jewels, in order to obtain so insignificant an accommodation as £300. When taxes came to be levied only on authority of Parliament, provisions were usually made in the acts for anticipating the produce of them by borrowing on the security of such produce. In 1664 the plan of raising money thus, in anticipation of the revenue, was more systematically provided for. Negotiable securities, bearing interest, were issued to all persons willing to lend their money to the government. This plan placed the credit of the government very high, and the goldsmiths of London, who acted as bankers, were much in the custom of placing the money in their hands at interest with the government. In 1672, however, all payments from the exchequer were stopped by an arbitrary proclamation of CHARLES II. The time was at first to be for one year, but it was afterwards extended indefinitely. The gross want of honesty and good faith shown by CHARLES and his advisers on this occasion was productive of great suffer-

ing, and damaged the credit of the government incalculably. The amount which the exchequer owed at the time payments were suspended was £1,328,526. The king, it is true, charged his hereditary revenue with six per cent. per annum interest on this amount, which was paid until the year 1685. The unfortunate victims of royal cupidity were then forced to enter the courts for redress. The suit was protracted for twelve years, when judgment in the lower court went against the crown. This was, however, afterwards set aside by the Lord Chancellor. On appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the court below was sustained. But when the amount finally came to be paid to the representatives of the original creditors, they got only about half of the original amount.

With the accession of WILLIAM and MARY came war and increased taxation. Loans were necessary to carry on the business of the government, and these were at first raised in the ordinary way, by tallies issued in anticipation of the revenue. These tallies were issued largely in excess of the amounts which the taxes upon which they were charged produced; and after £8,000,000 had remained outstanding unpaid, it became necessary to devise some other means of borrowing money. Of these new means, the first tried was in 1692, when life annuities and tontines were devised. £1,000,000 were authorized to be raised, at ten per cent. for seven years, and afterwards seven per cent., on the lives of the lenders' nominees, with benefit of survivorship, till the number was reduced to seven. The amount raised on these terms was only £108,000, and the annuity, after seven years, £7,567. An alternative was then allowed of fourteen per cent. on an annuity on a single life, the sum raised on which was £773,393, and the following year the sum was completed to £1,000,000.

Certain annuities were next issued; holders of life annuities were allowed, on depositing an additional sum, to convert them into annuities of ninety-six years. By this plan all the existing life annuities were converted into long or certain annuities.

It was under WILLIAM III. that the Bank of England was incorporated, and all its capital lent to the government at eight per cent. This was the foundation of the funding system, and the amount of £1,200,000 advanced by the Bank was the first instalment of the present funded debt. The interest on this amount was subsequently reduced at various periods to three per cent., at which it now stands.

In 1694 another million was raised on annuities for sixteen years. In the same reign exchequer bills were first issued; they bore seven per cent. interest. They were at first received with little favor, but being made receivable for taxes, they soon got into better credit. These bills have been issued from time to time, and are used for obtaining temporary loans in anticipation of revenue. Exchequer bills are called a part of the unfunded debt, to distinguish them from the other loans, which are funded.

In the reign of ANNE additions were made to the public debt much greater than the amount of money raised. A lottery loan brought in nine million dollars, and added to the debt nearly twelve. In the same manner many subsequent loans were negotiated at a discount, and a much larger sum placed as principal in the public debt than was received therefor.

In our American States it is usual for the governments, State and National, to borrow money for certain specified times and rates of interest. The plan of the English debt is different. The nation does not profess to borrow the money, since to make a loan there ought to be a promise to return. The nation grants an annuity forever to the person who pays a certain sum into the loan and his heirs, but it does not promise to redeem the principal. The capital is sunk, the interest only, in the shape of an annuity, being payable yearly.

From the small beginnings in 1694, when the Bank of England was established and the capital paid to the government for an annuity of eight per cent., and £4,000 per annum for services in conducting the fiscal business of the government, the annual amount which was paid as interest has gone on increasing till it now amounts to over twenty-eight million pounds sterling. At each successive addition to the public debt, financiers and economists loudly prophesied ruin. But the nation has gone on, apparently paying the present enormous yearly interest with as much ease as the one million of the time of WILLIAM and MARY, the two millions of the time of GEORGE I., or the four millions with which GEORGE III. commenced his reign. The debt reached its highest sum in 1815, when it stood at eight hundred and sixteen millions, upon which the yearly charge was thirty-two millions. It was reduced during the long years of peace until 1835, when it stood at seven hundred and fifty-eight millions. The following table will be found an interesting epitome of financial history, exhibiting, as it does, the amount of the debt and interest, yearly, from its commencement to last year:

General Abstract of the Funded and Unfunded Capitals of the National Debt of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Charge for Interest and Management of the same; and for Life and other Annuities, in the period from the first creation of the Public Debt (in 1691) to the Year 1858-9.

War or Peace.	Years.	Funded.	Unfunded.	General Totals.	Interest, &c., and Annuities.
War,	1691	£ 3,180,000 ..	£ 3,180,000 ..	£ 232,000
"	1692	3,310,547 ..	3,310,547 ..	230,000
"	1693	5,902,839 ..	5,902,839 ..	507,101
"	1694 ..	£ 1,200,000 ..	5,534,297 ..	6,734,297 ..	818,298
"	1695 ..	1,200,000 ..	7,236,846 ..	8,436,846 ..	887,192
"	1696 ..	1,200,000 ..	10,379,178 ..	11,579,178 ..	1,806,971
War and Peace,	1697 ..	1,200,000 ..	13,322,925 ..	14,522,925 ..	1,322,519
Peace,	1698 ..	3,200,000 ..	12,245,416 ..	15,445,416 ..	1,468,511
"	1699 ..	3,200,000 ..	10,599,355 ..	13,799,355 ..	1,428,539
"	1700 ..	3,200,000 ..	9,407,080 ..	12,607,080 ..	1,252,080
"	1701 ..	3,200,000 ..	9,352,486 ..	12,552,486 ..	1,219,147
Peace and War,	1702 ..	3,200,000 ..	9,567,225 ..	12,767,225 ..	1,215,324
War,	1703 ..	3,200,000 ..	9,125,779 ..	12,325,779 ..	1,158,460
"	1704 ..	3,200,000 ..	9,163,474 ..	12,363,474 ..	1,234,010
"	1705 ..	3,200,000 ..	8,935,351 ..	12,135,351 ..	1,210,051
"	1706 ..	3,864,263 ..	8,523,767 ..	12,388,030 ..	1,443,568
"	1707 ..	5,064,263 ..	10,180,086 ..	15,244,299 ..	1,590,630
"	1708 ..	5,064,263 ..	10,454,143 ..	15,518,406 ..	1,722,472
"	1709 ..	7,239,291 ..	11,694,048 ..	18,933,339 ..	1,921,477
"	1710 ..	7,239,291 ..	14,096,354 ..	21,335,645 ..	2,064,329
"	1711 ..	11,770,061 ..	10,628,364 ..	22,398,425 ..	2,274,377

War or Peace.	Years.	Funded.	Unfunded.	General Totals.	Interest, &c., and Annuities.
War,.....	1712 ..	£ 25,569,559 ..	£ 9,353,129 ..	£ 34,922,688 ..	£ 3,034,078
"	1713 ..	26,078,085 ..	8,621,762 ..	34,699,847 ..	3,004,287
War and Peace,.....	1714 ..	27,820,321 ..	8,355,139 ..	36,175,460 ..	3,063,135
Peace,	1715 ..	29,617,622 ..	7,805,612 ..	37,423,234 ..	3,114,625
"	1716 ..	29,493,888 ..	8,425,080 ..	37,918,468 ..	3,167,616
"	1717 ..	32,702,786 ..	7,605,471 ..	40,308,257 ..	3,144,293
Peace and War,.....	1718 ..	34,766,199 ..	5,613,485 ..	40,379,684 ..	2,965,889
War,	1719 ..	37,462,853 ..	4,409,298 ..	41,872,241 ..	2,822,370
"	1720 ..	49,844,890 ..	4,134,818 ..	53,979,708 ..	2,846,434
War and Peace,.....	1721 ..	49,811,715 ..	4,593,393 ..	54,405,108 ..	2,855,880
Peace,.....	1722 ..	49,920,899 ..	4,281,467 ..	54,202,366 ..	2,807,584
"	1723 ..	48,551,160 ..	4,445,830 ..	52,996,990 ..	2,728,080
"	1724 ..	48,132,895 ..	5,190,675 ..	53,323,570 ..	2,727,317
"	1725 ..	48,107,625 ..	4,131,452 ..	52,239,077 ..	2,717,589
"	1726 ..	49,093,295 ..	3,757,502 ..	52,850,797 ..	2,739,628
"	1727 ..	47,993,125 ..	4,530,798 ..	52,523,923 ..	2,860,984
"	1728 ..	47,711,205 ..	4,249,371 ..	51,960,576 ..	2,806,462
"	1729 ..	47,824,639 ..	3,716,581 ..	51,541,220 ..	2,292,150
"	1730 ..	46,824,639 ..	4,005,671 ..	50,830,310 ..	2,227,127
"	1731 ..	47,024,639 ..	3,714,147 ..	50,738,786 ..	2,219,986
"	1732 ..	46,116,947 ..	3,719,691 ..	49,836,638 ..	2,189,391
"	1733 ..	45,116,947 ..	3,611,150 ..	48,728,097 ..	2,153,405
"	1734 ..	45,094,147 ..	3,727,269 ..	48,821,416 ..	2,136,147
"	1735 ..	45,094,147 ..	3,853,942 ..	48,948,089 ..	2,141,600
"	1736 ..	44,680,947 ..	3,743,704 ..	50,424,651 ..	2,108,793
"	1737 ..	43,680,947 ..	3,550,352 ..	47,231,299 ..	2,057,073
"	1738 ..	42,962,486 ..	3,535,014 ..	46,497,500 ..	2,025,898
Peace and War,.....	1739 ..	42,962,486 ..	3,651,397 ..	46,613,883 ..	2,030,884
War,.....	1740 ..	42,949,562 ..	4,173,017 ..	47,122,579 ..	2,051,572
"	1741 ..	42,949,562 ..	5,432,877 ..	48,382,439 ..	2,099,950
"	1742 ..	45,454,516 ..	6,392,807 ..	51,847,323 ..	2,157,136
"	1743 ..	47,254,516 ..	5,946,473 ..	53,200,989 ..	2,181,586
"	1744 ..	50,049,532 ..	6,692,886 ..	56,742,418 ..	2,293,302
"	1745 ..	52,049,532 ..	7,668,285 ..	59,717,817 ..	2,428,329
"	1746 ..	56,073,070 ..	8,544,774 ..	64,617,844 ..	2,650,231
"	1747 ..	61,473,070 ..	7,642,344 ..	69,115,414 ..	2,882,538
War and Peace,.....	1748 ..	68,420,147 ..	7,391,985 ..	75,812,132 ..	3,165,765
Peace,.....	1749 ..	71,492,619 ..	5,996,321 ..	77,488,940 ..	3,204,858
"	1750 ..	71,657,717 ..	5,202,093 ..	76,859,810 ..	2,789,351
"	1751 ..	71,480,824 ..	5,716,202 ..	77,197,026 ..	2,769,484
"	1752 ..	70,964,793 ..	5,466,530 ..	76,431,683 ..	2,735,312
"	1753 ..	70,964,793 ..	4,070,022 ..	75,034,815 ..	2,694,038
"	1754 ..	70,869,162 ..	1,259,120 ..	72,128,282 ..	2,648,462
"	1755 ..	71,769,162 ..	736,410 ..	72,505,572 ..	2,650,041
Peace and War,.....	1756 ..	73,759,470 ..	815,555 ..	74,575,025 ..	2,753,566
War,.....	1757 ..	76,759,470 ..	1,065,927 ..	77,825,397 ..	2,736,254
"	1758 ..	81,756,147 ..	1,371,862 ..	83,128,009 ..	2,918,707
"	1759 ..	89,346,147 ..	1,927,312 ..	91,273,459 ..	3,181,895
"	1760 ..	97,862,793 ..	4,151,225 ..	102,014,018 ..	3,576,275
"	1761 ..	109,908,947 ..	4,386,040 ..	114,294,987 ..	4,148,999
"	1762 ..	122,088,947 ..	4,705,990 ..	126,794,937 ..	4,747,849
War and Peace,.....	1763 ..	129,160,193 ..	3,555,856 ..	132,716,049 ..	5,032,733
Peace,.....	1764 ..	128,257,089 ..	5,030,851 ..	133,287,940 ..	5,002,865
"	1765 ..	128,849,647 ..	2,966,526 ..	131,816,173 ..	4,028,250
"	1766 ..	129,561,835 ..	2,075,096 ..	131,636,931 ..	4,887,346
"	1767 ..	130,181,716 ..	1,929,106 ..	132,110,822 ..	4,875,558
"	1768 ..	130,322,486 ..	2,264,918 ..	132,587,404 ..	4,870,163

<i>War or Peace.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Funded.</i>	<i>Unfunded.</i>	<i>General Totals.</i>	<i>Interest, &c., and Annuities.</i>
Peace,.....	1769 ..	£ 128,567,870 ..	£ 1,745,410 ..	£ 180,313,280 ..	£ 4,786,941
"	1770 ..	127,182,485 ..	2,065,148 ..	129,197,633 ..	4,712,079
"	1771 ..	127,198,393 ..	1,787,619 ..	128,986,012 ..	4,733,694
"	1772 ..	125,790,701 ..	2,245,832 ..	128,036,533 ..	4,706,326
"	1773 ..	125,763,009 ..	3,108,488 ..	128,871,497 ..	4,749,567
Peace and War,.....	1774 ..	124,763,009 ..	2,399,404 ..	127,162,413 ..	4,698,313
War,.....	1775 ..	123,763,009 ..	3,079,802 ..	126,842,811 ..	4,703,519
"	1776 ..	125,899,532 ..	5,337,751 ..	131,237,283 ..	4,870,534
"	1777 ..	131,052,578 ..	5,724,059 ..	136,776,637 ..	5,112,344
"	1778 ..	137,052,578 ..	6,000,056 ..	143,052,634 ..	5,487,323
"	1779 ..	144,052,578 ..	9,521,772 ..	153,574,350 ..	6,100,060
Peace and War,.....	1780 ..	156,246,424 ..	11,214,558 ..	167,460,982 ..	6,931,739
War,.....	1781 ..	177,253,347 ..	11,975,334 ..	189,258,681 ..	7,451,052
"	1782 ..	197,773,347 ..	16,956,239 ..	214,729,586 ..	8,413,441
War and Peace,.....	1783 ..	212,773,347 ..	19,070,284 ..	231,843,631 ..	9,065,585
Peace,.....	1784 ..	228,627,049 ..	14,436,096 ..	243,063,145 ..	9,541,256
"	1785 ..	239,693,900 ..	5,892,570 ..	245,586,470 ..	9,678,942
"	1786 ..	239,200,719 ..	6,266,136 ..	245,466,855 ..	9,664,541
"	1787 ..	237,697,666 ..	6,581,559 ..	244,279,225 ..	9,595,379
"	1788 ..	236,191,315 ..	7,446,101 ..	243,637,416 ..	9,572,217
"	1789 ..	234,632,465 ..	8,120,446 ..	242,752,911 ..	9,567,359
"	1790 ..	233,044,965 ..	9,416,615 ..	242,461,580 ..	9,585,712
"	1791 ..	231,597,865 ..	10,138,134 ..	241,735,999 ..	9,513,507
"	1792 ..	229,614,445 ..	10,048,976 ..	239,663,421 ..	9,432,179
Peace and War,.....	1793 ..	234,034,716 ..	13,339,718 ..	247,374,434 ..	9,711,238
War,.....	1794 ..	247,877,235 ..	15,445,420 ..	263,322,655 ..	10,396,645
"	1795 ..	301,861,304 ..	19,601,375 ..	321,462,679 ..	12,699,310
"	1796 ..	355,323,771 ..	8,575,123 ..	363,898,894 ..	14,765,095
"	1797 ..	381,525,835 ..	7,434,755 ..	388,960,590 ..	15,575,330
"	1798 ..	414,936,332 ..	12,589,570 ..	427,525,902 ..	16,887,399
"	1799 ..	423,367,546 ..	18,956,831 ..	442,324,377 ..	17,560,127
"	1800 ..	447,147,163 ..	23,747,117 ..	470,894,280 ..	18,582,950
"	1801 ..	497,043,488 ..	20,468,383 ..	517,511,871 ..	19,819,839
War and Peace,.....	1802 ..	522,231,786 ..	15,421,222 ..	537,653,008 ..	20,268,551
Peace and War,.....	1803 ..	528,260,642 ..	19,472,154 ..	547,732,796 ..	20,812,962
War,.....	1804 ..	545,803,318 ..	25,328,000 ..	571,131,318 ..	21,658,890
"	1805 ..	573,529,932 ..	26,339,915 ..	599,869,847 ..	22,568,359
"	1806 ..	593,954,868 ..	27,141,815 ..	621,096,683 ..	23,196,582
"	1807 ..	601,733,073 ..	32,073,339 ..	633,806,412 ..	23,573,092
"	1808 ..	604,287,475 ..	39,258,308 ..	643,545,783 ..	23,595,013
"	1809 ..	614,789,092 ..	39,672,219 ..	654,461,311 ..	24,292,276
"	1810 ..	624,301,937 ..	37,891,919 ..	662,193,856 ..	24,553,162
"	1811 ..	635,583,448 ..	42,616,988 ..	678,200,436 ..	25,484,765
War with America and France,.....	1812 ..	661,409,958 ..	44,844,629 ..	706,254,587 ..	26,853,846
"	1813 ..	740,023,535 ..	48,070,246 ..	788,093,781 ..	29,893,737
"	1814 ..	752,859,907 ..	60,280,269 ..	813,140,176 ..	31,105,644
War and Peace,.....	1815 ..	816,311,941 ..	44,727,108 ..	861,039,049 ..	32,645,618
Peace,.....	1816 ..	796,200,191 ..	49,768,292 ..	845,968,483 ..	32,055,350
"	1817 ..	776,742,403 ..	62,639,742 ..	839,382,145 ..	31,591,927
"	1818 ..	791,867,314 ..	48,715,350 ..	840,582,664 ..	31,485,758
"	1819 ..	794,980,482 ..	41,550,500 ..	836,530,982 ..	31,168,540
"	1820 ..	801,565,310 ..	33,335,650 ..	834,900,960 ..	31,354,749
"	1821 ..	795,312,767 ..	32,671,731 ..	827,984,498 ..	31,105,819
"	1822 ..	796,530,144 ..	38,677,150 ..	835,207,294 ..	29,722,533
"	1823 ..	791,701,614 ..	35,778,550 ..	827,480,164 ..	30,142,582
"	1824 ..	781,123,222 ..	37,900,450 ..	819,023,672 ..	29,174,172

War or Peace.	Years.	Funded.	Unfunded.	General Totals.	Interest, &c., and Annuities.
Peace,.....	1825 ..	£ 778,128,268 ..	£ 31,708,200 ..	£ 809,831,468 ..	£ 28,987,778
"	1826 ..	788,801,740 ..	25,024,850 ..	808,826,590 ..	29,415,102
"	1827 ..	777,476,892 ..	27,622,050 ..	805,098,942 ..	29,328,782
"	1828 ..	772,322,539 ..	27,709,750 ..	800,032,289 ..	29,167,877
"	1829 ..	771,251,932 ..	25,547,600 ..	796,799,532 ..	29,067,658
"	1830 ..	757,486,997 ..	27,317,000 ..	784,803,997 ..	28,325,936
"	1831 ..	755,543,884 ..	27,172,800 ..	782,716,684 ..	28,329,986
"	1832 ..	754,100,549 ..	27,357,050 ..	781,457,599 ..	28,351,318
"	1833 ..	751,658,883 ..	28,071,496 ..	779,730,379 ..	28,481,181
"	1834 ..	748,675,300 ..	29,559,101 ..	778,234,401 ..	28,517,236
"	1835 ..	758,549,866 ..	30,114,335 ..	788,664,201 ..	29,135,811
"	1836 ..	761,422,571 ..	28,074,325 ..	789,496,896 ..	29,667,464
"	1837 ..	762,275,189 ..	25,258,925 ..	787,529,114 ..	29,537,833
"	1838 ..	761,347,690 ..	25,492,475 ..	786,840,165 ..	29,432,903
"	1839 ..	766,547,685 ..	20,683,375 ..	787,236,060 ..	29,385,451
"	1840 ..	766,371,726 ..	22,272,675 ..	788,644,401 ..	29,415,924
"	1841 ..	772,580,760 ..	19,678,925 ..	792,209,685 ..	29,462,030
"	1842 ..	773,068,341 ..	18,689,475 ..	791,757,816 ..	29,300,112
"	1843 ..	772,169,093 ..	20,495,650 ..	792,664,743 ..	29,047,473
"	1844 ..	769,193,644 ..	18,793,550 ..	787,987,194 ..	28,272,652
"	1845 ..	766,672,822 ..	18,442,400 ..	785,115,222 ..	28,125,113
"	1846 ..	764,608,284 ..	18,369,400 ..	782,977,684 ..	28,025,253
"	1847 ..	772,401,851 ..	17,974,500 ..	790,376,351 ..	28,442,683
"	1848 ..	774,022,638 ..	17,794,700 ..	791,817,338 ..	28,307,343
"	1849 ..	773,168,316 ..	17,758,700 ..	790,927,016 ..	28,091,579
"	1850 ..	769,272,562 ..	17,756,600 ..	787,029,162 ..	28,025,523
"	1851 ..	765,126,582 ..	17,742,800 ..	782,869,382 ..	27,907,068
"	1852 ..	761,622,704 ..	17,742,500 ..	779,365,204 ..	27,842,286
"	1853 ..	755,311,701 ..	16,024,100 ..	771,335,801 ..	27,597,645
"	1853-4 ..	753,073,849 ..	16,008,700 ..	769,082,549 ..	27,715,203
War,.....	1854-5 ..	752,064,119 ..	23,151,400 ..	775,215,519 ..	27,863,889
"	1855-6 ..	775,730,994 ..	28,182,700 ..	803,913,694 ..	28,444,274
Peace,.....	1856-7 ..	780,119,722 ..	27,989,000 ..	808,108,722 ..	28,550,039
"	1857-8 ..	779,225,495 ..	25,911,500 ..	805,136,995 ..	28,401,950
"	1858-9 ..	786,801,154 ..	18,277,400 ..	805,078,554 ..	28,204,299

WEALTH IN GREAT BRITAIN.—An income tax return has been issued which shows what progress this kingdom has been making within the last few years. The total amount of income and annual value of property assessed to the income tax in the United Kingdom has risen from £308,317,656 in 1854 to £335,730,254 in 1860. The increase of taxable income in England in the six years has been £26,348,685, and in Ireland, £1,701,993, but in Scotland there has actually been a decrease of £638,080. This decrease has arisen solely from a very large falling off in the returns under Schedule D., the profits of trades, professions, &c. The income taxed under that schedule in England rose from £76,215,936 in 1854 to £81,921,267 in 1860, and in Ireland from £4,621,069 to £4,891,652, but in Scotland it fell from £12,185,924 in 1854 to £8,626,144 in 1860; in 1858, after the commercial crisis at the end of 1857, it fell £2,500,000 below the previous year, and has never recovered. The income assessed under Schedule A., the annual value of lands, houses, &c., has risen greatly in all three kingdoms; in England it was £99,274,309 in 1854, and £112,082,749 in 1860; in Scotland, £11,947,791 in the former year, and £13,974,080 in the latter; in Ireland, 11,767,810, and 12,893,829 respectively; an increase of almost £16,000,000 in the whole, nearly half of which is from houses, and another quarter from an increase in the profit of railways. A very large increase has taken place also in Schedule E., (public offices, pensions and stipends,) from £14,445,552 in 1854 to £19,636,220 in 1860. The total income assessed to the income tax in 1860 was, in England, £282,718,049; in Scotland, £29,913,124; in Ireland, £23,099,081.

ANNUAL STATEMENTS OF THE MARINE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF NEW-YORK,

IN TABULAR FORM, FOR THE YEAR 1860.

NAME OF COMPANY.	Premiums received during the year.	Premiums earned during the year.	Losses for the year.	Expenses, &c.	Return on investments, &c.	Net profits, &c.	Int. on scrip, &c. per ct. pr. ct.	Stock, and dividend, per cent.	Fiscal year ends
Atlantic,.....	\$ 4,692,725 77 ..	\$ 4,541,138 59 ..	\$ 2,419,443 72 ..	\$ 609,212 55 ..	Incl. in ex. ..	\$ 1,512,479 82 ..	6 .. 85	Dec. 31, 1860.
Great Western,.....	2,171,291 80 ..	2,418,110 84 ..	1,897,192 49 ..	269,868 20 ..	\$ 828,173 88 ..	\$ 79,991 85 ..	6 .. 20 ..	7 @ 13 cash, ..	Dec. 31, 1860.
Sun,.....	1,816,113 39 ..	1,221,692 65 ..	767,685 85 ..	81,753 70 ..	89,095 87 ..	288,157 73 ..	6 .. 25	Oct. 4, 1860.
Mercantile,.....	789,377 84 ..	824,314 85 ..	567,664 06 ..	70,606 52 ..	44,457 84 ..	141,586 43 ..	6 .. 7 ..	7 @ 4 cash, ..	Dec. 31, 1860.
Pacific,.....	815,579 32 ..	816,304 69 ..	413,110 58 ..	99,023 18 ..	56,489 52 ..	247,681 41 ..	6 .. 80	Dec. 31, 1860.
New-York,.....	806,202 54 ..	799,038 50 ..	585,466 74 ..	47,188 56 ..	52,137 52 ..	114,200 68 ..	6 .. 12	June 30, 1860.
Columbian,.....	969,820 64 ..	779,998 99 ..	625,866 78 ..	112,502 39 ..	127,901 51 ..	loss 86,271 69 7	Oct. 31, 1860.
Commercial,.....	630,480 01 ..	632,405 83 ..	392,783 66 ..	46,568 42 ..	53,242 08 ..	189,816 67 ..	6 .. 15	June 30, 1860.
Union,.....	549,915 10 ..	587,198 60 ..	197,306 53 ..	124,193 68 ..	87,838 40 ..	178,309 99 ..	6 .. 86	Dec. 31, 1860.
Orient,.....	500,416 76 ..	517,342 21 ..	268,282 68 ..	86,312 36 ..	45,308 57 ..	144,455 84 ..	6 .. 15 1/2 ..	3 1/2 scrip, ..	Feb. 28, 1861.
Neptune,.....	392,775 25 ..	267,560 14 ..	134,932 49 ..	71,345 59 ..	13,206 96 ..	61,802 11 ..	new, .. 15 ..	7 @ 4 cash, ..	Dec. 31, 1860.
Washington,...	192,305 61 ..	142,170 03 ..	64,081 98 ..	46,053 23 ..	5,325 98 ..	83,249 37 ..	new, .. 15 ..	7 @ 3 cash, ..	Dec. 31, 1860.
	\$ 13,737,004 03 ..	\$ 13,547,250 42 ..	\$ 8,263,817 51 ..	\$ 1,664,123 38 ..	\$ 902,725 13 ..	\$ 126,843 68 ..	\$ 3,643,632 75 ..		

ASSETS.

	Real Estate.	Stocks, Bonds, &c.	Loans on Stocks, &c.	Cash.	Dividends and Claims.	Subscription Notes.	Premium Notes, Bills Rec., &c.	Total Assets.
Atlantic,.....	\$ 200,000 00 ..	\$ 2,666,378 42 ..	\$ 1,190,152 05 ..	\$ 106,154 67 ..	\$ 105,190 12	\$ 2,378,416 84 ..	\$ 6,646,292 10
Great Western,.....	..	1,119,447 61 ..	406,350 00 ..	169,777 18 ..	38,504 41	1,620,261 19 ..	3,354,640 89
Sun,.....	549,500 00 ..	\$ 281,018 29	123,274 76 ..	35,362 50	772,066 52 ..	1,761,222 07
Mercantile,.....	..	339,504 10 ..	140,490 00 ..	71,572 31 ..	77,088 21	512,368 55 ..	1,140,973 17
Pacific,.....	..	281,150 00 ..	197,623 01 ..	78,577 22 ..	53,558 07 ..	\$ 35,378 87 ..	414,163 55 ..	1,060,750 73
New-York,.....	67,311 42 ..	250,500 00 ..	201,788 80 ..	26,259 19 ..	62,594 48	427,967 45 ..	1,036,416 84
Columbian,.....	..	368,300 00	67,681 33 ..	82,538 77 ..	incl'd in p'm, ..	709,869 67 ..	1,225,684 77
Commercial,.....	..	\$ 498,736 17	70,154 00 ..	39,528 60	476,586 23 ..	1,025,855 06
Union,.....	75,000 00 ..	458,575 00 ..	895,874 20 ..	95,741 10 ..	179,381 81	454,825 95 ..	1,659,848 06
Orient,.....	..	410,321 50 ..	129,350 00 ..	23,255 05 ..	16,646 49 ..	\$ 600,000 00 ..	244,872 02 ..	1,426,445 00
Neptune,.....	..	88,000 00 ..	43,650 00 ..	77,738 39 ..	26,680 66 ..	86,575 32 ..	170,460 18 ..	488,099 55
Washington,...	..	60,500 00 ..	30,000 00 ..	62,510 26 ..	26,259 14	96,019 09 ..	275,318 49
	\$ 891,811 42 ..	\$ 6,757,481 09 ..	\$ 2,735,273 06 ..	\$ 974,690 46 ..	\$ 744,458 26 ..	\$ 721,954 19 ..	\$ 8,277,877 24 ..	\$ 21,108,545 92

* Including reserve of last year. † Expenses partially included in losses. ‡ Including bonds and mortgages. § Including loans on stocks, &c. ¶ Stock capital notes.

FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF NEW-YORK.

ANNUAL STATEMENTS OF NEW-YORK JOINT-STOCK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES: SHOWING THEIR CAPITAL, GROSS ASSETS, GROSS INCOME, EXPENDITURES, &c., FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1860.

Year of incorporation.	Name of Company.	Capital.	Gross Assets.	Amount of re-insurance.	Gross income.	Gross expenditures.	Net cash premiums received.	Amount paid for losses.	Amount paid for dividends.	Net amount of fire risks.	Average rate of premium.	Proportion of losses.
1824 ..	Etna.....	\$ 200,000 ..	\$ 236,740 ..	\$ 16,064 ..	\$ 59,484 ..	\$ 58,612 ..	\$ 43,864 ..	\$ 24,105 ..	\$ 20,000 ..	\$ 6,877,079 ..	.6267 ..	54.95
1838 ..	Adriatic.....	150,000 ..	162,086 ..	7,500 ..	36,919 ..	41,749 ..	26,746 ..	12,355 ..	15,000 ..	4,316,309 ..	.6299 ..	46.19
1811 ..	Albany.....	150,000 ..	212,995 ..	20,000 ..	58,871 ..	57,252 ..	46,860 ..	8,488 ..	40,000 ..	6,315,720 ..	.7142 ..	18.10
1860 ..	Albany City.....	100,000 ..	100,374
1857 ..	American.....	200,000 ..	269,671 ..	24,000 ..	77,470 ..	57,554 ..	61,186 ..	15,614 ..	24,000 ..	16,772,068 ..	.8396 ..	25.54
1859 ..	American Exchange.....	200,000 ..	206,683 ..	18,053 ..	67,810 ..	64,098 ..	53,983 ..	33,715	8,037,273 ..	.6492 ..	62.51
1833 ..	Aetlico.....	250,000 ..	298,613 ..	10,844 ..	139,238 ..	126,835 ..	119,188 ..	63,848 ..	27,467 ..	9,000,000 ..	.4918 ..	53.57
1859 ..	Artisans'.....	150,000 ..	120,146 ..	3,969 ..	31,227 ..	54,508 ..	22,249 ..	40,854	183.62
1851 ..	Astor.....	150,000 ..	208,572 ..	22,089 ..	70,440 ..	75,147 ..	56,436 ..	30,163 ..	24,000 ..	8,614,836 ..	.6293 ..	53.45
1851 ..	Atlantic.....	150,000 ..	249,942 ..	35,000 ..	112,567 ..	119,620 ..	96,491 ..	62,856 ..	80,000 ..	16,159,077 ..	.5570 ..	65.14
1833 ..	Beekman.....	200,000 ..	226,975 ..	12,120 ..	47,910 ..	54,594 ..	32,086 ..	20,743 ..	20,155 ..	5,474,509 ..	.5708 ..	64.65
1857 ..	Brevoort.....	150,000 ..	163,816 ..	5,000 ..	34,270 ..	80,190 ..	22,273 ..	14,557 ..	67 ..	8,781,769 ..	.5821 ..	65.49
1849 ..	Broadway.....	200,000 ..	294,000 ..	13,441 ..	56,848 ..	58,355 ..	37,217 ..	12,823 ..	81,616 ..	7,175,168 ..	.5046 ..	34.45
1824 ..	Brooklyn.....	153,000 ..	261,813 ..	26,000 ..	90,698 ..	85,895 ..	76,909 ..	27,873 ..	30,611 ..	14,409,868 ..	.5184 ..	36.24
1860 ..	Central Park.....	150,000 ..	156,652 ..	6,088 ..	12,680 ..	9,855 ..	9,546 ..	2,268	1,789,950 ..	.5883 ..	23.76
1836 ..	Citizens'.....	150,000 ..	324,419 ..	35,869 ..	106,272 ..	108,363 ..	85,630 ..	40,044 ..	41,021 ..	14,580,478 ..	.5936 ..	46.76
1833 ..	City.....	210,000 ..	341,262 ..	23,146 ..	71,004 ..	70,162 ..	47,519 ..	10,172 ..	42,000 ..	10,661,654 ..	.4397 ..	21.41
1850 ..	Clinton.....	250,000 ..	301,769 ..	16,000 ..	65,975 ..	59,969 ..	47,216 ..	8,063 ..	34,615 ..	9,755,450 ..	.4762 ..	17.08
1833 ..	Columbia.....	200,000 ..	229,978 ..	11,350 ..	43,905 ..	33,457 ..	23,962 ..	16,908	5,320,905 ..	.5217 ..	53.33
1859 ..	Commerce.....	200,000 ..	219,499 ..	10,000 ..	42,851 ..	35,554 ..	28,713 ..	19,086 ..	8,000 ..	3,699,499 ..	.7167 ..	66.47
1859 ..	Commerce, Fire.....	200,000 ..	218,132 ..	9,842 ..	47,040 ..	38,569 ..	31,719 ..	4,853 ..	16,000 ..	6,810,401 ..	.4521 ..	15.30
1850 ..	Commercial.....	200,000 ..	280,558 ..	29,605 ..	96,954 ..	90,451 ..	79,164 ..	35,450 ..	32,250 ..	12,499,347 ..	.6362 ..	44.78
1833 ..	Commonwealth.....	250,000 ..	326,271 ..	125,000 ..	91,639 ..	84,668 ..	71,346 ..	41,886 ..	27,500 ..	11,325,670 ..	.6070 ..	58.00
1853 ..	Continental.....	500,000 ..	1,024,752 ..	33,996 ..	359,357 ..	281,207 ..	296,402 ..	132,044 ..	69,671 ..	50,299,500 ..	.5942 ..	44.55
1833 ..	Corn Exchange.....	200,000 ..	298,965 ..	12,000 ..	174,250 ..	152,441 ..	153,300 ..	76,241 ..	39,900 ..	10,307,900 ..	.3373 ..	48.16
1806 ..	Eagle.....	300,000 ..	424,614 ..	22,632 ..	86,629 ..	88,951 ..	60,598 ..	12,127 ..	60,132 ..	14,286,999 ..	.4150 ..	20.01
1833 ..	East River.....	275,790 ..	302,734 ..	15,844 ..	64,433 ..	59,802 ..	48,889 ..	15,398 ..	21,775 ..	9,155,067 ..	.5106 ..	31.50
1850 ..	Empire City.....	200,000 ..	266,101 ..	12,000 ..	63,543 ..	65,150 ..	47,091 ..	19,210 ..	27,825 ..	10,617,848 ..	.4243 ..	40.79
1853 ..	Excelsior.....	200,000 ..	247,928 ..	24,450 ..	85,369 ..	81,441 ..	65,561 ..	60,961 ..	105 ..	8,839,032 ..	.7661 ..	93.01

1853	Exchange	150,000	195,174	15,941	54,697	72,848	44,087	87,960	18,000	5,076,120	7859	84.61
1855	Firemen's	204,000	261,408	30,000	85,344	85,927	68,522	42,122	24,480	11,042,200	6033	61.47
1858	Firemen's Fund	150,000	160,089	16,000	55,725	57,545	44,515	38,220	6,092,020	6118	85.28
1859	Firemen's Trust	150,000	163,796	10,968	37,744	84,607	26,708	18,243	5,571	4,424,372	5774	49.50
1853	Fulton	200,000	261,730	33,087	114,930	183,957	97,898	57,653	40,000	12,903,269	7476	58.89
1857	Gallatin	150,000	156,583	4,554	27,750	27,270	16,328	6,516	7,260	4,098,692	3712	39.91
1857	Gebhard	200,000	223,458	10,016	50,313	55,046	35,747	16,372	20,000	6,917,367	4837	45.80
1859	Germania	200,000	222,330	17,544	62,476	56,704	48,589	8,105	24,000	9,089,469	5388	16.68
1857	Goodhue	200,000	236,572	26,261	84,374	80,969	68,408	31,350	24,000	5,377,146	1,2605	45.83
1854	Greenwich	200,000	240,365	20,000	47,731	45,113	38,054	11,138	20,000	7,850,057	4021	38.83
1850	Grocers	200,000	237,090	9,842	37,663	45,575	21,872	7,006	24,000	5,586,803	3793	32.08
1852	Hamilton	150,000	175,119	15,637	50,130	55,320	39,473	38,879	6,000	4,450,600	5869	85.82
1852	Hanover	200,000	247,184	14,235	65,573	58,400	49,430	15,425	24,000	10,625,079	4428	31.21
1853	Harmony	150,000	180,561	13,500	48,621	54,275	38,789	24,811	15,000	5,050,000	7382	63.96
1853	Home	1,000,000	1,494,164	815,467	1,084,117	1,012,990	945,896	596,806	160,000	80,652,537	5852	63.09
1856	Hope	200,000	215,610	12,000	65,209	78,922	49,681	31,418	17,500	7,887,930	6318	63.94
1855	Howard	250,000	396,153	50,000	142,893	138,675	115,073	61,567	50,470	17,909,152	6260	53.50
1857	Humboldt	200,000	245,996	26,296	106,579	96,833	91,043	62,757	13,139,932	6321	63.93
1859	Importers and Traders	200,000	209,916	8,250	87,118	89,077	23,290	17,773	8,000	4,396,444	5379	49.74
1856	Indemnity	150,000	165,089	8,225	40,432	42,962	28,698	14,274	15,000	5,734,822	4554	69.95
1852	Irving	200,000	227,286	26,829	88,079	96,331	72,667	50,880	20,000	10,590,537	6375	38.91
1824	Jefferson	200,000	313,764	19,620	76,635	80,015	55,381	21,553	39,681	11,295,235	4869	85.16
1858	Kings County	150,060	153,548	13,088	47,864	60,439	38,821	33,059	5,252	4,675,291	7319	60.86
1798	Klickerbocker	280,000	349,203	22,571	64,869	58,833	42,851	26,080	19,920	10,337,119	4072	43.84
1856	Lafayette	150,000	173,732	18,000	67,466	66,575	55,989	27,347	15,000	7,384,032	7582	66.27
1856	Lamar	300,000	344,358	28,000	114,547	120,445	91,180	60,423	33,000	12,898,835	6482	60.50
1853	Lenox	150,000	176,973	13,773	49,476	38,965	38,125	23,065	5,644,500	6356	20.38
1833	Long Island	200,000	384,257	19,799	67,574	66,735	46,325	9,416	39,795	8,550,579	5366	21.68
1852	Lorillard	500,000	577,151	38,057	124,778	106,259	102,987	22,319	55,000	17,492,337	5786	57.74
1821	Manhattan	250,000	361,736	67,136	222,712	214,086	198,086	114,369	50,145	24,339,729	5216	57.24
1853	Market	200,000	264,863	40,000	117,412	129,543	100,646	57,611	44,000	19,506,456	5320	53.81
1857	Mechanics	150,000	187,791	15,948	59,800	65,095	47,480	25,550	21,000	6,921,870	6567	16.52
1853	Mechanics and Traders	200,000	280,865	20,559	74,911	66,672	57,622	9,521	39,905	11,401,200	5149	26.49
1852	Mercantile	200,000	253,216	17,019	64,316	61,381	46,897	12,425	24,000	8,405,451	5635	57.93
1850	Merchants	200,000	305,197	39,953	121,540	132,577	102,631	59,433	40,000	16,479,385	6050	70.62
1854	Metropolitan	300,000	386,060	56,844	189,164	196,341	166,238	117,893	18,000	19,951,285	7944

FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF N. Y.—(Continued.)

Year.	Name of Company.	Capital.	Gross Assets.	Amount of re-insurance.	Gross income.	Gross expenditures.	Net cash premiums received.	Amount paid for dividends.	Net amount of fire risks.	Average rate of premium.	Pr. ct. of losses.
1837	Montauk,	\$ 150,000	\$ 179,570	\$ 19,000	\$ 62,010	\$ 60,909	\$ 51,459	\$ 34,499	\$ 7,500	.7749	67.04
1832	Nassau,	150,000	225,269	15,485	50,622	47,257	38,579	1,573	30,000	.4556	5.58
1838	National,	200,000	296,454	26,489	74,461	95,560	55,537	38,691	40,135	.5053	69.66
1833	New-Amsterdam,	200,000	257,859	21,363	75,096	79,994	60,838	28,415	32,000	.8326	38.48
1856	New World,	200,000	222,714	10,000	45,632	45,182	81,266	9,327	18,000	.4509	29.84
1833	New-York Bowery,	300,000	393,247	33,000	91,232	107,826	64,012	23,265	60,000	.4126	39.47
1823	New-York Equitable,	210,000	318,732	27,237	92,106	106,861	71,960	42,586	48,748	.4574	59.18
1832	New-York Fire and Marine,	200,000	267,818	25,554	75,396	88,377	59,243	25,081	40,000	.5898	42.33
1850	Niagara,	200,000	304,812	81,313	106,128	106,224	85,829	34,878	39,900	.5700	40.63
1823	North America,	250,000	303,007	22,500	93,377	91,833	73,097	39,283	22,751	.5635	53.74
1822	North River,	350,000	407,310	25,400	76,128	75,900	48,924	21,644	34,622	.5152	44.73
1832	Northwestern,	150,000	291,014	50,565	178,433	218,927	161,832	153,311	19,500	1.1171	94.73
1851	Pacific,	200,000	286,167	28,926	95,560	89,495	77,542	25,260	40,000	.6419	36.44
1833	Park,	200,000	279,833	33,302	167,750	154,381	150,791	92,504	20,000	.7874	61.34
1851	People's,	150,000	154,074	16,972	52,635	66,148	41,595	35,519	13,500	.7251	85.39
1833	Peter Cooper,	150,000	170,104	11,000	41,206	47,031	28,892	17,491	18,000	.4830	60.54
1833	Phoenix,	200,000	283,143	57,731	203,278	240,026	186,081	141,961	36,000	.9000	76.29
1855	Relief,	200,000	256,257	29,000	57,665	85,966	71,352	39,229	28,000	.6049	54.98
1832	Republic,	150,000	313,920	23,739	100,142	77,072	81,544	29,539	16,500	.7737	36.22
1857	Resolute,	200,000	271,709	35,566	129,667	107,407	113,315	60,402	17,000	.5355	53.30
1833	Rutgers,	200,000	259,958	27,036	85,759	96,233	68,730	50,524	28,000	.6637	73.51
1856	Security,	500,000	639,818	94,300	311,453	297,034	252,004	156,377	47,300	.6392	55.61
1833	St. Mark's,	150,000	172,985	19,831	54,248	66,593	42,149	35,774	14,552	.8377	84.87
1832	St. Nicholas,	150,000	172,929	14,702	57,092	66,718	47,192	40,358	6,091	1.2722	85.52
1850	Standard,	200,000	222,065	12,491	51,403	46,929	36,837	20,369	10,000	.4192	55.22
1851	Stuyvesant,	200,000	252,144	13,000	61,130	50,575	45,888	11,474	24,000	.5334	25.03
1858	Tradesmen's,	150,000	165,437	8,943	38,090	38,410	28,409	9,546	11,250	.6251	34.66
1824	United States,	250,000	315,286	20,000	66,765	56,960	47,234	11,452	29,886	.4574	24.31
1850	Washington,	400,000	471,393	27,000	114,433	124,833	92,441	46,517	48,000	.6130	50.32
1833	Williamsburgh City,	150,000	203,181	30,860	75,599	85,485	64,252	45,641	20,860	.5232	71.03
1850	World's Safe,	100,000	143,942	1,963	7,598	4,284	4,365	3609588	8.24
Aggregate,		\$ 20,482,850	\$ 26,860,190	\$ 2,536,360	\$ 8,928,060	\$ 8,863,597	\$ 7,261,595	\$ 3,084,441	\$ 2,469,090	\$ 1,049,551,593	54.87

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES.

ANNUAL STATEMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF THIS AND OTHER STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, SHOWING THEIR ASSETS, LIABILITIES, RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES AND AMOUNT OF POLICIES IN FORCE, FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1860.

	Liabilities, Net present except capital value of stock and re-policies & insurance, re-insur-cc.				Premium notes re- ceived.	Cash pre- miums received.	Paid for claims.	Gross ex- income, penditures.	Amount of policies in force.
NEW-YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES.									
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S.,...	\$ 162,617 ..	\$ 92,251 ..	\$ 5,365 ..	\$ 65,000	\$ 65,547 ..	\$ 10,500 ..	\$ 76,070 ..	\$ 2,041,500
Germania Life Insurance Company,.....	194,545 ..	184,545	10,000	9,111	9,757 ..	499,979
Guardian Life Insurance Company,.....	122,516 ..	100,184 ..	2,881 ..	19,500	22,742 ..	6,000 ..	31,590 ..	1,083,400
Home Life Insurance Company,.....	157,877 ..	128,348 ..	40,000 ..	19,529 ..	\$ 20,616 ..	13,080 ..	3,000 ..	89,545 ..	1,053,650
Knickerbocker Life Insurance Company,.....	268,508 ..	149,892 ..	25,383 ..	88,192 ..	9,196 ..	53,155 ..	13,867 ..	78,199 ..	2,083,224
Manhattan Life Insurance Company,.....	1,079,287 ..	255,191 ..	183,046 ..	641,048 ..	183,345 ..	197,648 ..	100,389 ..	383,399 ..	12,500,210
Mutual Life Insurance Company,.....	7,296,756 ..	2,327,094 ..	143,869 ..	4,765,792	1,128,680 ..	357,851 ..	1,589,575 ..	40,159,123
New-York Life Insurance Company,.....	1,988,527	795,688 ..	1,291,181 ..	129,771 ..	366,802 ..	204,115 ..	608,889 ..	16,388,109
New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company,.....	724,263	1,001,750
United States Life Insurance Company,.....	701,482 ..	326,828 ..	88,698 ..	*290,955	208,621 ..	53,229 ..	241,274 ..	6,968,454
Washington Life Insurance Company,.....	141,279 ..	135,106 ..	6,173	23,892	28,298 ..	1,040,100
Aggregate,.....	\$ 12,772,062 ..	\$ 3,699,432 ..	\$ 1,256,107 ..	\$ 7,191,150 ..	\$ 292,929 ..	\$ 2,083,730 ..	\$ 748,403 ..	\$ 3,036,551 ..	\$ 85,371,499
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF OTHER STATES.†									
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., Hartford,.....	\$ 3,760,747 ..	\$ 514,720 ..	\$ 497,757 ..	\$ 2,748,270 ..	\$ 367,096 ..	\$ 413,365 ..	\$ 226,150 ..	\$ 1,010,689
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., Springfield,.....	851,743 ..	154,959 ..	8,200 ..	218,833 ..	52,617 ..	105,278 ..	37,700 ..	164,542 ..	\$ 5,628,950
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., Newark, N. J.,.....	3,811,722 ..	921,268 ..	533,270 ..	2,357,182 ..	250,677 ..	512,375 ..	208,567 ..	977,007 ..	25,426,598
National Life Insurance Co., Montpelier, Vt.,.....	272,274 ..	97,638 ..	11,198 ..	163,437 ..	4,505 ..	48,261 ..	19,174 ..	67,395 ..	2,008,136
New-England Mutual Life Ins. Co., Boston,.....	1,851,117 ..	389,869 ..	49,780 ..	1,411,467 ..	280,037 ..	251,851 ..	93,402 ..	568,971 ..	15,644,162
Aggregate,.....	\$ 10,077,606 ..	\$ 2,078,187 ..	\$ 1,100,207 ..	\$ 6,899,211 ..	\$ 904,934 ..	\$ 1,331,133 ..	\$ 644,993 ..	\$ 2,788,666 ..	\$ 48,707,816
FOREIGN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES.									
Liverpool and London Fire and Life Insurance Co., (United States Branch),.....	\$ 915,256	\$ 10,000	\$ 31,540 ..	\$ 10,185 ..	\$ 31,540 ..	\$ 1,169,771
Royal Life Insurance Co., Liverpool, England,.....	3,774,972 ..	\$ 2,086,536 ..	757,705 ..	\$ 980,680	347,985 ..	105,077 ..	403,134 ..	10,317,593

* This estimate is only brought down to March 4th, 1859, instead of December 31st, 1860.

† The American Mutual Life Insurance Company of New-Haven has made no annual statement to this department for the year 1860.

RAIL-ROADS OF NEW-YORK.

LENGTH, RECEIPTS, TONNAGE, &C., OF EACH OF THE RAIL-ROADS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK—YEAR 1860.

NAME OF ROAD.	Length of Road.	Total amount now paid in.	Total amount of funded and floating debt.	Total cost, 1860.	Total No. of tons carried one mile.	Rate of speed, Miles per hour.	Receipts from Passenger business.	Receipts from Freight business.	Total Earnings.
Adirondac Estate and Rail-Road Company,...	800	\$ 800,000	\$ 270,000
Albany and Susquehanna,.....	140	567,937	\$ 46,139	548,221
Albany and Vermon,.....	111.50	2600,000	9600,000
Albany and West Stockbridge,.....	38	1,000,000	1,889,559	2,889,559	9,412,864	15
Avon, Genesee and Mt. Morris,.....	15.50	198,000	8,471	200,000	8,250	..	\$ 6,494	\$ 1,667	\$ 8,551
Black River and Ulster,.....	34.94	\$ 22,371	752,620	1,287,714	475,400	20	38,882	29,821	72,457
Blossburgh and Corning,.....	14.81	250,000	220,000	496,661	1,693,800	15	8,604	29,966	84,310
Broadway, (Brooklyn),.....	4.63	200,000	17,800	222,833	42,501	49,240
Brooklyn Central and Jamaica,.....	14.50	448,750	127,102	586,619	49,190	68,975
Brooklyn City,.....	30.21	1,000,000	180,000	1,262,225	511,470	620,555
Buffalo and Alleghany Valley,.....	80	16,000	21,800
Buffalo, Bradford and Pittsburgh,.....	100	250,634	61,512	328,851
Buffalo, New-York and Erie,.....	142	650,000	2,615,198	8,163,765	22,771,300	12	185,751	422,713	580,000
Buffalo and State Line,.....	63.84	1,950,950	1,976,545	2,788,384	16,577,071	12	396,533	500,666	911,019
Cayuga and Susquehanna,.....	34.61	4948,500	375,550	1,377,755	17	15,750	89,474	57,648
Central Park, North and East River,.....	..	3,120
Chemung,.....	17.86	380,000	400,000
Eighth Avenue,.....	510	800,000	839,048	888,750	888,750
Elmira, Jefferson and Canandaigua,.....	46.84	500,000
Erie and New-York City,.....	25	352,043	38,595
Hudson and Boston,.....	17.83	175,000	175,000	12
Hudson River,.....	144	8,758,466	9,515,856	11,800,445	40,187,589	20	1,144,938	847,794	2,047,145
Lake Ontario, Auburn and New-York,.....	73.84	77,553	74,854
Long Island,.....	84	1,852,715	768,280	2,566,270	2,560,325	15	192,565	185,087	348,020
New-York Central,.....	555.83	24,000,000	14,332,523	81,106,094	199,331,892	15	2,569,265	4,095,933	6,957,241
New-York and Erie,.....	446	11,000,000	29,076,620	35,574,171	214,084,396	14	1,180,957	8,884,843	5,180,321
New-York and Flushing,.....	8	120,000	141,000	289,168	85,997	354	86,351
New-York and Harlem,.....	130.75	5,717,100	6,055,752	8,022,786	9,382,119	15	533,090	529,410	1,142,500
New-York and New-Haven,.....	62.25	2,980,889	2,123,858	5,384,254	3,909,502	15	800,182	196,539	1,049,768

1. The length of the road was originally 39.95 miles, but this is the only part of the line now operated. 2. The Albany, Vermont and Canada Rail-Road was sold under foreclosure of the first mortgage bonds and purchased by the bondholders; this sum represents the sum secured by the mortgage bonds. 3. The length of road laid and in operation is 24.75 miles. 4. The capital stock has been reduced one-half in pursuance of an act of the legislature. 5. The length of road laid and in operation is 5.50 miles. 6. The length of road laid and in operation is 4.50 miles. 7. The length of road laid and in operation is 18.45 miles. 8. Only 8 miles of road in this State. 9. The A., V. and C. R. R. was sold under foreclosure of the first mortgage bonds, and this was the amount secured by said bonds. 10. The original cost of the road was \$420,000.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ECONOMY.

By JOHN HILL BURTON.

- I. *Productions of Industry.* II. *The Departments of Labor.* III. *Laborers versus Drones.* IV. *Co-operation in Labor.* V. *Freedom of Trade in the Currency.* VI. *Permanency or Stability in the Currency.* VII. *The obligations of Government as to the Currency.*

I. *Productions of Industry.*—The productions of industry are what all the world desire, under the guise of the pursuit of riches, though many exercise their ingenuity in evading or throwing upon others the condition necessary to its attainment—labor. If production, in the form of the usual objects of commerce, were multiplied any number of times over, the world would be by so much the richer, and the people, who are scattered over its surface, by so much the nearer to opulence and comfort, and the further removed from the miseries of penury and the dread of starvation.

II. *The Departments of Labor.*—Enterprise is the first practical step in industrial progress. The whole human race is full of latent desires; they are called into activity and exertion by enterprising men, who open new sources for supplying them. Such is the constitution of our nature, that every new effort in this shape is the stimulus and creating cause of another effort. Every production that stimulates the desire of acquisition, raises the industrial energies of others to the creation of some equivalent that will purchase it. When we look around us in the great markets of the world, we find them placed here and there with their various distinctive characters, as if they were so many natural productions, indicative of different climes and soil. In Lyons we have silk; in Oberstein, jewelry; in Berlin, ornamental iron; in Birmingham, steam-engines; in Manchester, cotton. But if we examine the germs of these great schools of labor, we will find that they have had their first vitality *from the enterprise of individuals who have opened new sources of industrial enterprise, and have supplied desires which never sleep*; though their external development in the shape of demand has not appeared until the method of supply has come into existence.

III. *Laborers versus Drones.*—A duke who has ten younger children, is the parent of so many people who are but half as rich as they would have been had the number been five; but the mechanic who is the parent of a like number of skilled workmen, whom he has been rich enough to educate and train, and whom he has lived to see grown to manhood, and making their own bread, has, by leaving offspring behind him, *increased the enjoyable fund of the world's goods more than he has increased its consumers*, instead of sending consumers to compete with each other and the rest of mankind for a share of what previously existed. We have, therefore, no reason to presume that the earth will ever be peopled by

human beings fulfilling the condition of industrial productiveness applicable to the wants of progress.

IV. *Co-operation in Labor*.—It must be admitted, that in the midst of the general clamor about union and association, the small tradespeople and farmers of England have never tested the capacity of quantities of small sums combined together, to perform the functions of capital, in the adaptation of skill and economy to their operations; they might here derive a lesson from the Swiss dairy system, where the union of several petty holders brings into operation all the boasted advantages of the large farm system in this country. Co-operation of this kind, where all are to draw according to what they contribute, is not to be confounded with communism, where the share of all is to be uniform, or fixed by some arbitrary authority. The extension of this principle has been recommended to the middle and working classes by two able advisers, Mr. BABBAGE [*Economy of Machinery and Manufactures*, chap. xxvi.] and Mr. MELL, [*Principles of Political Economy*, chap. vii. sect. 5.] It is expected that under such a system, workmen, participating in the profits, would gain much larger incomes than they obtain in the shape of salaries. But it would be a mistake to suppose that they would do so by obtaining a portion of some great fund which now finds its way to the hands of the capitalists in the shape of profit. The great source of increase would be the enlarged energies of the workers, who, depending more directly for their incomes on the amount produced, would naturally labor with increased energy and vigilance.

V. *Freedom of Trade in Currency*.—There are many sound and necessary operations of a government, which, having the appearance of restriction and interference, tend in the end to freedom and security. It is a frequent remark by the friends of an unrestricted currency, that there should be a "free trade in money" as well as in merchandise. The most important mistakes sometimes arise from a misapplication of terms, and a little inquiry will probably show that free trade, as applied to the buying and selling of commodities, and the same term as applied to the making of a currency, are totally different things; the grounds on which the one is founded affording no support to the other.

In the first place, as far as trade or mere buying and selling are concerned, there really is freedom of trade in a currency. The only currency which possesses a value in exchange, without any fictitious means being used to support it, consists of the precious metals. No one who possesses so much of this commodity will ever fail of a market for it. It forces a free trade for itself. It is, in fact, its universal marketability that has caused it to be the great instrument of exchange all over the world. Governments have made efforts to suppress freedom of trade in this commodity, but have failed. In this, the natural *self-adapting currency*, there always will and must be free trade.

The question for consideration is, whether a factitious currency, the value and availability of which depend on the sanction of the law, should also be made free; or, in other words, whether any individual who chooses to issue engraved paper, calling it worth so many sovereigns in bullion, shall be entitled to compel the public to take it at the value he

sets on it. Undoubtedly it is overstating the case to say that, strictly speaking, any of the supporters of an inconvertible currency go thus far. They would not have a law that every person who engraves one pound upon a piece of paper, and signs his name to it, should be entitled thereby to satisfy his butcher and baker. It would be necessary to have the preliminary forms of a banking establishment being created, and this would, of course, put impediments in the way, and materially limit the extent of the operation. Neither, perhaps, is it maintained that people should be bound to sell for the banker's notes, if they prefer keeping their commodities unsold, or insist on only dealing for metallic money. But it is undoubtedly intended *that such paper shall be a legal tender*; that is to say, that when any bargain simply infers a payment in money, *the obligation shall be sufficiently fulfilled by a transfer of bank notes.* It thus virtually comes to this, that under any extensive system of inconvertible paper currency, an indefinite number of persons, acting as bankers, are to be allowed to issue their notes to such effect, that the public are bound to take them as money. We shall consider the question whether this would or would not be conducive to free trade.

VI. *Permanency in the Currency.*—Now it undoubtedly tends to freedom in buying and selling, that the medium of exchange should be *fixed*, and that he who sells, say, for instance, the price of his commodity, should be able to specify a certain sum of money, instead of indicating the specific objects of value which he will readily take in exchange. But if money is one thing to-day, and another to-morrow—if a pound becomes worth only three-fourths on Saturday of what it was worth on Monday—buying and selling will be subjected to inconveniences that must tend seriously to interrupt freedom of trade. *Brevity, simplicity and rapidity are the wheels of commerce.* In a country like this, where property is secure, and the currency for immediate purposes pretty well fixed, the rapidity and certainty with which the largest transactions are accomplished are marvellous to those accustomed to poor communities and small trading operations. A sale of some manufacturing commodity or agricultural produce will be accomplished on the Exchange in three minutes, and the essentials of the bargain will be contained in three or four lines of writing. But this facility is mainly founded on the circumstances that *each party knows what is meant by a hundred or a thousand pounds.* If this were uncertain—if the currency were perpetually fluctuating—if there were several classes of bank notes all in circulation, of which some are worth more than others—explanations and provisions would have to be introduced, which would render the bargain more like a deed of entail, with its reservations and substitutions, than a simple mercantile contract.

VII. *The obligations of Government as to the Currency.*—It is thus pretty apparent that a free trade in buying and selling, and a free trade in the creating of money, *are not one and the same thing*, and are not defensible by the same arguments. In fact, they are the antagonists of each other. The most valuable preparation for free trade is the fixing of the medium through which it is carried on. The essential preliminary to enable a man to charge his own price, which is the main element of

freedom of trade, is that he should be able to state the price in definite and distinct terms. The trader is not literally free to name his own price if he live in a community where the government, or any individual may at any time alter the real value of the price he has fixed, and make it one day worth so much, another worth something greater or less. If the government does not fix a standard of value, it would be fair that it should interpose and settle the just amount to be paid in connection with each transaction, concluded under a varying currency. If it will not keep the £100, for which I agree to sell my tea, uniform, it would be fair to desire that at the time when the settlement comes, it should fix and award to me a sum amounting to as much real value in money then as £100 was worth at the time of the sale. It may be conjectured that the government would find such operations still more complex, costly and unsatisfactory than a previous fixing of the currency, an operation, indeed, of which few statesmen deny the justice and utility, although many of them feel its difficulty.

NORTH CAROLINA STAY LAW.

THE following is the stay law passed by the legislature of North Carolina, at its recent session :

An Act to provide against the sacrifice of property and to suspend proceedings in certain cases.

SEC. 1. *Be it enacted, &c.,* That no execution of *fieri facias* or *venire exponas* founded upon a judgment in any suit or action for debts and demands due on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, covenants for the payment of money, judgments, accounts and all other contracts for money, demands or contracts for specific articles, other than those upon official bonds, or in favor of the State, or against non-residents, shall be issued from the passage of this act, by any court of record or magistrate for the sale of property until otherwise provided by law, nor shall there be any sales under deeds of trust or decree, unless by the consent of parties interested, until otherwise provided by law.

SEC. 2. Where such executions have issued, and are now in the hands of officers, whether levied or not, the officer having such executions shall return the same to the magistrate or court from whence they issued, without further execution thereof, and executions upon the same judgments shall not issue again until the operation of this act ceases: *Provided*, That this act shall not be construed to discharge the lien which has already been acquired by the taking out such execution.

SEC. 3. There shall be no trials of any cases requiring the intervention of a jury, nor upon warrants before a justice of the peace in any suit or action for debts or demands due on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, covenants for the payment of money, judgments, accounts and other contracts, for money demands or contracts for specific articles.

SEC. 4. This act shall not apply to liabilities upon the part of the public officers, either to the State, counties, corporations or individuals; nor to

State, county or corporation taxes, nor to debts hereafter contracted, nor to debts due the State, nor to debts due from non-residents, nor to the annual collection of interest: *Provided*, That no note, bill of acceptance or other obligation at present existing, shall be held or considered as a debt hereafter contracted.

SEC. 5. The interest which has accrued since the 1st day of January, A. D. 1860, or which may hereafter accrue upon any bond or promissory note which was payable before the passage of this act, may be collected by action of debt or assumpsit, before any justice of the peace, if the amount of interest sued for be within his jurisdiction, and if not, then in the County or Superior Court: *Provided, however*, That no warrant or suit shall be brought except for the interest for one year or more (always making an even number) by computing the time from the day when the interest upon such bond or promissory note began to accrue.

SEC. 6. That any person who is about to remove his property out of the State, without the consent of his creditors, shall not be entitled to the benefit of this act.

SEC. 7. That all mortgages and deeds in trust for the benefit of creditors, hereafter executed, whether registered or not, and all judgments confessed during the continuance of this act, shall be utterly void and of no effect.

SEC. 8. The time during which this law is in force shall not be computed in any case where the statute of limitations comes in question.

SEC. 9. That this act shall be in force from and after its ratification.

ALBANY BANK FAILURES IN MAY, 1861.

THE failure of the Bank of the Capitol, in April last, with a savings department, as was expected, produced some excitement among the depositors of the savings banks of the city. These deposits, mostly in small sums, are from a class of people easily alarmed, and to whom indeed their small deposits are quite as important as much larger ones of persons of more means. At the Albany Savings Bank, located at the Commercial Bank, there was a considerable run during the early part of bank hours, which, however, diminished as the day advanced. All who called were promptly paid, and extra clerks were detailed to assist the teller in hastening payments. The panic sensibly abated as depositors found their money was ready for them, and many went away without presenting their pass-books.

At the Mechanics and Farmers' Saving Bank there was something of a crowd in the morning, and extra tellers were there assigned to pay with the utmost promptness all calls. Before the usual hour of closing the demand had ceased.

At the other banks, some of which have small savings deposits, there was very little demand. The alarm did not extend to the ordinary business or customers of the banks.

By the terms of the deposit the savings banks are not bound to repay them except on the third Wednesday of January, April, July and October, and after a week's notice. But they do not avail themselves of this part of the agreement, and all who want their money can have it on call.

The New-York State Bank, by coming forward and redeeming the notes of the country banks having their agencies with the suspended banks in this city, did a good service, and prevented a currency panic, for such undoubtedly would have been the consequence had the notes of a dozen or more banks, good in themselves, been "thrown out" by the failure of their agents to redeem here according to law.

Vose & Co., iron founders, have used some \$160,000 of the bank's funds without the knowledge of the directors, and with no other security than their notes. Vose & Co. failed subsequently.

It also appears that the cashier of the bank kept an account with the Bank of Commerce in New-York, and that they (the Bank of Albany) have overdrawn an amount variously estimated at from \$100,000 to \$150,000 without security. The directors of the Bank of Albany *knew nothing of this account with the Bank of Commerce*, as their collection and reciprocal account was kept with the Bank of the Republic. It is thought drafts have been made on and paid by the Bank of Commerce, of which no record appears in the bank ledgers of the Bank of Albany. —*Albany Argus*.

The failure of this old bank was quite unexpected to the public generally. The resignation of Cashier KENDRICH first excited suspicion. But his successor, Mr. VAN ALLEN, was so confident of the ability of the bank to work through its difficulties that he borrowed \$50,000 to meet the most pressing demands upon it. But this was all used up on Friday, and facts were brought to light through the day of so astounding a character as to render a suspension of business inevitable.

On Saturday, May 11th, the doors were closed, a thorough examination of the books instituted, and a committee sent to New-York. A state check for \$6,000 having been sent back unpaid, Attorney-General MYERS at once placed an injunction upon the bank, and a receiver was applied for. ADAM VAN ALLEN was appointed.

Messrs. Vose & Co. are the largest debtors of the bank, (over \$200,000,) but it is understood that they have deposited securities for all but \$25,000 of their indebtedness, and that that will be secured. About \$75,000 of these securities, however, is business paper with their endorsement.

There are a multitude of rumors afloat in regard to the causes of this unfortunate affair. The books are said to be in a very bad condition, showing large indebtedness where none exists; and also that large amounts of deposited collaterals are missing. But nothing official having yet transpired, we refrain from further reference to even seemingly well authenticated rumors.

One fact is ascertained, the bill-holders are entirely secure. The amount of State stocks deposited in the Banking Department are several thousand dollars greater than the bills in circulation.

The last published statement of the bank (March 16) reads as follows:

Capital.....	\$ 504,960
Circulation.....	65,673
Profits.....	44,324
Due banks.....	52,903
Due Treasurer State of New-York.....	97,437
Due depositors on demand.....	274,449
Total liabilities.....	1,039,748

Mr. VAN ALLEN, the receiver, is a gentleman in whom the financial public have entire confidence. He will administer the duties assigned him with scrupulous promptitude and fidelity. But there is but little hope for the stockholders. They will deem themselves fortunate if they escape with the total loss of their stock. They are liable for an equal amount beyond their stock. The depositors, it is believed, will all be taken care of; they certainly will be unless some new revelation should show the affairs of the bank in a worse condition than is yet apparent.—*Albany Journal*.

BANK OF ENGLAND DISCOUNTS.

The following table shows the alterations in bank discounts, from 1858 to 1861, with the amount of bank notes issued and of bullion held at the respective periods; also, the average price of wheat in each year, and the price of three per cent. stock on the days of 'change.

BANK NOTES ISSUED.							
DATE.	Price of Consols.	Minimum Rate p. ct.	Bullion.	Held by the Public.	In reserve by Bk. of England.	Total.	
1859.							
April 28,....	89	.. 8½	£ 17,640,842	£ 21,988,625	£ 9,496,645	£ 31,485,270	
May 5,....	90	.. 4½	17,205,400	22,255,685	8,790,350	31,046,035	
June 2,....	98½	.. 8½	17,764,596	21,092,355	10,478,390	31,570,745	
June 9,....	98½	.. 8	17,957,887	21,134,345	10,607,545	31,741,890	
July 14,....	95½	.. 2½	17,941,791	21,712,530	10,100,525	31,818,055	
1860.							
Jan. 19,....	95½	.. 8	15,884,498	22,053,140	7,589,865	29,643,005	
Jan. 31,....	94½	.. 4	14,942,502	21,906,340	6,846,300	28,752,710	
Mar. 29,....	94½	.. 4½	15,271,701	20,980,355	8,082,685	29,063,040	
April 12,....	94½	.. 5	14,687,102	23,467,255	4,922,085	28,889,340	
May 10,....	95½	.. 4½	15,373,326	21,880,935	7,182,845	29,063,780	
May 24,....	95½	.. 4	15,844,195	21,223,290	8,346,100	29,569,390	
Nov. 8,....	98½	.. 4½	18,897,085	21,206,070	6,429,370	27,635,440	
Nov. 13,....	98½	.. 5	18,814,611	20,659,270	6,338,385	26,997,655	
Nov. 15,....	92½	.. 6					
Nov. 29,....	98½	.. 5	18,860,376	19,900,215	7,636,860	27,586,575	
Dec. 31,.... 6	
1861.							
Jan. 2,....	12,652,629	20,511,595	5,599,815	26,411,410	
Jan. 7,....	92	.. 7	
Jan. 9,....	91½	12,175,886	20,458,800	5,518,115	25,971,915	
Feb. 14,....	91½	.. 8	11,571,832	19,690,160	5,535,845	25,226,005	
Mar. 21,....	92	.. 7	12,701,425	18,851,195	7,453,425	26,804,620	
April 4,....	91½	.. 6	13,000,180	19,523,970	6,544,490	26,668,460	
April 11,....	91½	.. 5	13,122,432	20,158,340	6,690,860	26,848,700	
May 16,....	91½	.. 6	12,382,446	20,042,790	5,978,195	26,020,985	

Chinese War.

Chinese War.

STOLEN BONDS.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA *vs.* WELLS, FARGO & Co. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, APRIL TERM, 1860.

THIS case involves principles somewhat novel in this court. The defendants demurred to the complaint; the demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered for the defendants.

The complaint avers that the defendants are a company, incorporated under the laws of New-York, and doing business in this State; that in 1855 certain warrants were drawn by the Comptroller of State, a schedule description of which warrants is appended; that the warrants were drawn in payment of certain indebtedness of the State to the persons named in the warrants, were made payable to the payees or order, were delivered to the respective payees thereof, and by them endorsed in blank and afterwards, and prior to the 28th of March, 1856, were all presented, by the several holders thereof, to the said State Treasurer, and by him paid and discharged, and on the payment were delivered up by the holders to said Treasurer; that afterwards, and before the 1st of January, 1858, the warrants were stolen from the office of the Treasurer; that on the 27th of January, 1858, defendants, WELLS, FARGO & Co., presented the warrants to THOMAS FINDLAY, then Treasurer, as claims against the State, outstanding and unpaid, and entitled to be funded, under the act of the legislature of April 18th, 1857, entitled "An act to provide for paying certain equitable claims against the State, and to contract a funded debt for that purpose," and requested the said Treasurer to issue to them, in exchange therefor, the bonds of the State of California, provided for that purpose. That said warrants appearing to be of the class of bonds specified in the second subdivision of the eleventh section of that act, and not appearing to be within any of the exceptions therein mentioned, and having upon them no receipt or endorsement showing them to have been paid or cancelled, the said FINDLAY, Treasurer, believing them to be just and valid claims against the State, and entitled to be funded under the act, in ignorance of the fact that they had been paid and satisfied, and of the fact that they had been stolen, and that the defendants had no title to the warrants, did, on the 18th of March, 1858, at the instance of the defendants, exchange the warrants for bonds of the State, the defendants giving receipts for the bonds and surrendering the warrants. These bonds were payable to the bearer, and issued as and in the form required by the funding act.

That in October, 1858, the Treasurer ascertained the true facts of the case, and demanded of WELLS, FARGO & Co. the bonds, which they refused. Various grounds of demurrer were specially set forth by the defendants, but it is not necessary to consider them all here.

It will be observed that the complaint does not aver any knowledge on the part of the defendants of the facts of payment, &c., set up in the pleading; nor does it aver that the defendants were not rightfully in

possession of this paper, nor even that they were, or claimed to be the owners of this scrip, or that they made any false or fraudulent representation on the subject; nor does it aver that the bonds are still in the possession of the defendants. The whole case seems to rest upon the assumption that the bare fact that the defendants had possession of this scrip, presented it for funding, and in exchange for bonds, and received the bonds, makes the defendants responsible in this form of action for the value of the bonds. It is not a case of a defence against the bonds in the hands of the defendants, upon the ground of a failure of consideration arising from these facts, but the case of an asserted ground of affirmative relief, on account of the receiving of the bonds, under the facts disclosed in the pleadings.

These bonds, issued under the circumstances, are unquestionably negotiable instruments, and binding upon the State, in the hands of an innocent assignee. The principle has been settled in the cases of *DELAFIELD vs. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS*, 8 *Paige*, 533; 2 *Hill*, 177; 26th *Wendell*, 192, and in other cases.

Upon a proper case, the plaintiff, as held in the above cases, might have filed its bill to enjoin the negotiation of these bonds, and to have them surrendered or cancelled, as against a fraudulent holder, or other party having no just claim to them. But this is not such a proceeding. It seems to be in the nature of an action of detinue for the bonds, on the ground that they were issued by mistake; and the plaintiff seeks a recovery without any averment that the bonds are still in the hands of the defendants, predicated the liability of the defendants upon the sole fact of the issuance of these instruments to them under or in consequence of this mistake. We do not see how this claim can be maintained. The defendants seem to be in no greater default than the officers of the State.

From any thing that appears, they had what purported on its face to be a just and legal claim upon the State. The law requires of the officers of the State, (*Wood's Dig.*, p. 97,) on the payment of any warrant by the Treasurer drawn by the Comptroller on him, that he shall take the receipt of the person to whom the money is paid, on the back of the warrant, and carefully file away and preserve the same, endorsing thereon the numbers thereof. And, again, by the act of May 3d, 1852, concerning the office of Treasurer of State, (*Wood's Dig.* 717,) it is required of all persons to whom any warrant on the Treasurer is issued by the Comptroller, before such warrant shall constitute an indebtedness against the State, such warrant shall be presented to the Treasurer, who shall, if it be a lawful warrant, endorse the same on the back officially, with the date of such endorsement made by him, and no transfer shall be valid without such endorsement. The second section of the same act requires a register of these warrants to be kept by the Treasurer, with the date of the endorsement, the name of the person to whom issued, the amount, the number, and for whom issued.

There was nothing, then, to apprise the defendants of any objection to these warrants; but the very proofs which the State itself prescribed, as the proper assurance of their validity and authenticity, assured the beholder that they were what they imported on their face, and the act of 1858 provided for the funding of indebtedness of this character. It is

not material, in the view of which we are now taking of the case, to consider whether the warrants were negotiable instruments in the hands of an innocent holder, or whether the bonds issued by mistake for them could be impeached in the hands of a holder charged with notice. For the question upon the plaintiff's pleading asserts a wholly different principle; the principle, mainly, of a liability for having obtained and received these bonds under the circumstances. It is said that the defendants were bound to know the facts. We do not perceive the force of this suggestion, or why they should be held to any greater knowledge than the regular agents of the State, whose office and duty it was to ascertain the facts and to protect the public interests.

But it cannot be held that every man who deals with State securities is bound to search the books and records of the State officers, before proceeding to take an assignment of the claim against the State. We do not know that these books and papers are subject to public inspection; and, if they were so held, it might lead to very embarrassing results. In this case it appears that the law had already prescribed a method of procedure, deemed by itself a sufficient protection and notification of the character of the claim; and the failure of the officers of the government to follow the law ought not to be turned to the injury of a citizen and made the occasion of ruining him for being no wiser than those officers to whom this class of duties is specially intrusted.

The Treasurer seems to have been equally deceived in regard to this matter as the defendants, and yet he is admitted to be a vigilant and faithful officer. The hardship and injustice, therefore, of holding the defendants responsible for these bonds, is apparent. It is not, as we are now considering it, the attempt of defendants to enforce this bond against the State; it is the case of a party having under these equitable circumstances got into possession *bona fide*, and without fraud, of certain securities for a claim, apparently just against the State, and then the State coming forward, not to demand possession of the securities, but seeking to hold him bound for the value of these securities, after he has parted with them. If this transaction occurred between private parties there could be no doubt. If A. had published that all of his outstanding and unpaid orders on B. should be paid in stocks, and that his agents had been ordered to write a receipt on the back of those which had been paid, that they all should be registered and endorsed in the name of the payee, if they purported to be payable on presentation and for value; and if C. got one of those orders, took it to the clerk and agent of A., surrendered it, and took in lieu of it negotiable security, and afterwards transferred the security, we imagine no one would contend that C. could be made to pay the value of this security on the ground that a former clerk had omitted to cancel the paper and endorse it, and that through the mistake of the last clerk, which mistake was induced by the mistake or fraud of the first, the security had been issued to A.

To say the very least, the equity of C. to hold on to what he got, on a chose in action assigned to him, and which he had every reason to believe was a good claim, would be at least equal to the claim of A., whose own conduct or that of his agents caused the act from which the loss accrued. The principle applies in such case that the loss should fall on

him by whose fault or confidence it came. The condition of the person in possession would be the better under such a state of facts.

We see no difference between a State and an individual in the application of this principle. A State should act with as much justice, and be held to as strict responsibility, as one of her own citizens in these matters of dealing and contract; and it is better that she should be held responsible for the acts of her agents, than that she should reap the benefits of fraud committed upon innocent third persons, by those agents under cover and color of authority.

We regard the issuance of these bonds as a payment of the old claim, for we see no difference between these bonds, which are negotiable upon their face, and have a fixed value in the market, and circulate as money, and the same amount in bank notes or coin, so far as the rule is concerned which give protection to such payment. If the rule which makes a voluntary payment not subject to recovery, in cases of this sort, be not applicable, yet we think that the equity of the defendants upon the facts of this suit, is, to say the least, equal to that of the plaintiff, in which case the courts will not interfere, but will leave the parties where they were before.

If the defendants were mere agents to get these bonds, the case would be still stronger for them; indeed, it would be a case admitting of but little argument, for it would be very difficult plausibly to argue that an agent cannot present a claim on the State, without being held to know more about the facts and merits of it than the officers of the State; or, that when he takes the assurance of the State officers that it is a good claim, and receives the money, he shall suffer for his credulity (even after he pays his principal) in the full penalty of the sum he received.

But this question does not necessarily arise, and we put our judgment upon the broader ground already indicated.

Judgment affirmed.

We concur,—BALDWIN, J.; FIELD, C. J.; COPE, J.

The bonds referred to in above decision are numbered—

259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, is ten, \$1,000 each,...	\$10,000
1,363, 1,364, 1,366, 1,367, 1,368, is five, \$1,000 each,.....	5,000
1,360, 1,361, 1,362, is three, \$2,000 each,	6,000
1,365, 1,369, is two, \$500 each,.....	1,000
	<hr/>
	\$22,000

New-York, March 20, 1861.

How Bank Swindlers Live.—Within a few yards of one of the chief entrances to Regent's Park stands a large, handsome Gothic villa, profusely ornamented with trellis-work, and with "spacious grounds attached," as the auctioneers express it; altogether a residence which a man with £1,500 a year would feel was suited to his circumstances. The occupant of this delightful retreat was, until a few days ago, Mr. DURDEN, the clerk of the Commercial Bank—a man with an annual income of £150. Is it not strange that some of the directors, comprising some of the acutest men of business we have, should never have ascertained, with the ROBSON and REDPATH experiences before their eyes, the style of living of a servant who held so responsible a place, and who had such opportunities of defrauding them?—*London Correspondent of Cambridge Independent.*

GOLD AND THE EXCHANGES.

The Effect of the Gold Supplies on the Foreign Exchanges between the United Kingdom and Foreign Countries, and on the price of Silver.
By FRANCIS JOURDAN.

Read before the Statistical Society of London, 19th February, 1861.

IN treating statistically the subject of the foreign exchanges, it has generally been considered sufficient to furnish abstracts from the quotations published by those who are engaged in monetary transactions of this nature; but such quotations, though adapted to mercantile operations, dependent merely upon arbitrations or international monetary values existing at any one period of time, are inefficient when an essential object, as with all statistical inquiry, is to lay down accurately periodic fluctuations. In bringing before the Society the modifications essential to produce efficient tables of the fluctuations in the foreign exchanges, no claim can be laid to originality, as it will be shown that nearly fifty years ago the late Mr. RICARDO called attention to the necessity of making similar corrections, before drawing conclusions from the apparent fluctuations of different periods.

The impossibility of deriving correct results from the simple collection of facts in their ordinarily accessible form, and the consequent necessity of submitting these facts to a corrective process, rendering the inquiry somewhat complicated, it will be as well to explain the causes which give rise to this peculiarity, before laying down the plan here adopted for producing exchange tables in a correct form.

The technical term, "rate of exchange," expresses the amount of coin receivable in the money of one country, against a *fixed* amount of coin in another country; thus, the rate of exchange here upon Paris is at one period 25 francs 10 centimes; at another, 25 francs 20 centimes; meaning that at one time 25·10, at another 25·20 are receivable, against £1 of our money. And the currency of France being now virtually based upon gold, the difference between 25·10 and 25·20 is an exact numerical expression of the alteration which has occurred in the exchangeable value of the money of each country. In those cases, however, where the currencies are different, one country adopting *silver*, the other *gold*, as a legal tender, the *recorded* variations in the rates cease to express the *real* exchange fluctuations; for it is apparent that if a rise or fall has taken place in the price of *silver*, any fluctuation that has occurred may be partly attributable to this cause; for instance, if the price of silver advanced from 5s. to 5s. 1d. per oz., the moneys of those countries having a silver currency would become relatively more valuable than ours; and as the rate of exchange expresses the quantity of that silver money exchangeable for our pound sterling, the rate would naturally decline. In other words, supposing for the moment this rise in the price of silver to be the only active influence, the rate of exchange would fall inversely

as 5*s.*—5*s.* 1*d.*, indicating that so much less foreign coin of this enhanced value is equivalent to our pound sterling. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the fluctuations recorded upon places adopting a *silver currency* as consisting of two parts; the first part being incidental to any alteration that may have occurred in the *relative values* of gold and silver; the remainder, or second part, expressing the real fluctuation, or that which properly concerns a variation in the rate of exchange. Therefore, to obtain a correct statement of rates dependent upon both metals, it is necessary, when any variation has taken place in their relative value, to eliminate so much of the recorded fluctuations as arise from this cause. The result will then represent the extent of any *real* fluctuation in the exchange, or such as may be said to have its origin in the operations of trade.

Want of attention to another point of minor importance renders most of the tables hitherto compiled incomplete—these tables giving, in some instances, the rates current for bills payable *on demand* or three days' sight, and in other cases at three months' date; but to express correctly periodic fluctuations, the quotations ought, in all instances, to be for bills payable at the *shorter periods*—the variations in the rate of discount causing apparent fluctuations when no real alteration has taken place. No better illustration can be given of the necessity of attention to these points than a reference to an elaborate return to Parliament by the Bank of England, which contains the rates for bills upon Amsterdam, Hamburg and Paris, for a series of years. Now these rates are given for Amsterdam and Hamburg at three months' date, and for Paris at three days' sight, and being simple extracts from the published courses of exchange, of course make no allowance for the varying price of silver. For instance, we find Hamburg quoted 13·11½, (marks and schillings per pound sterling,) in April, 1852, and in November of the same year 13·7; and upon Amsterdam, at the same periods, the quotations are respectively 12·2 and 11·18, (gilders and stivers per pound sterling,) showing apparently a heavy fall in both instances; but as silver had advanced in a greater proportion during the same period, viz., from 5*s.* to 5*s.* 1½*d.*, the rates at the latter period were virtually rather higher, though apparently much lower. [The rates given in this return (220 L. sess. 2) would lead to the supposition that the exchanges on *Amsterdam* and *Hamburg* had fallen fully 1½ per cent. in seven months; but as *silver* had risen in the mean time as much as two per cent. in London, it is clear that the decline in the rates is more than accounted for by this alteration in the price of silver alone.]

It will doubtless be perceived that this apparent anomaly arises from the currencies of Hamburg and Holland being based upon *silver*; but, in further illustration of the subject, it may be as well to refer to some observations made by RICARDO, in which he says, with regard to a set of tables prepared about the commencement of the century: "The accuracy of these tables must be admitted or proved before the conclusions which result from the inspection of them can command assent; but so far from this being the case, their accuracy is disowned by Mr. MUSHET (the author) himself, who acknowledges the false principle upon

which his first tables were calculated, and accompanies the second edition of his pamphlet with the following notice :

"I have also corrected this mistake of considering the par to be fixed; because gold being the standard of the money in England, and silver in Hamburg, there can be no fixed par between those two countries; it will be subject to all the variations which take place in the relative value of gold and silver. To find the real par, therefore, we must ascertain what was the *relative value of gold and silver when the par was fixed*, and what is the relative value at the time we wish to calculate it. As it is universally admitted that gold is the standard measure of value in this country, and that silver performs the same office in Hamburg, it is evident that no tables *can be correct* which assume a fixed invariable par; the true par must vary with every variation in the relative value of the two metals." Mr. RICARDO goes on to make another objection to these tables, and says again, "The degree in which the exchange is above or below par, is calculated by a reference to the prices quoted from LLOYD'S *List*. Now, invariably have these prices been for bills at two and a half months, and as the par of exchange is computed from a comparison of the actual value of the coins of the two countries, payable *at the same time* in both, and not in one of them at the end of two and a half months, an allowance for interest must be made for this period."

From this, it appears that Mr. RICARDO objects to the tables he refers to, because, in the first instance, they were prepared without reference to the varying price of silver; and when this error was perceived, the quotations given were always those at two and a half months date, which may and frequently do vary, owing to alterations in the rate of discount, while the rate for bills on demand remains the same.

In comparing, therefore, periodic rates between this and other countries, the most important element is the metal which forms the legal tender, for the time being, in the respective countries. For instance, France and the United States have now *gold* currencies, while those of Holland, Hamburg and India are based upon *silver*. For the purpose of ascertaining our par of exchange with countries having a gold standard, it is simply necessary to compare the quantity of fine gold in the foreign coin with the quantity in our "sovereign;" and if the rate of exchange stands at such a point as to show that less fine gold is receivable abroad than is paid here through the operation of purchasing a bill upon that foreign country, the rate is said to be below par, and the probability of an export of bullion varies with the extent of the decline below this par.

In illustration of this, the twenty-franc piece, the present virtual legal tender in France, contains 89.617 grains of pure gold, or one franc contains 4.4808 grains; and our sovereign having 113 grains of pure gold, it follows that there are about the same number of fine gold grains in 25 francs 20 centimes as in £1 sterling; in other words, the fixed par between London and Paris is about 25.20. Now, if the rate of exchange here, upon Paris, is quoted below that point, it indicates that less than 25.20 are obtainable for every £1 sterling, and the rate is then said to be below par.

Our par of exchange with those countries where *silver* alone is admitted as a legal payment is not a similar fixed quantity, but fluctuates with the price of silver; thus, there are 165 grains of pure silver in a rupee; at 5s. per oz. for standard silver, this would be equivalent to about 1s. 10½d. of our money; but at 5s. 2d. per oz., it would be equivalent to 1s. 11d.; consequently the par of exchange ranges under these conditions from 1s. 10½d. to 1s. 11d., showing that when silver is 5s. per oz. it may answer to export it to India, if the rate for bills is 1s. 11½d., but it would not answer to do so if silver were 5s. 2d. per oz.

Consequently, to ascertain the real fluctuations in the case of those countries which possess a *gold* standard, we have merely to note the simple rise and fall; but to make a fair comparison of the periodic fluctuations in our rates upon countries with a *silver* standard, it is necessary to adjust these fluctuations in accordance with the varying price of silver. It may be as well to add that no allowance is here made for the per centage charged by different governments for converting the raw metal into coin, which occasionally affects slightly the profit on export, but of course has no influence on the main object now in view of obtaining the real fluctuations.

Out of the five places now under review, in two of them, namely, *France* and *America*, which have *gold* currencies, we attain, therefore, correct results, by merely recording the quoted rates for bills payable on demand. The other three, *Amsterdam*, *Hamburg* and *India*, with *silver* currencies, it is proposed to adjust so as to do away with the disturbing influence caused by variations in the relative value of gold and silver, and to give an estimate of the real fluctuations which it may be assumed would have arisen had the price of silver here remained unaltered. The mode adopted to attain this end is to fix this price at, say, 5s. 2d. per oz., and having ascertained the *per centage of difference* between the price of silver, during any given period, and *this fixed rate of 5s. 2d. per oz.*, by altering the quoted rates in the same proportion, we attain a correct view of the real *fluctuations* that would have occurred during the same period had the price of silver been constantly 5s. 2d. per oz.

This will, perhaps, be made clearer by a reference to the formula

$$R \cdot a$$

on which the adjustment is actually based $x = \frac{R \cdot a}{S}$ the symbol a

representing the average price of silver for any given period; R , the quoted rate of exchange during the same time; S , the fixed price of 5s. 2d. for silver as now proposed. R , expressing the amount of foreign silver coin given in exchange for our sovereign, must always rise as a , the average price of silver falls, and *vice versa*. A succession of these equations will, therefore, distinguish the fluctuations which are independent of the value of silver.

In the following table the annual *quoted* rates for these three places are calculated on the basis of 5s. 2d. per oz., and are given in parallel columns, under the head of *computed comparative rates*:

I. Table of Exchange, 1852—1859.

YEARS.	AMSTERDAM.		HAMBURG.		PARIS.	INDIA.		N.YORK.		Average Price of Silver per oz.
	Quoted Rates.	Computed comparative Rates.	Quoted Rates.	Computed comparative Rates.	Quoted Rates.	Quoted Rates.	Computed comparative Rates.	Quoted Rates.		
	<i>Glds. Stiv. Glds. Cts.</i>	<i>Mks. Sgs. Mks. Cts.</i>	<i>Frs. Cts.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>Rps. Cts.</i>	<i>Dls. Cts.</i>				
1852, ..	11 18·68 ..	11·652 ..	13 7·00 ..	13·120 ..	25 250 ..	2 0·19 ..	9·688 ..	4·8466 ..	5 0·535	
1853, ..	11 16·12 ..	11·718 ..	13 4·02 ..	13·147 ..	25·017 ..	2 0·59 ..	9·684 ..	4·8927 ..	5 1·514	
1854, ..	11 14·48 ..	11·680 ..	13 2·63 ..	13·063 ..	24·994 ..	1 11·55 ..	10·111 ..	4·8890 ..	5 1·505	
1855, ..	11 16·96 ..	11·723 ..	13 4·65 ..	13·151 ..	25·149 ..	2 0·74 ..	9·600 ..	4·9000 ..	5 1·846	
1856, ..	11 16·64 ..	11·718 ..	13 5·04 ..	13·181 ..	25·289 ..	2 0·20 ..	9·817 ..	4·9081 ..	5 1·373	
1857, ..	11 15·96 ..	11·757 ..	13 4·23 ..	13·218 ..	25·280 ..	2 0·69 ..	9·688 ..	4·8729 ..	5 1·786	
1858, ..	11 14·88 ..	11·682 ..	13 5·10 ..	13·196 ..	25·090 ..	2 0·39 ..	9·748 ..	4·8971 ..	5 1·418	
1859, ..	11 13·78 ..	11·635 ..	13 3·18 ..	13·207 ..	25·089 ..	2 0·49 ..	9·807 ..	4·9064 ..	5 2·086	

Thus the average quoted rate for Amsterdam, in 1852, was 11·18·68, (guilders and stivers,) or 11·934 guilders and cents per pound sterling, and the price of silver 5s. 0·535*d.*, the difference between which and 5·2 being 2·36 per cent. The quotation of 11·934, for 1852, is consequently reduced 2·36 per cent., and the result, 11·652, in the second column, is a correct estimate of the rate upon Holland, had silver been worth 5·2 in 1852. The Hamburg annual average rates of exchange are treated in a similar manner. With regard to India, that country having absorbed a very large quantity of silver during the last ten years, and the flow having been chiefly from hence, it is natural to expect that the rates of exchange should have been much influenced by the transmission of this bullion. It is accordingly found that the exchanges upon *India* have indicated a great demand for remittances—the price charged for bills having frequently been sufficiently over the intrinsic value of the rupee as to cover the expenses of transmitting specie, including insurance and loss of interest during transit; these expenses forming, of course, the natural limits, which the fluctuations in the rate of exchange between any two countries can never permanently exceed. A considerable portion of this silver has come from France, where, owing to the existence of a double standard, the fall in the value of gold, compared with silver, has rendered the former metal the more advantageous tender in payment, and gold has extensively replaced the silver coin taken for export to the East.

Before the Indian mutiny, when income and expenditure were more happily balanced than at present, the East India Company had to draw bills upon the presidencies against disbursements made in this country, and the rates charged were a fair index of the demand for remittances; and although these drafts were issued at sixty days' sight, they may be more fairly considered as representing the short exchange—the preference given to the company's paper, enabling them to obtain an exceptional rate, amounting to about one farthing per rupee above what first class commercial bills could be obtained at. [The quotations given for India, from 1852 to 1856, inclusive, are those charged by the *East India Company upon Bengal*, except during a portion of 1855, when the

rate was raised so high that the company were virtually out of the market as drawers of bills.] Since the mutiny, however, instead of having to receive money from India, large sums, representing the excess of expenditure beyond the requisite disbursements here, have had to be remitted by government; and although rates are still advertised at which drafts are issued, the rates are fixed so high as virtually to exclude remitters—the insignificant amounts actually drawn being merely obtained by parties not sufficiently conversant with exchange operations to prevent them from incurring unnecessary loss. The rates since 1857 are, therefore, derived from the quotations for first-class bills, and the annual averages are computed in the parallel column on the basis of 5·2 per oz., in accordance with the principle adopted for the other countries with silver currencies.

The last column gives the rate in New-York for bills at sight upon London. In consequence of the exchange operations with America being almost exclusively conducted on the other side of the Atlantic, any attempt to give the rate *here* upon New-York could only have been an estimate derived from the rates quoted there upon London; and as there could be little if any advantage in this—our object being chiefly to ascertain comparative rates—the quotations given are those derived from New-York. The par of exchange, owing to both countries having a gold currency, is easily ascertained—the number of grains fine in the eagle of ten dollars is 232; and the grains in our sovereign being 113, it follows that about dollars 4.87 are equal to our pound sterling, which is nearly equivalent to 109½, according to the mode adopted in America of estimating the exchange at a fluctuating per centage on the nominal value of 4s. 6d. per dollar.

Recapitulating the chief heads of the inquiry up to the present point, it will be perceived that the mode adopted in the collation of these tables, and which might be extended to future statistics on the same subject, is, *firstly*, to ascertain in all cases the rates for *short* bills—these quotations sufficing for countries with *gold* currencies, such as France and the United States, but which, if adopted without modification for places having *silver* currencies, are shown to be misleading; and to obviate this, it is proposed, in those cases where the currency is based upon silver, to give, in addition to the current quotations, *computed* rates, which, being estimated on a *fixed* basis, are such as it may fairly be concluded would have existed had silver not varied from the price of 5s. 2d. per oz.; in other words, adopting a fixed par, and enabling the *real* fluctuations, or those dependent on the course of trade, to be distinguished from the *apparent* fluctuations, or those derived from the usual price currents.

A further alteration, though one of mere detail, provides that the Indian and American rates shall be stated in *rupees* and *dollars* per pound sterling, instead of *shillings* and *pence* per rupee or dollar. One advantage of this alteration is, that the *higher* quotations upon these places then correspond, as in the case of Amsterdam, Hamburg and Paris, with what are called *favorable* rates, and *vice versa*, and enables the fluctuations to be more clearly set forth, by putting them in the following form :

II. Table showing the ratio of fluctuations in the foreign rates of exchange at London, with the average bullion in Bank of England, and the average rate of discount at the bank.

YEARS.	Amster- dam.	Hamburg.	Paris.	India.	New-York.	Totals.	Bullion in bank. Millions.	Bank rate. Pr. cent.
1852,....	997 ..	997 ..	1,006 ..	992 ..	991 ..	4,983 ..	20.7 ..	2½
1853,....	1,002 ..	999 ..	995 ..	991 ..	1,001 ..	4,988 ..	17.4 ..	3½
1854,....	995 ..	993 ..	994 ..	1,035 ..	1,000 ..	5,017 ..	13.9 ..	5½
1855,....	1,003 ..	999 ..	1,000 ..	983 ..	1,002 ..	4,987 ..	14.3 ..	4½
1856,....	1,002 ..	1,002 ..	1,006 ..	1,005 ..	1,003 ..	5,018 ..	11.2 ..	5½
1857,....	1,006 ..	1,004 ..	1,004 ..	992 ..	997 ..	5,003 ..	10.1 ..	6½
1858,....	995 ..	1,002 ..	998 ..	998 ..	1,002 ..	4,995 ..	17.7 ..	3½
1859,....	1,000 ..	1,003 ..	998 ..	1,004 ..	1,004 ..	5,009 ..	17.9 ..	2½

NOTE.—This table is constructed as follows: The number 1,000 stands in each case for the mean or average rate of the eight years, 1852–59. Upon *Amsterdam*, for example, the mean of the quotation set forth in Table page 109, is 11.690, consequently this stands for 1,000 in this table, and the rate in the same column for 1852, which is 11.652, being 3.8 cents, or 0.3 per cent. lower than the average of the eight years, is represented in this table by 997. The quotation for 1853 is found to be 11.713, or .02 per cent. above the mean, and is consequently represented by 1,002, the ratio 997; 1,002 expressing the extent of the fluctuation that occurred in the average rates for the respective years 1852 and 1853.

In this table the fluctuations in Table I. are represented by the variation above or below the number 1,000, which is adopted as a datum line of average of the computed comparative rates for the eight years under consideration. If the totals (col. 6) representing the collective fluctuations of the five places in this table are compared with the average annual amount of bullion held by the bank, it will be seen at once that on the whole the higher rates have coincided with low averages of bullion, and vice versa. On reference to the annexed statement—

Table showing the ratios of fluctuations in foreign rates of exchange, and average bullion in Bank of England.

YEARS.		Millions.
1852–53–58–59,	4,994	18.4
1854–55–56–57,	5,006	12.4

it will be perceived that in the four years, 1854, 1855, 1856 and 1857, when the bullion averaged 12.4 millions, the average aggregate of these exchanges was 5,006; in 1852, 1853, 1858 and 1859, when the bullion averaged 18.4 millions, the average was 4,994; and although the rates are not invariably high when the bullion is low, there is in no case any indication of that pressure in the form of lower exchanges which is generally expected to coincide with a diminution in the bullion of the bank.

To investigate this somewhat further, it is now proposed to examine the fluctuations in the *European* rates, with reference to the estimated amount of gold and silver exported and imported. A parliamentary return, printed in 1858, gives the amount of gold imported into Europe during the years 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855 and 1856, at 100.9 millions,*

* The estimate given in this return is for the seven years, 1851 to 1857, inclusive, and reckons the increase in the *European* stock of bullion during that period at 80.7 millions; from this is deducted 9.6 millions for the year 1851, which is not included here, leaving 71.1 millions as the addition for the six years, 1852 to 1857.

and the French author, LEVASSEUR, states that during the same period, 96.1 millions were imported into England, and 4.4 into France. As European places receive, probably, only a limited quantity, except through England and France, the two estimates may be considered nearly to correspond. With regard to *silver* the same parliamentary return gives the import for these five years as an aggregate of 21.8 millions. LEVASSEUR* estimates it much higher, or about 31.7 millions. The proportionate amount for each year would, however, be nearly the same, whichever estimate is taken as correct, and the smaller amount is adopted here as the assumed import. With regard to the amount *exported* from Europe, the great drain has, of course, been of *silver* to the East; this appears to have amounted during the eight years up to the end of 1859 to 75 millions, the *gold* sent to the same quarter having been 6.5 millions. The gold exported to other places out of Europe averaged about 2.4 millions annually. In the following table, the figures for the years 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856 and 1857, are obtained from the parliamentary paper alluded to above; the estimate for the years 1858 and 1859, from the third and fourth report on the customs; the requisite addition for the other European countries during these two years being calculated from the average of the six preceding years, and the published exports from the Mediterranean ports. It must be understood that this return is exclusive of the gold and silver produced in *Europe*.

III. Table showing the estimated bullion retained in Europe, average bullion in Bank of England, and rates of fluctuation in the Continental Exchanges.

YEARS.	Bullion in Europe. Millions.	Bullion in Bank. Millions.	Fluctuation in Exchange.
1857,.....	3.4	10.1	3,014
1859,.....	6.9	17.9	3,001
1856,.....	10.0	11.2	3,010
1855,.....	12.9	14.3	3,002
1852,.....	11.3	20.7	3,000
1858,.....	16.2	17.7	2,995
1853,.....*	14.5	17.4	2,996
1854,.....	19.0	13.9	2,982

The amount of bullion retained in Europe is estimated as shown in the following table:

IV. Table of Imports into and Exports from Great Britain.

YEARS.	Imports from Producing Countries.			Exports to Places out of Europe.			
	Gold. Millions.	Silver. Millions.	Total. Millions.	Gold. Millions.	Silver. Millions.	Total. Millions.	Retained. Millions.
1852,.....	15.2	4.7	19.9	6.0	2.6	8.6	11.3
1853,.....	22.4	4.4	26.8	6.7	5.6	12.3	14.5
1854,.....	22.1	4.2	26.3	2.7	4.6	7.3	19.0
1855,.....	19.9	3.7	23.6	2.8	7.9	10.7	12.9
1856,.....	21.3	4.8	26.1	2.0	14.1	16.1	10.0
1857,.....	21.4	4.1	25.5	2.0	20.1	22.1	3.4
1858,.....	20.0	3.7	23.7	1.8	5.7	7.5	16.2
1859,.....	20.0	5.5	25.5	2.4	16.2	18.6	6.9

* "La Question de l'Or," by E. LEVASSEUR, 1858.

The amounts of gold and silver imported (Table IV.) up to 1857, are derived from the Parl. Paper, No. 381. For the years 1858 and 1859, from the report on the customs of imports into the United Kingdom, adding 1·2 millions as probable arrivals at other European ports. The *silver* exported is taken from the annual circular issued by Mr. Low of the silver shipped to the East; the exports of silver to other quarters are but trifling in amount, and considered as balanced by excluding the *silver arriving* at other European ports. The *gold* exported out of Europe is estimated at an average of 1·5 millions in addition to the Eastern remittances, except for the years 1852 and 1853, when large quantities of coin were sent to Australia.

On examining this table it is apparent that some connection exists between the amount of bullion retained in Europe and the tendency of the exchanges here, the highest rates occurring when least bullion is retained, the lowest when the largest estimated addition is made to the European stock; and if taken in series of two years, the *fluctuations* will be found to follow in regular inverse ratio with the quantities of bullion retained.

Table showing the estimated Bullion retained in Europe, and the ratios of Fluctuation in the Continental Rates of Exchange.

Years.	Millions.		
1854 and 1853,.....	16·7	2,989
1858 " 1852,.....	13·7	2,997
1855 " 1856,.....	11·5	3,006
1859 " 1857,.....	5·2	3,008

The special feature attaching to the fluctuations set forth in the preceding table appears to be sufficiently established to warrant further investigation, more especially with reference to the large increase that has taken place during the same period in our metallic circulation. On this point Mr. WEGUELIN stated to the committee on bank acts, in 1857, that our circulation was supposed then to be equal to about fifty millions sterling, and to have increased 30 per cent. in the previous six years; looking to the fact that fifty millions were actually coined in ten years, up to the end of 1859, it would appear probable that this estimate is too low. LEVASSEUR, the French author before alluded to, considers the metallic circulation in England to have amounted to sixty millions in 1848, and reckons the addition to the end of 1856 at forty millions; this, on the other hand, is most likely an over-estimate. But in either case, for the sake of the present argument, it can be affirmed that in the absence of heavy drains of bullion, England has been the emporium of large additional quantities of gold, which must, to some extent, have had a tendency to raise the value of other commodities. Under the influence, therefore, of a large increase in the circulation, an excess of imports would naturally ensue until prices were again nearer a level. Without asserting that this is the sole cause of the phenomenon, it is clear that if imports were thus stimulated, it would affect the exchanges as seen in the above table. For instance, if eighteen millions of gold, arriving from the producing countries, were retained in Europe, ten millions or more would probably represent our share; and supposing this to raise prices for a time, imports being stimulated, while exports were diminished, the rates would naturally *fall*; and assuming the fall to arise from this cause,

it would properly bear some proportion to the amount of gold retained in Europe. In this light it would seem that the main leverage acting at present upon the exchanges proceeds from the gold arriving from the producing countries. Of that gold a quantity surprisingly equal in its annual amount reaches the shores of Europe, the largest share coming to England. If at the time of its arrival an active demand exists for export out of Europe, it goes immediately to supply the void, and generally after having been exchanged for continental silver. If no such demand exists, much appears to be absorbed into the English currency, its action influencing increased imports and low continental exchanges.

Recurring to the fact that lower exchanges in general occur coincidently with high bullion returns, and *vice versa*, it is probable that this appears an anomaly because a diminution of our reserve is almost invariably supposed to arise from an efflux to other countries, and that by raising the rate of discount, which always brings back bullion, this gold is recovered by an increase of exports. That this opinion, however, is to a great extent a fallacy, would appear for the following reasons :

1st. A partial suspension of business invariably ensues when any stringent measures are adopted by the Bank of England; that is to say, our exports are not, as a rule, increased under such circumstances.

2d. A comparison of the estimated amounts retained in Europe, with the average amount of bullion in the bank as seen in Table III., shows that these totals are quite independent of one another, and that the relatively large exports of bullion which occur when least is retained in Europe, do not necessarily affect the amount of bullion in the bank coffers.

3d. Recent panics have indicated a simultaneous diminution in the reserves of bullion at all the great centres of commerce.

On the strength of these cumulative facts, it appears tolerably clear that an adverse condition of bullion reserves during the years now under review is traceable, not so much to the *balance of trade* being against any one country, as to some universal cause acting simultaneously and sympathetically upon the principal trading communities.

The leading monetary event of the last ten years, namely, the large produce of gold in Australia and California, has doubtless introduced many novel features; but a further analysis of the problems presented by this addition to the former stock of precious metals is beyond the province of the present paper. The facts now brought forward appear, however, to establish the fact, that as far as relates to one of the most important practical questions, the position of the reserves at the chief entrepôts of commerce, we must no longer confine our view to the trade of any one country, or content ourselves, when considering an unexpected drain from the bank, with resting its solution upon the vague, and perhaps, therefore, generally adopted phrase of an unfavorable condition of the foreign exchanges, but study these fluctuations in bullion reserves, more with reference to the general condition of trade, as influenced at present by a large increase in the circulating medium. To throw much light upon this problem, including, as it does, the general effect of the gold discoveries, and their special influence upon the rate of interest and national reserves, except through the media of facts, would be expected by few, and least of all by the statist; and, as a contribution to this end, the

present tables are offered, and it is proposed to continue them in the Society's *Journal* for the sake of future reference in the present form, or with such improvements as may be suggested. As, however, silver is quite as universal a standard of value in other countries as gold, the question of the relative value of the two metals becomes of considerable importance, more especially with reference to the large proportionate increase in the quantity of gold, and it is, therefore, proposed to close the present remarks with a few observations based on the fluctuations in the price of silver during the last ten years.

V. Table of average price of Silver in bars, (standard,) and exports of Silver.

YEAR.	Average Price of Silver.	EXPORTS OF SILVER TO THE EAST.	
		From England.	From Mediter- ranean Ports.
1850,	4 11·987
1851,	5 0·988	£ 1,716,000
1852,	5 0·535	2,630,238
1853,	5 1·514	4,710,665	£ 848,362
1854,	5 1·505	3,132,003	1,451,014
1855,	5 1·346	6,409,889	1,524,240
1856,	5 1·373	12,118,985	1,989,916
1857,	5 1·786	16,795,232	3,350,689
1858,	5 1·413	4,784,923	911,043
1859,	5 2·036	14,682,671	1,521,970

It is somewhat singular that the effect of the vast increase in the supply of gold has hitherto been such, that the fact of any depreciation with reference to the value of other commodities is denied by many competent authorities; this question cannot, of course, be conclusively decided by a reference to the price of silver alone, as other causes, such as diminished production, or increased demand for silver, might make it more valuable; but looking at the annual averages in the above table, the evidence afforded appears to favor the opinion that the rise is mainly attributable to a depreciation in the value of gold. In the first place, the rise has been gradual, the years 1850 and 1851 give an average of 5s. $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per oz.; 1852 and 1853, an average of 5s. 1d.; 1854 and 1855, an average of 5s. $1\frac{1}{2}$ d.; and 1856 and 1857, average of 5s. $1\frac{3}{4}$ d.; and 1858 and 1859, an average of 5s. $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. The average for the five years previous to 1850, may be taken at about 4s. $11\frac{1}{2}$ d., and the argument that the rise has been caused by the increased demand for export to the East does not appear tenable if examined in connection with the actual amounts exported in each year. Previous to 1851 the exports to India and China were not so regularly reported as at present; in that year the amount exported was only £1,716,100; consequently, before the export had attained dimensions of any magnitude, a rise in silver had been established to the extent of nearly 2 per cent.; in 1852 and 1853 the exports for the two years were 7·3 millions; in 1854 and 1855, 9·5 millions; the excess of 1854 and 1855 over the two preceding years was therefore only 2·2 millions, and yet the price rose about $\frac{5}{8}$ per cent. In 1856 and 1857 the exports amounted to the enormous total of 28·9 millions, in two years,

an increase of nearly nineteen millions as compared with the two previous years, yet silver did not rise quite $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The amount sent out during the two years 1858 and 1859 was only 19·4 millions, or nine millions and a half less than during the two preceding years, but in silver a further rise was established of nearly $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. These facts show that the chief advance occurred before silver was sent away in large quantities to India; and though temporary fluctuations have since ensued, a steady rise has been developed, which appears independent of the demand for India, as the fluctuations in the price are seen not to accord at all with the quantities exported.

That silver has risen about 4 per cent., and that this rise is not caused by the demand for export, seems demonstrable from the facts here given; a depreciation in the value of gold appears, therefore, the only reason that can fairly be assigned for the advance which has taken place in the price of silver during the last ten years. Whether the actual depreciation in the value of gold has exceeded this per centage, the available supply from France moderating, as imagined by M. CHEVALIER, the rise in silver is a question which it is not now necessary to discuss, but it is important to observe, that the point at which it first becomes profitable to export silver from France in exchange for gold is owing to the nature of their double standard, when silver here is worth 5s. 1d. per oz.; and it is remarkable that the price has been much steadier since it attained this point, only rising since, in such measure as might be expected from the increasing difficulty of procuring coin from a source which it may reasonably be expected is now beginning to fail.

The preceding tables were compiled before the close of last year, and the figures only extend to the end of 1859; the present pressure upon the money market renders it of interest to add some further particulars.

The perturbed condition of the money market during the last two months of the year (1860) indicates the presence of the distinctive feature already commented upon, as peculiar to late years in the existence of a simultaneous drain of bullion from the Banks of England and France.

VI. Table showing—1. Average amount of Bullion in Bank of England. 2. Average rate of Discount of Bank of England. 3. Average amount of Bullion in Bank of France. 4. Average rate of discount, Bank of France.

YEARS.	BANK BULLION.		BANK OF FRANCE.	
	Millions.	Pr. c. per an.	Millions.	Pr. ct. per an.
1852,.....	£ 20·7	.. 2 $\frac{1}{8}$	£ 23·6	.. 3 $\frac{1}{8}$
1853,.....	17·4	.. 3 $\frac{1}{4}$	18·0	.. 3 $\frac{1}{4}$
1854,.....	13·9	.. 5 $\frac{1}{8}$	16·2	.. 4 $\frac{1}{4}$
1855,.....	14·3	.. 4 $\frac{1}{8}$	13·6	.. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1856,.....	11·2	.. 5 $\frac{1}{4}$	9·0	.. 5 $\frac{3}{8}$
1857,.....	10·1	.. 6 $\frac{3}{8}$	9·2	.. 6 $\frac{3}{8}$
1858,.....	17·7	.. 3 $\frac{1}{8}$	18·4	.. 3 $\frac{3}{4}$
1859,.....	17·9	.. 2 $\frac{1}{8}$	22·7	.. 3 $\frac{1}{2}$
1860,.....	15·2	.. 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	20·0	.. 3 $\frac{1}{4}$
Average of nine years,.....	£ 15·4	.. 4 5-16	£ 16·7	.. 4 $\frac{1}{4}$

The gold arriving from the producing countries in 1860 was less than for some years past; but, on the other hand, the exports of silver to the

east, notwithstanding the Chinese war, have been on a comparatively moderate scale. The Continent, however, appears to have absorbed more bullion than usual—the result being that more has been *exported* than imported in 1860—and in this respect the year forms an exception to any in the last decade, except perhaps 1857. The average amount of bullion in the Bank of England last year (1860) was 15·25 millions, and the average rate of discount $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., being in each case very nearly the average of the nine preceding years.

The remarkable sympathy which exists in the annual average reserves of the Banks of England and France, is best evidenced by putting the above returns in series of two years. If grouped in this way, it appears that to end of 1859 the fluctuations in the average amount of bullion held by each bank have invariably followed in the same order; this will be seen by the subjoined table:

VII. Table showing—1. Average amount of Bullion in Bank of England in two years. 2. Average amount of Bullion in Bank of France in two years. 3. Average Rate of Discount, Bank of England, in two years. 4. Average Rate of Discount, Bank of France, in two years.

YEARS.	Millions.	Millions.	per cent.	per cent.
1852 and 1859,.....	19·3 ..	23·1 ..	$2\frac{1}{2}$..	3 5-16
1853 " 1858,.....	17·5 ..	18·2 ..	3 7-16 ..	$3\frac{1}{2}$
1854 " 1855,.....	14·1 ..	14·9 ..	5 ..	$4\frac{3}{8}$
1856 " 1857,.....	10·7 ..	9·1 ..	$6\frac{1}{4}$..	6

It will also be found, that, in the case of the Bank of England, the rate of discount has been constantly maintained *inversely* as the stock of bullion; and although the same does not hold good with reference to the Bank of France, the deviation is not of sufficient importance to show that the administrators of that bank have acted upon unsound principles in regulating the rate of discount; for it must be borne in mind that it was illegal to charge a higher rate than 6 per cent. prior to 1857, and that from this circumstance it was impossible to restrict discounts at the time of the greatest pressure in 1856, except by limiting the term or number of days which the bills brought for discount had to run.

It would seem that the average bullion held by the Bank of England during the *nine* years to the end of 1860, has been 15·4 millions, and the average rate of discount 4 5-16 per cent.; the average amount of bullion held by the Bank of France, including the branches, during the same period, has been 16·7 millions, and the rate of discount $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. The bullion in the Bank of France on the 10th January, 1861, was about fourteen millions, while our return for the Bank of England gave but little over twelve millions. This appears to indicate that the pressure has been somewhat more severe here than in France, a fact of which there is but little doubt, as the rate of discount, which was raised almost simultaneously at both banks to 7 per cent., has since been lower in the open market in Paris than in London; but, on the other hand, the comparatively favorable position of the Bank of France is counteracted by the undue preponderance of silver, of which the reserve now consists.

While the above figures show, therefore, a generally cautious policy on the part of the Bank of France, they appear to justify two remarks of some significance: the *first* being, that the proper regulator of the rate of in-

terest is the reserve of bullion in hand, and that timely attention to this point is as indispensable as it is beneficial; the *second*, pointing to the inadvisability of retaining, as by law in France, both silver and gold (in the fixed proportion of $15\frac{1}{2}$ silver to 1 gold) as optional in payment to any amount. Gold being now the cheaper medium for discharging debts, has, in consequence, been adopted as the leading currency; but it can scarcely be doubted, apart from the other difficulties which surround this change in the law, that if the silver coins of France were reduced in value, passing, as they do with us, as tokens, and only legal for the payment of small sums, the amount of silver in circulation would largely increase; and an equal amount of gold, being thus released from circulation, would naturally flow back to the bank, palliating, without, of course, altogether obviating a pressure like the present one.

These observations may perhaps be considered as an additional testimony, supported by facts, that commercial legislation should rest upon a sound and reasonable basis, and that all such unhealthy expedients as purchasing gold at a premium, or attempting to restrict the rate of interest, may be safely and for ever discarded.

THE PARIS STOCK EXCHANGE.

From the London Athenæum.

Those Rogues of Stockbrokers.—Ces Coquins d'Agents de Change, par EDMOND ABOUT. Paris, Dentu.

M. ABOUT appears to have abandoned the romantic ground on which he laid the foundations of his reputation, and to have thrown himself into the troubled waters of French politics. He has put aside "Tolla" and the "King of the Mountains," to become a public censor. He has lately reviewed the political map of Europe; he has made a study of the aspect of Prussia in 1860; he has suggested, in a biting pamphlet, that the Pope should be permitted to retain the sovereignty of Rome and a garden; and now we find him busy with the Paris stockbrokers.

The French *Bourse* offers a tempting subject to a man with a talent for ill-natured remark. M. ABOUT has a habit of hitting home that makes him formidable. He is a downright man, who calls a nettle but a nettle. He never stops to qualify or apologize. In the midst of writers who cloud their thoughts (when they have any) with verbiage, and deface them with silly affectations intended to be picturesque and quaint, he stands out in bold relief as a man of sinew and courage, who has something to say, in plain, manly terms, to his fellow-countrymen.

His story of Paris stockbrokers, now before us, is full of interest, and is told in his best manner. He begins by defining the meaning of the word *coquin*, and then proceeds to justify its application to the subjects of his book. From PHILIPPE-LE-BEL's first dealings with stockbrokers,

and the stockbrokers' laws of CHARLES the Ninth and HENRI QUATRE, we are led to the relations which existed between the first revolutionary government and the *Bourse*. This government contented itself with the reinstatement of the old edicts of the fourteenth century; and, to the present moment, according to M. ABOUT, the most remarkable change that has affected stockbrokers during the last five centuries is the removal of the scene of their transactions from the Grand Pont, near the old Place de Grève to the Place de la Bourse, where M. HAUSSMAN now permits them to carry on their business at a daily shilling a head. This business has, indeed, undergone many changes. The old brokers, who had neither three nor four and a half per cents, nor railway scrip, nor foreign loans to deal with, trafficked in silks and woollens, in corn and cattle. They paid high sums to the government as caution-money; but then their position was hereditary. The honor of removing their operations from manufactures to State loans belongs to LAW; the honor of laying the foundation of the present army of sixty licensed stockbrokers is the property of the first NAPOLEON. The BOURBONS took advantage of the stockbrokers' patent to raise money. They sold to the stockbroker the right to name his successor. By this sale they changed his character. He had been a State functionary; he became the independent proprietor of a profitable monopoly; yet, as M. ABOUT shows, the old laws that governed him as a State functionary still exist. Hence certain complications, which M. ABOUT points out:

"The functionaries established by NAPOLEON, under the name of *agents de change*, were intrusted with the purchase and sale of *rente* and scrip, all for cash; for the law does not allow time bargains, but classes them with common gambling operations. The stockbroker is forbidden to sell before he has scrip in hand, or to buy without money. He is also forbidden to open an account with a client. He may not be the guarantor of the operation with which he is charged. He may not speculate on his own account. By the *Commercial Code*, the least infraction of these laws is followed by the confiscation of the broker's rights. But this is not all. Regarding confiscation as only an administrative punishment, and considering the culprit should suffer a real punishment, the *Code* renders the broker liable to a fine—the maximum fine being 3,000 francs. But the legislator of the empire did not foresee that, in 1816, the position of stockbroker would become real property; that it would be worth 1,000,000 francs under CHARLES the Tenth; 800,000 francs under LOUIS PHILIPPE; 300,000 francs in 1848; 2,000,000 francs in 1858 and 1859; and 1,700,000 to-day. He could not foresee that to the enormous price of the office there would be added a capital of between 500,000 and 600,000 francs as caution-money for the treasury, the reserve fund of the Stockbrokers' Company, and for floating cash. He never believed that when he was dismissing an imprudent functionary he would be despoiling a proprietor. He never suspected that by the law of 1807 the magistrates of 1860 might enforce a fine of 3,000 francs, and a supplemental punishment of dismissal, involving to the culprit the loss of 2,500,000 francs. Neither PHILIPPE-LE-BEL, nor even the legislator of 1807, could have guessed that time bargains would become customary

and necessary financial transactions; that cash bargains would be only a one hundredth part of the stockbrokers' transactions; that the *Bourse* negotiations would average 300,000 francs of *rente* for the account, to hardly 3,000 francs for cash; that the official *Moniteur* of the French Empire would daily publish, in the teeth of the old *Commercial Code*, the quotations on account; and that the State itself would negotiate loans, payable in tenths, from month to month—true time bargains! What would have been the astonishment of the first NAPOLEON if he had been told that these speculations which he was condemning would one day make the prosperity, the strength and the greatness of France! They give vigor to the most timid capitalists; they furnish millions for the operations of peace and war; they discover the superiority of France over all the nations of Europe; and if we ever revenge ourselves for his misfortunes, it will be less on battle fields than on the green baize of speculation. The truth is, that Russia and Austria were as much beaten by our loans as by our generals."

M. ABOUT describes the enthusiasm with which the Paris stockbrokers subscribed more than a million sterling towards the first great Crimean loan. Their patriotism was praised by the emperor; but, according to the 89th article of the *Commercial Code*, they might have been dismissed from 'Change and fined heavily. According to M. ABOUT, nearly all their operations are illegal. By the 13th article of the *Commercial Code*, they may not sell without having received scrip or money; yet they buy and sell empty-handed daily. In short, nearly all their operations are contrary to law. The author affords us an instance of the way in which the law meets an every-day transaction:

"Any rogue, provided he has credit, gives an order to his stockbroker. If the speculation fails, he says to his broker, 'I leave you to pay my creditor, because you are simple enough to guarantee all the operations you undertake. For myself, I owe you nothing. I appeal to the law on gambling. The law does not recognise time bargains. Your obedient servant.' The agent pays. But he is wrong. He exposes himself to dismissal and a fine—2,503,000 francs! Still he pays. He then seizes his debtor by the collar, and drags him before the judges. The rogue carries his head high. 'Gentlemen,' he says, 'I ordered the sale of ten thousand francs of *rente*; but I had no papers, no *rente*; therefore it was a pure gambling transaction. The law does not recognise gambling transactions; therefore I owe nothing.' If I were the tribunal I should answer the rogue in this way: 'You deceived the stockbroker by ordering him to sell that which you didn't possess. This is a swindle that is recognised by the law. Go to prison.' Here is a parallel case that has happened. M. BAGIEU, a stockbroker, sued an individual who owed him 30,000 francs. The defendant urged that it was a gambling transaction. The tribunal gave their decision against the stockbroker, and condemned him to 10,000 francs fine and a fortnight's imprisonment, as having been concerned in a gambling operation. An action of this description is now pending at Havre."

Other perplexities suffered by the French stockbroker are set forth by

M. ABOUT. He justifies his title, since he shows that a *coquin*, or rascal, is a fellow who habitually violates the laws of his country, while he proves that the French stockbroker would be paralyzed and pauperized if he remained within the terms of the law. From 1843, when M. LACAVE-LAPLAGNE was Minister of Finance, to the present time, incessant promises of amendment of the law have been made; but these promises have never gone beyond the production of ponderous and neglected reports. Even the judges have petitioned the government of the emperor, still the Paris stockbroker remains a *coquin*.

"When I was a little boy," writes M. ABOUT, in conclusion, "at JAUFFRET'S school, I was seated in the school-room, near a cracked window. It was a bad place, especially in the winter. The wind came through, in little cutting blades of air, and reddened my nose and stiffened my fingers. During two years I complained, from time to time, to my masters, who, one and all, promised to report the matter at head quarters. But, on a certain day in January, I lost all patience; I threw a big stone and smashed the window. I had my ears pulled, and the glazier was sent for."

Does M. ABOUT propose to throw a stone at the Tuilleries, or at the Senate, or at both?

MINT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Philadelphia, June 14, 1860.

For the satisfaction of their Excellencies, the Japanese embassy, the undersigned, Director of the Mints of the United States, certifies to the results obtained by assay of the gold coins of Japan and of the United States, made in their presence by the proper officers of the Mint:

One cobang weighed 138 21-32 grains, and the gold extracted from it weighed 79 10-32 grains.

One other cobang weighed 138 10-32 grains, and the gold extracted from it weighed 79 2-32 grains.

One other cobang weighed 139 9-32 grains, and the gold extracted from it weighed 79 22-32 grains.

So, on the average of these three, the cobang contains $79\frac{3}{8}$ grains of gold, which makes the proportion of fineness 575 thousandths. This result agrees so well with our reports of assays made in the usual way, (by taking only a half gramme, or about $7\frac{3}{4}$ grains,) that we trust it will give additional confidence to the embassy in our regular method of assay.

A gold dollar of the United States weighed 25 26-32 grains, and the gold extracted from it weighed 23 7-32 grains, which agrees, as nearly as may be, to 900 thousandths, our legal standard.

Therefore, for comparison, the cobang contains $79\frac{3}{8}$ grains of gold, and the dollar contains 23 7-32 grains of gold. But it will be more strictly accurate to say that the proportion of gold in a cobang is 572 thousandths,

and in the dollar 900 thousandths, and it is necessary to add, that the actual weight of the gold dollar is 25 8-10 grains by law, which is a more exact basis of calculation than the single piece, which weighed 25 8125-10000, and was, therefore, a little too heavy.

The silver being extracted, with the necessary allowance for absorption, showed almost 59 grains of silver in each cobang, and the copper was only 12-32 of one grain in each cobang.

To recapitulate, the average composition of the cobang is as follows, in grains :

Gold,.....	79 12-32
Silver,.....	59
Copper,	0 12-32
	<hr/>
	138 24-32

JAMES ROSS SNOWDEN.

Communication from the Director of the Mint to the Envoys from Japan.

Mint of the United States, Philadelphia, June 20, 1860.

To their Excellencies, the Ambassadors from the Empire of Japan to the United States of America :

The undersigned, the Director of the Mints of the United States, begs leave to refer your Excellencies to the last conference held with the officers of the Mint in regard to the assay and the currency ; at which time it was asked, whether it would not be proper that the officers of the treasury of Japan should rate the new gold itzebu at 90 cents, and the new gold cobang at \$3 60, in exchanging for Mexican dollars or for gold and silver dollars of the United States, because that is an even decimal figure, and the real value is very near thereto ; such valuation to be temporary, until the Japanese government shall have instituted certain reforms in its currency and coinage ? To which it was replied—and I have now to repeat the same in writing, as you requested—that we consider it altogether proper, and a convenient rate for calculation.

The officers of the Mint do not presume to enter upon the subject of the proposed reforms any further than to make a few suggestions, which, if not acceptable, may simply be laid aside. It is probable that it would be just as difficult in Japan as in any other country to introduce great and radical changes in the currency, especially in the unit of moneys, with which the people are familiar. Now, it is to be observed, that while the old silver itzebu was rather too high in its real value to be exchanged at the rate of three to the Mexican silver dollar, or the United States gold dollar, yet the change introduced lately has brought it down to a very near adjustment to that valuation ; and three new silver itzebus exchange very well with either of the dollars above mentioned—not to the very last fraction, but near enough—so that this need not be altered ; and thus we have the basis that three itzebus are equal to one dollar.

The next point is, to make the gold itzebu and the gold cobang to correspond to that basis, according to the general relation of value between

gold and silver, so that the Japanese may understand their real wealth, and no longer be defrauded by the artful exchanges of foreign merchants; and as you have already alloyed the silver itzebu so as to make it near the standard fineness of nine-tenths, (according to the rates in the United States, Mexico and other countries,) we suggest that the same standard should be used for the gold. Whether the remaining one-tenth should be silver or copper, or both, is a minor matter, with which we shall not concern ourselves. The great point is to get the right quantity of gold; then the cobang, being four itzebus, should contain as much gold as $1\frac{1}{2}$ of our gold dollars. It should contain 30.96 grains, or 5.2632 condarines, of fine gold; and being nine-tenths fine, its actual weight should be 34.4 grains, or 5.848 condarines. This coin would be small, but a little larger than our gold dollar; and you would do well to coin also a piece of ten cobangs, which would be equal to $13\frac{1}{3}$ dollars. The gold itzebu would be quite too small for a coin, and seems to be of no use while you have a silver itzebu.

Inasmuch as some confusion might arise from continuing the name "cobang" for a coin so different in value from that previously known under that name, it would be better, it seems to us, to introduce into the currency a gold dollar, to be rated as equal to three silver itzebus. This dollar, if equal to our own, should weigh 25.8 grains nine-tenths fine, containing, therefore, 23.32 grains of pure gold; or, in your own weight, about 4.39 condarines nine-tenths fine, equal to 3.95 condarines of pure gold. This suggestion, we think, should receive your careful consideration, especially as your people are somewhat acquainted with the silver dollar of Mexico, which conforms very nearly to the gold dollar herein recommended; and as the dollar is a coin and money of account, adopted by nearly all the American nations, and is familiar to many others, it possesses advantages which commend it to your consideration.

As to the shape of the coins, it is very obvious that a circular form would greatly facilitate the work at your Mint. A round piece is always right when laid on the die; but a square or oval piece must be carefully adjusted, and this is a loss of time and labor.

I cannot close this communication without expressing the favorable opinion of the officers of the Mint as to the accuracy of your assays. If, as you state, the intention was to make the cobang consist of 573 parts gold and 427 parts silver, then the fact that it actually contains 572 parts gold shows a close approximation, and it further shows that your assayers understand their business. At this day the coins of France are one-thousandth less than they are intended to be, and all the doubloons of North and South America are five or ten thousandths, and even more, below their professed fineness. In these remarks we refer strictly to the new cobangs, because those which were coined a few years ago did not show the same accuracy. Your new silver coin should be about one per cent. finer than it is, according to the single piece we assayed; but the assay of silver, if it is done by the furnace, can never be so exact as the gold. We therefore recommend the "humid assay" for silver.

It may be useful for your Mint officers to have a small piece of absolutely fine gold to compare with your own, and I therefore beg you to accept what is enclosed for that purpose.

JAMES ROSS SNOWDEN, *Director of the Mints of the United States.*

THE FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL SYSTEM OF FRANCE.

The official exposé of the situation of the French Empire made to the Senate and Corps Legislatif, 1861.

THE official statements of the French government are always interesting, and have a sincerity and frankness about them rarely witnessed in similar European documents. There is also a precision and a philosophic arrangement in the details which recommend them to political economists and staticians. For these reasons we place before our readers and desire to preserve in our pages, the valuable report of the present year, condensed somewhat from the original, for want of room.

French Finances.—The economical reforms accomplished in the course of the last year have led, in many of the elements which constitute the public revenue, to various modifications, which impart a new character to the financial condition of 1860, and of the calculations of the budget of 1862. The result of these modifications, as already known, the probable consequences they should effect on the immediate future, naturally attract the attention of the public authorities, who properly consider that the good order of the finances of a State is one of the fundamental conditions of its grandeur and prosperity.

At the moment when the national industry is about to enter into competition with the foreign, the government does not hesitate to provide, by liberal financial measures, for the success of economic reforms. Laws were proposed to the *corps législatif* to abolish existing duties on certain staple articles, such as cotton, wool, dyestuffs, and to diminish in a considerable degree the duties upon certain articles of large consumption, such as sugars and coffees. The application of these new laws, in the month of May, 1860, affected the budget of that year in its equilibrium of receipts and expenses previously anticipated. The diminution of the receipts consequent upon these laws amounts to the sum of ninety millions for that year.

Diminution on cotton,...	14,000,000f.	Diminution in coffee,.....	1,000,000f.
“ wool,.....	7,000,000	On various other articles,..	1,000,000
“ sugars,...	56,000,000		
“ coffees,...	11,000,000		90,000,000f.

Various measures were taken in the course of the last legislative session to compensate for these deficiencies. The law of May 5, 1860, to this end disposed of the resources not employed in the sinking fund.

The sums carried in the budget to be employed in the redemption of the consolidated debt ceased in consequence on the 5th of May, to receive that direction, and became disposable of to the extent of. . .	26,020,507f.
The law of July 26, 1860, imposed an extra duty of 25 francs on the existing duty per hectolitre of alcohol, which contributed to the augmentation of the imposts on beverages, to an excess of.	9,666,000

A decree of the 19th of October, raised to 10 francs the price per kilogramme of tobacco, which had been but 8, where it had remained from the year 1816. This advance in price, and the increase of consumption during the first months of the year, secured an augmentation of.	11,191,000f.
Then, too, the continued progress of the public revenues has produced, over and above the anticipations of the budget, other increases in amount as follows :	
Direct contributions, not comprised in the annexed heads,.....	3,374,000
Registries and stamps,.....	20,711,000
Salts,.....	4,497,000
Indirect contributions, various sources,.....	5,781,000
Forests,.....	5,000,000
Postal service,.....	5,529,000
Different products (of the budget,).....	7,529,000
	<hr/>
	99,298,507f.

Thus, by means of the reserves of the sinking fund, increased advance on imposts, &c., &c., the sacrifices made by the treasury before referred to would not have exceeded the resources of the budget of 1860, but for supplementary and extraordinary credits, rendered necessary by peculiar circumstances, such as the war in China, the expedition to Syria, the augmentation of the army in Rome, the remodelling of three departments; but as these expenditures will be met in part by the Chinese indemnity and the cancelling of credits, the final balance of the budget of 1860 cannot yet be determined.

The resources of the floating debt are elsewhere sufficient to meet the eventual balance. It has not been necessary up to this time to have recourse to these resources to the same extent as at other epochs.

Some years this floating debt has reached the amount of 900 millions; in 1860, January 1, it was 864 millions; in 1861, January, it was reduced to 750 millions, and the treasury bonds remain at this time below one hundred millions.

Budget of 1861.—The budget of 1861 has given place to recent discussions from the necessity of recurring to the examination of the documents and facts which served as the basis of the calculations of receipt and expenditure. This budget had been adopted with an excess of receipts of 653,812 francs; but at the termination of the negotiations which were necessary to regulate, by means of supplementary conventions, the different tariffs, and the details of the execution of the treaty with England, the necessity was apparent for the interests of the national industry to accord new reductions on flax seed, oil seeds and other staples. The loss to the treasury occasioned by these reductions amounted to nearly five millions; but, on the other hand, the increase of receipts which, in the expectations of the budget, should have resulted in the increased consumption of sugar, did not appear to be realized, in consequence of the insufficiency of the culture of the beet, hindered by continual rains. It became necessary to find a method of restoring the equilibrium of the budget of 1861. The decree of the 19th of October last raised from 8 to 10 francs per kilo. the price of snuff and smoking tobacco, which gave an important increase to its resources. This price includes the first cost, the freight of the article, the manufacture and the profit of the retailer.

The new resource which the augmentation of the price of tobacco will bring to the treasury will exceed thirty millions, not only sufficient to cover the diminished receipts indicated by the causes before mentioned, but it places the budget in a more satisfactory condition of equilibrium than formerly.

Budget of 1862.—The elements of the budget of 1862, now submitted to the examination of the *corps législatif*, permit the expectation of a surplus of many millions. According to custom, the basis of the calculation of receipts for 1862 is that of those of 1860; but this rule has not been followed with regard to certain articles of consumption where there has been a reduction of duty, as on sugar, or an increased rate as on tobacco. On the other hand, the estimate of the custom-house duties to be collected on merchandise of British origin and manufacture comprised in the treaty of commerce, must give rise to future estimates of a delicate nature and of a new character. The estimate on sugars for 1862 is its consumption, on the basis of that of 1858, with 30 per cent. increase only; on tobacco, it is on the consumption of 1858, with the enhanced price fixed by the decree of October. The duties to be received on goods of British origin and manufacture formerly taxed or prohibited, but hereafter accessible in French markets, have been estimated in the budget of 1861 to be six millions. For the budget of 1862 they are estimated at ten millions. It must be observed that the period of entering the chief articles of English merchandise was limited to a few months in the budget of 1861, while in 1862 they will be admitted during the entire year.

Extraordinary Budget of Public Works.—The law of the 14th of July, 1860, has appropriated a sum of forty-five millions, coming from various resources without the budget, for the execution of the great public works, and has provided that a special account of the expenditure, and of the resources which have been appropriated, shall be annexed to the law for the regulation of each work. The sum has been realized for the disposable excess of the funds of the army endowment, changed into *rentes* transferred to that account by the Minister of Finances according to law. Fifty-five millions have thus been realized.

Direct Taxes.—The land tax, the personal and moveable tax, the duty on doors and windows, are determined every year by the law of finance for each department. The principal of the contingents, which constitute the part of the impost coming to the State, has not been augmented since 1821, except by a very slight increase, resulting from an excess of construction upon the repeals, and this is owing to the municipal and general councils of local authority, and does not add to the State budget.

On the contrary, the duty on patents increases, in consequence of the augmentation of the number of patentable inventions and the constant extension of commercial transactions. The amount of this impost, fixed in 1852 at thirty-eight millions and a half, rose in 1860 to fifty-two millions seven hundred thousand francs. These augmentations have gone on notwithstanding the laws of 1853 and 1858, which erased from the range of patentables about one hundred and fifty-seven thousand fancy articles, and brought to the smaller workers permanent relief, and in con-

formity with the views of the imperial government. The expense of the collection of the direct taxes is now but *one franc twenty centimes per thousand francs*.

Registry and Domains.—The duty on registries, records and mortgages procure for the treasury returns which vary according to the movements of business and the number and importance of its transactions. These results, from year to year, show the progress of the general prosperity. Thus, in 1859, the registry fees produced 271,000,000 francs; in 1860, 301,000,000. The stamps, in 1859, produced 53,500,500 francs; in 1860, 56,400,000, and the increase is about three millions annually. The administration of lands pursues, with profit to the State, the sale of such houses and lands of which the revenue is not equal to the saleable value. It takes charge of the administration of the forests, the difficult and important operations connected with their improvement, and the rights appertaining to their customary use.

Duties and Indirect Taxes.—The diminution of the revenue occasioned by the suppression of the duties on cotton and wool, and the reduction on sugars and coffees, have not been, in an economical view, without compensation, and have been advantageous, in a large degree, to commerce and industry. The importations of wools and cottons, notwithstanding the inquietude of some manufacturers, have made considerable progress.

In 1859, the cotton, either in transit through France or for manufacture in the interior, amounted to nine hundred and sixteen thousand quintals metrical, (one hundred kilos each quintal,) but in 1860 the importation had risen to 1,392,000. During one year the increase has been more than 30 per cent., and on wool it has been 20 per cent., and 50 per cent. on indigo. The importation of coke and coal, favored especially by the lowering of the tariff, amounted in 1860 to 400,000 tons. In sugar, the year 1860 witnessed an increase of consumption of four millions of kilogrammes. The importation of coffee was more marked. In 1859 it was only about 500,000 quintals metrical; in 1860 it was 100,000 more. The tax on salt has shown an increase of three millions.

Forests.—The receipts which, in 1859, the grants for wood-felling in the demesne forests should produce, have given place to valuations very different. It was announced that the reduction of the duty on iron would necessarily diminish sensibly the revenue from the forests of the State. The event has falsified these expectations, and shown that in most of the metallurgic countries, where iron is manufactured with wood, the reduction in the duties has not had as bad an effect as was feared. The administration of forests realized in 1860 five millions of francs beyond its receipts in 1859. The operations of cantonnement, undertaken in 1857 by order of the Emperor, and followed up actively in 1858–59, have been successfully developed in 1860. The number accepted by the communes and homologues amounted to 177 at the end of 1859, and now number 275. The revenue from the forests is expected to augment at once. The creation and development of roads in these forests have increased these revenues. Sixty thousand metres have been paved, embank-

ments made, lines straightened and neighboring roads improved, at an expense of five millions of francs, to facilitate the transportation of the timber cut in these forests. One remarkable measure has been adopted under a law of last year—the re-wooding of the mountains. Explorations have been made, the best plans studied, preparations of seeds and nurseries completed to carry out this plan, and the administration of the forests having charge of the whole subject have had subventions voted by the general councils.

Post-Office.—The foreign postal arrangements are constantly improving in consequence of the treaties with foreign nations. The service of the French transatlantic lines to Brazil and La Plata has been doubled to the advantage of the public—the communications with these countries, which was enjoyed previously but once a month by means of the British packets. Letters are also sent, after twenty years' efforts, to the British possessions in Asia by the British mails, on very moderate terms compared with what they formerly were. A favorable postal convention with Sardinia has been concluded. The law of June 4th, 1859, concerning the transportation of remittances in letters, has produced consequences worthy of being noted. Since the 15th of July of that year, when the law went into effect, 918,400 letters have been posted, of the declared value of 572 millions of francs. In 1860 the postage of these was 450,000 francs. The increase of postages in 1860 has risen to the amount of 58,387,000 francs, a gain for the former year of 1,800,000.

Commerce, Public Works, Agriculture.—The principal duty of the Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, during the year 1860, has been determined by the imperial declaration of the 3d of January, and his speech at the opening of the senate and *corps législatif*, viz., the abolition of duties on the staples (or first commodities) necessary to industry, the reduction of duties on sugar and coffee. Energetic improvement of ways of communication, reduction of tolls on canals, and a general lowering of the expense of transportation, loans to agriculture and industry, works of public utility, suppression of prohibitions, and commercial treaties with foreign governments. The summary of the works executed under the direction of this department of the ministry shows how far this mission has been accomplished.

I. *Commercial Reforms.*—The treaty concluded the 23d January, 1860, with England, has been the most important of the reforms stated. It fixed the principle of a new economical *regime* into which France was about to engage, but before proceeding to reduce the tariffs, it was necessary to be informed with precision of the actual condition of the different industries of France. Inquiry was the inevitable consequence of this treaty.

An imperial decree of the 11th of April confided to the Superior Council of Commerce the duty of proceeding to this inquiry with the aid of the Administration of Commerce. It convened in May and closed its labors in November. At the same time, all the various interests were called on to indicate their wants and wishes. The abolition of prohibitions rendered indispensable the suppression of all the duties on the

staples with which industry employed itself. The law of May 5th referred particularly to wool and cotton, which employed so many hands and so much capital. Then followed the law of 25th of May, which reformed the tariff on sugar, coffee, cacao and tea. Made especially in view of the popular interests, these reforms were not less necessary than those which were applied to the staples, as they tended to furnish, in good condition, healthy food to the working classes, reacted on the whole of production, and permitted more economical and more remunerating labor.

The interests of agriculture and industry constantly required the lessening of duties on the importation of machines and mechanical powers. It was evident that French industry should contend as advantageously as that of England, in the interior as in the foreign markets, and to that end should be able to remodel its material on as good terms as was done by its rivals, the law of the 1st of August rendered applicable by anticipation and in a determinative way the system which should inaugurate the conventions intervening with Great Britain.

The law of "assistance to industry" has satisfied in another sense this necessity. A sum of forty millions has been placed at the disposition of those who wished to renew their machinery or their material. In conformity with the regulations of the public administration, decreed for the execution of the law of the 1st of August, a special commission was formed for the distribution of this sum. Four hundred and seventy-four applications for loans were made to the Minister of Commerce, representing the sum of about seventy millions. The commission acted promptly and prudently in this matter.

To these legislative acts succeeded the conventions complementary of the treaty of the 24th of January. The tariff on iron, bronzes and steel was established October 1st, by an imperial decree, in advance of a promulgation of the convention, which had not been ratified in time to be applicable, and which regulated the tariff on metals, machines and mechanism, cutlery and refined sugars, &c. A month later a second convention, of the date of November 16, completed the work, of which the germ was in the treaty mentioned. The decree of 5th January last, on some staple articles, is the completion of the law of the 5th May preceding, in respect to wool and cotton. These various acts may be considered as the basis of the new system, and cannot produce their full effect until they are understood by our neighboring countries. Negotiations are on foot with Belgium and Prussia, under the name of Zoll-Verein, and conferences have been commenced with Holland.

2. *Public Works.*—The law of the 14th July, 1860, has appropriated large resources to important works of public character. The advanced season of the year in which the law was passed, and the continuance of inclement weather, have prevented any marked results, in spite of the best sustained efforts and the utmost zeal of the engineers. A special credit of about twelve millions will be divided between the roads, the bridges, the canals, the rivers and the maritime ports. While the land roads parallel to the railways have diminished in their business, there has been a considerable increase of traffic on the transverse routes. The importance attached to their repairs will always remain, and every year

something will be done for their improvement. The departments which from their configuration are deprived of railways, should in all justice be benefited by other roads, to meet the wants of agriculture and commerce. Eleven millions are appropriated for this purpose. The imperial routes in Corsica, and in the immense forests of that island, are objects of solicitude with the government.

The reconstruction of those bridges, which have reached the term of their durability, and which do not longer answer their purposes, is essential to the system of highways. A large number of these have been so treated on the Seine, the Durance and the Arde. A remarkable work is proceeding at Brest, and the bridge of LOUIS PHILIPPE, at Paris, is to be rebuilt. The expenses of these, twelve in number and in progress, are 4,666,400 francs, and will further require the sum of 2,775,800 francs.

The improvement of navigation, artificial and natural, has particularly fixed the attention of the Emperor. His principal efforts have been to improve the rivers which form the great internal arteries of the empire; such as the High Seine, between Paris and Montereau, in which the draft of water will be increased 1m.60 by the construction of twelve dams, as prescribed by the decree of July 28, 1860; of the l'Yonne, between Montereau and Laroche; la Marne, between Saint-Maurice and Dizy, which is the head of navigation between Paris and Strasbourg, and on which twelve dams will be constructed, by decree of 24th March, 1860; of the Rhone, between Lyons and Arles, which unites the Mediterranean with the departments of the centre and the east. A rapid execution of these important works will follow. The damming up of the maritime Loire, authorized by decree of August 24th, 1859, has been energetically pursued. Three ship-yards have been organized between Couéron and the Island Cheréze, between the high Indre and Couéron and the pass of Pellerin. One million has been appropriated to this important work. On the lower Garonne, they have finished the canalization of the pass of Montferrand, and commenced the works at those of Bassen and Ambes, authorized by the decree of 27th January, 1860. Many other rivers, less important, doubtless, in themselves, but very much so as outlets of local production—the Mayenne, Sarthe, Lot, Adour and Vire—have been objects of solicitude, and the improvements there have received from the administration the most lively impulses. The Moselle and the Meuse are under consideration.

The canals, the imperfections of which have long been exaggerated, offer in general a much better navigation than the rivers into which they debouch. The alterations they need are principally works of maintenance; the deepening of the reaches of certain lines, such as those of Brittany; the regulating of the tow-paths; the reduction of too sudden curves, and the widening of parts too narrow. These different works have been the objects of definite and careful study, and some have been resolutely undertaken. The branch line of Nevers, on the canal, lateral to the Loire, will be finished this year; that of l'Aisne, to the Marne, was opened in 1860; and though the stoppages will be indispensable at many points, they will be executed during the inactive season in the next summer. Great activity has prevailed on the Canal of Marans, to

Rochelle. The works of maintenance of the canal of the centre are far advanced, and the deepening of the canals of the north is commenced. Steps are also taken to commence the construction of a canal to the collieries of La Sarre, for which negotiations are opened with Prussia, with expectations of an early arrangement. The rates of toll have been lowered on some of them, and, on the rivers, to the satisfaction of the agricultural and commercial interests.

The examination of these great water-courses, since the disastrous inundations of 1856, has been perseveringly made and concluded. This important service, attested by documental evidence, has resulted in completing the construction of works of security for the towns so sadly affected by those inundations. The law of May, 1858, has appropriated for their protection the sum of twenty millions of francs. *Seventeen towns in the valleys of the Loire and Rhone have these defences more or less advanced, and forty-five towns and centres of population are to receive the benefit of the system. (Some of them in the basin of the Garonne.)*

Maritime Ports.—The works of improvement at the various ports are actively prosecuted. At Havre, the lock-gate of the "Transatlantic," and the graving dock, are nearly finished. The widening of the channel is in the way of execution, and the project is entertained of enlarging the entrance gate by the removal of the citadel. At Marseilles, the NAPOLEON basin, sheltered by a jetty, one hundred metres in length, is rapidly progressing, and will be finished in 1862; at Bologne, the new wet dock; at Brest, the port NAPOLEON, in the gulf of Porstrein; at St. Malo, the useful works there; at Cette, the extension of the maritime canal, which connects the port with the railway dock (of Midi) at Rochelle; the wet dock and deepening of the channel; the improvement of the mouth of the Adour—all these, and also works at several ports of a second order, bear witness to the interest which the government takes in maritime subjects.

Railways.—The progressive development of the network of railways is now one of the most lively as well as legitimate pre-occupations of the public. The government also occupies itself in insuring the construction of the railways already decreed, and to prepare for the creation of new lines, which important interests offer for its consideration. [Here the report goes into large details as to the subject of railways constructed by itself, or by legalized companies, not particularly interesting to our readers, giving tables of new lines to be completed in 1861, of 705 kilometres; in 1862, of 1,168 metres; and of those now being examined, for construction at a future day, 1,550 metres.]

The rates of freight are the subject of inquiry, and a commission is examining the subject, with reference to a reduction in favor of agricultural industry.

3. *Mines and Metallurgic Factories.*—The report presented by the minister of public works at the beginning of the year 1860 upon coal industry has pointed out in detail the measures to be taken to secure the lowest cost for the conveyance of coal to the point of consumption. [The

various parts of the country needing supplies of this article, and the works contemplated or in progress for the purpose are described at some length; but, being of no particular interest to our readers, are omitted in this article.] Examinations have been made on a large scale for the discovery of new mines, under the patronage of the State, and instruction as to the mode of procedure in such cases.

An official publication gives the progress and advance of mining industry since the year 1853 throughout the French empire, viz. :

In that year there were 277 mines of coal, producing 59,379,854 quintals metrical, worth 59,654,905 francs, or 1,005 francs per quintal.

In 1859 the number worked was 292; product, 74,825,718 francs; value, 94,979,163 francs, or 1,269 francs per quintal. During the same period the importation of foreign coal was equally progressive.

In 1853 the imports of this article were 35,305,300.

In 1859, of 57,593,873 quintals there was a small quantity re-exported. The whole consumption in 1853 was 94,224,053 quintals; in 1859 it was 138,636,584 quintals. If the development of the coal interest be any proof of prosperity, it is certain that the empire has prospered. With reference to the manufacture of iron, the results are as follows :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Amount manufactured.</i>	<i>Fuel.</i>	<i>Value.</i>
1853,.....	2,924,279 quintals metrical, with charcoal,	54,581,714 francs.
1853,.....	3,687,860 " " coke,	50,482,476 "
1859,.....	3,360,180 " " charcoal,	53,442,986 "
1859,.....	5,261,343 " " coke,	63,215,096 "

Of Iron.—With regard to this metal, there are analogous results :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Amount manufactured.</i>	<i>Fuel.</i>	<i>Value.</i>
1853,.....	1,004,042 quintals metrical, with charcoal,	42,734,662 francs.
1853,.....	3,494,792 " " coal,	105,437,686 "
1859,.....	1,078,618 " " charcoal,	45,496,407 "
1859,.....	4,122,374 " " coal,	128,524,300 "

Agriculture.—Under the energetic impulsion of the Emperor, agricultural industry is making new advances every day. One of the most remarkable and useful of its enterprises is the securing (fixation) of the shore sands or dunes of Gascony. Forty-eight thousand hectares (about two acres each) of sterile soil are transformed into fine forests, which protect the country from the invasion of the sands. Marl, furnished at a reduced price to the cultivators, is used in Sologne over all the lands situated near the railways. The canal of Sauldre opens an outlet for the marls of Blancafort. In short, a vast system of works, including the canalization of Beuvron, the forming of a network of farm roads and "rural railways," is under consideration, as the sure means of the improvement of a region long cast off and neglected. In the Dombes, the regulation of water-courses and construction of agricultural roads have produced happy results. The government particularly interests itself in the filling up or destruction of unhealthy ponds of water, important and difficult as it is, and to be accomplished by amicable negotiations and purchases from the proprietors. In Corsica, the marshes on the western side are being drained and dried up, and so in the adjacent lands; those of San Pellegrino, Porte Vecchio and Biguglia no longer endanger the public

health. The sanitary law of 19th June, 1857, for rendering healthy the lands of Gascony, and the valuation of them, was executed with remarkable success. The general co-operation of the municipal councils, and their anxiety to second the views of the government, made coercive measures unnecessary. The sale of a part of these improved communal lands furnished means for the execution of the works. The same policy, by a law of July 28, 1860, is to be forthwith pursued in relation to the marsh and waste lands belonging to the communes of the empire. (Information sought by circular notices sent to engineers and others for their plans.) The general and national agricultural meeting, only determined on in August, 1859, has assumed unhopèd for proportions, and the progress realized since 1856 by the French agriculturists. Whilst at the universal exhibition of that year the French compartment comprised but 5,308 animals or lots of animals, implements and agricultural products, at that of 1860 the number was 11,300. These numbers show the interest which the agriculturists take in these exhibitions, where, at the fountain head, they may derive the elements of reflection and useful instruction. The praise due to this institution may be perceived by the influence it has had in creating a spirit of emulation in the various departments, and the establishment of at least twelve local meetings or exhibitions of a similar character.

Independently of the prizes and medals distributed in great numbers at these exhibitions, were a silver cup and a sum of five thousand francs for the best agricultural management. Thus stimulated, the farmers or proprietors increase their structures, improve their dwellings, make up their stables with choice animals, undertake works of irrigation and drainage, and, in a word, instead of seeking to excel in parts, aim at being successful in the whole of their domain. The sums distributed by the local societies and committees assisting the action of the government in 1860 were 1,662,000 francs, of which but 335,000 were required from the funds of the State. The Emperor has ordered the purchase of ten English steam-ploughs, for the purpose of resolving the problem of ploughing by steam, and characteristically sent an agriculturist with the army to China, to study the agriculture of that country, and to ascertain what plants and vegetables might be acclimated in France. In 1860, schools of instruction in this science were established, and have continued to render all the services expected from them.

Annexation of Savoy and District of Nice.—At the epoch of the annexation, the Emperor directly gave instructions to the minister of public works to give his attention to those necessary to be constructed in those territories. This was done in the usual scientific and intelligent manner, and Savoy will bless the day when, with but one line of railway, and very neglected resources, it came under the government of France. Roads and bridges, navigation, maritime ports, drainage, imperial roads, river improvements and new railways, are all in hand, with adequate appropriations for their execution. There can be no doubt that the people will find their position greatly improved under the new *régimé*, which, however it may theoretically wield its power, is doing more for art, science, manufactures and industry than any other European government. And

though the reason may be that private capital and private enterprise, as in England, accomplish these works themselves, and for a profit in most cases, and, therefore, governmental aid is not required, yet it is very evident the third, like the first NAPOLEON, has large, liberal and enlightened views as to the internal wants of the empire. The system with which the government improvements are carried on, the careful conduct of the treasury, the sensible method of looking at expenditure, in order to determine the amount of required revenue, may be illustrated by their opposite, even in some model republics, where public works are continually exceeding the estimates, and where tariffs are adjusted by uncommercial and inexperienced men, suddenly, and without due examination. So that in one form the revenues glut the treasury with an unwieldy and dangerous surplus, and in others leave it bare and bankrupt.

The order, care, precision and truthfulness of the French system of finance, commerce, public works and agriculture, are worthy of profound study by our public men, and the constituencies which elevate them to their position. At this critical moment in our affairs, with a rival confederacy and dissimilar tariffs, when our legislation is not only to affect our own commercial interests but those of Europe, we have thought it well to place before the readers of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE one of the most remarkable and instructive documents of the times.

THE PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER,

AND ITS EFFECTS UPON LABOR AND PRICES.

On the probable fall in the value of Gold: by M. CHEVALIER, Member of the Institute of France, &c., &c. Translated by RICHARD COBDEN, Esq.

POLITICAL economy appears to have made but little progress as a veritable science during late years. Unlike those branches of knowledge which can be reduced to a mathematical certainty, political economy, or the science of wealth, has so much to interfere with its daily working; so many parallel and transverse motions, so to speak, crossing its path, innumerable as the many changes and conceits of human life, that it is impossible to reduce it to the conditions of a pure science; it must ever remain an abstract, and, indeed, one of the most abstract of all the sciences.

The various commercial panics which periodically overspread the more civilized nations, bringing ruin and distress where all was brightness and prosperity—those terrific “falls of values,” as they are called—are always productive of numberless theories and discussions upon their causes and the means of their avoidance. Generally, too, it is on these occasions that the general questions of money, exchange, standards of value, prices, &c., receive the most attention from the general public. Each writer has his peculiar panacea for the acknowledged evil, and still it is found upon the recurrence of a revulsion of trade that some new

element, some new motive power, some gale from an unexpected point of the commercial compass, has disconcerted all their speculations and rendered their remedies worthless. Thus, the opinions of those who ascribed commercial revulsions to the bank circulation were overthrown by the spectacle of the suspension of the Bank of Hamburg, which issues no circulating notes, and the severe commercial distress accompanying that suspension. Another anomaly is produced by the occasional over-issue, by order in council, of notes of the Bank of England, in order to prevent a suspension of specie payments. It might naturally be supposed that if evil is at any time to be apprehended from the issue of bank paper beyond the required amount of specie in the vaults, it would be the greatest when the notes are rapidly running in for gold.

These are but specimens of the effects of extraneous influences operating upon the course of trade, to the utter destruction of the theories of economists, and should teach caution to every writer who would treat of these subjects. We shall not attempt to note all the opinions which have been advanced in reference to the various branches of the science, but will confine ourselves to a discussion of the probable effect of the recent gold discoveries in California and Australia, of which M. CHEVALIER has discoursed so lucidly in the volume noted at the head of this article.

That the question of a probable fall in the value of gold should excite public attention is not matter for surprise, for if the effect of the increased production of this precious metal is to be as represented by M. CHEVALIER, a revolution in the private affairs of all classes of civilized communities is impending, bringing reduced incomes to some while enriching others, almost without their consent, and certainly without any intelligent appreciation of the cause. In the words of our author, "Under the influence of this greatly increased and cheapened production of gold, it is reasonable to expect, at least in all those countries where gold circulates in large quantities, and where it is or tends to be the sole medium of exchange, a general disturbance of prices, a deeply felt derangement of interests, and a modification more or less radical in the different relations of society;" and further on he remarks, "all those persons whose incomes expressed in monetary units remain the same, would be injured by the change to the extent of half their income, all other things being equal. The national creditor is the characteristic type of this class of sufferers." This statement being based upon the assumption that the fall of gold will be equal to one-half its value.

We may as well say, at the outset, that we entirely dissent from the general position of M. CHEVALIER on this question.

Before entering into a critical examination of the subject, however, it may be well to ascertain in what the functions of money and of the precious metals consist. "Money (says Mr. McCULLOCH) is a term used to designate whatever commodity the inhabitants of any particular country accept as an equivalent for their labor." This definition is scarcely so true as that which Dr. ADAM SMITH has given us: "Money has become, in all civilized nations, the universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold or exchanged for one another." The equivalent which mankind accept for their labor is those other products of labor which they require for their

use, which may be obtained directly by barter, or by the intervention of a medium, which is money; thus, money is rather "an instrument of exchange" than "an equivalent," and when we reflect that the largest part of the commerce of the world is carried on without the use of equivalents at all, that is, by bills of exchange and commercial credits, which merely represent the value of the commodities purchased and a promise to pay an equal value of other commodities in another place, we at once perceive that money, properly speaking, plays but a subordinate part in the transactions of commerce. It is, indeed, in practice, rather that commodity which nations universally agree to receive for the differences and balances produced in the multifarious exchanges of their different products of labor.

Money, it is true, performs an important part in the production of wealth. By saving the time and labor which would be necessary to carry on a system of barter, without such an instrument of interchange, it increases, in a high degree, the productive powers of labor. (TORRENS *on Wealth*.) But in our day the process of bills of exchange and commercial and banking facilities perform a much greater share of this exchange, and it should always be kept in view in discussing the subject, that the money, that is, the gold and silver, used in commerce bears but a very small proportion to that commerce. In other words, the products of labor which are daily exchanged through the medium of commerce, with other products of labor, infinitely exceed the amount of money used to facilitate it. An apt illustration of this is furnished by M. CHEVALIER himself, in his notice of the London clearing-house, where traffic in the products of labor to the extent of two thousand millions per annum are settled with the intervention of but a very small proportion of money. The equivalent of this labor was the other labor exchanged for it, while the minor difference at the moment was settled by the use of the universal instrument. We do not doubt that the universal instrument is also an equivalent; none other would answer the purposes required; but it is only an equivalent as any other product is only an equivalent; it holds no exclusive place, no superiority amongst those products, except as a universal instrument. The importance of this distinction will appear as we proceed. It is mainly upon this point, we think, that the two main schools of political economists are at issue. While one exalts money, represented by gold and silver as the universal equivalent and standard by which all other commodities are valued, and according to the rise and fall of which all other products must correspondingly fall and rise, the other, asserting that as gold has an arbitrary and fixed value in commerce, its value must always remain the same, while other commodities may rise and fall in the market according to the usual law of supply and demand.

We incline to the opinion that both of these principles are, to some extent, erroneous, while perhaps to both may be assigned a portion of truth. Labor is and can be the only true and permanent measure of value, and the only equivalent. Gold has its intrinsic value, not because it is the universal equivalent, or the universal instrument of exchange, but because of the difficulty, the time and the amount of labor which are required to produce it. Its value is thus regulated by the amount of

labor required for its production, just as iron, copper or other substances have their value. Why, then, should we think more of the production of a largely increased quantity of gold than of the same value of iron or copper. Manifestly it would bring no more in the market than the other. The wealth of the country producing it, or of the world, would not be increased more by the one than by the other. The measure would be, in the value of the labor consumed in producing it; how much labor expended in producing the gold would purchase the iron; and again, how much labor in producing the iron would purchase the gold. Thus, then, the real wealth of the world is increased by the production of gold only in the same proportion as by the production of an equal value of iron or other commodity. But it is argued that gold has the superior office of being the universal equivalent, and by the production of an over-supply, so that in fact it becomes a drug in the market by want of use for it; and then, by submitting it to the process of coinage, a really depreciated currency might be formed, while its reduced value would be shown by the advance in prices of all other commodities; and this is the position assumed by M. CHEVALIER, and which, too, is endorsed by his editor, Mr. COBDEN.

Both of these writers appear to have forgotten their own much cherished principles of free trade in reference to this subject. They are accustomed to argue that when the price of a commodity falls below the value of the labor required to produce it, the production of that particular commodity will cease; and if this reasoning is applied to the gold product, we shall perceive that so soon as its price falls, its production will cease. The question then arises, what is it which regulates the price? M. CHEVALIER makes the precious metals the measurer of value and the regulator of prices. Here we are at issue with him. Labor is the only equivalent, as it is the only true measure of value; and gold being merely the universal instrument of exchange, it can only be of service where there are other commodities, the products of labor to be exchanged with each other. Gold cannot be used for many of the purposes of life; it cannot be eaten; it is useless for tools or implements of labor; it may be useful for ornament, for we are not so utilitarian as to deny that taste or fancy is of value to the human race; but otherwise, and except as a medium of interchange, it is really of less value than iron. If our argument is correct, the increased production of gold will have none or very little effect upon its value. This will depend upon the amount of labor required for its production, and upon the value of that labor at other pursuits. Thus, if more wages can be obtained by the production of iron than by producing gold, the production of gold will cease till the wages procurable by the production of iron or other commodities are reduced, or the increased want of gold, increasing the wages paid for its procurement, causes its renewed production. Thus labor is the measure of value, not gold, and the latter is shorn of that importance with which we are wont to clothe it. Dr. ADAM SMITH, in his *Wealth of Nations*, says: "Gold and silver, like every other commodity, vary in their value; are sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier and sometimes of more difficult purchase. The quantity of labor which any particular quantity of them can purchase or command, or the quantity of other

goods which it will exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made. The discovery of America reduced, in the sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to about one-third of what it had been before. As it costs less labor to bring those metals from the mines to the market, so when they were brought thither they could purchase or command less labor; and this revolution in their value, though, perhaps, the greatest, is by no means the only one of which history gives some account. But as a measure of quantity, such as the natural foot, fathom or handful, which is continually varying in its own value, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity of other things, so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value, can never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities. Equal quantities of labor, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the laborer, in his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, whatever the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labor which purchases them. At all times and places that is dear which is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labor to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labor. Labor alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only." This is sufficiently corroborative of our position, though we think we may take exception to some of the conclusions of the learned author. He appears to have omitted to notice the peculiar effect of an increased quantity of the universal instrument upon labor itself. This, as Colonel TORRENS has observed, and which we have before quoted, increases in a very high degree the productive power of labor, by facilitating its employment and distribution; and if thus, then it increases the capacity of that labor to purchase the products of other labor, and thus stimulating labor by its reaction upon itself, and causing by its own activity a rise in the value of all commodities by its increased capacity to consume.

May not to this cause be attributed any rise in values which may have taken place at different times all over the civilized world, rather than to the increased production of gold? Dr. SMITH, in the extract above quoted, refers the decline in the value of the precious metals to the immense increase in its production after the discovery of America. But may not the rise in prices of other products and commodities, by which the apparent fall in the value of gold and silver was measured, have been caused by the principle we have advanced—the renewed activity of labor reacting upon itself. Indeed, the idea of a fall in the value of gold upon the discovery of America appears to be inconsistent with his own principle, that labor, and labor alone, is the measure of value. For it would require as much labor to produce a bushel of grain, or to manufacture a yard of cloth, after as before that event. We are aware that it may be said that

it is the nominal as distinct from the real value that was affected. To this, however, it may be well answered that the nominal price, or legal tender price of gold, is fixed by law and custom, and is, or ought to be, stationary; and that the great bulk of the precious metals, as a product of value, is kept in the form of bullion, and will only be worked up into coin as it is required to facilitate commerce, as the universal instrument of exchange, the remainder being held in warehouse as stock awaiting demand.

"Give the people employment and they will get bread," said the late DANIEL WEBSTER; and Dr. ADAM SMITH had previously written, "the end of all production is consumption." It is the increased capacity for consumption which both gives the inducement and yields the reward of labor. Too little attention, it appears to us, has heretofore been given to this important cause of the progress of civilization and of wealth. Why is it that with the amazing increase of the products of the soil, for instance, the great increase in labor-saving machines, the drainage of lands, the improved and educated system of agriculture, and the use of steam, in place of hand-labor in so many ways about our farms, the value of wheat, and of all the products of the farm, have rather increased in price? Why is it that in manufactures, with all the marvellous improvements which have been made during the half century, the value has been so well maintained? During that period at least no extraordinary quantity of the precious metals were produced and brought into use, so as to be considered the cause of the advance in the value of other commodities. If no particular cause had operated upon the markets to prevent it, it is quite clear that the wonderful increase in the productions and manufactures of the world during the past fifty years would have had the effect of reducing their values to an almost worthless price. To what, then, can we attribute the prevention of such a result other than the increased capacity of the very producers themselves to consume the various products of labor?

All historians appear to agree that the value of gold and silver fell very rapidly, and to a very considerable extent, after the discovery of America, and it might be presumptuous to doubt their statements; and yet historians are seldom good political economists, and we might be permitted to ask for an explanation of the fact that no decrease in the value of the precious metals has been noticed since the beginning of the sixteenth century. M. CHEVALIER estimates the annual production of gold at the beginning of the present century at £3,312,000, at which rate we should have received, during the three centuries which have elapsed since the discovery of America, £993,600,000, and we think we are entitled to ask why this enormous mass has not been the cause of a gradual depreciation of its value, if Mr. MILL's and M. CHEVALIER's view is correct.

Prior to the fifteenth century Europe had been sunk in a degrading lethargy. The will of the nobles was the law of the land. Trade and industry were unknown. The feudal system had worked out its worst results; and not till the accession of HENRY the Seventh in England, and FERDINAND and ISABELLA in Spain, were the people sufficiently at rest to turn their attention to the national industry. And it is to the revival of the national industry in those reigns, and in those of their immediate successors, that we should principally refer the real cause of the increased price of

commodities, and the consequent apparent fall in the value of gold in the latter part of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries. We are told that the sixteenth century is to be distinguished from the fifteenth as the day is from the night, in regard to the activity and advancement of the nation in every field of exertion and enterprise where those accumulated results are to be achieved that constitute civilization. The names of GRESHAM and CAVENDISH, of FROBISHER, and HAWKINS and DRAKE, are renowned as allied to the revival of industry in our own country. The laws of HENRY the Seventh have chief reference to measures of trade and manufactures, proving that a great revival of industry was taking, and had taken, place. "This good prince," says HALL, the chronicler, "by his high policy marvellously enriched his realm and himself, and left his subjects in high wealth and prosperity;" and the great increase of wealth, and the more general diffusion of luxuries among all classes, are remarked by all the historians of the time. We also read of the commencement of great works of public improvements for the convenience of the internal trade of the country, which must have greatly increased to require or to bear such expenditures. These changes, it should be noted, all occurred before any increase in the quantity of gold, furnished by the American mines, could have been felt in England.

During the same period in Spain, the accession of FERDINAND and ISABELLA, and the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon put an end to long years of anarchy and popular lethargy. In the language of Mr. PRESCOTT, "the convulsions of the latter part of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries shook to the ground the ancient political fabrics of Europe, and roused the minds of its inhabitants from the lethargy in which they had been buried for ages. Spain felt the impulse. Under the glorious reign of FERDINAND and ISABELLA we behold her emerging from chaos into a new existence; unfolding under the influence of institutions adapted to her genius, energies of which she was before unconscious; enlarging her resources from all the springs of domestic industry and commercial enterprise, and insensibly losing the ferocious habits of a feudal age in the refinement of an intellectual and moral culture." Any presumed effect of the gold and silver discoveries mentioned by ADAM SMITH could not have occurred till after the death of these sovereigns, and yet we have evidence during their reigns of the very great awakening and increase of the national industry and enterprise; proofs of which, as in England, are found in the great number of laws passed at this period for the encouragement and regulation of trade. "New regulations were demanded for its growing trade and new internal relations, which were attempted to be supplied by the pragmatical," and, indeed, "the greater portion of the laws of this reign are directed, in one form or other, to commerce and industry. Their very large number, however, implies an extraordinary expansion of the national energy and resources—such for example are the laws encouraging foreigners to settle in the country; those for facilitating communication by internal improvements, roads, bridges, canals, on a scale of unprecedented magnitude."

All these measures direct us to the great fact that the domestic industry of Spain was fully awakened and was prospering in an unprecedented degree before the discovery of America by COLUMBUS; and, indeed, that

discovery itself was one of the consequences of this awakened enterprise. During this period the capacity of the people to consume the products of the labor of others must have greatly increased, stimulating them to greater development of their own industry, and thus increasing their own and the nation's stock of wealth, and at the same time enhancing prices, if our axiom is correct.

As a further illustration of these views, we read that "the revenue of Spain, which was, in 1474, the year of ISABELLA's accession, but 885,000 reals, and had risen, in 1477, to 2,390,078 reals, and, in 1482, after the resumption of the royal grants, to 12,711,591, had finally, in 1504, when the acquisition of Grenada and the domestic tranquillity of the kingdom had encouraged the free expansion of all its resources, risen to 26,283,334 reals, or thirty times the amount received at her accession. All this, it will be remembered, was derived from the customary established taxes, without the imposition of a single new one." Now all this increase in the national wealth of Spain, the country most directly benefited by the discovery of America, had occurred before any receipts of the precious metals had taken place; for then, as now, in reference to California and Australia, it was declared that more value had been sent to America than had been received in return; "in a mere financial point of view, they, the American discoveries, had been a considerable charge upon the crown." May we not be justified, then, in attributing the apparent fall in the value of gold and silver in the sixteenth century, mentioned by ADAM SMITH and others, to the general revival of industry and the advance and prosperity of labor, and the increase in its value as caused by its own activity, rather than to the effect of the increased production of the precious metals? We know that the same effect is produced in the prices of commodities by the abuse of commercial credits; by stimulating industry, and extravagance of demand beyond its limits of supply, the price of labor is fictitiously advanced, till a crisis comes which brings prices to what the bullionist calls the specie level, but which is, in reality, the proper labor level, or capacity of the producer of one kind of material to consume that of the other; and we perceive no reason why such results should be referred exclusively to the effect of the production of gold.

The mistake of supposing gold and silver to constitute peculiarly the wealth of a country, independently of their value as a commercial medium, has not been confined to one country or to any particular age. The Spaniards, by acting upon this supposition, impoverished their country, and lost all the brilliant advantages of their western possessions; and we are still in danger of such views, in one form or other, interfering with the due development and emancipation, and ennoblement of labor. Well may the historian exclaim, that "the season of the most brilliant results is not always that of the greatest national prosperity. The splendor of foreign conquest is often dearly purchased by the decline of industry at home."

ZUNIGA, the historian of Seville, tells us that the gold currency of Spain had continued to rise in value till 1497, when it gradually sunk, and gives, as the cause, the increased import from Hispaniola; while another Spanish historian, of the same date with ZUNIGA, BERNALDEZ,

states that so little gold had been brought home, (A. D. 1500,) as to raise a general belief that there was scarcely any in the island. Would it not be more correct to ascribe the gradual rise in the value of gold, mentioned as a fact by ZUNIGA, to the increased demand for the article, caused by the greatly increased commerce before noticed, and its decline to the gradual decline of industry, and the suicidal policy of the Spanish government in prohibiting its export by law?

In the work before us, M. CHEVALIER, taking for his basis the supposition which we have been discussing, that the great increase in the production of gold, after the discovery of America, caused a reduction in its value to about one-third of its former value, proceeds to discuss the probable effect of the large supplies which are being received from the newly-discovered mines of California and Australia, and tells us that the phenomenon of the first-mentioned fall in the values of the precious metals revealed itself by a general rise of prices of all other commodities.

As we have before remarked, an increase in the supply of any article of commerce does not necessarily imply a reduction in price. Many commodities might be named which have risen in price, while the quantity produced has been very greatly increased. This effect depends upon the demand existing for the particular article; and if it can be shown that the real cause of the rise of prices in all commodities was really other than by the increased production of gold, the argument falls to the ground. We have attempted to show another cause for this effect, with how much success we must leave to the judgment of our readers.

M. CHEVALIER has exceeded the ground assumed by Dr. ADAM SMITH on this point; for the latter excepts to the universal conclusion that a great increase of the precious metals necessarily lowers the price. He says, "Slight observations, however, upon the prices, either of coin or of other commodities, would not probably have misled so many intelligent authors, had they not been influenced at the same time by the popular notion, that as the quantity of silver naturally increases in every country with the increase of wealth, so its value diminishes as its quantity increases. This notion, however, seems to be altogether groundless." The learned author then goes on to state what might cause an increase in the amount of these metals: firstly, an increased abundance from mines; and, secondly, from the increased wealth of the people, from the increased product of their labor. He saw clearly that, by the increased wealth, caused by the increased activity of labor in a given country, the quantity of gold and silver might be therein increased; but he appears to have failed to see, what we have before affirmed, and which we hope we may be pardoned for repeating, that upon his own primary principle that labor, and labor alone, is the true measure of exchangeable values, the increased or decreased production of the precious metals has nothing whatever to do with the value of other commodities. Their value, as of these, depends upon the amount of labor required to produce them. If the increased production of gold and silver causes a rise in the value of all other commodities, then gold and silver must necessarily be the true measures of exchangeable values, and not labor at all. This we

conceive to be the cardinal error of M. CHEVALIER, and the elaborate arguments he has built upon it, well worthy as it is of his reputation as an author, becomes, in consequence, of little practical value to the science.

Our author tells us, that "under the influence of this greatly increased and cheapened production of gold, it is reasonable to expect, at least in all those countries where gold circulates in large quantities, and where it is or tends to be the sole medium of exchange, a general disturbance of prices, a deeply-felt derangement of interests, and a modification, more or less radical, in the different relations of society;" thus predicting a great crisis and general loss to holders of money securities by the new gold discoveries. This position appears to be scarcely consistent with his own statement, that the rise of prices already occurred is to be attributable partially "to the fact that the various classes of society have indulged in an increased consumption, either from their having greater resources, or from their habits of economy having undergone an unfavorable change. As respects the working classes, the impulse given to public works, and to the various industrial undertakings, has caused an extraordinary demand for their labor, and the consequent increase in their wages has enabled them to consume a greater quantity of certain articles of subsistence, and of those manufactured products which are most accessible to the masses of mankind."

This latter quotation quite bears out the position we have assumed as to the greatest cause of the increase of prices, but we are at a loss to discover how he arrives at the conclusion that this is only an "accidental and transient" effect, while the increased production of gold will produce a "permanent and fixed" rise in prices. We should prefer to consider that the increased activity of labor, aided by all the modern appliances of inventions, and the still greater addition of the general reduction of the workmen, which causes that constantly increasing rise of prices that accompanies the increased capacity to consume, would be the permanent and fixed, while the gold discoveries and its productions would form the accidental and transient.

Again, M. CHEVALIER commits a fatal mistake in assuming, as he does, that the wages for a day's labor in California must fall to an equality with other temperate climates, and thus, that the cost of producing gold will be in this way further diminished and its fall in value secured. This is committing the same error which he wishes others to avoid by taking their metals in corn instead of gold, in order to avoid the loss consequent upon its fall. If the wages of labor is more highly paid in California or Australia than in Europe, it is certain that sooner or later emigration will reduce the wages in those countries, or by creating a vacuum, and a consequent demand in Europe, raise the wages there to an equality; but the price may not be necessarily lowered in California; it may, on the other hand, be wholly raised in Europe; and, indeed, if M. CHEVALIER'S views were correct, it would be wholly in Europe that the rise would occur, to meet, as he would argue, the depreciation in the value of gold. But labor will go to that employment which, in the long run, is most remunerative; and if the gold fields are most remunerative the labor of the world will rush in till the demand there is supplied, or till

the rise of wages in other pursuits again withdraw the laborer from the mines and its production ceases. Thus the product of gold and silver, being governed by the demand, and the demand being based upon the relative value of labor, there need be no fear of any extra production of the precious metals. The use of money being, as we have stated, solely to facilitate the interchange of commodities, the products of labor, it will only be produced so long as it is required for that purpose. A few years since great difficulty was experienced in providing the means of interchange of the rapidly increasing productions of labor, and, amongst the suggestions to supply the deficiency, a resort to one pound notes was advocated as a means of aiding the interchange. The rapidity of the increase in the wealth of civilized nations, and in the value of their productions, had so far exceeded every known form of appliance for the purpose of exchange, that the discovery of the great metallic wealth of California was hailed with joy by all. Since the receipts of gold from thence and from Australia, commerce has moved more freely, the basis for credits has been more broadly laid, and mankind has less difficulty in making interchanges of their ever-increasing labor.

We shall not follow M. CHEVALIER through the details of his work, nor, indeed, is it necessary that we should, since we dissent from his premises. It is enough to say that he has filled up the outline of his argument with a variety of illustrations which are in themselves of much value. We may, however, remark that the universal law of "nature's equilibrium" has already set at rest the question of a scarcity of silver, upon which he has laid much stress, by the recent discovery of the rich silver mines in California, Arizona, Sonora and other provinces of the United States, which bid fair, by the use of improved machinery and greater enterprise, to produce a much larger value than even the gold mines.

It will be very properly asked, what effect will this large increase in the production of the precious metals have upon the world? In reply to this query, it may be assumed that it is much easier to say what effect it will not have, than to state precisely that which it will produce. We are free to confess, however, that we look upon the increase of the precious metals as a great blessing to civilization. Not that it will cause a re-distribution of wealth throughout society, for the distribution of wealth is effected in much the same way in all ages of the world. The prudent, laborious and economical will become wealthy, while the reckless, the idle and the extravagant will become poor. But the increase of the precious metals, by widening the basis of that commercial credit by means of which nine-tenths of the commerce of the world is carried on, will greatly enhance that commerce, and create a large increase in the demand for labor, at more remunerative wages. Thus, all branches of business and all classes of society will be benefited, and the increased employment thus given will allow of increased enjoyment of luxuries as well as of necessities by the laboring classes, and as capital, being the surplus of this labor, is laid up, it will again multiply the employment and consequent happiness of the people.

But the share which gold or silver will have in this result will bear but a small proportion to that of the increase of education, of skilled labor, and of the various labor-saving machines which are now and which will

be brought into use for the benefit of mankind. Soon it will be necessary for every man, woman and child to have some species of education, to enable him to attend to or to use the machines which are daily brought into use for the purpose of lightening the burden upon the hands, while they increase the burden upon the brain. It would be worth the investigation to ascertain the difference of education at present required of even our agricultural laborers from that of a century since; a knowledge required to use the various improved implements and processes used in the present system of cultivation; and if in these, how much more in the use of the various manufacturing machines? All these implements and all these processes tend to the profit and the elevation of the laborer; and as he is advanced and has more means with which to purchase and consume the products of other men's labor, the artisan, the professional man and the landlord are enriched. While these are the offices and purposes of labor, as the great creator of wealth, we must not forget that gold and silver, the *universal instruments* of commerce, are necessary to grease the wheels of the social coach, and should ever be acknowledged as such.

The work of M. CHEVALIER has had the advantage of being introduced to the English reader by no less prominent an individual than Mr. COBDEN. As the accepted chief of that class of politicians which has not inappropriately been called the Manchester school, Mr. COBDEN has been able to give to the work of his author an importance in the eye of the general English public, which it might not otherwise have obtained. It is not singular that in times of peace and of commercial progress and competition this class of politicians, which makes the trade of a nation or of the world of higher importance than its nationality, should become popular; and we may assume, also, that the translator's present engagement, in connection with the new French commercial treaty, will not lessen the idea of authority with which his editorial comments in the preface to the English edition will be received wherever the English language is spoken. It is, therefore, to be regretted that Mr. COBDEN should have taken so much for granted, and, indeed, that he has, without proper examination, hazarded so complete an endorsement of his author's views. It is no more than should have been expected by his friends that he should have looked more deeply into the authorities of the free trade school before committing himself so unreservedly. An active man, in the prime of life, and possessed of some parts, taking the wave at its full, will always be able to attain a certain prominence and popularity in any pursuit; and if to this be added the possession of what the late Sir ROBERT PEEL was pleased to call "unadorned eloquence," it is difficult to place a limit to the success which he might secure. It is well, however, for such a man to remember the theatre of his popularity, and, while perhaps the world may be very willing worshippers of his free-trade doctrines, and even may accord some praise to his energy in respect of commercial treaties, it may still be very unwilling to accept his peace theories or his authorships.

We can have no quarrel with a foreigner, and especially a Frenchman, for ignoring the fact that Dr. ADAM SMITH wrote *the Wealth of Nations*, and laid the foundation of those principles of trade which Mr. COBDEN and his followers profess to follow; we say profess, for it is too

often that, like Mr. ROEBUCK dealing with his constituents at Sheffield, in speaking of the Canadian tariff, they can use the one argument upon one side, and with the greatest complacency the opposite upon the other.

Doubtless M. CHEVALIER found it more convenient to consult the old economist and the later French writers upon these subjects; but there can be no excuse for his English translator, who, as the head and front of the Manchester school, should have been careful to have fully compared the reasonings of his author with those received principles of the science which are acknowledged by Englishmen, before introducing, by so flattering an endorsement, a work which we think we have sufficiently shown has been written without a due regard to those principles.

The friendship and assistance of M. CHEVALIER, in the arrangement of the French treaty, might possibly have been obtained without pledging the English reader to the soundness of his views upon the production of gold. We fear, however, that Mr. COBDEN has, in this instance, travelled somewhat out of his sphere. Whatever may be his success as a trade legislator, we opine he will never attain prominence as an author. In the very beginning of his preface we are treated to a quotation from Sir ROBERT PEEL's speech on introducing the bank act of 1844, in which Sir ROBERT refers to the effect produced upon commerce by the expansion and contraction of the currency—meaning the paper currency of the country; and which we are gravely asked to consider as applicable to a great increase in the importation of gold. Lest we should be thought to be deceived, we will quote the unfortunate passage: "In introducing the bank act of 1844 Sir ROBERT PEEL said, 'there is no contract, public or private, no engagement, national or individual, which is unaffected by it. The enterprises of commerce, the profits of trade, the arrangements made in all the domestic relations of society, the wages of labor, pecuniary transactions of the highest amount and the lowest, the payment of the national debt, the provision for the national expenditure, the command which the coin of the smallest denomination has over the necessities of life, are all affected by the decision to which we may come on that great question which I am about to submit to the consideration of the committee.'" And then Mr. COBDEN goes on to say, "the main object which the author of the present bank act had in view was to prevent those fluctuations in the amount of the currency which were alleged to have arisen from the arbitrary action of the Bank of England, and which rarely exceeded two or three millions in the course of a long series of years. With much greater force, then, must his expressions apply to the present state of things, when an *annual* increase in the production of gold of nearly thirty millions has suddenly taken place, more than one-half of which finds its way to our shores." It is evident to the merest tyro that Sir ROBERT PEEL had reference, in the remarks just quoted, not to any increase of gold in the currency of the country, but to the excessive issues of paper currency by the banks, without the corresponding basis of gold in their vaults; and yet Mr. COBDEN would drag the illustrious statesman in to fortify the baseless fabric of his friend. We will venture to affirm that it could never have entered into any other man's conception, that Sir ROBERT was afraid of being overburdened by any increase of the imports of gold into the country; much would it have rejoiced the heart of that statesman to see his country able to import, by its industry, "one-half of

thirty millions of gold annually." It was the fluctuation in the amount of the bank issues which, according to Sir ROBERT'S view, should be restricted to as nearly a metallic basis as possible, to which he referred as affecting all contracts and all expenditures. Neither he, nor the people of England, ever had occasion to fear too great receipts of the precious metals; they have been, and will still be, always but too glad to obtain the universal medium, in exchange for their manufactures and the products of their mines, increasing by its means the employment of the people.

Mr. COBDEN also tell us that, "unless the cardinal rule of commerce, that quantity governs price, which applies infallibly to all other commodities, loses its force where gold is concerned, this sudden and great increase (in the production of gold) must be followed by a reduction of value." Now we had supposed hitherto, that price depended on the amount of *demand*, as well as of the supply, and even then temporary differences, caused by other considerations, often affected prices; but it has been reserved for Mr. COBDEN to instruct us that it is quantity, and quantity only, which governs price. Experience has shown us the immense increase in the demand for all the products of industry which advancing civilization produces, and it is difficult to imagine a limit to the capacity for consumption of a people rapidly advancing in all the concomitants of education and of taste; and we cannot see why the demand for gold should not equal any possible supply.

As if still further to convince us of the superficiality of his researches into the science of political economy and the currency question, Mr. COBDEN informs us that "there have been two schools in this country on the currency question, the one having at its head Lord OVERSTONE, who has attributed great fluctuations in the prices of commodities to the action of the bank on the currency; and the other, represented by the late Mr. TOOKE, who maintained that as long as the notes of the bank were convertible into gold, they could not become depreciated or cause a rise of prices."

That Lord OVERSTONE'S opinions are not properly stated in this extract is quite evident from his declaration, (letter to J. B. SMITH,) that fluctuations in the amount of the currency are seldom, if ever, the existing causes of fluctuations in prices and in the state of trade. These causes are the buoyant and sanguine character of the human mind, miscalculations as to the relative extent of supply and demand, fluctuations of seasons, changes of taste and fashion, legislative enactments and political events, together with excitements or depression in the condition of other countries connected with us by trading intercourse.

We have no doubt that the greatest cause of fluctuations in prices, and of panics and commercial revulsions, is to be found in the abuse of commercial credits, including merchants and manufacturers, as well as bankers' credits, indeed every means and form of commercial credit whatever. The operation of this system of credit tends directly to a rise of prices, and to raise them progressively till the day of general liquidation returns, when prices fall to a cash, specie or real labor level, and panic, revulsion and bankruptcy ensues. Lord OVERSTONE acknowledges this view when he says that trade moves in cycles—first a state of quiescence, next of improvement, growing confidence, prosperity, excitement, overtrading, convulsion, pressure, stagnation, distress, ending again in quies-

cence, and repeating the process as often as credits are used and abused. While merchants' credits are used in commerce, and we acknowledge their benefits and even necessity, so long there will be panics and revulsions in trade, and though bank regulations and other currency measures may have some effect in mitigating the severity of a crisis, they can never prevent one, nor, indeed, would an entirely metallic currency be of avail as a preventive of these sudden and dire visitants of the commercial community.

THE ENGLISH MONEY MARKET.

SUBJOINED is a comprehensive table affording a comparative view of the Bank of England returns, the bank rate of discount, the price of Consols, the price of wheat and the leading exchanges, during a period of four years, corresponding with the present date, as well as ten years back, viz., in 1851 :

	1851.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
BANK OF ENGLAND—					
Circulation, post-bills,.....	£ 20,700,000	£ 21,346,000	£ 22,228 000	£ 22,649,000	£ 20,633,000
Public deposits,.....	8,931,000 ..	6,994,000 ..	9,436,000 ..	8,209,000 ..	7,291,000
Other deposits,	8,695,000 ..	13,155,000 ..	13,551,000 ..	13,748 000 ..	12,092,000
Government securities,.....	13,545,000 ..	10,692,000 ..	11,780,000 ..	9,817,000 ..	9,980,000
Other securities,	14,251,000 ..	16,685,000 ..	18,682,000 ..	21,670,000 ..	21,401,000
Reserve of notes and coin, ..	8,667,000 ..	11,345,000 ..	11,088,000 ..	9,067,000 ..	6,483,000
Coin and bullion,.....	14,212,000 ..	17,408,000 ..	18,088 000 ..	16,496,000 ..	12,071,000
Bank rate of discount,.....	3 per ct. ..	3 per ct. ..	3 per ct. ..	4 per ct. ..	6 per ct.
Price of Consols,.....	97½ ex-d. ..	95½ ex-d. ..	94½ ex-d. ..	93½ ex-d. ..	89½ ex-d.
Average price of wheat,.....	43s. 5d. ..	42s. 8d. ..	46s. 4d. ..	58s. 5d. ..	51s. 0d.
Exchange on Paris, (short,) ..	25 0 ..	25 2½ ..	25 7½ ..	25 12½ ..	25 40
Amsterdam, " ..	11 16½ ..	11 15 ..	11 12 ..	11 14½ ..	11 18½
Hamburg, (3 months,)	13 8 ..	13 6½ ..	13 3½ ..	13 5 ..	13 10½

Of this comparative view the London *Economist* remarks :

In June, 1851, the census for that year had just been published. The proceedings of Parliament were of little importance, the principal measure passed being the Inhabited House Duty Bill. The accounts from California continued promising, the export of gold in the first four months of the year having considerably exceeded £3,000,000. The news had arrived of an earthquake at Valparaiso, which destroyed £200,000 worth of property, but fortunately no lives.

The fourth week of June, 1851, a fire had destroyed some of Alderman HUMPHREY'S warehouses on the other side of London Bridge, the damage done being estimated at £150,000. News had also arrived of the burning of the whole of the better part of the town of Archangel. The Sardinian government were about to contract a loan in London of £3,000,000. The Spanish budget for 1852 had just been made public. In the English Parliament, the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill had passed through the committee of the House of Commons.

The first week in July, 1851, Parliament was occupied with a number of useful measures, but none of any prominent importance. The Great Exhibition continued to be crowded with visitors. The advices from California mentioned the total destruction, by fire, of San Francisco. Several serious questions had been laid before the German Diet, the prin-

cial being the admission of the non-German provinces of Austria into the Confederation, but it was believed that this proposal would be withdrawn.

1858.—The fourth week in June, 1858, extreme stagnation prevailed in the stock exchange and in all speculative circles. Owing to the demand incidental at this period of the quarter, coupled with the payment of an instalment of 25 per cent. on the Brazilian loan, the rate of discount in Lombard-street had recovered to the bank minimum of 3 per cent., and the returns of that establishment showed an increase of a million and three-quarters in the "other" securities, and a decrease of a million in the reserve.

The first week in July, 1858, the rate of discount in the open market was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., but gold was flowing out of the bank. Rumors of a Turkish loan were in circulation. Political and commercial affairs were alike quiet.

1859.—The third week in June, 1859, whilst at home all was calm and confidence in the new government of Lord PALMERSTON, abroad a little anxiety was occasioned, owing to the turn the war in Italy was taking, and the menacing attitude towards France which Germany appeared to be on the eve of assuming.

The fourth week in June, 1859, the demand for money was rising, in anticipation of the instalment on the Indian loan of £5,047,000, due on the 19th July, but the reserve of notes was very large, and the prospect of peace between France and Austria caused great buoyancy in the funds.

The first week in July, 1859, great excitement prevailed in consequence of the conclusion of an armistice between France and Austria. Consols rose from $93\frac{1}{4}$ to $94\frac{3}{4}$, and the rate of discount was $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. lower in Lombard-street than at the bank, the prospect of immediate peace overriding the fact of supplemental army and navy estimates to the extent of $3\frac{1}{4}$ millions.

1860.—The third week in June, 1860, the Baden Congress had just met, and the first interviews had taken place between the Emperor and the Prince Regent (now king) of Prussia. In England, the principal event was the great volunteer review by the Queen in Hyde Park. The GREAT EASTERN had sailed for New-York. There was an increased demand for money in the discount market, but the bank rate was only 4 per cent.

The fourth week in June, 1860, the proposals for the new Russian $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. loan of £8,000,000 had just been issued, at a price which was estimated to amount to $90\frac{3}{8}$. The present quotation for that stock is now below 90. News had been received of the loss of the Peninsular and oriental steamer MALABAR. The advices from British Columbia mentioned fresh provocations from the notorious General HARNEY.

The first week in July, 1860, the House of Commons was discussing the privilege resolutions brought forward by the select committee appointed to examine and report upon the precedents for the late rejection by the Lords of the Paper Duty Repeal Bill. The notorious failures in the leather trade, comprising Messrs. STREATFEILD, LAWRENCE and MORTIMORE, and many other houses, had just taken place. A revolutionary movement had been commenced in Naples, and the king had fruitlessly proclaimed the constitution of 1858. Prince JEROME NAPOLEON, the ex-king of Westphalia, had lately died. The advices from Lisbon mentioned the dissolution of the ministry, and that the Marquis of LOULE had been entrusted with the formation of the new Cabinet.

REVIEW OF THE STOCK MARKET OF NEW-YORK.

Lowest and Highest sales for cash from December 1, 1860, to July 20, 1861.

BONDS AND STOCKS.	DEC., 1860.		YEAR 1860.		JAN., 1861.		FEB., 1861.		MARCH, 1861.		APRIL, 1861.		MAY, 1861.		JUNE, 1861.		TO 20TH JULY.	
	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.
United States six per cents, 1863,...	95	100	95	109½	97	100	94	100	95	95½	89	95	80	95	75	78½	89	90
U. S. five per cents, 1874, coupon,...	85	95	85	104½	92	97	85	98½	85	90	75	89½	76	79½	75	78½	76	82
Indiana State five per cents,.....	88	93	87½	..	85	88	85	87½	88	93	80	..	78	80	75	77½
Virginia six per cent. bonds,.....	73	80½	73	95	74½	77½	72	80	74	81	86	76½	43½	51½	39	48	44	50
Tennessee six per cent. bonds,.....	64	79	64	93	72	76½	67	76½	72	77	41	75½	40½	47½	34½	41½	37	45½
Georgia six per cent. bonds,.....	102	105	94	60	60½	58	60	57	70
North Carolina six per cent. bonds,	77½	82	76	100	74	82	74	82½	78	82	45	81	53	62	44	53	48	62
California seven per cent. bonds,...	85	89	83	95	86½	88	86	88	87½	88	78½	87½	71½	75	76½	78	74½	78½
Missouri six per cent. bonds,.....	61	71	61	84½	67	72½	64	70½	68½	69½	87½	66	85	42	36	40½	37½	46½
Canton Company shares,.....	14	15	14	23½	14½	15	14	15	14	15	8	14½	8½	10	8½	9
Cumberland Coal Co., preferred,...	8	9	8	17½	8½	9½	7	8½	7	7½	6	7½	4	5½	4½	4½	4½	5½
Pacific Mail Steamship Company,...	74½	85½	70	107½	84½	94	80½	88	82	88½	50	86	60½	71	59	69	69	77
New-York Central Rail-Road,.....	69	76½	70	92½	75½	83½	75½	80½	75½	80	68	75½	71½	78½	71½	74½	78½	79½
Erle Rail-Road shares,.....	23½	39	23½	43	34½	40½	30	36	30	36	17	32½	19½	23½	21½	23½	22½	29
Hudson River Rail-Road,.....	36	45	36	66	44	49½	40½	48½	43	47	33	45½	84	87½	81½	81½	82	83
Harlem Rail-Road shares,.....	12	14½	8	24	15	16½	14	16½	15½	16½	11½	16½	10½	12½	8½	10½	9½	12½
Harlem Rail-Road, preferred,.....	27	35½	27	55	36	42	34	43	38	41½	28	41½	25½	31½	20½	25½	22½	29½
Reading Rail-Road shares,.....	80	86½	80	49½	87	45½	88½	47½	89	46	29½	44½	80½	82½	80½	83½	83	89½
Michigan Central Rail-Road,.....	41	50½	34½	73½	51½	61½	49½	60½	54	60	40	58½	40	46	39½	44½	42	47½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana R.R.,...	10½	15	5	25	18½	16½	12½	15½	14½	18½	12½	17½	10½	18½	10½	12½	12	15½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana, guar.,...	23	33	19½	50½	33	38	27½	34	38	39½	26	39½	24½	29½	22½	27½	26½	33½
Panama Rail-Road shares,.....	106	121	106	146½	112	117½	112	116	115	115	97½	110½	99	107	104	109	105	111½
Illinois Central Rail-Road shares, ..	51½	75	51½	89½	74½	88½	69	94½	75½	83	55½	81½	57	71	62	69	65	69½
Galena and Chicago Rail-Road,...	58	67½	55	82½	63	74½	66½	74½	68½	74	55	73½	55½	61	56	61½	60½	66½
Cleveland and Toledo Rail-Road,...	20	31	19½	49½	31½	37½	27½	38	33	37	22½	36½	20½	25½	20½	21½	23½	33
Chicago & Rock Island Rail-Road, ..	42½	54	42½	54½	52½	62	52½	61½	56	61	34	58	80½	82½	89	86½	84	45
Illinois Central Construction bonds,	82	91	81	100½	94	97	95	97	97	102½	85	98	89	92½	89	92	89	92
Pennsylvania Coal Company,.....	78½	76	73½	87	77	80	76	80	76	80½	72	81	75	77	76	77½	73	79
Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.,...	80	80	80	101½	85	92	87	92	85	90	82	90	80	84	79	83½	80	84

NEW-YORK STOCK MARKET FOR JUNE.

THE quotations of cash sales for the month of June show less variation than in May last. Notwithstanding the death of the Treasurer of the New-York Central Rail-Road Company, their shares close at 74, being only $\frac{1}{2}$ under the highest price attained in the month, and this month have reached 79 $\frac{3}{8}$. Hudson River sevens fluctuated only 3 per cent. in June. Harlem, 1 $\frac{3}{4}$; Reading, 3 $\frac{1}{2}$; Michigan Central, 4 $\frac{1}{8}$; Michigan Southern, 2 $\frac{1}{4}$; Panama, 5; Illinois Central, 7; Galena and Chicago, 5 $\frac{5}{8}$; Cleveland and Toledo, 3 $\frac{3}{4}$.

In State loans there is a marked improvement in Virginia sixes, which close at 43 $\frac{1}{2}$ against 39, the lowest price; North Carolina, 50, an improvement of 6 per cent.; Missouri, 38, an improvement of 2; Pacific Steamship shares close at 69 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 70, whereon sales were made at 69.

Our list embraces the lowest and highest prices, for cash, at the board during the month of June, and for each month since December 1st.

The condition of the stock market, up to the 20th July, is materially improved. With large sales, Virginia sixes have sold two per cent. beyond the highest price in June; Tennessee, 4 $\frac{3}{8}$; Georgia, 10; North Carolina, 9; Missouri, 6 $\frac{1}{4}$. These prices indicate fresh confidence in a return of prosperity to the States named.

Pacific Mail shares have sold in July 18 per cent. above the lowest price in June. Rail-road shares have improved largely.

BANK STATISTICS.

PITTSBURGH.

7 Banks—Capital, \$4,464,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 7,254,136 ..	\$ 1,356,392 ..	\$ 2,609,006 ..	\$ 1,891,947 ..	\$ 217,108
Jan. 12,....	7,164,457 ..	1,403,357 ..	2,609,056 ..	1,927,290 ..	218,148
Jan. 19,....	7,215,916 ..	1,400,485 ..	2,662,671 ..	1,733,946 ..	233,858
Jan. 26,....	7,123,312 ..	1,425,592 ..	2,686,706 ..	1,657,037 ..	242,595
Feb. 2,....	7,099,421 ..	1,449,086 ..	2,642,821 ..	1,701,427 ..	233,634
Mch. 2,....	6,929,720 ..	1,583,104 ..	2,859,981 ..	1,614,658 ..	248,088
Mch. 9,....	6,847,158 ..	1,611,121 ..	2,857,021 ..	1,666,118 ..	259,789
Mch. 16,....	6,966,490 ..	1,654,416 ..	2,893,191 ..	1,703,449 ..	284,589
Mch. 23,....	7,161,834 ..	1,668,240 ..	2,919,811 ..	1,662,048 ..	183,967
Mch. 30,....	6,570,905 ..	1,697,560 ..	3,024,751 ..	1,655,558 ..	186,069
Apr. 6,....	6,906,519 ..	1,741,545 ..	3,120,256 ..	1,680,975 ..	185,705
Apr. 13,....	6,863,931 ..	1,788,595 ..	3,045,446 ..	1,707,703 ..	145,015
May 1,....	6,962,898 ..	1,795,678 ..	3,175,181 ..	1,811,785 ..	188,152
June 1,....	7,107,820 ..	1,896,394 ..	3,526,582 ..	1,715,579 ..	240,418
July 1,....	7,120,869 ..	1,997,626 ..	3,631,239 ..	2,398,198 ..	249,123

NEW-YORK.—54 Banks—Capital, June, 1861, \$69,907,000.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Weekly Clearings.	Sub-Treasury.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 129,625,465 ..	\$ 24,839,475 ..	\$ 8,698,288 ..	\$ 86,454,430 ..	\$ 95,994,898 ..	\$ 8,645,500
Jan. 12,....	129,125,515 ..	26,460,988 ..	8,357,198 ..	88,148,883 ..	123,308,183 ..	2,584,400
Jan. 19,....	126,084,520 ..	29,598,738 ..	8,067,570 ..	89,648,696 ..	121,218,782 ..	2,166,000
Jan. 26,....	123,935,153 ..	28,968,941 ..	7,920,298 ..	87,886,046 ..	123,070,934 ..	5,751,800
Feb. 2,....	121,907,024 ..	31,054,509 ..	8,099,376 ..	87,879,743 ..	122,183,525 ..	4,328,000
Feb. 9,....	120,680,050 ..	34,655,645 ..	8,361,305 ..	88,988,631 ..	121,525,631 ..	3,664,900
Feb. 16,....	119,880,371 ..	37,119,000 ..	8,278,840 ..	91,547,158 ..	111,887,663 ..	3,856,000
Feb. 23,....	119,236,290 ..	38,044,229 ..	8,128,722 ..	91,628,626 ..	118,142,167 ..	3,896,700
Mch. 2,....	121,893,963 ..	34,480,407 ..	8,290,755 ..	89,635,298 ..	126,728,882 ..	9,166,030
Mch. 9,....	122,705,094 ..	38,892,768 ..	8,585,783 ..	88,711,448 ..	129,808,550 ..	7,524,000
Mch. 16,....	122,649,925 ..	36,219,676 ..	8,392,847 ..	90,520,779 ..	119,500,578 ..	6,720,000
Mch. 23,....	120,750,455 ..	39,480,784 ..	8,345,011 ..	91,940,228 ..	120,183,015 ..	6,240,510
Mch. 30,....	120,958,165 ..	41,408,808 ..	8,484,844 ..	93,611,893 ..	119,040,819 ..	6,092,841
Apr. 6,....	122,118,496 ..	41,705,568 ..	8,930,141 ..	94,859,810 ..	123,277,671 ..	8,486,494
Apr. 13,....	123,108,885 ..	41,764,748 ..	8,801,429 ..	96,626,078 ..	124,284,307 ..	10,441,278
Apr. 20,....	124,701,259 ..	40,620,720 ..	8,525,157 ..	97,804,762 ..	124,020,087 ..	11,058,653
Apr. 27,....	124,817,154 ..	38,991,658 ..	8,840,476 ..	96,788,759 ..	106,948,819 ..	10,773,106
May 4,....	124,610,166 ..	38,054,254 ..	9,296,399 ..	94,977,381 ..	106,418,816 ..	9,761,752
May 11,....	123,182,298 ..	38,801,545 ..	9,304,241 ..	94,879,967 ..	104,168,420 ..	8,588,902
May 18,....	120,007,906 ..	39,557,980 ..	9,061,181 ..	93,179,526 ..	98,102,519 ..	7,867,542
May 25,....	118,141,356 ..	39,622,791 ..	8,793,882 ..	91,334,877 ..	94,155,277 ..	6,886,008
June 1,....	118,290,181 ..	37,502,402 ..	8,688,780 ..	90,197,459 ..	88,847,249 ..	11,468,789
June 8,....	117,509,075 ..	36,887,025 ..	8,968,007 ..	87,656,760 ..	95,465,614 ..	10,758,608
June 15,....	115,494,821 ..	38,280,211 ..	8,707,818 ..	87,992,791 ..	86,467,176 ..	9,488,884
June 22,....	118,667,640 ..	39,480,189 ..	8,444,830 ..	87,602,343 ..	88,183,062 ..	8,004,656
June 29,....	112,404,012 ..	42,078,011 ..	8,338,559 ..	88,721,752 ..	83,279,416 ..	6,094,283
July 6,....	112,184,668 ..	45,630,025 ..	8,862,799 ..	90,579,758 ..	83,318,280 ..	4,616,620
July 13,....	112,445,542 ..	45,016,836 ..	8,499,699 ..	91,805,987 ..	86,893,087 ..	7,055,543
July 20,....	112,086,103 ..	46,602,295 ..	8,354,192 ..	93,298,195 ..	96,566,821 ..	6,573,193

BOSTON.—42 Banks—Capital, January, 1859, \$35,125,433; June, 1861, \$38,231,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due to Banks.	Due from Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 62,025,734 ..	\$ 4,204,610 ..	\$ 7,082,018 ..	\$ 18,719,190 ..	\$ 7,663,862 ..	\$ 8,371,804
Jan. 12,....	62,720,067 ..	4,199,155 ..	6,825,325 ..	18,422,650 ..	8,082,942 ..	7,605,680
Jan. 19,....	63,275,167 ..	4,425,256 ..	6,706,045 ..	18,366,511 ..	8,346,141 ..	7,094,433
Jan. 26,....	63,237,796 ..	4,532,019 ..	6,374,476 ..	18,185,128 ..	8,477,340 ..	6,714,029
Feb. 2,....	63,264,318 ..	4,629,068 ..	6,247,643 ..	18,184,009 ..	8,485,680 ..	6,563,176
Feb. 9,....	63,434,332 ..	4,773,614 ..	6,387,552 ..	18,074,598 ..	8,818,692 ..	6,299,117
Feb. 16,....	63,118,582 ..	4,651,803 ..	6,216,299 ..	17,795,444 ..	8,312,101 ..	6,791,101
Feb. 23,....	62,765,088 ..	4,738,981 ..	6,334,383 ..	17,833,065 ..	8,451,939 ..	6,522,815
Mch. 2,....	62,725,101 ..	4,751,291 ..	6,372,201 ..	17,981,201 ..	8,111,201 ..	6,921,107
Mch. 9,....	62,649,600 ..	4,836,600 ..	6,345,600 ..	18,132,000 ..	7,978,000 ..	7,082,600
Mch. 16,....	62,511,727 ..	5,867,722 ..	6,166,253 ..	18,126,034 ..	8,269,601 ..	6,550,263
Mch. 23,....	62,359,922 ..	5,601,871 ..	6,059,548 ..	17,811,827 ..	8,611,882 ..	6,450,362
Mch. 30,....	62,666,800 ..	5,605,400 ..	6,108,600 ..	18,629,000 ..	8,845,500 ..	7,269,900
Apr. 6,....	62,611,820 ..	5,809,425 ..	6,996,996 ..	19,918,555 ..	9,193,022 ..	8,596,667
Apr. 13,....	62,734,600 ..	5,875,600 ..	6,900,500 ..	19,697,500 ..	9,383,000 ..	8,167,000
Apr. 20,....	62,396,500 ..	5,780,700 ..	6,733,000 ..	19,440,700 ..	9,482,000 ..	8,210,500
Apr. 27,....	61,507,897 ..	5,638,790 ..	6,610,860 ..	18,571,856 ..	9,640,246 ..	8,131,220
May 4,....	61,884,400 ..	5,832,000 ..	6,875,000 ..	18,846,700 ..	9,223,000 ..	8,168,400
May 11,....	61,156,500 ..	5,997,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,309,600 ..	8,660,000 ..	7,625,600
May 18,....	61,206,000 ..	6,172,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,646,800 ..	8,351,000 ..	7,299,500
May 25,....	60,525,000 ..	6,402,700 ..	6,280,800 ..	18,586,000 ..	8,300,800 ..	7,144,500
June 1,....	60,213,500 ..	6,461,800 ..	6,139,700 ..	18,536,800 ..	8,206,000 ..	7,135,800
June 8,....	60,625,800 ..	6,018,800 ..	6,460,800 ..	18,204,500 ..	8,093,000 ..	7,198,000
June 15,....	60,074,100 ..	5,488,700 ..	6,452,500 ..	18,293,000 ..	8,000,000 ..	7,208,000
June 22,....	60,180,500 ..	5,831,000 ..	6,322,800 ..	18,240,800 ..	7,758,600 ..	7,428,000
June 29,....	60,095,675 ..	5,874,853 ..	6,106,524 ..	18,264,875 ..	7,609,614 ..	7,093,610

PHILADELPHIA.—19 Banks—Capital, June, 1861, \$11,810,520.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 26,891,280 ..	\$ 4,020,266 ..	\$ 2,689,812 ..	\$ 15,261,925 ..	\$ 3,593,785
Jan. 12,....	26,555,986 ..	4,151,824 ..	2,694,217 ..	15,001,591 ..	3,464,167
Jan. 19,....	26,172,473 ..	4,268,105 ..	2,754,815 ..	14,750,882 ..	3,416,292
Jan. 26,....	25,892,265 ..	4,443,781 ..	2,787,638 ..	14,891,200 ..	3,148,795
Feb. 2,....	25,801,981 ..	4,588,054 ..	2,778,818 ..	15,295,453 ..	2,699,627
Feb. 16,....	25,344,076 ..	4,881,426 ..	2,809,865 ..	14,904,783 ..	2,864,874
Feb. 23,....	25,146,864 ..	4,901,704 ..	2,795,113 ..	14,835,806 ..	2,878,996
Mch. 2,....	25,085,810 ..	5,006,938 ..	2,811,491 ..	14,868,786 ..	2,811,491
Mch. 9,....	24,626,588 ..	5,295,814 ..	2,896,492 ..	14,501,214 ..	2,788,978
Mch. 16,....	24,627,504 ..	5,533,320 ..	2,802,414 ..	15,018,566 ..	2,897,500
Mch. 23,....	24,603,908 ..	6,059,320 ..	2,764,090 ..	15,464,754 ..	2,776,645
Mch. 30,....	24,978,496 ..	5,200,068 ..	2,811,268 ..	15,800,147 ..	3,010,776
Apl. 6,....	25,413,186 ..	6,452,093 ..	3,070,220 ..	16,006,115 ..	3,135,784
Apl. 13,....	25,415,442 ..	6,675,122 ..	2,820,813 ..	16,458,833 ..	3,543,158
Apl. 20,....	25,309,955 ..	6,796,011 ..	2,641,055 ..	16,633,231 ..	3,332,073
Apl. 27,....	25,296,942 ..	6,250,137 ..	2,546,305 ..	15,749,282 ..	3,278,704
May 4,....	25,488,065 ..	5,898,802 ..	2,716,602 ..	15,671,997 ..	3,107,898
May 11,....	25,715,318 ..	5,738,048 ..	2,607,421 ..	15,528,151 ..	3,017,655
May 18,....	25,496,530 ..	5,553,551 ..	2,435,552 ..	15,549,797 ..	2,793,670
May 25,....	25,091,226 ..	5,643,220 ..	2,408,513 ..	15,410,522 ..	2,554,385
June 1,....	24,671,294 ..	5,718,826 ..	2,317,067 ..	15,806,666 ..	2,491,024
June 8,....	24,585,244 ..	5,767,994 ..	2,294,562 ..	15,267,675 ..	2,543,406
June 15,....	24,282,443 ..	5,927,466 ..	2,198,087 ..	15,379,559 ..	2,477,029
June 22,....	24,240,988 ..	6,336,744 ..	2,147,212 ..	15,740,672 ..	2,460,557
June 29,....	23,967,200 ..	6,688,393 ..	2,101,812 ..	15,997,943 ..	2,412,562
July 6,....	24,127,173 ..	6,956,112 ..	2,190,085 ..	15,851,924 ..	2,610,189
July 13,....	23,996,328 ..	7,255,798 ..	2,154,812 ..	16,129,765 ..	2,739,490
July 20,....	23,942,341 ..	7,477,298 ..	2,128,922 ..	19,190,876 ..	2,881,735

BANKS OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK.

Official Returns for 1859, 1860, 1861.

The returns of the banks of this city, as made upon the requisition of the Superintendent of the Bank Department, for the quarter ending June 22, 1861, are complete, and the statement compares with those for June, 1859, June, 1860, and March, 1861, as follows:

LIABILITIES.	June 25, 1859.	June 30, 1860.	March 16, 1861.	June 22, 1861.
Capital,.....	\$ 68,645,014 ..	\$ 69,758,777 ..	\$ 69,835,118 ..	\$ 69,650,605
Net profits,.....	7,555,451 ..	8,055,245 ..	7,337,888 ..	8,328,802
Circulation,.....	8,128,072 ..	8,723,385 ..	8,358,245 ..	8,297,715
Due banks,.....	23,744,605 ..	26,394,167 ..	28,219,700 ..	25,006,717
Depositors,.....	72,713,844 ..	79,988,633 ..	83,512,435 ..	77,158,416
Due others,....	571,902 ..	977,431 ..	1,262,660 ..	901,671
Total,.....	\$ 181,358,888 ..	\$ 193,897,638 ..	\$ 198,526,046 ..	\$ 189,343,926
RESOURCES.	June, 1859.	June, 1860.	March, 1861.	June, 1861.
Discounts,.....	\$ 118,543,934 ..	\$ 125,139,040 ..	\$ 117,232,347 ..	\$ 105,822,353
Stocks,.....	12,210,779 ..	12,601,564 ..	13,576,038 ..	17,851,260
Bonds and mort.,	503,312 ..	633,268 ..	556,071 ..	642,678
Real estate,.....	6,055,947 ..	6,314,469 ..	6,403,388 ..	6,440,873
Due by banks,...	6,213,431 ..	7,013,735 ..	5,574,256 ..	5,350,018
Cash items,.....	17,099,736 ..	19,070,961 ..	17,662,134 ..	13,205,922
Specie,.....	20,682,304 ..	23,054,639 ..	37,458,566 ..	39,972,361
Overdrafts,.....	49,445 ..	69,962 ..	63,246 ..	58,461
Total,.....	\$ 181,358,888 ..	\$ 193,897,638 ..	\$ 198,526,046 ..	\$ 189,343,926

The loans have diminished \$15,000,000 since June, 1860; while the stock investments have increased \$5,200,000, and the specie reserve \$16,900,000.

The Superintendent of the Bank Department makes known the following recapitulation of securities held for the banks of the State of New-York, July 1, 1861, compared with July 1, 1857:

	July 1, 1857.	July 1, 1861.	Decrease.
Bonds and mortgages,.....	\$ 8,099,801 ..	\$ 5,586,692 ..	\$ 2,513,108
New-York State stocks,.....	21,725,721 ..	19,420,099 ..	2,305,122
United States stocks,.....	498,220 ..	4,832,300
Illinois State stocks,.....	638,996 ..	410,250 ..	228,746
Arkansas State stocks,.....	212,000 ..	24,000 ..	187,000
Michigan State stocks,.....	172,000 ..	41,000 ..	131,000
Cash held,.....	77,357 ..	157,704
Total securities,.....	\$ 31,422,596 ..	\$ 30,472,045 ..	\$ 950,551
Total circulation,.....	29,842,618 ..	28,631,273 ..	1,211,340

INDIANA.

Official Statement, showing the Circulation, Securities and place of Redemption of the Free Banks of Indiana, now in operation.

	Securi- ties.	Circula- tion.		Securi- ties.	Circula- tion.
Bank of Goshen, Goshen,....	\$ 83,502	\$ 51,279	Kentucky St'k Bk., Columbus, \$	50,000	\$ 39,752
Bank of Salem, Salem,.....	82,500 ..	88,339	Salem Bank, Goshen,.....	64,962 ..	51,420
Bank of Corydon, Corydon, ..	61,000 ..	30,000	Exchange Bank, Attica,.....	83,810 ..	47,887
Bk. of Mt. Vernon, Mt. Vernon	128,315 ..	93,039	Exchange Bank, Greencastle,	88,758 ..	52,119
Bank of Elkhart, Elkhart,...	67,925 ..	50,222	Parke Co. Bank, Rockville,...	101,000 ..	76,701
Ind. Farmers Bk., Franklin, ..	61,000 ..	38,000	Cambridge City Bank,.....	86,334 ..	49,400
Bank of Salem, New-Albany,	92,500 ..	39,174	Bank of Paoli, Paoli,.....	63,968 ..	35,118
Southern Bank, Terre Haute,	123,000 ..	92,835	Lagrange Bank, Lima,.....	66,050 ..	51,123
Indiana Bank, Madison,.....	112,577 ..	74,452			
Prairie City Bk., Terre Haute,	75,000 ..	39,773		\$ 1,492,196	\$ 950,663

Free Banks of Indiana which are voluntarily retiring their Circulation.

	Securi- ties.	Circula- tion.		Securi- ties.	Circula- tion.
Bank of Rockville, Wabash,...	\$ 24,000	\$ 20,515	Canal Bank, Evansville,.....	\$ 1,000 ..	\$ 478
Huntington County Bank,...	500 ..	455	Indiana Stock Bank,.....	1,256 ..	1,256
Crescent City Bk., Evansville,	2,500 ..	1,824		\$ 29,256	\$ 24,528

Free Banks of Indiana that have withdrawn their Securities and filed the requisite bond.

	Circulation.		Circulation.
Brookville Bank, Brookville,...	\$ 7,683	Farmers' Bank, Westfield,.....	\$ 1,600
Merchants and Mech., N. Albany,	1,037	Hoosier Bank, Logansport,.....	1,225
Indiana Reserve Bank, Kokomo, ..	998	Fayette Co. Bank, Connersville, ..	1,688
Bank of Indiana, Michigan City, ..	7,405	Bank of Syracuse, Goshen,.....	7,405
Bank of Monticello,.....	120		\$ 29,161

Suspended Banks.—Annexed is a complete list of the suspended free banks of Indiana, the notes of which are redeemed at the Auditor's office, with the rate at which they are redeemed:

Atlantic Bank,.....	at 80	Bank of Rockport,.....	at par.
Bank of Albany,.....	at 90	Central Bank,.....	at par.
Bank of Albion,.....	at par.	Farmers' Bank, Jasper,.....	at 91
Bank of America,.....	at 87	Kalamazoo Bank,.....	at 90
Bank of Attica,.....	at 89	Laurel Bank,.....	at 82
Bank of Bridgeport,.....	at 88	Northern Indiana Bank,.....	at 83
Bank of Connersville,.....	at 87	N. Y. and V. State Stock Bank,	at par.
Bank of Gosport,.....	at par.	Orange Bank,.....	at par.
Bank of Perrysville,.....	at par.	State Stock Bank, Peru,.....	at 85
Bank of South Bend,.....	at par.	State Stock Bank, Marion,.....	at 90
Bloomington Bank,.....	at 85	Savings Bank of Indiana,.....	at 69
Boone County Bank,.....	at par.	Traders' Bank, Nashville,.....	at 92
Bank of T. Wadsworth,.....	at 91	Wayne Bank, Logansport,.....	at par.
Bank of N. America, Clinton,..	at 90		

ALBERT LANGE, Auditor of the State of Indiana, gives notice that all suspended banks, the notes of which are redeemed at the Auditor's office, are on the above list.

BANK ITEMS.

To BANKING INSTITUTIONS.—We have the address of a gentleman, qualified by experience, for discharging the duties of Teller, Book-keeper or Cashier of a bank. Any banking association in need of such services may address this office.

NEW-YORK.—The quarterly returns of the banks to the Bank Department at Albany were made under date of Saturday, June 22d.

Rome.—ENOCH B. ARMSTRONG, Esq., was, on the 11th June, elected President of the Bank of Rome.

Batavia.—A. N. COWDIN, Esq., was, on the 11th June, elected Cashier of the Bank of Genessee, to succeed MARCUS L. BABCOCK.

Niagara Falls.—The suspension of HOLLIS, WHITE & Co.'s Bank, of Niagara Falls, is announced. According to the last annual report of the Superintendent of the Banking Department, the circulation is \$14,998, protected by the deposit of \$15,000 of New-York State sixes.

Albany.—MR. HUSBAND, Superintendent of the Assorting (or Clearing) House of the Albany Banks, has resigned. It will continue its operations as heretofore. MR. S. MOFFAT, is at present the acting Superintendent.

MASSACHUSETTS.—The Franklin Savings Bank, at Boston, commenced business July 1, 1861. President, OSMYN BREWSTER; Secretary, B. C. CLARK, Jr.; Treasurer, H. WHITTEMORE. The bank proposes to pay four per cent. interest per annum on deposits, and to divide the surplus profits every three years among the depositors.

Annexed is a statement of the Rhode Island banks made on the 1st July:

	Providence.	Out of Providence.	Total.
Capital,.....	\$ 15,590,450	.. \$ 5,632,279	.. \$ 21,222,729
Circulation,.....	1,723,233	.. 1,315,534	.. 3,038,767
Deposits,.....	2,654,971	.. 835,912	.. 3,490,883
Due banks,.....	945,865	.. 77,892	.. 1,023,757
Loans,.....	19,046,487	.. 7,263,624	.. 26,310,111
Specie,.....	485,629	.. 139,926	.. 625,555
Bank notes,.....	547,078	.. 120,955	.. 668,033
Due by banks,.....	1,087,836	.. 386,304	.. 1,474,140

CONNECTICUT.—L. W. CARROLL, Esq., was, on the 3d June last, elected President of the Quinnebaug Bank, Norwich, Connecticut, in place of SAMUEL C. MORGAN, Esq., resigned.

WISCONSIN.—Some months since, when the currency panic first broke out in its fury, the solvent banks of Milwaukie determined upon a list of banks whose circulation they would protect and countenance until the 1st of December next, when the new banking law takes effect. Subsequently, the depression of public stocks became so great that a number of these banks were rendered almost worthless, and their bills were discredited. A revision of the list of banks to be received was then made, and the principal Milwaukie banks and bankers signed an agreement to receive the circulation of a certain published list at par, the same not being actually worth that, but merely so received for the purpose of supplying the State with a currency. In June last it was reported that the Milwaukie banks had determined to throw out the notes of a number of these banks that they had agreed to protect, and which they had been, up to that day, and during the day, paying out. This report obtained general circulation among the populace and created an intense excitement. The feeling was particularly violent among the German population, many of whom held notes of these to-be discredited banks. The first demonstration was made at the Second Ward Bank. The telegraph has already informed us of what the mob did, and we therefore omit the details, which do not vary substantially from those already published. The following is a list of the banks, the throwing out of which led to the disturbance, with their circulation and the value of their securities:

<i>Amount of circulation, May 28.</i>		<i>Value of securities, May 28.</i>		<i>Amount of circulation, securities, May 28.</i>		<i>Value of securities, May 28.</i>	
Bank of Columbus, . . .	\$ 63,851	..	70.9	Dodge County Bank, . .	20,257	..	60
Bank of Grant County, ..	60,016	..	62.1	La Crosse County Bank,	12,800	..	50.4
Bank of Green Bay, . . .	43,964	..	66.9	Northern Bank,	19,060	..	56.7
Bank of Portage,	47,223	..	75	Wisconsin Pinery Bank,	46,361	..	75.5
City Bank of Kenosha, ..	19,411	..	63.1	Waupun Bank,	22,063	..	72.9

MISSOURI.—LOUIS C. BILLON, Esq., was, on the 3d of June last, elected Cashier of the Bank of St. Louis, in place of WILLIAM E. BURR, Esq., who is now Cashier of the branch of the same bank at Boonville.

Small Notes.—The Bank of St. Louis has commenced the issue of small notes. The other banks are getting them ready as fast as possible, and will be able to supply the demand in a few days.

NORTH CAROLINA.—According to a statement in the Raleigh papers, the banks of North Carolina have resolved to loan the State twenty per cent. of their capital stock. The amount tendered by the Bank of North Carolina was \$500,000, and by the Bank of Cape Fear about \$300,000.

PRIVATE BANKERS.

ILLINOIS.—Messrs. A. C. BADGER & Co., (late of the firm of A. D. HUNT & Co., Louisville, Kentucky,) have opened an office for the transaction of a general banking and collection business at Chicago.

MICHIGAN.—Mr. McNAIR, banker, of Kalamazoo, has failed. It is said to be a very bad failure, and will be felt heavily in that community. Messrs. PRATT & PERRIN, bankers, of Niles, have also made an assignment.

MASSACHUSETTS.—Messrs. ALDERMAN & GORE, bankers, Boston, suspended early in July, 1861.

BANK DIVIDENDS, JULY, 1861.

New-York Bank Dividends, January and July, 1860 and 1861.

NAME OF BANK.	Capital. June, 1861.	1860.		1861.		July, 1861. Amount.
		Jan.	July.	Jan.	July.	
Atlantic Bank,.....	\$ 400,000
Bank of America,.....	3,000,000	3½	3½	3½	3½	\$ 105,000
Bank of Commerce,.....	9,148,480	3½	3½	3	3	274,454
Bank of New-York,.....	3,000,000	3	3	3	3	90,000
Bank of North America,....	1,000,000	3½	3½	3½	3½	35,000
Bank of the Commonwealth,	750,000	3½	3½	3½	3	22,500
Broadway Bank,.....	1,000,000	5	5	5	5	50,000
Butchers and Drovers' Bk.,	800,000	5	5	5	5	40,000
Chatham Bank,.....	450,000	3½	3½	3½	3	13,500
Chemical Bank,.....	300,000	6	6	6	6	18,000
Continental Bank,.....	2,000,000	3½	3½	3
East River Bank,.....	206,525	3½	3½	3½	3½	7,228
Grocers' Bank,.....	300,000	3½	3½	3½	3½	10,500
Hanover Bank,.....	1,000,000	3½	3½	3½	3	30,000
Importers and Traders' Bk.,	1,500,000	4	4	4	3	45,000
Irving Bank,.....	500,000	3½	3½	3	3	15,000
Market Bank,.....	1,000,000	3½	3½	3½	3	30,000
Mechanics' Bank,.....	2,000,000	4	4	4	3½	70,000
Mercantile Bank,.....	1,000,000	5	5	5	4	40,000
Merchants' Exchange Bank,	1,235,000	3½	3½	3½	3	37,050
Metropolitan Bank,.....	4,000,000	4	4	4	3	120,000
New-York County Bank,...	200,000	3½	3½	3½	3	6,000
North River Bank,.....	400,000	3½	3½	3½	3	12,000
New-York Dry Dock Bank,	200,000	4	4	4	3½	7,000
New-York Exchange Bank,	150,000	4	4	4	3	4,500
Park Bank,.....	2,000,000	4	4	4	4	80,000
People's Bank,.....	412,500	3½	3½	3½	3½	14,437
Phenix Bank,.....	1,800,000	3½	3½	3½	3½	63,000
Seventh Ward Bank,.....	500,000	5	5	5	5	25,000
Tradesmen's Bank,.....	1,000,000	4	4	4	3	30,000
Total,.....	\$ 42,252,505					\$ 1,295,169

By the above table it appears that only two of the banks have passed their dividends out of thirty. In view of the exigencies of the country, and of the uncertainty as to the future, we think that sound policy would dictate a stronger reserve fund. By the quarterly statements of the fifty-four banks, it seems that the capital is \$69,650,605, and that the net reserved profits were,

June, 1860,..... \$ 8,055,245

June, 1861,..... 8,328,802

or about twelve per cent. on the 29th June, 1861.

Baltimore Bank Dividends, July, 1861.—Merchants' Bank, 4½ per cent.; Union Bank of Maryland, 3½ per cent.; Chesapeake Bank, 4 per cent.; Farmers and Planters' Bank, 4 per cent.; Bank of Baltimore, 3½ per cent.; Franklin Bank, 3 per cent.

KENTUCKY.—The Bank of Kentucky has declared a dividend of four per cent. The Farmers' Bank of Kentucky also a dividend of four per cent., for six months, both payable in July. Northern Bank of Kentucky, a regular dividend of three per cent., and an extra dividend of five per cent.

St. Louis Bank Dividends, July, 1861.—Union Bank, 3 per cent.; Bank of the State of Missouri, 3 per cent.; Exchange Bank, 3 per cent.; Southern Bank of St. Louis, 3 per cent.; Mechanics' Bank, 3 per cent.

Notes on the Money Market.

NEW-YORK, JULY 24, 1861.

Exchange on London, at sixty days' sight, 107½ @ 107½.

THE market has been abundantly supplied with money for first-class paper, and "on call" on collaterals of the best stamp, but for all other securities the negotiation is difficult. We hear of loans on call at as low a figure as five per cent., mainly on government and State loans. The volume of business is reduced so largely, as compared with last winter, that but little first-class paper is made in our city. Our business men, and especially our manufacturers, have curtailed their operations and their obligations as rapidly as possible during the past four months; and nearly every department of trade and commerce is marked with stagnation. The only activity visible is in those articles that are required for war purposes, or for the use of troops and government officials. The business among the banks of our city is cut down fully one-third, and the loans reduced from 129 millions, as on the first January, to 112 millions at this date. The loans of the Boston banks are three millions below the highest aggregate of the year 1861; Philadelphia, also, three millions.

We annex the ruling rates for business paper at this date, compared with the last week in April, May and June:

	April 20. Per cent.	May 22. Per cent.	June 24. Per cent.	July 24. Per cent.
Loans on call, State Stock securities,.....	5½ @ 7 .. 5½ @ 7 .. 5 @ 6 .. 5 @ 6			
" other good securities,.....	7 @ 7½ .. 8 @ 9 .. 6 @ 7 .. 6 @ 7			
Prime endorsed bills, 60 days,.....	6 @ 7 .. 7 @ 10 .. 6 @ 7 .. 5 @ 6			
First class single signatures, 4 to 6 months, .	7 @ 8 .. 8 @ 10 .. 8 @ 12 .. 7 @ 9			
Other good bills,.....	8 @ 10 .. 10 @ 12 .. 12 @ 15 .. 9 @ .			
Names less known,.....	12 @ 24 .. 15 @ 30 .. no sale. .. no sale.			

The specie movement, under the existing course of foreign trade, is of course a limited one in exports, while every steamer brings increased sums from Europe. We annex the foreign export for each year since 1852, embracing from first January to third week in July:

1852,.....	\$ 14,411	1857,.....	\$ 25,677
1853,.....	10,997	1858,.....	14,736
1854,.....	18,122	1859,.....	40,838
1855,.....	18,363	1860,.....	26,106
1856,.....	18,475	1861,.....	3,254

The domestic exports of New-York for the last fiscal year have reached the enormous sum of 118 millions of dollars, which is largely in excess of the export of any previous year, and in excess of that of the two years ending June 30, 1859. The following table presents the general results for the past year, as compared with the preceding four years:

Foreign Imports at New-York for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1857—1861.

ENTERED.	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
For consumption,....	\$ 141,430,109 ..	\$ 94,019,659 ..	\$ 158,451,780 ..	\$ 164,881,435 ..	\$ 106,706,066
For warehousing,....	62,275,672 ..	44,463,806 ..	32,665,650 ..	38,523,572 ..	54,498,823
Free goods,.....	16,036,530 ..	23,665,487 ..	27,518,177 ..	27,936,396 ..	29,121,710
Specie and bullion,...	6,441,855 ..	9,324,384 ..	1,611,700 ..	2,377,315 ..	34,075,161
Total entered,.....	\$ 226,184,167 ..	\$ 171,473,336 ..	\$ 220,247,307 ..	\$ 233,718,718 ..	\$ 224,401,260
Withdrawn,.....	27,950,212 ..	49,376,593 ..	27,108,299 ..	29,657,025 ..	36,162,363

The table of exports presents still stronger contrasts, especially in the items of domestic produce and in specie and bullion, viz.:

Exports from New-York to Foreign Ports for the fiscal years ending June 30.

	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
Domestic produce,...	\$ 75,928,942 ..	\$ 55,931,987 ..	\$ 53,804,893 ..	\$ 70,249,811 ..	\$ 118,189,878
For. mdse., (free,)....	2,396,903 ..	3,104,160 ..	2,202,863 ..	3,335,038 ..	2,224,564
For. mdse., (dutiable,)	3,932,370 ..	7,309,672 ..	3,596,336 ..	6,354,055 ..	6,111,228
Specie and bullion,...	44,348,468 ..	34,322,071 ..	46,839,444 ..	58,097,646 ..	23,860,867
Total exports,.....	\$ 126,606,683 ..	\$ 100,667,890 ..	\$ 106,443,541 ..	\$ 138,036,550 ..	\$ 150,386,522
Exclusive of specie,	82,258,215 ..	66,345,819 ..	59,604,097 ..	79,938,904 ..	126,525,665

The large shipments of produce to England and the Continent this year, with reduced importations of foreign goods, serve to keep the exchanges at a discount. The ruling rates for bankers' bills on London this month have been $106\frac{1}{2}$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}$, closing to-day at $107\frac{1}{2}$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}$ for sixty days; Paris, 5.40 @ 5.30 francs per dollar. Produce bills on Liverpool and London have ranged from $103\frac{1}{2}$ @ $105\frac{1}{2}$, closing to-day at $104\frac{1}{2}$ @ $105\frac{1}{2}$, which is a large discount, the par of exchange between New-York and England being about 109.25 @ 109.50, or \$4 84 @ \$4 85 per sovereign or pound sterling. We annex the current quotations, compared with the closing rates of April, May and June, for bankers' sixty day bills:

	April 20.	May 22.	June 24.	July 24.
London, bankers' bills,.....	$106\frac{1}{2}$ @ $106\frac{1}{2}$..	$105\frac{1}{2}$ @ $106\frac{1}{2}$..	$105\frac{1}{2}$ @ $105\frac{1}{2}$..	$107\frac{1}{2}$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}$..
Do. mercantile bills,....	105 @ 106 ..	105 @ 106 ..	$104\frac{1}{2}$ @ 105 ..	$105\frac{1}{2}$ @ $106\frac{1}{2}$..
Do. with bills of lading,.	105 @ $105\frac{1}{2}$..	$103\frac{1}{2}$ @ $104\frac{1}{2}$..	$102\frac{1}{2}$ @ 104 ..	$104\frac{1}{2}$ @ $105\frac{1}{2}$..
Paris, bankers' bills,.....	5.35 @ 5.30 ..	5.45 @ 5.25 ..	5.40 @ 5.37 ..	5.30 @ 5.27 ..
Amsterdam, per guilder,....	$39\frac{1}{2}$ @ 40 ..	39 @ 40 ..	39 @ $39\frac{1}{2}$..	$40\frac{1}{2}$ @ 41 ..
Bremen, per rix dollar,.....	$76\frac{1}{2}$ @ 77 ..	77 @ 78 ..	$75\frac{1}{2}$ @ $76\frac{1}{2}$..	$77\frac{1}{2}$ @ 78 ..
Hamburg, per marc banco,.	$35\frac{1}{2}$ @ $35\frac{1}{2}$..	35 @ $35\frac{1}{2}$..	$34\frac{1}{2}$ @ $35\frac{1}{2}$..	$35\frac{1}{2}$ @ 36 ..

In State loans the market has been active, with a decided improvement. The highest sale of government six per cents this month was 90; five per cents of 1874 sold $8\frac{1}{2}$ above the highest price of the month of June; Virginia six per cents, 2; Tennessee, $4\frac{1}{2}$; Georgia, 10; Missouri, $6\frac{1}{2}$. These prices arise after a knowledge, on the part of capitalists and operators, that the States of Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee and North Carolina have, for the present at least, suspended payment of interest. We annex quotations of the government and leading State securities in this market for the past eight weeks:

	June 1st.	8th.	15th.	22d.	29th.	July 6th.	13th.	20th.
U. S. 6 per cents, 1867-8,....	86 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	84	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	89	89 $\frac{1}{2}$
U. S. 5 per cents, 1874,.....	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	77	79	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ohio 6 per cents, 1886,.....	95	96	90	86	88	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	92
Kentucky 6 per cents,.....	76	76	78	80	72	76	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	78
Indiana 5 per cents,.....	79	80	78	76	76	74	76	77
Pennsylvania 5 per cents,...	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$..	75	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	78
Virginia 6 per cents,.....	45 $\frac{1}{2}$	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	42	39	43	46	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	47
Georgia 6 per cents,.....	55	55	60	53	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	58	62 $\frac{1}{2}$..
California 7 per cents, 1877,.	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	76	77	78	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	77
North Carolina 6 per cents,...	53	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	52	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	50	50 $\frac{1}{2}$	61	58
Missouri 6 per cents,.....	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	38	38 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	44 $\frac{1}{2}$
Louisiana 6 per cents,.....	54	55	54	51	58	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	59	57
Tennessee 6 per cents,.....	41	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	36	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	38 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	43 $\frac{1}{2}$

The market for rail-road shares has been very active during the month, and prices have recovered from the low values quoted in June last. We note an advance in New-York Central shares $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. above the highest sale in June; Erie, $5\frac{1}{2}$; Hudson River, $3\frac{1}{2}$; Harlem, 2; Reading, $5\frac{1}{2}$; Michigan Southern, 3; Panama, $2\frac{1}{2}$; Rock Island, $8\frac{1}{2}$; Galena and Chicago, $4\frac{1}{2}$.

We annex the ruling cash rates for leading rail-road shares in this market during the past eight weeks. [Those with a star pay no dividend at present:]

	June 1st.	8th.	15th.	22d.	29th.	July 6th.	13th.	20th.
N. Y. Central R. R. shares,.....	72½	71½	72½	73½	73½	73½	76½	77
*N. Y. and Erie R. R. shares,...	23½	21½	23	22½	22½	22½	23½	27
*Harlem R. R. shares,.....	10½	10	10	9½	10	9½	10	11½
*Reading R. R. shares,.....	31½	30½	32	32½	33½	33½	37	38½
*Hudson River R. R. shares,....	34½	31½	31½	32½	32½	33	35	37½
*Michigan Central R. R. shares,.	42	40	42	42	44½	43	44½	45
*Michigan Southern R. R. shares,	11½	10½	11½	11½	12½	12	13½	14
Panama R. R. shares,.....	102	104	106½	108	105	107½	109	112
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. shares,	45	40	40	42	39½	37½	40½	40½
*Illinois Central R. R. shares,...	69	62½	65½	65½	67	65½	67	67½
*Cleveland and Toledo R. R.,...	23½	20½	22½	22½	24½	24	27	30½
*Chicago and Rock Island R. R.,	34½	32½	35	35½	35	34½	38½	43½
Galena & Chicago R. R. shares,	57½	56	59½	60½	60½	61½	64½	65½
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy,	55	53	55½	56	..	54	58	61½

The Michigan Central Rail-Road directors say that a small dividend has been earned the past six months, but they deem it proper that it should be used for the improvement of the roadway—a very proper decision, and one which best promotes the interests of the company. The policy of disbursing dividends when the money is required for maintaining the roadway, has been too often adopted, to the detriment of stockholders.

The Massachusetts State loan for \$1,000,000, at six per cent., has been taken this month at 1½ per cent. premium and upwards. The Ohio State six per cent. loan has been taken at par. The New-York State seven per cent. loan of \$700,000 was taken at a premium of 1.38 to 4.50 per cent. Rhode Island has negotiated a State loan of \$100,000, at a fraction under six per cent. interest. The average bids for the Michigan State loan were at 85; a portion of the loan is on the market at 90. Bids for the Indiana six per cent. loan of \$1,300,000 were made at 81 @ 88.90. The Connecticut State loan of \$800,000 was taken at par and a fraction over.

Congress, on the 17th July, passed an "Act to authorize a national loan, and for other purposes," by which the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered, within twelve months from that date, to borrow the sum of two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, "or so much thereof as he may deem necessary for the public service, for which he is authorized to issue coupon bonds, or registered bonds or Treasury notes, in such proportions of each as he may deem advisable." The tone of public sentiment is such, that we have no fears that any difficulty will be experienced by the Treasury in the negotiation of such portions of this sum as shall be from time to time required. The bonds will be issued for the term of twenty years, bearing not over seven per cent. interest; the Treasury notes, in sums not less than fifty dollars, and bearing interest at the rate of 7.30 per cent. per annum, (equivalent to two cents per day on each hundred dollars.)

The Treasury Department, by the same act, is authorized to issue Treasury notes for sums between ten and fifty dollars in payment of salaries and other dues, and in exchange for coin. These will not bear interest, but will be repayable on demand, and may be converted into Treasury notes bearing interest.

Discount and Money Market.—Of the London money market the London *Economist*, of July 6th, says: "The demand for money was very active at the commencement of the week, owing to the preparations for the fourth of the month, when, as usual, large quarterly payments became due. In the discount market no business was transacted under six per cent., and the applications at the bank were on a very large scale. Yesterday, however, there was more ease, but to-day there has again been a good demand, although not so heavy as previously. Occasionally the best short paper was taken this afternoon at a fraction below six per cent., but these transactions were altogether exceptional. On the Stock Exchange loans on government securities are still sought, and the rate remains at six per cent., with an upward tendency. It has been officially announced that a subscription will be opened at the Bank of France for the issue of 300,000 bonds of 440 francs each, bearing twenty francs a year interest, and redeemable in thirty years at 500 francs. This will represent a total of about £5,300,000, which is to be applied to the construction of railways."

NAMES OF PRIVATE BANKERS

AND OTHERS,

Whose Cards (with their references) may be found on the cover of "The Bankers Magazine," or "The Merchants and Bankers' Almanac" for 1861

New-York,.....**Mut. Life Insur. Co.**
 ".....Guardian Life Insurance Co.
 ".....New-York Life Insurance Co.
 ".....Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
 ".....Bk. of British N. A. (Agency.)
 ".....National Bank Note Co.
 ".....American Bank Note Co.
 ".....Bradstreet's Reference Guide.
 ".....D. Plumb & Co's Ref. Guide.
 ".....Coleman & Co., Wm. T.
 ".....Duncan, Sherman & Co.
 ".....Samuel Hallett & Co.
 ".....Peters, Campbell & Co.
 ".....E. Morrison, 17 Nassau.
 ".....Schuchardt & Gebhard.
 ".....Merklee & Thatcher.
 ".....Locke & Craigie, Plumbers.
 ".....Taylor Brothers, Bankers.
 ".....Wm. A. Wheeler.
Geneva,.....Schell & Hemmup, Bankers.

Mass.—Boston,..**Burnett, Drake & Co.**
 ".....Chickering & Sons.
 ".....Walker, Wise & Co.

Conn.—New-Haven, **W. W. Bacon.**

Pa. Philada.,..**Davis & Birney.**
 ".....Work, McCouch & Co.
 ".....Peterson & Brothers.
Bradford,.....E. P. Steers & Co.
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 ".....Moore, Sherman & Co.
Rockford,.....Lane, Sanford & Co.

Springfield,.....N. H. Ridgely & Co.
 ".....J. Bunn.

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Io.—Cedar Rapids, Carpenter, Stibbs & Co.
Clinton,.....Budd & Baldwin.
Davenport,.....Macklot & Corbin.
Fairfield,.....Bernhart Henn & Co.
Fort Dodge,.....Charles A. Sherman.
Iowa City,.....J. H. Gower & Co.
Keokuk,.....Wm. Thompson & Co.
Muscatine,.....Green and Stone.
Sioux City,.....Weare & Allison.
Washington,.....State Bank of Iowa

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Ann Arbor,.....Hale & Smith.
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 ".....National Insurance Co.
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Ohio.—Cin......Gilmore, Dunlap & Co.
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San Antonio,.....John C. French.

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
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
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For List of Sizes, Prices, &c., Bankers are referred to my Circular. Nearly all the principal Banking Institutions in the United States are using my Safes, to whom those desirous of purchasing are referred.

THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

EDITED BY J. SMITH HOMANS, JR.

ACTUARY OF THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, OF NEW-YORK.

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SEPTEMBER, 1861.—CONTENTS.

	Page
ART. I. THE GOVERNMENT LOAN OF AUGUST, 1861—PROCEEDINGS OF THE BANK CONVENTION AT NEW-YORK,.....	161
II. Review of the New-York Stock Market for the month of July, with lowest and highest sales, 1860 and 1861,.....	171
III. The English Money Market for July, with quotations of Consols, Exchequer Bills and Railway Shares, 1859, 1860, 1861,.....	175
IV. The Kossuth Notes Case in England—Decision of the English Court of Chancery,.....	177
V. WHAT IS MONEY? 1. Monopolies are against the ancient and fundamental laws of England. 2. Money consists of Gold and Silver only. 3. Copper Coin unknown to the law as currency. 4. Considerations on Paper Money. 5. Paper notes are a matter of Credit, not of Money,.....	186
VI. THE PAWNBROKERS OF PARIS—Description of the Mont de Piété. By E. ABOUR. 1. What the Mont de Piété is. 2. Early History. 3. Reverses. 4. Borrowing. 5. Selling off. 6. The Customers. 7. The Commissioner's Duties. 8. Profits. 9. Innovations. 10. Victims of Usury. 11. Troubles. 12. Past and Present Condition,.....	192
VII. The Pawnbrokers' Bank of Dantzic,.....	200
VIII. Charter and By-Laws of the Loaners' Association of New-York,.....	208
IX. Life Insurance in France,.....	215
X. National Loan Act of the United States, July 17, 1861,.....	219
XI. BANK STATISTICS. 1. New-York. 2. Boston. 3. Pittsburgh. 4. Philadelphia. 5. New-Orleans. 6. Bank of Egypt. 7. Kentucky. 8. Bank of the State of Indiana. 9. South Carolina. 10. Bank of England. 11. Bank of France,.....	224
XII. FOREIGN ITEMS.—1. Financial Scandal in Paris. 2. Pawnbrokers in Paris. 3. Bankrupt in High Life,.....	232
XIII. Private Bankers—Changes in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, &c.,.....	236
XIV. BANK ITEMS—New Banks—Bank Failures—Bank Dividends—Foreign Banks,.....	233
XV. Notes on the Money Market and Stock Market of New-York, for August, 1861,.....	237

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July, 1861.

COLLECTIONS IN THE SOUTH AND WEST.

Several new banking houses have commenced operations lately. The cards of these may be found on the cover of this work, or in the Bankers' Almanac for 1861, and a complete list of all the banking houses, as well as of all the banks in the United States, may be found in the "Merchants and Bankers' Almanac," for 1861. The cards of bankers in the following places may be found on the cover of this Magazine, or in the Bankers' Almanac, for 1861:

MASSACHUSETTS.—Boston.—New York.—New York City, Geneva, Phelps.

PENNSYLVANIA.—Philadelphia, Scranton, Bradford, Towanda.—MARYLAND.—Baltimore.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.—Washington.

VIRGINIA.—Fredericksburg, Richmond.

CALIFORNIA.—Sacramento, San Francisco.

ILLINOIS.—Chicago, Carlinville, Moline, Ottawa, Rockford, Quincy, Springfield.

INDIANA.—Richmond.

IOWA.—Cedar Rapids, Clinton, Fairfield, Davenport, Fort Dodge, Iowa City, Keokuk, Muscatine, Sioux City, Washington.

KENTUCKY.—Louisville.

MICHIGAN.—Ann Arbor, Battle Creek, Grand Rapids, Niles.

MINNESOTA.—Minneapolis, St. Paul.

MISSOURI.—St. Louis.

OHIO.—Cincinnati, Dayton, Sandusky, Toledo, Zanesville.

TENNESSEE.—Memphis.—TEXAS.—Galveston, Palestine, San Antonio, Houston.

WISCONSIN.—Milwaukee.

CANADA.—Kingston, &c.

KANSAS.—Leavenworth City.

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THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
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Statistical Register.

VOL. XI. NEW SERIES. SEPTEMBER, 1861.

No. 3.

THE GOVERNMENT LOAN OF AUGUST, 1861.

THE month of August has been marked by one of the most important financial negotiations of the present century. The banking institutions of three cities have agreed, in convention, and on one day, to take the new treasury loan to the extent of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars. There is no parallel of this in history; and it indicates strongly the prevailing conviction on the part of our merchants, bankers, bank stockholders and capitalists that they must stand by the government in its endeavors to re-establish the laws of the country upon a more permanent and solid foundation than previously existed.

If we are again to become and remain a united people, as contemplated by the constitution and laws which were framed alike by all the States, it will be obviously necessary to prevent a recurrence of the rebellion which is now in force; and to establish such principles as will hereafter be fully assented to by all parties and by all extremes of the Union.

Congress having passed laws authorizing the issue of government bonds and treasury notes to the extent of two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, (per act, pp. 219—221 of this No.,) Secretary CHASE, of the Treasury Department, had an interview with the representatives of the banks at New-York on the 10th August, and daily thereafter until the 16th, when the negotiations were fully completed, whereby he had a guarantee of the taking, by them, of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars of the new bonds and notes issued under the above act. The following is an official summary of the proceedings of the several inter-

views held by the banks with Mr. CHASE on the 15th and 16th. The agreement entered into was as follows :

At a meeting of bank officers, held at the American Exchange Bank, on Thursday, August 15th, 1861, at which thirty-nine banks of this city were represented, the following plan for assisting the United States government was unanimously adopted—the votes being taken by a call of names :

SECTION 1. An immediate issue to be made by the United States Treasury Department of treasury notes dated August 15, 1861, bearing interest from that date, at 7.30 per cent., to the extent of fifty millions dollars.

SEC. 2. The banks of New-York, Boston and Philadelphia associated, to take jointly this fifty millions at par, with the privilege of taking at par an additional fifty millions October 15th, by giving their decision to the department October 1st; and also at par fifty millions December 15th, by giving their decision December 1st, unless said amount shall have been previously subscribed as a national loan. It being understood and agreed, that no other government stocks, bonds or treasury notes, (except treasury notes payable on demand, and the Oregon war loan,) shall be negotiated or paid out by the government until February 1st, 1862, should the associates avail of both privileges, or until December 15th, 1861, should they avail of the first only, or until October 15th, 1861, if they take but the present fifty millions, except that the government may negotiate in Europe or through subscriptions to the national loan.

SEC. 3. An appeal to the people for subscriptions to the national loan, to be made by the government, and as the subscriptions for the notes progress and the moneys are paid in, the same shall be paid over to the government or deposited with banks selected by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the concurrence of a committee of the associates; and so much of the proceeds of said loan as shall be required for the purpose, shall be applied in re-imbursement of the associates for subscriptions by them paid in and not otherwise reimbursed. The treasury notes issued to the associates, so far as the New-York banks are concerned, shall be received by the Loan Committee of New-York banks at ninety per cent. as a basis for issuing clearing-house certificates to any bank desiring under the existing arrangement, (which must necessarily be continued,) and the subscription of the banks shall be in the proportion of capital, except that the interest and proportion of no one institution shall exceed one-tenth of the whole fifty millions of dollars.

SEC. 4. On the 1st of October, should the associates, for any cause, decide not to avail of the privilege of taking the second fifty millions, then the balance of notes remaining of the fifty millions already taken by them shall be apportioned and divided among them, (*pro rata*), and they shall make payment for their respective proportions.

SEC. 5. Of the sums subscribed by the associates, ten per cent. shall be paid forthwith to the Assistant Treasurer at New-York, Boston or

Philadelphia, and the residue shall be placed to the credit of the United States on the books of the banks subscribing. Certificates shall be issued to each subscriber, stating the amount so paid in and deposited; and as the deposits shall be withdrawn or paid into the treasury, (which shall be, as nearly as may be, in proportion of the several subscriptions.) Treasury notes bearing 7.30 interest shall be issued in equal amounts to the subscribers respectively. And when the deposits shall be entirely paid to the United States, treasury notes for ten per cent. originally paid shall also be issued, and all notes issued to such subscribers shall bear even date with the certificates, and carry interest from such date.

SEC. 6. In *part* payment of deposits for the first fifty million dollars, the Treasury Department will receive from the associates any past due treasury notes, or sixty day treasury notes. Should the second amount of fifty million dollars be taken by the associates the department will receive, on account of deposits, any treasury notes outstanding, except 7.30 per cent. notes.

SEC. 7. The transaction on the part of the associates may be conducted by a committee in New-York, in which the banks of Boston and Philadelphia should be represented; which committee should meet daily for the direction of details, and at least weekly for deliberation and consideration of important business.

SEC. 8. In addition to the banks of New-York, Boston and Philadelphia, it would be desirable that other parties should become associate—say trust companies, savings banks, insurance companies and private bankers—who in lieu of *pro rata* of capital should designate, when joining the association, what amount of interest they decide to take.

SEC. 9. The capital of the banks of New-York, Boston and Philadelphia, and the respective proportions under a *pro rata* division would be as follows :

	<i>Bank Capital. Pro rata proportion of fifty millions.</i>	
New-York,.....	\$ 70,000,000	.. \$ 29,500,000
Boston,.....	38,000,000	.. 15,500,000
Philadelphia,.....	12,000,000	.. 5,000,000

It is proposed that the division should be, say to

New-York,.....	\$ 30,000,000
Boston,.....	15,000,000
Philadelphia,.....	5,000,000

New-York, August 15, 1861.

Proceedings of a Meeting of Bank Officers, held Thursday, August 15, 1861.

An adjourned meeting of bank officers was held August 15th, at the American Exchange Bank, at 11 o'clock, A. M., JOHN A. STEVENS, Esq., of the Bank of Commerce, in the chair, and GEORGE S. COE, of the

American Exchange Bank, Secretary, when the following banks were represented, viz. :

Bank of New-York,	Mechs. and Traders' Bank,	Saint Nicholas Bank,
Manhattan Company,	Bank State of New-York,	Shoe and Leather Bank,
Merchants' Bank,	American Exchange Bank,	Continental Bank,
Mechanics' Bank,	Bank of Commerce,	Bank of Commonwealth,
Union Bank,	Ocean Bank,	Oriental Bank,
Bank of America,	Pacific Bank,	Marine Bank,
Phenix Bank,	Bank of the Republic,	Atlantic Bank,
City Bank,	People's Bank,	Importers and Traders' Bk,
Tradesmen's Bank,	Bank of North America,	Park Bank,
Merchants' Exchange Bank,	Hanover Bank,	Mechanics' Bank'g Assoc'n,
National Bank,	Irving Bank,	Grocers' Bank,
Butchers & Drovers' Bank,	Metropolitan Bank,	East River Bank,
Manufacturers and Merchants' Bank.		

Thirty-seven banks at roll-call; subsequently the Citizens' Bank and the Market Bank were represented.

The following banks, members of the Clearing-House Association, were not represented, viz. : Fulton Bank, Chemical Bank, Greenwich Bank, Leather Manufacturers' Bank, Seventh Ward Bank, Broadway Bank, Mercantile Bank, Chatham Bank, Nassau Bank, Corn Exchange Bank and North River Bank. Eleven banks not represented.

The chairman called the attention of the meeting to the second section of the report of the committee, as amended but not adopted by the meeting of the preceding day. A full discussion of the section, as amended, followed, participated in by Messrs. J. E. WILLIAMS, W. A. BOOTH, CALEB BARSTOW, M. M. FREEMAN, SHEPHERD KNAPP, JOSEPH M. PRICE, THOMAS TILESTON, JAMES PUNNETT, JAMES GALLATIN, GEORGE S. COE, J. A. STEVENS, Messrs. MERCER and PATTERSON, of Philadelphia, and GRAY, of Boston. During the discussion Mr. PUNNETT offered the following resolution, viz. :

Resolved, That it is the sense of this meeting that the Secretary of the Treasury should only resort to the issue of the treasury notes, payable on demand, as a very last resort, after all other modes of issue shall have been exhausted.

This resolution was afterwards withdrawn.

Mr. GRAY, of Boston, presented the following plan for the consideration of the meeting, viz. :

The banks of New-York, Boston and Philadelphia, with such other banks as shall be associated with them, under regulations to be established by the banks in the three cities named, to take of the United States government a loan of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars. The whole amount of the loan to be placed at the credit of the United States on the books of the several banks, and to draw interest, at the rate of 7 3-10 per cent. per annum, from this date. The Secretary of the Treasury to draw the sums required from time to time, but not exceeding fifty millions in the aggregate before October 4th, 1861, nor exceeding an additional fifty millions in the aggregate before November 23d, 1861. *Provided*, That if the committee of the associated banks give notice to the Secretary of the Treasury, on or before October 1st, 1861, that the associated banks desire not to take beyond fifty millions

of said loan, the agreement is entirely at an end for any amount beyond fifty millions, in which case the banks shall have no claim for interest on any amount beyond fifty millions of the original subscription.

The second section of the report of the committee, as amended, was then adopted by a unanimous vote.

The third section of the report was then read. Mr. BARSTOW moved to amend the section by inserting "90 per cent." in place of "75 per cent." The amendment was adopted, twenty-three banks voting in the affirmative and nine banks in the negative.

Mr. VERMILYE moved to strike out the words inclosed in brackets, at the close of the third section, as follows, viz.: "Except that the interest and proportion of no one institution shall exceed one-tenth of the whole." After an explanation of the object proposed by the clause, made by Mr. VAIL, the proposed amendment was withdrawn by Mr. VERMILYE. Mr. GALLATIN renewed the motion, which was seconded by Mr. PUNNETT.

Mr. JOHN E. WILLIAMS, of the Metropolitan Bank, moved to add the words "fifty millions of dollars" to the clause after the words "one-tenth of the whole." Mr. GALLATIN then withdrew his motion, and the amendment proposed by Mr. WILLIAMS was adopted.

Mr. PRICE proposed the following, as a substitute for part of the third section, viz.:

Resolved, That the notes thus purchased, as received, shall be held in trust, by a committee appointed for that purpose, for the respective associated banks, in the proportion that the whole amount of notes bears to the amount of capital, and that they be empowered to dispose of the same, in sums to suit purchasers, for their par value and accrued interest to date of sale.

Resolved, That said committee shall apportion to each bank the amount required to meet the payment of each stated draft of the Secretary of the Treasury, after having deducted the par of such sales as shall have been made since the payment of the next preceding drafts of the Secretary, and that they deposit the accrued interest received to their own credit, the same to be apportioned monthly, after deducting the expenses properly pertaining to the discharge of their duties.

On motion, the proposed substitute was laid on the table. The third section, as amended, was then adopted by a unanimous vote.

The fourth section was read, and, without alteration, adopted unanimously.

On motion, the whole of the fifth section, as reported, was withdrawn by the chairman of the committee, and the following substituted, viz.:

Of the sums subscribed by the associates, ten per cent. shall be paid forthwith to the Assistant Treasurers at New-York, Boston or Philadelphia, and the residue shall be placed to the credit of the United States on the books of the bank subscribing, and certificates shall be issued to each subscriber, stating the amount so paid in and deposited; and as fast as the deposits shall be withdrawn or paid into the treasury, which shall be, as nearly as may be, in the proportion of the several subscriptions, treasury notes, bearing 7 30-100 per cent. interest, shall be issued, in

equal amounts, to the subscribers respectively; and when the deposits shall be entirely paid to the United States, treasury notes, for the ten per cent. originally paid, shall also be issued; and all notes issued to such subscribers shall bear even date with the certificates, and carry interest from such date.

The fifth section was then adopted unanimously, as were also, after reading, and a separate vote in each instance, the sixth, seventh and eighth sections.

The ninth and last section of the report was read, and the blanks filled as follows, viz.:

New-York,.....	\$30,000,000
Boston,.....	15,000,000
Philadelphia,.....	5,000,000

The section was then adopted unanimously.

The report of the committee, as amended, was then adopted unanimously on call of the ayes and nays, the following banks voting in the affirmative, viz.:

Bank of New-York, Manhattan Company, Merchants' Bank, Mechanics' Bank, Union Bank, Bank of America, Phenix Bank, City Bank, Tradesmen's Bank, Merchants' Exchange Bank, National Bank, Butchers and Drovers' Bank, Mechanics and Traders' Bank, Bank of the State of New-York, American Exchange Bank, Bank of Commerce, Ocean Bank, Pacific Bank, Bank of the Republic, People's Bank, Bank of North America, Hanover Bank, Irving Bank, Shoe and Leather Bank, Continental Bank, Oriental Bank, Atlantic Bank, Importers and Traders' Bank, Park Bank, Mechanics' Banking Association, East River Bank, Manufacturers and Merchants' Bank. Thirty-two banks voting aye, including all the banks represented.

The following banks, members of the Clearing-House Association, were not present at the call of the ayes and nays, viz.: Fulton Bank, Chemical Bank, Greenwich Bank, Leather Manufacturers' Bank, Seventh Ward Bank, Broadway Bank, Mercantile Bank, Chatham Bank, Metropolitan Bank, Citizens' Bank, Nassau Bank, Market Bank, Saint Nicholas Bank, Corn Exchange Bank, Bank of the Commonwealth, Marine Bank, Grocers' Bank, North River Bank. Eighteen banks not represented.

On motion, the following gentlemen were appointed a committee to wait upon the banks not represented at this meeting, viz.: MOSES TAYLOR, SHEPHERD KNAPP, W. A. BOOTH and C. P. LEVERICH.

Mr. GALLATIN offered the following resolution, which was adopted unanimously:

Resolved, That the thanks of this meeting be presented to the gentlemen representing the banks of Boston and Philadelphia, for their prompt response to the invitation to unite with the banks of this city in the consideration of the very important subject which has now been acted upon, and for the valuable aid and assistance which they have rendered.

The resolution was responded to by Messrs. MERCER and PATTERSON, of Philadelphia, and Mr. GRAY, of Boston.

Mr. R. W. HOWES offered the following resolution, viz. :

Resolved, That the committee of the association, on behalf of the New-York banks, shall consist of seven persons, to be appointed by the chairman, with the advice and approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, and we recommend that the president of the Bank of Commerce be chairman of that committee.

Mr. VERMILYE offered the following resolution, viz. :

Resolved, That copies of the plan this day adopted by the banks of New-York in aid of the government be sent to the banks of Boston and Philadelphia and their co-operation in the same be urgently solicited.

At the suggestion of Mr. W. A. BOOTH, that the chairman of the meeting invite the Secretary of the Treasury to be present and hear a report of the proceedings thus far in relation to the loan, a committee was appointed to wait upon him for that purpose.

After the action of the meeting had been stated to Mr. CHASE by the chairman, that gentleman addressed the association, expressing his entire satisfaction at the result to which they had arrived, and his belief that it would tend to the greater prosperity of the banks and to the highest welfare of the nation.

On motion, it was

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to whom shall be referred the plan adopted, and the various suggestions in respect to details, who shall conform them to the existing arrangements for the exchanges between the associated banks.

The chairman appointed the following gentlemen as that committee, viz. : JAMES GALLATIN, G. S. COE, H. F. VAIL, JOSEPH M. PRICE and J. PUNNETT.

On motion of Mr. A. V. STOUT, it was

Resolved, That the resolution offered by Mr. PRICE, and now lying on the table, be referred to the last appointed committee.

Mr. MOSES TAYLOR offered the following resolution, viz. :

Resolved, That the thanks of this meeting are due and are cordially tendered to Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury, for the patient, clear and forcible manner in which he has presented to us the financial condition of the government and the country, in the several interviews which he has held with us while in the city. That he has confirmed the confidence which we had before entertained in the wisdom, integrity and efficiency of the administration of his department of the government.

On motion of Mr. W. A. BOOTH, it was unanimously *Resolved*, That this meeting, in assuming the grave responsibility of furnishing means to sustain the government in this important crisis, beg leave respectfully to express to the President of the United States its confident expectation that the government will, without respect to party or personal considerations, so conduct its affairs in every department of administration as to insure vigor, integrity, economy and efficiency, to the triumphant termination of the war.

A copy of the last resolution, signed by the chairman and secretary of this meeting, was directed to be sent to the President of the United States, after which the meeting adjourned to meet at twelve o'clock the following day, at the same place.

We learn that the Treasury Department will immediately begin the gradual issue and employment of United States notes of the convenient denominations of fives, tens and twenties, payable on demand in specie, on presentation at the branch offices of the treasury, designated in the corner of each note. We have already seen the specimen sheets of the notes made payable at the office of the Assistant Treasurer in New-York. They are now ready for use at Washington; taking the place of small gold coin at all points of government disbursement where these United States notes are equally valuable, as a medium of exchange on the great cities, and even preferable to gold. We believe it is no purpose of the government to force a large circulation of these notes. Their redemption in specie will be amply provided for at the specified points of payment, and the proportion which may be floated—in other words, withheld as a circulating medium from immediate presentation—will be left entirely to the degree of popularity which they may attain through the country.

Mr. Cisco, the Assistant Treasurer, undertakes the work of forwarding to Washington the offers of all parties, whether for small or large amounts, and arranges for all the necessary detail attending the transaction. It is probably not generally understood that the interest on the 7.30 notes is payable semi-annually, every 1st of January and July, and not at the time of redemption. Ample provision was made for its payment by the last Congress.

The order to engrave the United States Treasury notes, authorized by the act of July 17th, was received by the American Bank Note Company July 25th, and since that time from thirty to forty first-class artists have been engaged in preparing the plates for the printers. The work has so far progressed that we are enabled to give a general description of the notes to be forwarded to Washington for signature by persons appointed to sign them for the Register of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.

The following plates have been engraved, and are now printing as rapidly as possible:

Eight plates of four five dollar notes on each, payable in the following places: New-York, Boston, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Cincinnati. The names of the places are engraved on the notes. The notes are printed in two colors, green and black on the face, and green on the back. The green is indestructible, and is a perfect protection against photographic counterfeiting. The \$5 note is embellished on the left margin with a full length figure of "AMERICA" standing on a globe, with the motto, "*E Pluribus Unum*," and on the right a portrait of ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

There are five plates of \$10's, four notes on each, made payable at the places specified above, and printed in the same colors as the fives. On the left is an admirable likeness of President LINCOLN; in the centre the

American eagle; and on the right a full length figure representing the Arts.

Five plates of \$20's, payable as above, and in the same tints, in the centre of which is a full length figure of Justice. The other parts of the note are filled with a combination of geometrical lathe work and other securities against counterfeiting. These notes are all executed in the finest style of engraving, and are really beautiful works of art.

Of these notes, a portion of the \$10's will be the first in circulation. These notes are all payable on demand; they are a little larger than ordinary bank notes, and are much smaller than the 7 3-10 interest notes, and were reduced in size for convenience as a circulating medium.

In addition to these notes, the following 7 3-10 interest notes, payable three years after date, the interest payable semi-annually, are in the course of preparation, and some of them will be issued on the 1st of September.

Fifties, distinguished by a very large engraving of the American eagle; one hundred dollar notes, which will be ornamented with an engraving of General SCOTT, the best and most life-like portrait of the original we have ever seen; the five hundreds have in the centre a portrait of WASHINGTON, on the left a figure of Justice, and on the right a figure of Fortune.

The \$1,000 note has a fine portrait of Secretary CHASE; the \$5,000 note has a picture of an Indian woman supporting the arms of the United States, with an appropriate background and a figure of Justice on the left.

The 7 3-10 interest notes specify on the face that they are convertible into twenty years 6 per cent. United States bonds, and also state the interest per day on the notes of each denomination.

The notes have been prepared with great care and excellent taste. The different denominations, from \$5 to \$5,000, are printed in the same tints and have the same general character. The design of the Treasury Department has been to give these issues an identity as government securities; and while the various denominations differ from each other, there is a general similarity which distinguishes them from the ordinary bank note circulation.

The Boston Bankers and the Government Loan.

A meeting of the banks of Boston was held on Saturday, August 17, at the Clearing-House, to consider the question of endorsing the action of their committee at the New-York bank consultation. HON. WILLIAM GRAY described the proceedings of that meeting, and the determination to which it had come. The policy recommended and defined by him was freely discussed by the gentlemen representing the various banks of the city.

MR. J. G. CARNEY, of the Bank of Mutual Redemption, moved that the banks of Boston accept so much of the New-York programme as to subscribe \$10,000,000 toward the government loan.

MR. CHARLES B. HALL, of the National Bank, suggested that this was the just proportion of Boston.

Mr. HAVEN, of the Merchants' Bank, remarked that the banks of Providence, Hartford, and other New-England cities, would probably make up the amount to the \$15,000,000 apportioned to Boston at the New-York meeting. The motion to take \$10,000,000 passed unanimously.

HON. WILLIAM GRAY said that he should communicate the result of the deliberation of this meeting to the New-York committee, and then his functions as a member of the committee of the banks here would end, and he should not probably meet the bank representatives again. But he wished to say before leaving, that the situation of the country, so far as the government was concerned, as deduced from reliable information, was peculiar.

It could not be denied that the departments at Washington do not respond as readily to the will of the people as they should. There is great doubt whether that singleness of purpose exists, and efficient action is secured which the times demand. It is nearly certain that the Cabinet is not a unit.

The banks, having responded so patriotically in furnishing money to carry on the war, have the right to advise those entrusted with its expenditure, and upon whom the whole management of affairs depends. Mr. GRAY suggested the expression of some opinion on the part of the banks, and the appointment of a committee to acquaint the President with their sentiments.

On motion of Mr. C. B. HALL, the thanks of the meeting were unanimously presented to Mr. GRAY for his valuable services in representing the Boston banks.

To carry out Mr. GRAY's idea, on motion of Mr. WALLEY, of the Revere Bank, the banks resolved, without a dissenting voice, that they cordially respond to the sentiments of the New-York banks in the confident expectation that the government will, without respect to party or personal consideration, so conduct its affairs in every department of administration as to insure vigor, integrity, economy and efficiency to the triumphant termination of the war.

The following named gentlemen were chosen to communicate the opinion of the Boston banks to the President: HON. WILLIAM GRAY, WILLIAM T. ANDREWS, of the City Bank, and ANDREW T. HALL, of the Tremont Bank.

ENGLAND raised a "royalty loan" of eighteen millions sterling (seventy million dollars) in one day in 1798, when her population was less than ten millions. France raised five hundred millions of francs (and had offers for five times that sum) in 1855-56. The French government, in July, received bids for a five per cent. loan of 150,000,000 francs. The bids exceeded four thousand millions of francs, or thirteen times the sum required. A "popular loan" of one hundred millions of dollars, distributed through the twenty-four loyal States, would cause no drain of specie from the West to the East, or from the East to Europe. Every well-managed bank and insurance company would take a part of such a loan, and capitalists, even in the small towns of Wisconsin, Iowa and other Western States, would take their share.

REVIEW OF THE STOCK MARKET OF NEW-YORK.

Lowest and Highest sales for cash from January 1, 1861, to July 30, 1861.

BONDS AND STOCKS.	YEAR 1860.		JAN., 1861.		FEB., 1861.		MARCH, 1861.		APRIL, 1861.		MAY, 1861.		JUNE, 1861.		JULY, 1861.		Closing quotations, 31 July, '61.
	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	
United States six per cent., 1863....	95	109½	97	100	94	100	95	95½	89	95	80	95	75	78½	82	90	79½
U. S. five per cent., 1874, coupon, ..	85	104½	92	97	85	93½	85	90	75	89½	76	79½	75	78½	76	82	79½
Indiana State five per cent.,	88	93	87½	91	85	88	85	87½	88	93	80	80	78	80	75	77½	77
Virginia six per cent. bonds,	73	95	74½	77½	72	80	74	81	36	70½	43½	51½	39	48	44	50	50
Tennessee six per cent. bonds,	64	93	72	76½	67	76½	72	77	41	75½	40½	47½	34½	41½	37	45½	42½
Georgia six per cent. bonds,	102	105	94	97	88	94	88	91	81	88	60	60½	53	60	57	70	61
North Carolina six per cent. bonds, ..	76	100	74	82	74	82½	78	82	45	81	58	62	44	53	48	62	61½
California seven per cent. bonds, ..	82	95	86½	88	86	88	87½	88	78½	87½	71½	75	76½	78	74½	78½	75½
Missouri six per cent. bonds,	61	84½	67	72½	64	70½	63½	69½	37½	66	85	42	36	40½	37½	46½	41½
Canton Company shares,	14	23½	14½	15	14	15	14	15	8	14½	8½	10	8½	9	9	9½	9½
Cumberland Coal Co., preferred,	8	17½	8½	9½	7	8½	7	7½	6	7½	4	5½	4½	4½	4½	5½	4½
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, ..	70	107½	84½	94	80½	88	82	88½	50	86	60½	71	59	69	77	71½	71½
New-York Central Rail-Road,	70	92½	75½	82½	75½	80½	75½	80	63	75½	71½	78½	71½	74½	78½	79½	75½
Erie Rail-Road shares,	8½	43	34½	40½	30	36	30	35	17	32½	19½	23½	21½	23½	22½	29	28½
Hudson River Rail-Road,	36	66	44	49½	40½	46½	43	47	33	45½	34	37½	31½	34½	32	38	34
Harlem Rail-Road,	8	24	15	16½	14	16½	15½	16½	11½	16½	10½	12½	8½	10½	9½	12½	10½
Harlem Rail-Road, preferred,	27	55	36	42	34	43	38	41½	28	41½	25½	31½	20½	25½	22½	29½	25½
Reading Rail-Road shares,	80	49½	37	45½	38½	47½	39	46	29½	44½	30½	32½	30½	33½	38	39½	36½
Michigan Central Rail-Road,	84½	73½	51½	61½	49½	60½	54	60	40	55½	40	46	39½	44½	41	47½	42
Michigan S. & N. Indiana R.R.,	5	25	18½	16½	12½	15½	14½	18½	12½	17½	10½	18½	10½	12½	12	15½	14
Michigan S. & N. Indiana, guar., ..	12½	50½	33	38	27½	34	33	39½	26	39½	24½	29½	23½	27½	26½	38½	27½
Panama Rail-Road shares,	106	146½	112	117½	112	116	115	117½	97½	116½	99	107	104	109	105	111½	106
Illinois Central Rail-Road shares, ..	51½	89½	74½	88½	69	84½	75½	83	55½	81½	57	71	62	69	62	69½	62½
Galena and Chicago Rail-Road,	55	82½	63	74½	66½	74½	68½	74	55	73½	55½	61	56	61½	60½	66½	61½
Cleveland and Toledo Rail-Road, ..	18½	49½	31½	37½	27½	38	33	37	22½	36½	20½	25½	20½	21½	23½	38	26½
Chicago & Rock Island Rail-Road, ..	42½	54½	52½	62	52½	61½	56	61	34	58	30½	39	32½	36½	34	45	39½
Illinois Central Construction bonds, ..	81	100½	94	97	95	97	97	102½	85	98	89	92½	89	92	89	92	89½
Pennsylvania Coal Company,	73½	87	77	80	76	80	76	80½	72	81	75	77	76	77½	73	79	77
Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., ..	80	101½	85	92	87	92	85	90	82	90	80	84	79	83½	80	85½	85

THE NEW-YORK STOCK MARKET FOR JULY.

THE fluctuations in shares have been wide, resulting in an improvement at the end of the month compared with the close of June. In government six per cent. bonds of 1868 there have been sales at 89 @ 90. The five per cent. bonds have ranged from 76 to 82, with moderate sales. In six per cent. treasury notes there have been few sales at par. The lowest price reached was 96 $\frac{1}{4}$ (on the 30th.)

In State loans there has been, to holders, a satisfactory advance. Tennessee six per cents have ranged from 37 @ 45 $\frac{1}{2}$; Virginia, 44 @ 50; North Carolina, 48 @ 62; Missouri, 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 46 $\frac{3}{4}$; Georgia, 57 @ 70. California seven per cents exhibit, at present, more steadiness than the bonds of the Atlantic States. Georgia sixes have brought better prices during the month than the others. North Carolina seems to be next in public favor, while the bonds of Missouri and Virginia, owing to their large amounts on the market, are low and fluctuating constantly. North Carolina in July sold 9 per cent. higher than in June; Tennessee, 4 per cent. better; Missouri, 6 $\frac{1}{4}$.

Coal company shares are more in favor. Delaware and Hudson have reached 86 $\frac{1}{2}$; Pennsylvania Coal Company, 78 @ 79; Cumberland Coal Company, 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 5 $\frac{3}{4}$. In rail-road shares the improvement is more visible, following satisfactory returns as to the monthly revenues of leading companies. New-York Central shares have sold in July 4 $\frac{5}{8}$ above the highest price in June; Erie Rail-Road, 5 $\frac{5}{8}$; Hudson River, 3 $\frac{1}{2}$; Harlem, 2; Harlem preferred, 4; Reading, 5 $\frac{3}{4}$; Michigan Central, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$; Michigan Southern, 3; Panama, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$; Illinois Central, $\frac{3}{4}$; Galena and Chicago, 5; Chicago and Rock Island, 8 $\frac{1}{2}$; Cleveland and Toledo, 11 $\frac{3}{8}$.

The traffic on nearly all the rail-roads in the Northern States, and throughout the whole of our territory in which civil war is not raging, is good; showing, in many cases, for the month of June, considerable increase over the corresponding month for 1860. The movements of produce have been, and continue to be, large. The new crop bids fair to equal that of 1860, supplying abundant eastern-bound freight for the year to come. Passenger business on all the roads is light, as well as western-bound freight. The country is consuming not one-quarter the usual amount of merchandise. In all the States in rebellion the rail-roads are substantially surrendered up to the Confederates, who pay for their use in Confederate bonds. The Mobile and Ohio Rail-Road Company, just opened at the commencement of the outbreak, will be severely injured by the war. The upper portion of the road is not run by the company. Most of the Southern roads long since ceased all payments to the North, on account of current supplies and business; and we presume that the great majority of them hereafter will pay neither dividends nor interest on the debts till the war closes.

MONTHLY EARNINGS OF RAIL-ROADS FOR JUNE, 1861.

ROADS.	June, 1861.	June, 1860.
Buffalo, New-York and Erie,.....	\$46,774	\$44,603
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy,.....	147,056	152,423
Chicago and Rock Island,.....	86,841	97,358
Cleveland and Toledo,.....	60,687	55,180
Erie, (new company),.....	529,757	401,560
Galena and Chicago,.....	164,933	93,448
Hudson River,.....	123,282	129,996
Illinois Central,.....	188,194	188,060
La Crosse and Milwaukee,.....	106,002	50,780
Michigan Central,.....	133,619	123,095
Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien,.....	139,816	48,797
New-York and Harlem,.....	87,492	87,492
Philadelphia and Reading,.....	270,061	278,269
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago,.....	206,373	165,795
Toledo, Wabash and Western,.....	79,073	67,073
Watertown and Rome,.....	32,120	31,453

FLUCTUATIONS IN THE STOCK AND SHARE MARKET OF LONDON,
FOR 1859, 1860, 1861.

Subjoined is a table of the fluctuations in the stock and share market during the month of July, 1861. The range of Consols, which was $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in June, has on this occasion been only 1 per cent., and the result of the month's operations has been to establish the recovery of three-quarters per cent., or a half per cent., reckoning accrued dividend. In the railway share market there has been little average alteration. On the *Paris Bourse*, during the month, there has been a rise of only one-eighth. We add, also, the comparative rates for July, 1859, January and July, 1860, and January, 1861, in the price of Consols and Exchequer bills and in rail-road shares:

	JULY, 1859.		JAN., 1860.		JULY, 1860.		JAN., 1861.		JULY, 1861.	
	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.
Consols,.....	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	89 $\frac{1}{4}$	90 $\frac{1}{4}$
Exchequer Bills,....	21s.	21s. pm.	16s.	33s. pm.	4s. ds.	4s. pm.	10s. ds.	2s. pm.	7s. ds.	2s. pm.
RAILWAYS.										
Brighton,.....	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	113	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	116	118
Caledonian,.....	80	85	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{2}$
Eastern Counties,..	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	56	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	57	50	53 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	50
Great Northern,...	100	105	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	119	110	114	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$
Great Western,....	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	71 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	73	68 $\frac{1}{2}$	75	70 $\frac{1}{2}$	71 $\frac{1}{2}$
Lond. and N. West.,	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	98	102	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$
Midland,.....	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	105 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	129	137 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$
Lanc. & Yorkshire,	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$
Sheffield,.....	85	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	89 $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	47 $\frac{1}{2}$
South Eastern,....	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	75	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$
South Western,....	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	93	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	96 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. East.—Berwick,	89	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	105	107 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. East.—York,....	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	77	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	94 $\frac{1}{2}$
Lombard Venetian,	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ pm.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ pm.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ds. par.	2 ds.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ds.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ds.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ds.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ pm.
East Indian,.....	97	141	102	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	99	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$

THE ENGLISH MONEY MARKET.

SUBJOINED is a comprehensive table, from the London *Economist*, affording a comparative view of the Bank of England returns, the bank rate of discount, the price of Consols, the price of wheat, and the leading Continental exchanges, during a period of four years, corresponding with the first week in August, as well as ten years back, viz., in 1851:

	Aug. 1, 1851.	Aug. 1, 1858.	Aug. 1, 1859.	Aug. 1, 1860.	Aug. 1, '61.
BANK OF ENGLAND—					
Circulation, bank post bills, .	£ 21,615,000	£ 21,602,000	£ 23,130,000	£ 22,770,000	£ 20,998,000
Public deposits,	4,758,000 ..	4,103,000 ..	5,323,000 ..	4,234,000 ..	3,701,000
Other deposits,	9,022,000 ..	14,319,000 ..	14,351,000 ..	14,717,000 ..	12,194,000
Government securities,	13,464,000 ..	10,774,000 ..	11,208,000 ..	9,758,000 ..	9,466,000
Other securities,	11,800,000 ..	15,400,000 ..	17,690,000 ..	19,712,000 ..	18,547,000
Reserve of notes and coin, ..	7,549,000 ..	10,997,000 ..	9,493,000 ..	8,164,000 ..	6,548,000
Coin and bullion,	13,894,000 ..	17,340,000 ..	17,330,000 ..	15,758,000 ..	12,196,000
Bank rate of discount,	3 per ct. ..	3 per ct. ..	2½ per ct. ..	4 per ct. ..	5 per ct.
Price of Consols,	96¾ ..	96¾ ..	95¾ ..	98¾ ..	90¾
Average price of wheat,	42s. 4d. ..	45s. 8d. ..	43s. ..	57s. ..	51s. 2d.
Exchange on Paris, (short,) ...	25 fcs. ..	25 5 ..	25 5 ..	25 10 ..	25 87½
Amsterdam, (short,)	11 16¾ ..	11 16 ..	11 12¾ ..	11 14¾ ..	11 18¾
Hamburg, (3 mos.),	13 8¾ ..	13 7 ..	13 4¾ ..	13 5¾ ..	13 10¾

Of this comprehensive view of the London money market, the *Economist* adds the following remarks:

1851. The second week of July, 1851, the "Ecclesiastical Titles Bill" had passed the House of Commons, and had been read a first time in the House of Lords. "The Inhabited House Duty Bill" had also gone through the Commons. A grand entertainment had been given to the Queen and Prince ALBERT, by the Lord Mayor and Corporation of London, in honor of the great exhibition. A commercial treaty had just been concluded between England and Sardinia, the object of the latter being to make as great an approach as possible to free trade. The accounts of the revenue of Great Britain and Ireland, for the financial year ending 5th April, 1851, had been made up, and showed a surplus of nearly three millions.

The third week in July, 1851, the House of Lords had just thrown out a bill to admit Jews into Parliament. In France, M. DE TOCQUEVILLE had prepared an able report in favor of a revision of the constitution. The Sardinian Chamber of Deputies had just approved a treaty of commerce and navigation with Holland. The accounts from California reported the extraction of large quantities of gold from quartz by machinery. The London money market continued easy.

The fourth week of July, 1851, the French Chamber had failed to carry, by the required majority, the proposed revision of the constitution, thus paving the way to the *coup d'état* in the following December. The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was passing through the House of Lords. The Peace Congress has met at Exeter Hall, and the most hopeful views were indulged in, with regard to the cessation of war in the future. The attendance at the great exhibition continued unabated.

At the close of July, 1851, Mr. GLADSTONE's celebrated letters on the tyranny and misgovernment of the Courts of Naples and Rome were exciting a great sensation. The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill had just passed the House of Lords. The great exhibition continued to attract crowds, and the policy of removing the building from Hyde Park was being discussed. The reactionary movement in Germany was making further progress, the Duke of ANHALT-DESSAU having suspended the constitution to which he had deliberately pledged himself. There was less ease in the London money market, but the best bills were taken at $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.

1858. The second week in July, 1858, the arrivals of gold were large, and money very easy.

The third week in July, 1858, the best bills were discounted at $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. The Queen was about to visit the Emperor of the French at Cherbourg. The adjudication of the New-Zealand, at four per cent., guaranteed loan of £300,000, had taken place at the reserved price of 107.

The fourth week in July, 1858, considerable animation was observable in the stock market, in anticipation of a pacific speech from the Emperor of the French at Cherbourg. A favorable influence was also exercised by the news of a great defeat of the Sepoy mutineers near Lucknow, and a favorable statement by Lord STANLEY in respect to the prospects of Indian finance.

At the close of July, 1858, the approaching issue of a fresh batch of Indian government debentures did not prevent a steady rise in the funds, which were also favorably affected by the receipt of more encouraging advices from the *Paris Bourse*. Good securities of all descriptions were in increased demand for investment. Great excitement had been occasioned by the announcement that the Atlantic telegraph had been successfully laid.

1859. The second week in July, 1859, capital was also abundant; the rate of discount at the bank was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and in Lombard-street $2\frac{1}{4}$. The preliminaries of peace had been signed between France and Austria.

The third week in July, 1859, the English funds had fallen nearly one per cent. The market was principally affected by the decline in French *rentes*, and the impending pecuniary demands of the Indian government.

The fourth week in July, 1859, the bank rate of discount was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., yet the funds were one per cent. lower than in 1858, when the rate was three per cent. It should, however, be observed, that a drain of gold existed at the bank, and that adverse political rumors were beginning to create uneasiness.

About the first of August, 1859, an increased demand for money arose, in consequence of the extension of trade following the restoration of peace between France and Austria. Money was one-quarter per cent. higher in the general discount market than at the Bank of England, and the great Lombard-street establishments raised the rate they allowed for money, at seven days' call, from $1\frac{3}{4}$ to 2 per cent.

1860. The second week in July, 1860, intelligence had been received of the outbreak of the massacres in Syria. The Prince of Wales had

left England on his visit to the British-American Colonies and the United States. The Great Eastern had arrived at New-York. GARIBALDI continued to make steady progress in the liberation of the Two Sicilies. In Parliament, the chief business had been the privilege resolutions in the Commons on the paper duty question, and the votes for the war in China.

The third week in July, 1860, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had presented his financial statement in the House of Commons, and the Attorney-General had withdrawn his bankruptcy bill. The East India Railway Company had announced the issue of a million and a half in debentures. The creditors of the great leather house of STREATFIELD, LAURENCE & MORTIMORE had held a meeting, when the parties principally interested announced their intention of sending the affair into the Court of Bankruptcy. The Syrian massacres were exciting much interest and indignation. Disturbances continued to prevail in Naples. The recall of Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN from the governorship of Madras had exercised a good effect in Calcutta.

The fourth week in July, 1860, no domestic event had occurred of any importance, and the debates in Parliament were generally without interest. From abroad, news had arrived of the evacuation of Sicily by the royalist troops, and of the commencement of the campaign of GARIBALDI on the main land. France was preparing for an early embarkation of troops for Syria. The Emperor of Austria and Prince Regent of Prussia had met at Toplitz.

About the first of August, 1860, an important letter from the Emperor NAPOLEON to Count de PERSIGNY, his ambassador in London, on the policy of France towards England, had just been published. After some negotiation, the representatives of the Great Powers had agreed to a convention respecting the proposed French intervention in Syria. At home, attention was chiefly directed to the intended outlay of £9,000,000, extending, however, over several years, which had just been voted by the House of Commons for fortifications. Money was in rather more demand in London at four per cent.

LOAN SOCIETIES.—The Marquis of TOWNSHEND, speaking of these associations as a cause of distress, says:

"So far from being a benefit to the poor, they constitute a very plague spot in this country. Your readers will hardly be prepared to credit the indisputable fact that these harpies wring out of the wretched borrowers of a few pounds such an amount in the shape of inquiry fees, fines, expenses and interest, as generally exceeds 200 per cent. per annum. This system of plunder usually terminates in results almost too fearful to contemplate. The unwary mechanic, or small shopkeeper, in a moment of temporary embarrassment, is unable to resist the temptation held out by specious advertisements, setting forth that loans from £1 to £100 at 5 per cent. interest, repayable by weekly instalments, can immediately be obtained at the office of ——— Society, and becomes a victim by heartless usurers. In proof of what I have just stated as regards this system of gross extortion and oppression, I will refer only to the scenes that continually occur in the metropolitan small debt courts. Revelations are there made of the practice of crushing usury, by which thousands of our struggling poor are reduced to utter destitution. The Royal Benevolent Society helps those who are willing to help themselves. It advances to the industrious and respectable small sums of money, to be repaid by instalments without any charge or interest whatever. That this system has been crowned by success, is proved by the fact that the repayments are almost always made with the greatest punctuality."

THE KOSSUTH NOTES CASE IN ENGLAND.

INTERNATIONAL LAW—FRAUD—INJUNCTION—PAPER CURRENCY.

In the English Court of Chancery, Lincoln's Inn, London, before the Lord Chancellor and the Lords Justices of Appeals.

In the Court of Chancery, on the 12th of June, the Lord Chancellor and the Lords Justices gave judgment on the appeal against the decree of Vice-Chancellor STUART, restraining Messrs. DAY and M. KOSSUTH from issuing notes representing the currency of Hungary. The Lord Chancellor said he agreed with the Vice-Chancellor that, under the circumstances, the court had jurisdiction in the case, and that, as this was an attempt to interfere with the currency of Hungary, of which the Emperor of Austria was the acknowledged king, the plaintiff had a perfect right to come to this court to ask protection. The appeal must be dismissed. The Lords Justices concurred. An offer was made on the part of the Emperor to forego his costs, on condition that the notes were destroyed. This was not acceded to, and it was arranged that the notes should be cancelled, and the paper, when reduced to pulp, sold to Messrs. DAY at the market price, the plaintiff to have the costs of the appeal.

The following is the report in full :

THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA *vs.* DAY AND KOSSUTH. (*Judgment.*)

These appeals by the defendants from a decree of Vice-Chancellor STUART were argued at the beginning of the present term, and stood over for judgment. It will be recollected that the object of the suit was to compel the defendants, Messrs. DAY & SONS, to deliver up to be cancelled no less than twenty-three tons weight of bank notes, purporting to be notes of the Hungarian State or nation, which had been engraved by them by order of the defendant, KOSSUTH. The Vice-Chancellor granted a perpetual injunction in the terms of the prayer of the bill, and from this decision the defendants appealed.

Mr. R. PALMER, Sir H. CAIRNS and Mr. COTTON appeared for the Emperor of Austria; Mr. BACON and Mr. WICKENS for the appellants, the DAYS; and Mr. COLLIER, (of the common law bar,) Mr. C. T. SIMPSON, Mr. TOULMIN SMITH and Mr. WESTLAKE for KOSSUTH.

The Lord Chancellor delivered judgment.—I must confess that, when I first read, from the short hand writer's notes, the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor in this case, serious doubts entered my mind whether it could be supported. The injunction appears to be ordered with a view to prevent an injury, of a public kind, to what the plaintiff asserts to be "his legal rights, claimed by him as the acknowledged possessor of the sovereign power in a foreign State at peace with this kingdom." The printed paper manufactured by the defendants, "purporting to represent public paper money of Hungary," is said to be intended "to be circu-

lated at some future time as the public paper money of Hungary, in exercise of some contemplated power hostile to that of the plaintiff, and intended to supersede it." The question is stated to be, "whether the defendants can be allowed to continue in possession of this large quantity of printed paper, manufactured and held by them for such a purpose? Or whether the plaintiff has the right, which he claims, to be protected against the invasion of the defendants, and to have delivered up to him what has been thus prepared and made ready to be used for a purpose hostile to his existing right?" His Honor goes on to observe, that "the regulation of the coin and currency of every State is a great prerogative right of the sovereign power, recognised and protected by the law of nations, and to be recognised as a legal right, because the law of nations is part of the common law of England." He adds, that "the manufactured paper in the possession of the defendants ready be used for a purpose adverse to the existing right of the plaintiff, and being made for no other purpose, and not being capable of being used for any other purpose, except one hostile to the sovereign rights of the plaintiff, and not being property of a kind which, like *warlike weapons*, may be lawfully used for other purposes—if the court were to refuse its interference, the refusal would amount to a decision that it has no jurisdiction to protect the legal right of the plaintiff." The Vice-Chancellor seems to grant the injunction as a protection of the prerogatives of the plaintiff, as King of Hungary, and to have chief regard to the allegation in the plaintiff's bill, that the notes were to be used in Hungary, "in violation of the rights and prerogatives of the plaintiff, as king of that country, for the promotion of revolution and disorder there." The notes are supposed to differ from "warlike weapons" only in this, that warlike weapons may be lawfully used for legitimate purposes, whereas the notes can only be used in hostility to the rights of the plaintiff, as king of Hungary—leading to the inference that if there were clear proof of "munitions of war" being manufactured and kept in this country for the express purpose of fitting out a warlike expedition against Venice or any other part of the Austrian dominions, the Court of Chancery would grant an injunction against such a use of them, and would order them to be delivered up to be destroyed.

However, in arguing the appeal in this court, the counsel for the plaintiff have entirely repudiated any claim to the injunction on the ground of a mere invasion of any prerogative of the plaintiff as a reigning sovereign, or of the notes being to be used to effect a revolution, or for any political purpose; and they have very freely admitted that this court has no jurisdiction to interfere merely with a view to prevent revolution, and that is only to prevent an injury to property that, in a case like this, its aid, by injunction, can be invoked. The appellants first contend that the bill is demurrable, making no case for the relief sought, even if its allegations be admitted to be true. But on this point I can entertain no doubt, for, discarding all that the bill says about "revolution" and "hostility to the rights of the plaintiff as sovereign of Hungary," it alleges (what, perhaps, might have been assumed) that he has the privilege of authorizing the issue in Hungary of notes for payment of money to be circulated in that country as money; that the circulation of Hun-

gary consists of notes of the National Bank of Austria, issued under his authority as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary; that the defendants have prepared notes exceeding in amount 100,000,000 florins, which, although not imitating or meant to resemble the notes of the Bank of Austria, profess to be notes of the Kingdom of Hungary, and guaranteed by the State, and to be signed, in the name of the Hungarian nation, by the defendant, LOUIS KOSSUTH; that he intends, as soon as he receives these spurious notes, to send them to Hungary and to introduce them into circulation there; and that the introduction of the said notes into Hungary will create a spurious circulation there, and thereby cause great detriment to the State and to the subjects of the plaintiff. Now, I am clearly of opinion that the plaintiff here states unlawful acts and intentions of the defendants, by which, if not prevented, a damage will be done to the property of the plaintiff, as sovereign, and to the property of his subjects, whom he has a right to represent in an English court of justice.

I am next to consider how far these allegations are substantiated by evidence. We have an admission that the plaintiff is *de facto* Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, and that, as such, he has been recognised by Queen VICTORIA, our gracious sovereign, and that, as such, he has now an ambassador accredited and received at her court. The objections to his title may be canvassed in the Diet at Pesth, but they cannot be listened to in an English court of justice. We are not at liberty to inquire into the pretended superior title of his father, or of the late Emperor, said to be still alive. If the present Emperor of the French was suing here as a plaintiff, should we permit any claim to the sovereignty of France to be made on behalf of the COMPTE DE CHAMBORD or of the COMPTE DE PARIS, or suffer any inquiry into the *coup d'état* by which the republic was overturned in 1851, or the fairness of the subsequent election of his Imperial Majesty by universal suffrage? The right of issuing notes for payment of money as part of the circulating medium in Hungary, seems to follow from the *jus cudendæ monetæ* belonging to the supreme power in every State. This right is not confined to the issue of portions of the precious metals of intrinsic value, according to their weight and fineness, but under it portions of the coarser metals, or of other substances, may be made to represent varying amounts in value of gold and silver for which they may pass current. It is in evidence that the National Bank of Austria, by the authority of the Emperor, does issue notes which form the circulating medium of Hungary, and from this arrangement a profit accrues to the Emperor.

Objection is made, that in Hungary it is unlawful or unconstitutional to issue such notes to pass as money and to be a legal tender, without the authority of the Diet. But they might pass as money without being a legal tender, and as *de facto* they are a legal tender according to the law as administered in Hungary, we can hardly inquire in an English court of justice as to whether this is a stretch of prerogative. I do not feel justified in following the advice of M. KOSSUTH's counsel, that this court should punish the Emperor of Austria for his arbitrary rule, by refusing the protection which he solicits for the monetary property of himself and his subjects in Hungary.

If any complaint should be made in a foreign court of justice of an injury to our currency, consisting of Bank of England notes, we should hardly expect to be nonsuited on account of an alleged over-issue, contrary to Sir ROBERT PEEL's act, or of an order in council having issued by a stretch of prerogative to suspend cash payments. The manufacturing of these notes by the defendants, the Messrs. DAY, for the defendant, M. KOSSUTH, to the enormous amount of 100,000,000 florins, is not disputed. They are (as the bill describes them) in the Hungarian language; they have on their borders in German, and also in the Slavonian and other languages, the amount which they purport to represent, and bear upon them an impression of the royal arms of Hungary. The following is a literal translation of one of them:

“ *One Florin.*

“ *This monetary note will be received in every Hungarian State and public pay-office as*

“ *One Florin in Silver,*

Three Zwanzigers being one Florin, and its whole nominal value is guaranteed by the State.

“ *In the name of the Nation,*

“ *KOSSUTH, LOUIS.*”

The note is thus declared to be of the value of one florin in silver, and there is an assurance that it will be received for this amount in every Hungarian State and public pay-office, and that its whole nominal value is guaranteed by the State. Finally, it is signed by LOUIS KOSSUTH, the defendant, “in the name of the nation,” he thus declaring that he has the authority of the nation so to sign it and to give the guarantee.

A remarkable circumstance respecting the note is, that although perfected and ready for issue and circulation, it bears no date, and there is no sign or intimation of an intention to inscribe any date upon it. Let us now take M. KOSSUTH's own statement, in his affidavit, of the use he means to make of these notes. After asserting “that the plaintiff in this suit is not and never has been King of Hungary, either *de jure* or *de facto*,” he declares “that he himself never had attempted, nor had any intention to attempt, to introduce the said notes—falsely in the said bill called ‘spurious notes’—into Hungary, so long as the present condition of forcible dominion exists there.”

What the plaintiff calls “revolution,” but which will in fact be the restoration of the laws and rights of Hungary, must itself have happened in Hungary before the notes in the said bill named can acquire the value for which the plaintiff expresses so much fear through that circulation in the kingdom of Hungary. This answer to the charge of an intention to use the notes with a view to injure and depreciate the present currency of Hungary, only amounts to a declaration that M. KOSSUTH will not attempt to introduce them into Hungary till an opportunity occurs of being able to do so with effect. The “revolution” or “restoration” must be complete “before they have acquired their full value.” But M. KOSSUTH, whom I consider as a man of honor as well as a man of extraordinary talents and accomplishments, does not deny, that as soon as the opportunity offered he would pour these notes into any part of Hungary

where they could be introduced. As soon as they were introduced, the existing currency would cease to circulate and would become of no value. He may well consider this attempt laudable, if he be actuated by a desire to re-establish the ancient constitution of Hungary—not to gratify any object of personal ambition or vengeance; but I must say, that in an English court of justice the manufacturing in England of such notes, for such a purpose, by him and his associates, I think cannot be defended.

M. KOSSUTH, now an exile in this country, and having *de facto* no authority in Hungary, while a sovereign *de facto*, FRANCIS JOSEPH, reigns there, the ally of Queen VICTORIA, a sovereign to whom, while residing in England, M. KOSSUTH owes temporary allegiance, takes upon himself to affirm that this monetary note will be received in every Hungarian State and public pay-office, that its whole nominal value is guaranteed by the State, and that he (LOUIS KOSSUTH) has authority to sign it in the name of the Hungarian nation. Can it reasonably be doubted that this was meant to be a rival to the present currency in Hungary, wherever it could be brought into competition with it, and that as the new currency gained credit the old would cease to be of any commercial value? Thus, if the acts meditated by the defendants, and forbidden by this injunction, were actually done, a pecuniary loss would be sustained by the plaintiff and by all his subjects, holders of the existing currency. It seems to me idle to say, that many tons of these notes would be kept in warehouses, without bulk being broken, till the wished for revolution or restoration had become an accomplished fact; and, the existing currency having vanished, room would be made for the introduction of the new currency without prejudice to sovereign or subject. The depreciation or destruction of the existing currency in Hungary I believe, upon the evidence, to have been an object aimed at by M. KOSSUTH and those associated with him. The defendants, the Messrs. DAY, are allowed to be very respectable tradesmen, but they do not deny the allegation in the eighth paragraph of the bill—

“That before they prepared the plates for the said documents, they were aware of the purpose for which the said LOUIS KOSSUTH intended to use the same, and that he was not authorized by the plaintiff to prepare or issue the same, and that the said documents were in violation of the rights of the plaintiff as King of Hungary.”

I will now consider the objections to the decree appealed against, which appear to me to be chiefly relied upon by the appellants' counsel in the very learned and very able arguments which we have had the advantage of hearing from them. In the first place, they deny the right of the plaintiff, as a sovereign prince, to maintain this suit; and if the suit were instituted merely to support his political power and prerogatives, or for any alleged wrong sanctioned by the government of England, I should acquiesce in that position. But “THE KING OF SPAIN *vs.* HULLETT,” “THE KING OF THE TWO SICILIES *vs.* WILLCOX,” and various other authorities, show that by the law of England a foreign sovereign may sue in our courts for a wrong done to him by an English subject unauthorized by the English government, in respect of property belonging to the foreign sovereign, either in his individual or in his corporate capacity. Then comes the great question, whether this is a subject over

which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction by injunction? Notwithstanding my sincere respect for the authority of that great American jurist, Justice STORY, I cannot concur with him in his recommendation of a mysterious obscurity to be preserved by courts of equity respecting special injunctions, and the caution which should make them "decline to lay down any rule which shall limit their power and discretion as to the particular cases in which such injunctions should be granted or withheld." I think that all branches of the law should, if possible, be made clear and simple, and should be defined as accurately as possible. I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that Lord MACCLESFIELD was wrong when he laid down, in "*BURNETT vs. CHETWOOD*," that "the Court of Chancery has a superintendency over all books, and might in a summary way restrain the printing or publishing any that contained reflections on religion or morality." So I have no hesitation in saying that Lord ELLENBOROUGH was wrong when he laid down, in "*DUBOST vs. BERESFORD*," that "the Lord Chancellor would grant an injunction against the exhibition of a libellous picture." For this language I have the high authority of Lord ELDON, who, in "*GEE vs. PRITCHARD*," (2 *Swanston*, 414,) upon the question of granting an injunction against the publication of a libel, said, "the publication of a libel is a crime, and I have no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of crimes;" adding, what is most pertinent to the present case, "the question will be, whether the bill has stated facts of which the court can take notice, as a case of civil property which it is bound to protect." Again, the same great judge, in the same case of "*GEE vs. PRITCHARD*," with reference to the question whether there can be property in a letter written to a friend, after admitting that, if the question had then arisen for the first time, he should have found it difficult to satisfy his mind that there was a property in the letter, goes on to say:

"But it is my duty to submit my judgment to the authority of those who have gone before me. The doctrine of this court ought to be as well settled and made as uniform almost as those of the common law, laying down fixed principles, but taking care that they are to be applied according to the circumstances of each case. I cannot agree that the doctrines of this court are to be changed with every succeeding judge. Nothing would inflict on me greater pain, in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had done anything to justify the reproach that the equity of this court varies like the Chancellor's foot."

The recommendation of mystery and obscurity in treating of judicial jurisdiction is only fit for the Star Chamber, which was called "a Court of Criminal Equity." I conceive that this court has jurisdiction by injunction to protect property from an act threatened, which, if completed, would give a right of action. I by no means say that in every such case an injunction may be demanded as of right, but if the party applying is free from blame, and promptly applies for relief, and shows that by the threatened wrong his property would be so injured that an action for damages would be no adequate redress, the injunction will be granted.

Although an action arising purely *ex delicto*, for an injury to property, may not have been brought by a foreign sovereign against an English subject in an English court, on principle, I cannot doubt that such action

would be maintainable. If the Bank of Austria was actually damaged by the unlawful importation from England into Hungary of spurious notes, intended to discredit the notes of the Bank of Austria, I apprehend that the Bank of Austria might maintain an action in England against the wrong-doers. The case of "*THE BANK OF ENGLAND vs. ANDERSON*" may be considered an authority that the Bank of Austria might maintain an action, and be entitled to an injunction under such circumstances. If the Bank of Austria might, why may not the King of Hungary, on proof that, by the same wrong, a pecuniary damage has been sustained by him? The case of "*SIR JAMES CLARKE vs. FREEMAN*" is cited as an authority against an injunction for a wrong which produces pecuniary damages. There Lord LANGDALE refused an application, by a very distinguished physician, for an injunction against the wrongful publication of advertisements falsely imputing to him that he sold and recommended quack medicines, in a manner tending to injure his practice and profits. But the injunction was refused, only on the ground that the plaintiff did not make out that any pecuniary loss would accrue to him from the publication; and Lord LANGDALE said, "The granting of the injunction in this case would imply that the court has jurisdiction to stay the publication of a libel."

For the same reason, in "*MARTIN vs. WRIGHT*," an injunction was refused to Mr. MARTIN, the celebrated artist, who painted Belshazzar's Feast, against the exhibition of a copy of it on a greatly enlarged scale, with dioramic effects, and advertised as "Mr. MARTIN's Grand Picture of Belshazzar's Feast." The Vice-Chancellor, SHADWELL, there observed, "The copy represented as MARTIN's picture must be either better or worse; if it is better, MARTIN has the benefit of it; if worse, then the misrepresentation is only a sort of libel, and the court will not prevent the publication of a libel;" adding, "If MARTIN had exhibited his picture as a diorama, then he might have been entitled to an injunction." Pecuniary damage, therefore, in such cases, is always made the criterion. Great reliance was placed by the appellants' counsel on the decision of the House of Lords in "*JEFFEREY vs. BOOSEY*," reversing an unanimous decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, in which I had concurred. That high tribunal must, of course, be considered as having decided rightly, but the *ratio decidendi* was merely that an absolute assignment, executed abroad, of all an author's copyright in a musical composition, gave no title to the assignee beyond the territory of the State in which the assignment was executed. And this is no authority for saying that the assignee could not have maintained an action in England for an injury to the copyright within the limits of that territory. A more specious objection was rested on the class of cases in which it has been held that we take no notice of the "revenue laws" of foreign countries, so that an injunction would certainly be refused to a foreign sovereign who should apply for one to prevent the smuggling of English manufactures into his dominions to the grievous loss of his fisc. But, although, from the comity of nations, the rule has been to pay respect to the laws of foreign countries, yet for the general benefit of free trade, "revenue laws" have always been made the exception; and this may be an example of an exception proving the rule.

The prohibition by the government of China of the importation of opium, on the alleged ground of public morals, was likewise mentioned; but the English government refused to interfere with this trade, considering that the Chinese prohibition was rather with a view to revenue, or for the protection of the native culture of the poppy.

Last of all, we were told that as his Holiness the Pope, being a temporal sovereign, has an *index expurgatorius*, including a translation of the Holy Scriptures, if he were to make it penal to import into Civita Vecchia any of the books in this index, (which would clearly be within the scope of his lawful authority,) according to the doctrines contended for by the Emperor of Austria, his Holiness might apply for an injunction against the exportation from this country of a cargo destined for his dominions, consisting of volumes which we revere as most sacred. But as to foreign laws which we are to respect, there has ever been an exception of foreign laws in conflict with our own laws on subjects of religion and morality. In this last case it could hardly be alleged that any injury to property, or any pecuniary loss could come in question. Before concluding, I ought to mention that my opinion, in favor of the decree, does not by any means depend upon the supposed analogy between this case and the prosecution of PELHAR for libelling the Emperor NAPOLEON I., or the prosecution of Lord GEORGE GORDON for libelling MARIE ANTOINETTE. Nor do I think that "*FARINA vs. SILVERLOCK*," or any of the trademarks' cases can be rendered available; for here, instead of there being any attempt at *simulation*, the object is clearly disclosed to make a contrast between Kossuth's notes and those of the Emperor of Austria. For the same reason, the acts of Parliament against forging the paper securities of foreign governments do not assist us.

I must likewise observe, with great deference to some remarks which were made during the argument, that I do not think that any importance is to be attached to the fact that M. Kossuth had actually been Finance Minister of Hungary at a prior period, for not only is the plaintiff's bill entirely silent on this subject, whereas it ought to have charged the fact, if reliance was to be placed on his continuing to act in that capacity when his authority to do so had expired, but there seems to me to be no ground whatever for imputing fraud to him on this score, and no one in Hungary can be supposed to give credit to the notes on the supposition that they were issued with the authority of the Emperor of Austria. Therefore the case of "*ROUTH vs. WILSON*," in which an injunction was granted against advertisements falsely representing the plaintiff to be director of a joint-stock company, does not seem to me to apply. But I repeat, that I place much reliance on the fact that the defendant, Kossuth, by these notes asserts that they are guaranteed by the State, and that he had authority to sign them in the name of the Hungarian nation. It is very satisfactory to me to think, that if this decree is affirmed, there is no danger of this country losing the credit which it has long enjoyed, of being an asylum for those who, from persecution or revolution, have been driven for a time from their native land. They enjoy this asylum on the condition that while resident in England they enter into no conspiracies or plots against existing governments in foreign States, which would be an infraction of our municipal law by native-born subjects.

Fitting out a warlike expedition in England to bring about a revolution in the dominions of a sovereign in alliance with Queen VICTORIA, would certainly amount to a misdemeanor, be the confederates native-born subjects or aliens, and the manufacture of twenty tons of promissory notes for the same purpose may amount to the same offence.

Therefore, I can consider M. KOSSUTH no more an object of pity, if by an injunction he receives a check in this enterprise, than the Emperor LOUIS NAPOLEON would have been, if, by a criminal prosecution, he had been stopped in his enterprise when he was about to sail from the Thames for Boulogne, with a view to dethrone LOUIS PHILIPPE. Our sympathy has been powerfully appealed to in favor of the Messrs. DAY. If their plates for printing Hungarian notes should be defaced, and all the Hungarian notes they have manufactured should be demasked, and, instead of circulating at Presburg, Pesth and Buda, should be consigned to the use of the grocer and the trunkmaker of London, the manufacturers have a very dubious remedy by action against M. KOSSUTH for their work, labor and material. But they must have been aware that there was some considerable risk in the gigantic speculation in which they embarked; and as they, no doubt, would have derived much profit as well as fame if Hungary had been revolutionized by their means, they must console themselves with the reflection that they have failed in a great enterprise, and that their fate holds out a lesson to other tradesmen to be contented with the gains and reputation to be earned in the ordinary occupations of their calling, however sober and commonplace these may be. I rather think that the decree ought to be varied with respect to prohibiting M. KOSSUTH from the use of the royal arms of Hungary, for it would appear that they may be innocently used by all Hungarians, and, I presume, by all mankind. With this variation, I am of opinion the decree appealed against ought to be affirmed, and that the appeal must be dismissed.

The Lords Justices delivered judgment in accordance with that of the Lord Chancellor.

Upon a discussion taking place as to the costs of the appeal, Mr. R. PALMER, on behalf of the plaintiff, said he was willing to waive his rights to costs if the defendants would deliver up the whole of the notes to the plaintiff to be destroyed.

Mr. BACON said there was twenty-three tons of paper which were valuable to his clients, the DAYS. He could not consent to the destruction of so much property, as the engraving on the notes could be obliterated, and then the pulp could be used again.

Mr. R. PALMER said, under the circumstances he could not waive his right to the costs of the appeal, which their lordships ordered the defendants to pay.

Mr. BACON then asked for an extension of time within which the notes were to be cancelled. The defendants might think fit to appeal the case to the House of Lords.

Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE said, that in that case a special application might be made to preserve things *in statu quo* until after the hearing of the appeal.

Mr. BACON then asked for six months' delay.

Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE.—You mean six days.

The Lord Chancellor directed the cancellation to be delayed for one month, and then to be done according to the directions of the Vice-Chancellor in Chambers. The stones used for engraving would be also cancelled in the same way. The case might be mentioned on minutes to the Lord Justices on Monday week.

WHAT IS MONEY?

STRICTURES ON THE CASE OF THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA *vs.* DAY AND KOSSUTH, DECIDED IN THE ENGLISH COURT OF CHANCERY, JUNE, 1861.

From the London Economist.

- I. *Monopolies are against the ancient and fundamental laws of England.*
 II. *Money consists of Gold and Silver only.* III. *Copper Coin unknown to the law as currency.* IV. *Considerations on Paper Money.* V. *Paper notes are a matter of Credit, not of Money.*

SIR,—The *Economist* has more than once called attention to the interest attaching to the attempt of the Austrian government to make use of the English Court of Chancery as a political engine. But, though the bill filed by the Emperor of Austria against M. Kossuth and the Messrs. DAY is a political manœuvre, and has a direct political object only, and for this reason ought never to have been entertained by our Courts of Chancery, there are points involved in the matter which are of great importance to those who care less for politics than for commerce, and who are too apt to lose sight of the necessary connection that there must always exist between a sound political system and the free course of commerce.

As, though my name has often appeared in connection with this case, I have, throughout, declined to accept the position of retained counsel in the cause, for the express reason that the opportunity of taking such an independent course as seemed to me desirable would be thus shackled, you will perhaps allow me to invite attention to one branch of the subject which is of general interest, and which was really the point on which the argument in the case turned.

I must premise that a court of law is placed in a somewhat anomalous position, when the very subject-matter presented to it involves the demand for it to extend the sphere of its own jurisdiction; still more, when it is asked to extend this jurisdiction to oblige an Emperor. The anomaly is increased when the matter on which the court is asked to extend its jurisdiction is an entirely political one, while the chief judge of the court is himself a political officer, and a member of the English cabinet as such. These facts show the great need there is for jealous caution in the consideration of the whole case, and for well weighing all the points that arise in the discussion of it.

The case has been argued with great ability by the eminent counsel

engaged on behalf of the plaintiff. It is a pleasure as well as a duty to acknowledge this. But the main, indeed the only substantial ground on which, both in the Vice-Chancellor's court and on appeal, they rested their case, was the prerogative right of a sovereign to regulate money; which was many times referred to as the "*jus monetæ*." In the Vice-Chancellor's court the alleged right was affirmed to be a *property*, which the court would protect, inasmuch as it is a "monopoly." This was rather an odd argument to submit to an English court of law, in the face of the principle so distinctly enunciated by Lord COKE, that "all monopolies are against the ancient and fundamental laws of this kingdom;" a principle which the same authority enforces in many places and in the most emphatic manner. In the Court of Appeal, the "monopoly" argument, which asked an English court of law to help a foreign Emperor to enforce what is directly contrary to the fundamental laws of England, was less insisted on, and the prerogative of the sovereign as to money was made the strong ground of reliance. It was indeed attempted to be set up, that the sovereign sues as a sort of "public officer," (like the clerk of a bank,) on behalf of the whole State, and so can sue, in an English court, touching any thing that the whole State of which he is sovereign can regulate. But such an assumption is so palpably weak and unsustainable, that it need not be now dwelt on, more than to say, *first*, that, as the State may regulate all internal matters whatever, there would, if this were admitted, be no possible subject on which a foreign sovereign could not call upon an English court of law to interfere, under the pretext that the State of which he is sovereign has power to regulate something arising out of it; *secondly*, that the assumption of such a character by the plaintiff comes rather grotesquely at a time when he was asked to be accepted as head of the State in question, and has not yet been so accepted.

The court did, indeed, lay it down that the plaintiff must be assumed to be King of Hungary, and that it could not inquire into the legitimacy of his title. It may be very agreeable to an Emperor plaintiff to find himself so politely treated by an English court of law. He may be pleased to be able to parade before Europe that, though the Diet of Hungary will not acknowledge him as king, unless he first fulfil the requisitions which the law has imposed as the conditions of kingship, an English court of law has declared that it will take his own word alone for it that he is King of Hungary, and will give its judgment, in a trial at law, in conformity with this recognition.

But there happen to be two awkward circumstances that make the Court of Chancery stand in a very ridiculous position, when thus so willing to do the polite thing to an Emperor plaintiff. *First*, it was explicitly admitted, by the present Foreign Secretary, on 25th April last, in his place in the House of Commons, that no notification of the accession of FRANCIS JOSEPH to the throne of Hungary has ever been received by the Queen of England. He stated, that the only notification received was one that any reader may find on pp. 103, 104 of the "Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Hungary," presented to Parliament in 1850. This notification extends only to the *imperial* throne of Austria, and alludes to the family compact of 1713, regulating the succession to that

throne. It does not even allude to the *royal* throne of Hungary, or to the Act of Settlement of 1723, by which alone the succession to the latter throne is regulated.

But, *secondly*, I find on the face of the letters patent that stand on the front of the *Corpus Juris Hungarici*, now before me, that the Emperor of Austria calls himself King of Jerusalem. It follows, as a necessary and unevadable consequence, that, if the plaintiff is to be admitted as king, without inquiry into his title, because he calls himself King of Hungary, then, in case it should happen that the Sultan enter into a contract with Messrs. BOULTON and WATT to make a quantity of copper coin for circulation in Jerusalem, the Court of Chancery will be obliged to grant an injunction against the fulfilment of that contract, should the Emperor of Austria, who calls himself King of Jerusalem, choose to file a bill for the purpose. Illustrations showing, even still more strongly, the absurd consequences of such an extraordinary (however polite) ruling of the court, might be given; but this is enough for the present.

Had the Emperor of Austria filed his bill simply as Emperor of Austria, and as now holding Hungary by the grace of Russian arms and by main force, though in defiance of lawful right, the question of a *de facto* sovereignty would, of course, have arisen, and must have stood for what it is worth. But the plaintiff does not venture to go so far as this. He only ventures to rest his claim on rights alleged to belong to him "as King of Hungary." He binds himself, by this, to make out that the law of Hungary gives him certain rights, which are infringed by the defendants in this case.

The whole matter comes back, therefore, (passing over the point as to the validity of the plaintiff's actual title, as King of Hungary,) to the question, what is that prerogative of the crown, as to money, which an English court ought to recognise and sustain?

In order to sustain the plaintiff's case, it was necessary to contend that the *jus monetæ* includes paper currency as well as coin. And this was accordingly asserted to be so. If this proposition can be shown to be unfounded, it is self-evident that the whole of the plaintiff's case breaks down.

So far from "money" including paper currency, and so far from the prerogative of the crown extending to the control of paper currency, it can be shown conclusively that the former is strictly confined to metal pieces, and that the latter is limited to gold and silver. Out of the vast multitude of illustrations of this subject which I have collected—all uniformly and without exception pointing in the same direction—I will now refer to a few, which will be most likely to recall names familiar to the intelligent reader.

In Lord COKE's first Institute (COKE upon LITTLETON) he defines "Money, moneta, legalis moneta Angliæ," as coin, "either in gold or silver." (P. 207.) In his second Institute, he speaks, expressly, upon "what prerogative the king hath in silver and gold; and first and principally in making of money current with in the realm." Again: "No subject can be enforced to take, in buying or selling, or other payment, any money made, *but only of lawful metal, that is, of silver or gold*;" "the money of England must either be of gold or silver;" "the king's prerogative

in the mines or veins of gold and silver—for *he hath no prerogative in any other metal* ;” and again, he expressly defines the words “English money” thus: “This is intended of all money of *gold or silver* current within the realm of England.” (Pp. 576–578, 742.)

The unanswerable and reiterated force of this language was attempted to be evaded by the plaintiff’s counsel, under the allegation that, in COKE’s time, copper coin was unknown. A more unlucky suggestion could not have been made. It assumes as a fact that which can be shown, by overwhelming evidence, to have been quite the contrary to fact.

LORD COKE himself, on the very page where he declares that the “King hath no prerogative in any other metal than gold and silver,” happens to mention that there was *copper* money in the beginning of the reign of ELIZABETH. So that he was himself familiar with the existence of copper money, when he wrote that gold and silver money is that to which alone the royal prerogative extends.

But copper and brass money had been then long in use, and in great quantities. The State Paper Office contains patents, professing to grant the monopoly of making copper money to LORD HARRINGTON, and many other documents proving the extensive use of copper money tokens in England and throughout Europe, before the time when COKE wrote. These patents were not granted under pretence of any prerogative as to the money, but as part of that attempt to erect monopolies which was declared, by the act of 1623, to be contrary to the fundamental law of England. A similar patent was granted, in 1614, for a new way of working copper ore. One, indeed, of the best known cases in the old law reports, is the “Case of Mines,” reported by PLOWDEN, in which the royal prerogative as to gold and silver is affirmed, and is rested upon the ground of the necessity for regulating the coinage thereof, while the prerogative is as explicitly declared not to extend to mines of copper, tin, &c.

So common was copper coin at the beginning of the seventeenth century, that in Mr. BOYNE’S valuable book on the “Tokens of the Seventeenth Century,” published in 1858, he gives a list of no less than 9,466 different sorts of this coin; that is, copper coin issued with different devices and by different people. And this 9,466 is but a part of those that were actually issued. It would be difficult to have a stronger proof, both of the commonness of copper coin, and that the regulation of its issue was not within the king’s prerogative. It is a well-known fact, that the private issue of copper tokens was only stopped by the act of 57 GEO. III., c. 46; and then stopped, not because of any pretence of royal prerogative, but because of the obvious inconvenience to the public of so many kinds of copper money being in circulation.

SIR MATTHEW HALE agrees with Lord COKE, that the material of lawful money in England “is either pure silver or pure gold, or else silver or gold mixed with an alloy;” and again, in describing “what shall be said to be the king’s money,” he declares that “it must be of money of gold or silver.” (*Pleas of the Crown*, vol. i., pp. 188, 210.)

The same thing could be illustrated by a great number of quotations from the rolls of Parliament and other authorities. But I must pass to the characteristics elsewhere stated to be necessary to all money. Sir

M. HALE states these as being: "(1.) The material whereof it is made. (2.) The denomination or extrinsic value. (3.) The impression or stamp." All these are characteristics of metal pieces only; and it has been seen that gold and silver were alone held to fulfil the first of them. In a remarkable case, called "the Case of Mixed Moneys," which is found in Sir JOHN DAVIS' *Reports*—but which, for reasons very obvious to those familiar with the subject, the plaintiff's counsel in this case did not find it convenient to quote—occurs the following: "Six things or circumstances must concur to make lawful and current money: (1.) Weight; (2.) Fineness; (3.) Impression; (4.) Denomination; (5.) The authority of the prince; (6.) Proclamation. For every piece of money ought to have a certain proportion of weight, and a certain proportion of purity or fineness," &c.

The laws of Hungary on this subject are identical in principle with those of England. In the second affidavit filed by M. KOSSUTH some of these laws are quoted. Many others might have been so. None of these is pretended to be controverted in the only affidavit filed, in answer, on the plaintiff's behalf; nor is any law of Hungary able to be quoted, by the three makers of that affidavit, which sustains the plaintiff's claim. On the contrary, all they can do is, to make a vague allusion to an alleged "unwritten law;" which allusion, as well as some other parts of their affidavit, demonstrate (as I shall probably take another opportunity of showing) either their own ignorance of Hungarian law, or their deliberate intention to mislead the court.

The laws of England and of Hungary agree, therefore, entirely, that there can be no such thing as lawful "money," except metal pieces; those pieces, so far as the king's prerogative is concerned, being of the material of gold and silver. It gives an interesting illustration of this, that the Parliament of England, when anxious after the execution of CHARLES I., to arrogate to itself all the royal prerogatives, issued a decree for ordering the "moneys and coins of England;" in which it recites this prerogative as appertaining only to gold and silver, and makes order for new coins accordingly, (17th July, 1649.)

It is self-evident that an English court of law, when asked to deal with a matter in which Hungary is concerned, must be guided either by the law of England or by the law of Hungary. These two happen to be identical upon the matter in question; and both, equally, put the plaintiff at once out of court. By both, the prerogative as to money is expressly limited to metal pieces—and that metal, gold and silver. It has nothing whatever to do with paper notes.

The plaintiff's counsel have attempted to override the express law of England and of Hungary, and Sir JOHN STUART has allowed himself to be entangled in the sophistry, under pretence of some vague and indefinite superior law, which they call the "law of nations;" a law that is without any binding *sanction*, and therefore can be, in no true sense, a *law*; and which, however prettily it may be laid down in the digested theories of suggestive writers, can never override the express law of any State; and can, indeed, only be of use in so far as it gives a true summary of those laws which different States have actually agreed to recognise as binding between one another.

Now it does happen that, instead of any of the great authorities on international law confirming the theory which is necessary to the plaintiff's case, every one of them is against it; every one of them confirms the principle recognised by the law of England and the law of Hungary. PUFFENDORF alone was able to be *alluded to*, as mentioning "paper." But care was taken not to *quote* PUFFENDORF—for the quotation would have upset the object of the allusion. PUFFENDORF is strong upon the duty of the magistrate to maintain money at its true value and intrinsic worth, as the medium of exchange; and says that, whatever may be done "in cases of exigency" and "in times of necessity," the resources of the moment ought to be "exchanged for the common specie" as soon as the emergency is passed. GROTIUS and VATTTEL are equally clear as to the duty of the State in regard to money, and as to the grounds upon which alone the State has any function in the matter.

What, then, are paper notes? To "money," an intrinsic value is essential. Paper notes are nothing more than the record of a certain amount of *credit to be given*. Money carries its own value in itself: paper notes depend wholly on something that is beyond themselves. "When," says ADAM SMITH, "the people of any particular country have such confidence in the fortune, probity and prudence of a particular banker as to believe that he is always ready to pay, upon demand, such of his promissory notes as are likely to be at any time presented to him, those notes come to have the same currency as gold and silver money, *from the confidence that such money can at any time be had for them.*" Your readers will be well aware that I could cite passage after passage in which "metal pieces" are the only things allowed, by ADAM SMITH, to be really "money," and in which he points out the necessary dependency of the use of paper notes upon that metal money which is their only basis. Mr. MILL, in his chapters on "Money," and on "Credit as a Substitute for Money," is equally precise.

The history of our Bank of England illustrates the same thing. In GODFREY'S account (SOMERS' *Tracts*, vol. xi.) it is well said:—"There are others who are for forcing a currency of bills, or tallies, and think they may pass as well as bank bills. But they do not consider that it is nothing makes bank bills current but only because that all those who desire it can go, when they will, and fetch their money for them; and to force anything to pass in payment but money, would soon end in confusion." I need hardly add, that Bank of England notes are not themselves money, and can only be issued in certain proportions to the actual amount in store, and are obliged to be paid, on demand, in money, over the counter of the bank and its branches, though they are made a legal tender, by act of Parliament, in other places. (3 and 4 W. IV., c. 98, sec. 6.)

Paper notes are therefore a matter solely of *credit*, not of *money*. The laws of political economy regulate the uses of credit. And credit can never, without the greatest danger to commerce, be let be dealt with by our courts of law, as a matter that rests in the breast of prerogative. The Emperor of Austria, by now applying for an injunction, does indeed admit that KOSSUTH'S credit is greater than his own in Hungary, inasmuch as he is afraid of notes which (to use your own words in the *Economist*

of May 11) "bear expressly on the face of them the political assumption under which alone they could be available." He avows, by filing this bill, that he is afraid of Kossuth's *credit*. But the regulation of credit can never be matter of prerogative. It behoves the commercial world to consider well what will be the principle admitted if the Court of Chancery should extend its politeness to the Emperor of Austria so far as, not only to do what the Hungarian Diet has not done, and acknowledge him to be King of Hungary, but grant him this injunction to stop the making of certain paper notes that only bespeak a credit without which they are simply worthless. If this be done in the present case, the Emperor of Austria, or another foreign sovereign, can, at any time hereafter, come to the Court of Chancery, and demand, with an unanswerable precedent to back the demand, that the House of BARINGS, or any other in London or Liverpool, or elsewhere in England, shall be restrained from accepting bills of exchange, or that any banker shall be restrained from issuing letters of credit, any of which may, by any future possibility, reach the country of the plaintiff sovereign; or that either of these shall be restrained from using "*credit*" in any way, or adopting any of the usual forms of recording any admission of credit given, as the means of carrying on any of their ordinary transactions with any foreign country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

Toulmin Smith.

Highgate, Middlesex, June 6, 1861.

P. S.—The foregoing letter was written and in type before the judgment of the Court of Appeal was given. That judgment does not make it necessary to alter a single word. It was a political judgment. The fundamental principles which have always been understood to fix and guide the jurisdiction of courts of equity were overlooked; and, at the same time, so much only of the evidence before the court as helped the political aims of the judgment, was noticed; while the uncontradicted and abundant evidence before the court, which is inconsistent with that judgment, was wholly disregarded.

The judgment makes the commercial importance of the case even more striking than it was before. The only ground attempted to be rested on, for the judgment given, may be properly called *protectionism run mad*. A king may, in spite of the direct letter of the law, interfere to say who the people shall give credit to, lest those people may possibly suffer damage through the depreciation of *other* credit. An English court will help a foreign king to do this. It follows, that, in spite of commercial treaties and free trade, an English court will interfere to prevent the exportation of goods from England, which any foreigner may fear will come into competition with his own. It cannot be necessary to say more upon a judgment which is made to rest upon economical and commercial fallacies than which none more unsound or more mischievous were ever propounded.

T. S.

THE PAWNBROKERS OF PARIS.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MONT DE PIÉTÉ. BY E. ABOUT.

I. *What the Mont de Piété is.*—II. *Early History.*—III. *Reverses.*—IV. *Borrowing.*—V. *Selling off.*—VI. *The Customers.*—VII. *The Commissioner's Duties.*—VIII. *Profits.*—IX. *Innovations.*—X. *Victims of Usury.*—XI. *Troubles.*—XII. *Past and Present Condition.*

THE following description of the celebrated pawnbroker's establishment in Paris, known as the Mont de Piété, is from the pen of EDMOND ABOUT, and sheds much light upon the system. A bank chartered by the legislature of New-York at its last session is about to go into operation in this city with similar objects, and the subject is therefore one worthy of consideration and inquiry. We transfer from the New-York *Evening Post*. [ED. B. M.]

I. WHAT THE MONT DE PIÉTÉ IS.

The French law punishes severely all loans upon wagers and usury, but it authorizes a charitable institution which lends upon security at ten per cent. interest. This anomaly of the savings bank is the Mont de Piété, at Paris.

The government places it among the charitable institutions for this reason. Instead of capitalizing his profits, the great insurer of Paradise-street adds them every year to the public charity fund. He lends at ten per cent., a monstrosity which, however, is profitable to the hospitals. This philanthropy sends paupers to the almshouse, and then aids them when they get there.

If all the profits of the Mont de Piété had been accumulated from its foundation, instead of falling into the hospital fund, they would form to-day a capital of nearly twenty millions of francs, and the rate of interest might be lowered five per cent. Other phenomena as curious as the following would no longer be seen: A rich speculator has personal securities in his pocket-book; he pledges them at the bank, and the bank lends him at four per cent. A poor fellow owns a mattress worth fifty francs; he pledges it in Paradise-street, and the Mont de Piété lends him some few sous at ten per cent.; and yet the shares of rail-roads and industrial companies deposited by the rich capitalist are more subject to depreciation than the poor man's mattress.

Another peculiarity is worthy of remark, because it offends our moral sense. The law permits a creditor to sell all the furniture of his debtor, except his bed. But if the creditor calls himself the Mont de Piété, and lives in Paradise-street, his auctioneers sell every day some millions of mattresses and blankets belonging to his debtors.

This paradoxical institution dates from the time of LOUIS XVI. The Mont de Piété was founded by letters patent of the 9th of December, 1777, and opened on the 1st of January, 1778. "This project," said LOUIS XVI., "is founded solely for charitable purposes, and is worthy

of enjoying the public confidence, since it assures pecuniary aid, with small obligations to the borrowers—stripped of other resources—and the profits which will result from this establishment will be applied entirely to the relief of the poor and the improvement of charitable institutions.” [Preamble of the Letters Patent of 1777.]

II. EARLY HISTORY.

The government had decreed that the securities or pledges offered at the Mont de Piété should be deposited in the convent of the White Mantles. The good monks protested loudly. We have at hand a letter written by them, first to the minister and afterwards to the king, declining the honor imposed upon them.

“May it be permitted to brothers who have no ambition but to serve God and to be useful to the Church and State according to the laws of their order.”

What were the services the White Mantles could render to the State appears in the close of this curious supplication.

“That a project may be renounced, the execution of which would only disturb, in every possible way, the calm and tranquillity of a community of brothers, who, we must observe, never cease raising their hands towards heaven to implore for his sacred majesty, as upon the royal family and the kingdom in general, the most abundant blessings and benedictions.”

We will not enumerate here all the reasons alleged by the good fathers for the preservation of their repose and tranquillity, but it may be useful to quote the following passage:

“We will not conceal from your Grace that it appears to us not in the least conformable to the law of God and the rules of the Church concerning usury; in which our mode of thinking is entirely similar to that of our Archbishop, and the decision given on this subject by the Sorbonne, June 17th, 1765. This establishment, like certain others, a wise prince may think proper to tolerate, to prevent great evils. But this purely civil toleration, which only saves the guilty from the vengeance of human laws, cannot save them from that of God.”

It is evident that the White Mantles confounded the Mont de Piété with the tolerated houses. Were they in the right? We shall see.

III. REVERSES.

The government of Louis XVI. closed their ears, instituted commissioners for the Mont de Piété, September 6, 1779, and published in ten years, from the 9th December, 1777, to the 3d February, 1787, more than forty letters patent; decrees of Parliament, decrees of the King's Council and sentences of police, which testify their solicitude for this new institution.

Suppressed by the revolution, restored to the hospitals in the fifth year of the republic, paralyzed for seven years by the competition of the Lombards, the Mont de Piété re-entered into possession of all its privileges on the 16th Pluviose—year 12, and was definitely reorganized by the decree of the 24th Messidor, year 13, which is still law in April, 1861.

This is the actual organization of the Mont de Piété. This privileged usurer, or, to use polite language, this banker, operates without capital.

IV. BORROWING.

Before lending to the needy of the city of Paris this establishment borrows. From whom?

1. From the Hospital Administration in Paris, which thus invests a part of its available funds.

2. From all the responsible agents of the benevolent associations, who, in the terms of the ministerial instructions, are bound to give cash security.

3. From third parties, on notes payable on demand after one year.

Its first operation then is borrowing. Lending, which is the aim of the institution, only occupies the second place. A man in need of money presents himself in the office with an article, woollen blanket or string of diamonds, it matters little which. An auctioneer appraises the pledge. The Mont de Piété lends four-fifths of the estimated value, if the article is gold or silver; two-thirds in every other case. The borrower receives the amount of the loan; a receipt to the bearer is delivered to him; the pledge or security is placed in the warehouse. There are something like sixty million francs' worth of securities in the warehouses of the Mont de Piété. In the course of fourteen months the pledge is redeemed by the depositor or borrower, or sold by the creditor, if the time is not extended. A word upon each of those operations; the redemption, the renewal, the sale.

Redemption liberates both parties. The borrower returns the money and pays the interest. The lender returns the pledge and takes back his receipt. Renewal or extension is a new engagement, contracted in the same form and conditions as the first.

V. SALE OF PLEDGED PROPERTY.

Selling off clears the warehouses. It is done by public auctions, through one of the fourteen auctioneers attached especially to the Mont de Piété. These ministerial officers, being jointly responsible for all the losses which may result from their estimates, previously deduct half per cent. on the sum lent, and three per cent. on the amount of the sale.

The Mont de Piété reimburses itself, capital and interest, and places the surplus or bonus at the disposition of the borrower. In the three years which follow the engagement, the bearer of the receipt has the right to reclaim the surplus. This term expired, a special subscription gives the bonus to the hospital fund. This operation is very simple, and I see nothing to complain of in it, except the exorbitant rate of interest.

VI. THE CUSTOMERS.

It is to be regretted that bankrupts, thieves and criminals of every kind, abusing the facility of the institution, so often place the Mont de Piété in the position of a receiver of stolen goods. We may blame the workmen of Paris who thoughtlessly sacrifice the little all of their families to indulge in a carnival frolic. But we must do justice to Mr. FRAMBOISIER, of Baunay, and all the honorable commissioners who have put within the reach of the needy a resource more innocent than crime.

It is very sad, without doubt, that the poor should have to pay ten

per cent. for money, when the rich only pay five ; but I would rather see the beggar take his watch to the pawnbroker than hear him picking the lock of my door.

Between the Mont de Piété and its clients has existed from the beginning an intermediate class. I have already said that we had commissioners ever since 1779.

The administration foresaw that the greatness of the distances, the timidity natural to borrowers, the rusticity peculiar to the petty employees, and a thousand other reasons, would prevent the public from rushing in crowds to Paradise-street. For the interest of all, as well as their own, they have therefore permitted twenty commissioners to establish themselves in the different quarters of Paris. They are chosen by the administration, which assures itself of their solvency and morality, and demands security from them.

VII. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSIONER.

The commissioner does not lend. He advances the money on his personal responsibility. If he has mistaken the value of the pledges, so much the worse for him. His operations are approved, rejected or modified by the sovereign administration. Say that I carry him my watch, and that he lends me a hundred francs. The Mont de Piété examines the pledge and only lends three louis. The commissioner will be considered as having lent me himself the forty francs difference, and he will only receive upon this sum an interest of six per cent. instead of ten.

The obligations of the commissioner are those of the borrower ; he substitutes himself for his principal, and represents him with the administration. He engages, renews, releases, handles the bonus after the sale, as if he were provided with a warrant in form. His services are not gratuitous. He has two per cent. on engagements and renewals, one per cent. on redemptions, and the amount of the bonus. The poor wretch who borrows at ten per cent. at the chief mont, borrows at thirteen through the commissioner. It is one enormity grafted on another.

However, I must allow that the generality of borrowers go willingly to the commissioner. Is it solely for the pleasure of giving three per cent. more ? I doubt it. It must be rather because the employees of the chief mont are as complying as the machinery of a steam-engine, smiling as the bars of a prison, friendly as the broken bottles on a party wall. Why should they smile upon the borrowers ? The cashier will not give them ten francs more at the end of the month.

The commissioner has other ways of working. His personal interests impress him to retain his borrowers, and to have a certain set of his own. He smiles upon new-comers, he talks, he listens to confidences, he gives his sympathy to the unfortunate, he abridges formalities, he spares them fatigue and shame, he opens convenient doors for them to escape unseen. Of course a borrower is more at his ease with the proxy whom he pays at the rate of two per cent. than in the presence of a disinterested and sullen official.

VIII. PROFITS.

The result of this is, that the twenty commissioners of Paris receive about 400,000 francs a year—20,000 francs apiece. Do not exclaim at

the amount of the sum. In the first place it is not equally divided. One of these gentlemen, more active and more popular than the others, makes, perhaps, 70,000 francs a year; there are then many who make much less than the average. Besides, this is only the gross profit. We must deduct from it the interest of the price of charge; the difference on the interest of the security; (the *Mont de Piété*, which lends at ten, only pays three per cent. ;) the interest of the accumulating funds; the general expenses, such as rents, clerks, porters, conveyance, printing, registering, light, fuel, losses through mistakes in estimates, miscalculations, abuse of confidence, &c. All told, you will find that more than one commissioner gives his time, his liberty and his intelligence for a thousand crowns a year—a very modest sum.

IX. INNOVATIONS.

It is not less true that the needy of Paris, already losers by the usury of the chief mont, allow four hundred thousand francs more to flow into the hands of the commissioners. Some directors of the *Mont de Piété* have sought to remedy this evil. I should also have sought to do so if I had been in their place. Personal interest would have sharpened in me the zeal for the public good. To manage the money of the poor borrowers; to ruin the commissioners, some of whom were insolently making their fortunes; to enlarge the influence of the administration; to create new business; to provide for clients; to double the importance and profits of the directors; this was a seducing prospective. At the end of the year 1837, M. J. DELAROCHE, brother of the illustrious and lamented painter, obtained the place of director. He proposed to create branches which should lend at ten per cent., like the chief mont, and which should kill off the intermediate agents. It seemed evident that the public would not be fools enough to borrow at thirteen, when in the same street, and, so to speak, at the commissioner's very door, they were offered money at ten. The Council of Administration, after consulting together, formed two auxiliary offices in Paris. The commissioners lost nothing by it. But a deficiency of more than 30,000 francs was discovered at headquarters. The innovation of M. DELAROCHE was blamed as a disadvantage, and the inventor, a young man, beat a retreat.

He bequeathed his plans for reform to one of his old clerks, M. BLAIZE, who succeeded to the directorship in December, 1848. It is to M. BLAIZE that we owe the creation of the central comptroller, chief of the whole bureau of accounts—an unique official, and a really administrative phenomenon, who is called every evening to control his own operations of the morning; but that is of no consequence. M. BLAIZE considered for a long time the suppression of the commissioners of the *Mont de Piété* by the creation of branch offices. The National Assembly rejected his plan, and he retired discouraged. But this theory was resumed by M. LEDIEU, who still reigns, and who, by dint of will and perseverance, has made it a reality. Twenty auxiliary offices, spread all over Paris, invite borrowers to pledge their watches; twenty officers offer the public the money of the *Monte de Piété*. Walk in, good people, and go no longer to the commissioner who took thirteen per cent. ! Here is money for nothing, money at ten ! a mere gift !

X. VICTIMS OF USURY.

Would you like to know how the public respond? The twenty branch offices made in 1860 more than fourteen hundred thousand engagements.

But the commissioners of the Mont de Piété, who had made 400,000 francs in 1859, still made 400,000 (or within 7,000 of it) in 1860. Then the competition of the branch offices has not turned the tide away from the commissioners, and we have still the same number of Parisians who borrow at thirteen per cent. But on the other side, the permanent temptation of these new establishments which, so to speak, incite the people to borrow, has thrown more than a hundred thousand poor wretches into the claws of usury.

What a result! 1,400,000 articles of furniture taken from poor households. How many mattresses? How many cradles? How many woolen blankets in this last winter of ten degrees? And all this to ruin twenty poor commissioners, who, if it were not for this, would be well enough off.

The Mont de Piété will have, henceforth, 20,000 francs to spend every year for each of these bureaux; 400,000 francs in all. This is 400,000 francs less, annually, for the almshouses. The amount appears enormous, but it is moderate; twenty rents, twenty office directors; the material and the *personnel*. It has even been necessary to double the director's salary since the administration has gone this length. 12,000 francs were sufficient in 1852. To-day it is 15,000 francs regularly, 3,000 for lodgings and 6,000 for a carriage. Twenty offices cannot be visited on foot.

XI. TROUBLES.

Is that all? Alas! no. I have remarked that the formation of the two first branch offices had caused a deficiency of 30,000 francs in the central depot. Since they have been in possession of twenty officers the danger has increased ten-fold.

There is talk (without the slightest foundation, of course) of pledges strayed away, important deficits and inextricable disorder. Still graver facts are stated, and the foreign journals do not fail to accuse the central administration. The prefect of the Seine has had to give his attention in this quarter, and neglect for a time the demolition of Paris. A committee of inquiry, presided over by the Attorney-General in person, is vigorously seeking the guilty persons. Oh! gentlemen, do not look so far from home. We shall not be much better off, indeed, when you have sent some poor wretches to the galleys. The real guilt lies in the new system, the system of branch offices. It is to them alone that I owe a grudge. These offices have no warehouses, and could have none. They receive the pledges only to send them to headquarters. From this arises a new order of things, or rather a disturbance of the old order.

XII. PAST AND PRESENT CONDITION.

The logical organization of the Mont de Piété is indicated by the nature of its operations. It lends money, it receives movables. When the crowns leave the establishment the pledges enter it, and *vice versa*. The

nature of the loan is in accordance with the nature of the article. The cashier gives and receives the money, while the warehouse director receives or gives out the pledges. Everything turns round these two directors, and the responsibility is divided between them. The responsibility of specie is an old affair enough; that of articles is a little newer; the minister of the marine knows what the education of the accountants of the arsenal costs France. The cashier of the Mont de Piété never has more than 200,000 francs at his disposal; the warehouse director always has at hand several millions in precious stones. In the normal and regular state, before the addition of auxiliary offices, the most minute precautions were taken against the loss or theft of pledges. The business of each agent was traced and his responsibility defined. The pledges as soon as received passed to the warehouse; the jewels on the first story, the clothes above, the mattresses in the upper story, the heavier articles on the ground floor.

Once put in its place, the pledge could not leave the warehouse, except to be returned to the bearer of the receipt against the payment of the loan and interest. Its entrance was registered in the engagement office; and this double operation maintained a perfect balance between the warehouse and the funds in hand.

But times are now changed! If an engagement takes place, the borrower who has gone to the auxiliary office receives the loan directly, but his pledge does not go to the warehouse until the morrow or the day after, or even later. On occasion of a redemption, notice is required twenty-four hours beforehand, and the warehouse yields it up before the hour is returned. Thus the cash is lent every day before the security is given; the warehouse restores before it is reimbursed.

And if before being brought in, or in the double journey to headquarters and back again to the office, the pledges or the money are lost, or stolen, whose is the blame? Does it fall on the director of the office?

Poor security, unless an enormous security is exacted from him. In that case he receives an enormous salary, and the branch offices cost enough already.

On the warehouse director? On the cashier? Evidently not. Their responsibility does not extend to articles which they have never received, or which they have regularly delivered.

One of the forty or fifty witnesses heard by the Committee of Inquiry, said on his examination: "I would not accept the direction of the Mont de Piété with 50,000 francs emolument, if I had to make good the losses incurred in the warehouses."

A respectable functionary who worked in the Mont de Piété in better days, wrote to me this month: "Our poor warehouse is a gulf, where they put in and take out at pleasure without counting."

I think the present director, M. LEDIEU, an excellent man; that he has done all for the best, and that his office in Paradise-street is paved with good intentions. But if my observations could enlighten him upon his error, and if I had protected the patrimony of the poor, my ink and my time would not be wasted.

THE PAWNBROKERS' BANK OF DANTZIC.

*Communicated for the Bankers' Magazine.**To the Editor of the Bankers' Magazine :*

I OBSERVE that on the 13th of March a meeting was held for the purpose of establishing in this city a Pawnners' Bank, at which meeting you acted as secretary. Allow me to express to you the great satisfaction I feel at the idea of establishing such a bank in this city. New-York already possesses so many excellent institutions for the alleviation of the distress of the poor, but as yet none which will enable the poor, in times of need, to get a loan without being obliged to take their refuge to usurious private pawnbrokers, who not unfrequently combine with their trade that of receiving stolen goods.

The establishment of such a bank will certainly prove an enterprise of great utility, for, while the merchant in want of cash takes his refuge to the banks for a discount, nothing has thus far been done in this city to render assistance to other classes when in need, notwithstanding their ability to give ample security for the small loans they may require. They stand exposed to fraud, to the utmost shaving and usury.

Thirteen years ago, when I was a member of the common council of my native city, Dantzic, that body resolved upon the establishment of a public pawnners' bank. Ever since that time I have taken a lively interest in all institutions of that kind, and gathered material regarding the same. Since two years I have urged the establishment of a pawnners' bank in this city to several wealthy men, but have not been successful in finding such men who had a heart for the relief of the poor, and at the same time understood that the establishment of a public pawnners' bank is as respectable a business as that of a bank of issue, and at the same time a safe enterprise. You can, therefore, imagine the pleasure I feel at the now intended establishment.

There is, so far, but one pawnners' bank in the United States, *i. e.*, in Boston, and this has been in operation but about a year, so that but little experience has yet been had here in that branch of business. I, being acquainted with the management and regulations of the Dantzic Pawnners' Bank, hope, therefore, to further the interest of the new enterprise by giving you below an abstract of the management, regulations and business of the Dantzic bank. It is true, the business of the bank in that city has been carried on on a smaller scale, in accordance with the comparatively small number (66,000) of its inhabitants, and the general wealth of that city; but I should think that a knowledge of its management, &c., nevertheless would suggest some valuable hints with regard to the establishment of such an institution in any other city.

The Pawnners' Bank of Dantzic does business under the guaranty of the city authorities. The profits which the bank yield are used for rendering aid to the poor.

The business of the bank is conducted by a committee, under the superintendence of the board of aldermen, which committee consists of two members of said board and three members of the common council. One of the members of the board of aldermen is chairman.

The affairs of the bank are revised once a month by a committee consisting of one member of the board of aldermen and two of the common council; extraordinary revisions, not before announced, to be held at least once a year.

The business is conducted by a cashier, a comptroller, an appraiser and some assistants. These officers are elected by the board of aldermen, and are sworn. Jewels, gold and silver must be appraised by a sworn jeweller. All the officers of the bank are required to observe strict secrecy respecting all matters connected with the business of the bank.

The bank gives loans on all movable articles, particularly on jewels, gold, silver, metals, and all things made of metal, also on wearing apparel, &c., &c., in fact on all articles that can be used for any certain purpose. On such articles the bank advances one-half of the amount they are appraised at, and on gold and silver two-thirds. Excluded are all articles worn out, liquids, engravings, pictures, books, and all articles that are easily exposed to damage. It is furthermore at the option of the bank to refuse as pawns any article the loan on which is considered as connected with any risk.

The bank advances loans to no smaller amount than one thaler, and allowing no other fraction than a half thaler. The interest is at the rate of twelve per cent. a year. The pawnor is charged with no other expenses whatever except with those that he has incurred when not redeeming the pawn at the expiration of the stipulated time. All loans are made for the term of six months; it is, however, at the option of the pawnor to redeem his pledge before the expiration of that time, in which case he is only charged with interest for the time gone by. Interest, however, is not calculated on single days, but only on full months, so that every portion of a month counts for a whole one.

The bank does not take any pawns from parties whom it does not consider authorized to pledge them, nor from persons whose authority to take loans is limited by law, such as married women, without written permission from their husbands; or from minors.

In case there is nothing in the way of accepting the pawn, the same is appraised by the sworn appraiser, and the amount of the appraisal as well as the amount to be loaned are made known to the pawnor. If the latter is not inclined to take the loan upon the proposals made by the bank, the pawn is returned to him without any charge. If, on the other hand, he is willing to accept the proposition of the bank, he receives the amount fixed, upon delivery of the pawn. The latter is then numbered and put away. Jewels and other valuables are carefully sealed up. The pawnor has the privilege of adding his private seal to that of the bank.

The pawn-book contains the following heads: 1. The number of the pawn. 2. The name of the pawnor. 3. The description of the pawn. 4. The appraisal of the same. 5. The amount of the loan. 6. The day on which the same was given.

A pawn-ticket, containing all these items, and agreeing in every respect with the pawn-book, has to be made out by the cashier and delivered to the pawner, who, in case of loss of the pawn, can only claim from the bank the amount appraised, as stated on the ticket.

The pawns are kept as little as possible exposed to being injured, and are insured against fire at the expense of the bank. Any loss or damage incurred by fire is paid out of the proceeds of such insurance. In what cases the pawner or the bank has to stand the loss or damage incurred by fire is determined by the general laws. All damage caused by rot or by moths is not paid by the bank. The officers of the bank are strictly forbidden to make private use of any of the pawns left at the bank, under the penalty of being immediately discharged.

Only the pawner, whose name is mentioned on the ticket, or a person who can bring satisfactory proof that he is authorized by the pawner to redeem any pawn, will be considered as being entitled to receive such. Only to such a person, on delivery of the pawn-ticket and payment of charges and interest, the same is delivered, provided the same be not attached by any court. The redemption of part of a pawn is not allowed. In case any person loses his pawn-ticket it is necessary, in order to provide against loss, immediately to notify, in writing, the bank of such occurrence. In case the pawn is not already redeemed by some person on delivery of the original pawn-ticket, such notice, together with the name of the party giving the same, as well as all other particulars, are entered in a book, which being done, said party receives a certificate of his having notified the bank of his loss. Only after the lapse of one year from the date of the pawn-ticket, and four weeks after this time, and on delivery of the certificate, as well as upon giving an acknowledgment, the pawner is entitled to receive the pawn, provided the original pawn-ticket has meanwhile not been presented at the bank.

In case, however, the original pawn-ticket is presented before the lapse of the above-mentioned time, and the holder thereof claims the pawn, the same is not delivered to him, but the pawn-ticket retained. The claimant receives a copy of the same, which is to be countersigned by the cashier, and in which it is remarked that the original has been retained. He (the claimant) is directed to claim his right against the possessor of the certificate, who is to be named to him in order to apply for a legal attachment of the pawn.

If no attachment is made until at latest four weeks after the time specified above having elapsed, the original pawner is admitted to redeem his pawn; and if he likewise does not make his appearance, the pawn is disposed of in the manner provided for below.

In all cases, however, in which such a pawn cannot be returned before the expiration of the time allowed, the debtor is allowed to refund the loan itself, and thus to exempt himself from paying further interest. Prolongations of loans are allowed only in so far as in the opinion of the bank the pawn retains the value assumed when first pawned, to which end the bank has the right to have the pawn appraised anew. If a prolongation is thought to be allowable, a new pawn-ticket is given, on returning the old one and on payment of the accrued interest.

The pawn is marked with a new number and entered anew into the pawn-book.

Every pawner, after the expiration of the six months provided for in the pawn-ticket, is allowed additional six months for redeeming the pawn. If this additional time likewise elapses without redemption, the bank is authorized to dispose of the pawn at public auction. Such auctions take place in the premises of the bank three times a year, or oftener, as the case will require, in the presence and under the superintendence of one of the directors. The day on which the auction will take place must be properly advertised. Of every thaler's worth of the proceeds of such auction, $\frac{1}{3}$ thaler goes to the bank, and has to be deducted from the amount received for the pawn.

With regard to any pawn belonging to a bankrupt's estate the same proceeding is to be observed, but on the demand of the court the sale must be effected even at other than the appointed time. In such case, however, the full amount of the auction charges must be borne by the bankrupt's estate.

Immediately after the auction has taken place, notice is given once, through the papers, to those pawners whose pawns have been sold to apply to the bank for the purpose of receiving any balance which may be due to them, after the amount of the loan, as well as the accrued interest and the auction charges have been deducted, on delivery of the pawn-ticket and giving a receipt for the money.

The pawns, in such notice, are only designated by the time at which they were given to the bank, but neither the names of the pawners nor the numbers of the pawns are to be published.

In case the balance due on a pawn is less than ten thalers, and nobody calls to claim it within six weeks, the same has to be turned over to the poor fund, and the pawn-ticket, with the right of the pawner on the face of it, to be considered null and void.

If, before the expiration of a year, counting from the first summons, nobody applies for a balance due on a pawn amounting to more than ten thalers, the magistrate will propose to the court to issue a public summons of the interested parties, in which summons the time of forfeiture has to be fixed at three months. If a pawner applies within this time he receives the balance, after deducting the charges of the court.

On the other hand, the demands of precluded parties, after deducting the legal charges and eventual losses of loaned capital and interest, and without any other charges, are to be delivered, at the close of the year, to the poor fund.

If the pawner, whose name is in the pawn-book, puts in his claim, but is unable to produce the pawn-ticket, he must await the elapse of the time specified in such cases, which is six weeks from the time at which notice was given in the papers, where the balance is less than ten thalers, one year where it exceeds that sum, and only after the expiration of this time he can receive the balance on signing a receipt in full.

If, in the mean time, the pawn-ticket is presented by another person, the name has to be retained and the amount delivered to the court for settlement. This is done, also, when the court has an attachment on the pawn, or even on any balance which the sale of the same may leave, and where notice was given too late by the court to proclaim the sale of the pawn.

The superintendent has the supreme management of the bank and its officers, who have promptly to comply with his directions. He sees that the regulations of the bank and the instructions of its officers have been strictly executed. He must satisfy himself that the moneys loaned from the city treasury, for the objects of the bank, do not exceed the actual want. The receipts given by the cashier for the loans from the city treasury must be presented to him before taking up the loan, in order to limit the loan in case they exceed the want, after consulting the cashier, to the smaller amount fixed by the superintendent. If he has no objection to make, he endorses the receipt. He himself keeps an account of these loans, as well as of the repayments, for which purpose every receipt for a repaid loan by the cashier of the city treasury must be presented to him.

He must satisfy himself, at least once a week, that the business of the bank is carried on in the right manner. It is, therefore, not only necessary for him frequently to examine the books of the cashier, to compare the pawns on hand with the account kept of the same, to ascertain the correctness of the appraisements, but also to see that the premises are sufficiently secured against dangers, that the pawns are insured according to their appraisement, and properly kept, and that the return pawn-tickets are at once annulled. The pawn-book, which is exclusively entrusted to the care of the cashier, must, during any temporary absence of his, be delivered by him directly to the hands of the superintendent, as no third party is allowed to have possession of the same.

In case it is required to fill the place of the cashier by a substitute, the latter enters into all the right and duties of the cashier also with regard to the pawn-book. The superintendent has the power to give to any officer leave of absence for twenty-four hours; a longer leave of absence can only be granted by the chief magistrate. The necessary provisions for the safety of the premises during the absence of the cashier have to be made by the superintendent after consulting the former.

The sale of the pawns at auction takes place under the direction and in the presence of the superintendent, who keeps an account of the highest bids. Payment for every pawn sold must be in cash.

The correspondence with third parties and public authorities must be signed by the superintendent and countersigned by the cashier.

The cashier of the bank is responsible for carrying on the business of the same in a prompt manner. He is bound to keep the treasury and the pawns in accordance with provisions made in the laws of the State, as well as those contained in the regulations of the bank. In doubtful cases he has to obtain special directions from the superintendent of the bank. The cashier is expected to be polite to all customers and to observe the greatest secrecy; but in case of theft or fraud the investigating officers must be informed of the name of the pawnor.

The bank is open for the transaction of business every day of the week, except Sunday, from 9 o'clock, A. M., to 1 P. M. If a substitute has to be appointed to fill the place of the cashier, on account of sickness of the latter, he has to bear the expenses connected therewith. The appointment of the substitute has to be confirmed by the magistrate, and for his transactions and omissions the security given by the cashier re-

mains pledged. The cashier is strictly forbidden to make any private use of the pawns. The cashier is also responsible for any misuse of this kind on the part of the appraiser and assistants. Third parties shall have access to the pawns only in such cases where the superintendent, after having satisfied himself about the special interest of the party applying, has given the necessary authorization.

If the cashier finds that the appraiser is careless in appraising the pawns, it is his duty to notify the superintendent of the fact. He is responsible for the actions and omissions of the clerks or assistants which he appoints.

He has the duty to keep the books of the concern. These books, as well as the seal of the bank, the moneys and pawns, are under his charge.

He has to attend to the necessary disbursements and receipts. The amount of cash in the hands of the cashier must not exceed the sum of five hundred thalers. Any surplus must be at once delivered to the city treasurer. Every day after the business is closed the journal has to be balanced. If there is any difference found between the book and the cash on hand, notice thereof has to be given to the superintendent before the beginning of the next business day.

When a pawn is accepted, the cashier has to enter it in the pawn-book and the appraiser marks in a separate column the amount of the appraisal. The cashier receives the pawn in exchange for the pawn-ticket, signed and stamped by him, and for paying the loan specified therein. He enters the disbursement in the journal and diary, marks the pawn with its approximate number on a ticket, which must be of such a kind as to strike the eye, and affixed to the pawn. He is also responsible for the careful preservation of the same in the premises of the bank.

On the redemption of a pawn, the cashier, on receipt of the amount of the loan, principal and interest, and on the return of the pawn-ticket, returns the pawn to the pawner whose name is mentioned in the ticket, eventually to the one who satisfactorily proves that the possession of the pawn has been legally transferred by the pawner to him. The cashier enters the receipt in the pawn-book, journal and diary, and crosses with red ink the item in the pawn-book.

The cashier at once annuls the returned pawn-ticket, which he preserves. If a prolongation is granted, the cashier enters the amount of interest in the pawn-book, journal and diary, annuls the old pawn-ticket, and, as for the rest, proceeds as in the case of a new transaction. The old pawn receives on the label the number of the new ticket. If there is any suspicion that the offered pawn has been abstracted from other parties by means of theft or fraud, it will not be accepted, and notice must be given to the superintendent.

It is the business of the cashier to see that the forfeited pawns, without exception, are sold at auction at the appointed time. At the auction, at which the superintendent presides, the cashier renders the assistance required of him. At the close of the auction the receipts are entered in the pawn-book, journal and diary. The acceptances of the pawns sold at auction are crossed in the pawn-book by the cashier with red ink in all the columns, if the loan, together with the interest, is covered by the proceeds.

If the pawner applies for the proceeds of the sale of his pawn at auction, the cashier, after having satisfied himself that the claim of the pawner is still valid, on receiving a receipt, has to pay to the latter the balance, after deducting the expenses, and has to enter the disbursement in the journal and diary.

It is the business of the cashier to see that the pawns are kept properly insured against fire, according to their appraised value. As soon as the amount insured, at the beginning of a month, is reached by the appraised value of the pawns deposited in the course of the month, another amount in advance must be insured, so as to have every pawn insured on its being deposited.

At every revision of the cash on hand the cashier has to deliver a balance-sheet.

At the end of every year the cashier has to make the necessary preparations for balancing the books. He balances the journal and the different accounts in the diary, the latter in such a manner as to show clearly, with regard to the receipts, the total amount of the loans received from the city treasury, the moneys loaned on pawns, the moneys repaid, the proceeds of the auction sales and the amount of the unredeemed loans, with the accrued interest; and with regard to the disbursements, the total amount of moneys actually disbursed, and of the loans from the city treasury not yet repaid.

After this, all vouchers, serving for the verification of the receipts and disbursements, are properly numbered, and the unredeemed loans made on pawns, with the specification of the number in the pawn-book, are transferred to the new diary in such a manner that at every single loan any additional interest can be added. This being done, and the balance of cash being likewise transferred to the new journal and diary, the cashier presents, at latest until 1st February of every year, the journal and diary, together with the vouchers, to the city authorities for revision.

For any defects occurring, either through the cashier himself or by his fault through another party, the cashier is responsible with all his property, and, in particular, with the security given by him. The amount of the security to be deposited by the cashier has to be fixed by the city authorities.

The appraiser has the duty to inform every person who applies to the bank for a loan, or for a prolongation of the same during business hours, of the appraised value of the pawn, with the understanding that all who apply, up to one o'clock, shall be attended to, if possible, on the same day.

As soon as the pawn is accepted, the appraiser enters the amount of appraisement in the proper column of the pawn-book, adding thereto his signature. In appraising, he has, in accordance with his oath, to be guided merely by his own conviction, without allowing the influence of any third party. In this respect he is subordinate to nobody. But it is a matter of course that the cashier is at liberty to call his attention to any point which he (the cashier) considers to be of some importance.

In appraising, the most important point is to ascertain, as near as possible, the value which such articles usually have at public auction.

For every mistake committed by him, by which a detriment is caused to the bank or to a third party, he is responsible with all his property.

I will here close my remarks about the regulations and arrangements of the Dantzic Pawners' Bank, and only add a few statistical notices.

The bank has been in operation for about twelve years, and already, on the 31st December, 1858—that is, after ten years' business, and although only charging twelve per cent. interest per annum—proved to have made a clear profit of 19,477 thalers, with a capital of 34,000 thalers, which had been loaned out of the city treasury, and of which 4,000 thalers already had been repaid.

At the end of the year 1858 the number of pawns had reached 20,998, the value of which amounted to 59,087 thalers.

The net profit for the year 1858 amounted to 8,298 thalers, (of which 7,849 thalers were for interest on loans, 408 thalers for excesses yielded by auction sales, and 40 thalers extraordinary income,) which, after deducting 5,322 thalers, the amount of the yearly expenses of the bank, leave a clear profit of 2,976 thalers.

The number of pawns sold at auction only amounted to two and a half per cent. on an average.

In regard to the bank to be established here, I beg leave to say, that in my opinion it would be of still greater usefulness if it was authorized to make, also, larger advances on merchandise; (of course, to a limited amount;) for, inasmuch as our banks do not take merchandise as collateral security, those business men who only command small means, and cannot offer such securities as the banks require, are almost as badly off as the poor man who wants to borrow one or two dollars. He, under present circumstances, often has to submit to a heavy loss, by being obliged to sell some goods, which, had he been able to hold for a short time longer, might have yielded him a handsome profit.

It would also be of great importance to have the privilege entered in the charter of the "New-York Pawners' Bank" to establish branch offices at different parts of the city. This is the case in the large cities of Europe, and a point well to be taken into consideration when establishing a bank in a large city like New-York.

I have the honor to remain, dear Sir,

Most respectfully yours,

FRDR. GERHARD,

Ed. of German Bank Note Rep.

THE LOANERS' ASSOCIATION IN NEW-YORK.

We republish, from a pamphlet copy received at this office, the charter, by-laws and prospectus of the Loaners' Association in the city of New-York. This Association will probably commence business soon, under the management of the following directors:

MAUNSELL B. FIELD,
B. LEWIS, Jr.
ISAAC SEYMOUR,
DAVID B. TURNER,
WILLIAM P. EARLE,
GEORGE W. MCLEAN,
WILLIAM J. WILLIS,
SIMEON DRAPER,
HENRY R. McMURRAY,
LORIN INGERSOLL,
LUTHER REDFIELD,
J. B. DICKINSON,

GARDNER WILLARD,
CHARLES W. BAKER,
EDWARD L. DONNELLY,
SEYMOUR A. BUNCE,
WILLIAM J. PECK,
CHARLES A. BAUDOUINE,
SAMUEL C. REED,
WILLIAM MERRIFIELD,
HON. FERNANDO WOOD, *Mayor of New-York, ex-officio.*
HON. ROBERT T. HAWS, *Comptroller of New-York, ex-officio.*

DAVID B. TURNER, *President.*

MAUNSELL B. FIELD, *Vice-President and Actuary.*

RICHARD B. CONNOLLY, *Cashier.*

This pamphlet contains, in addition to the charter, by-laws and prospectus of the Loaners' Association, an appendix, with the report of the legislature on the bill; report of the Pawnors' Bank of Boston, and various extracts from recent works on the policy of such institutions. Copies will be furnished gratis on application to the editor of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, Nos. 61 and 63 William-street.

CHARTER OF THE LOANERS' ASSOCIATION.

The People of the State of New-York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. MAUNSELL B. FIELD, B. J. LEWIS, ISAAC SEYMOUR, DAVID B. TURNER, WILLIAM P. EARLE, GEORGE W. MCLEAN, WILLIAM J. WILLIS, SIMEON DRAPER, HENRY R. McMURRAY, LORIN INGERSOLL, ABRAM S. VOSBURGH, LUTHER REDFIELD, J. B. DICKINSON, GARDNER WILLARD, CHARLES W. BAKER, EDWARD L. DONNELLY, SEYMOUR A. BUNCE, WILLIAM J. PECK, CHARLES A. BAUDOUINE, SAMUEL C. REED, WILLIAM MERRIFIELD, and their associates and successors, shall be, and are hereby constituted a body corporate, under the name of the "Loaners' Association," to be located in the city of New-York, with the powers and privileges hereinafter granted and named.

It shall not be an association to issue any evidence of debt in the form of circulating notes, and shall loan on pledge of goods and chattels only; and no loan shall be made upon any goods and chattels, unless the same

shall be placed in the custody of said association at the time the loan upon the same shall be made.

SEC. 2. The capital of said corporation, to be raised by subscription, shall not exceed three hundred thousand dollars, in shares of one hundred dollars each.

SEC. 3. When fifty-thousand dollars have been duly subscribed, and twenty-five thousand dollars thereof actually paid in, the stockholders may organize and proceed to business under this charter.

SEC. 4. The charge on all loans, to cover expenses of every kind, including interest, shall be uniform, and not exceed one and a quarter per cent. per month.

SEC. 5. When the association has disposable funds, it shall loan on all goods and chattels offered, embraced within its rules and regulations, in the order in which they are offered, with this exception, that it shall always discriminate in favor of small loans to the indigent. It shall loan to four-fifths of the appraised value on gold and silver plate and ware, and two-thirds of such value on all other goods and chattels as aforesaid.

And no loan shall be made to one individual, copartner, incorporation or association, either directly or indirectly, exceeding the sum of one thousand dollars.

SEC. 6. The government of the association, and all the corporate powers of said association, shall be exercised by a board of twenty-three directors, who shall be chosen annually by the stockholders, in the month of May, two of whom shall be the mayor and comptroller of the city of New-York during their respective terms of office; and the persons named in the first part of the act shall be the first directors, and shall hold their office for one year from the passage of this act, or till others are appointed; a majority of the board thus created shall elect one of their number president, and shall appoint such other officers as may be deemed necessary.

SEC. 7. All loans shall be on a time fixed, and not over one year, and the pawner shall have a right to redeem his property pledged at any time within the specified period, on payment of the loan and rate of compensation to the time of offer to redeem.

SEC. 8. If the property pledged is not redeemed within the time limited, the same shall be sold at public auction, and the net surplus, after paying loan, charges and expenses of all kinds, shall be held one year, subject to the call of the owner; if not then called for, the same shall go into a fund for the year, when the entire forfeiture takes place, called the profit and loss fund.

SEC. 9. All losses on loans, from failure of title or other causes, shall be satisfied from the said profit and loss fund.

SEC. 10. The net balance of said fund, at the end of each year, shall be made up annually, to the first day of January, and be doled in fuel and provisions to the needy of the city of New-York, under the direction of the board, during the months of January, February and March.

SEC. 11. The board shall give to each pawner a card, inscribed with the name of the corporation, the article or articles pawned, the name of the pawner, the amount of the loan, the rate of compensation, the date

when made, the date when payable, and the page of the book where recorded.

SEC. 12. The whole sum earned each year shall be duly disposed of at the end of the year. The earnings to be divided among the stockholders shall not exceed ten per cent. per annum, and the balance, if any, shall go into the profit and loss fund, and be distributed in charity, as hereinbefore provided.

SEC. 13. The real estate which it shall be lawful for the said corporation to purchase, hold and convey, shall be such as shall not exceed in value one hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

SEC. 14. The stockholders of said corporation may establish such by-laws, rules and regulations for conducting its business as may be necessary, not inconsistent with the laws of this State.

SEC. 15. The stock of said association shall be transferable only at the office of the association, and on its books.

SEC. 16. The corporation hereby created shall continue for a term not exceeding twenty years.

SEC. 17. The legislature may at any time alter, amend, modify or repeal this act.

SEC. 18. The said association shall annually report, on the first of January, to the Superintendent of the Banking Department of this State, the amount of its loans and the number of persons to whom loans have been made during the year, and the number of persons to whom loans have been made and remain unpaid at the date of such report.

SEC. 19. This act shall take effect immediately.

BY-LAWS OF THE LOANERS' ASSOCIATION.

1. The regular annual meeting of stockholders for the choice of directors shall be held on the third Wednesday of May in each year.

2. A special meeting of stockholders may be called at any time by vote of a majority of the directors, by the president, or the vice-president and actuary, on the written application of not less than ten stockholders, due notice of not less than one week being given.

3. The officers of the association shall consist of a president, a vice-president and actuary, and a cashier.

4. The president of the board of directors shall be, *ex officio*, chairman of every meeting of the stockholders, and, in his absence, the vice-president and actuary, and in case both are absent, the stockholders may choose a temporary chairman.

5. The cashier of the association shall be, *ex officio*, secretary of every meeting of the stockholders, and, in his absence, the stockholders may choose a temporary secretary.

6. The cashier and appraisers shall give bonds, to the satisfaction of the directors, for the faithful discharge of their respective duties.

7. The directors of the association shall have full power to purchase or hire and fit up suitable premises, and to appoint legal counsel, employ assistants, and generally to do whatever may be required for the transaction of the regular business of the association.

8. The directors shall hold regular meetings at least once a month, or as much oftener as may be necessary.

9. At all general or special meetings nine directors shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of all business.

10. The cashier shall report monthly to the directors the condition of the association, and the transactions of the past month.

11. No loan exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars shall be made without the sanction of a majority of the officers of the association.

12. No loan shall be made at a lower rate of interest than one and a quarter per cent. per month, without a special vote of the directors.

13. The property advanced on by the association, other than that kept in fire-proof and burglar-proof iron safes, shall be kept insured against fire to the full amount of the loans made upon it, and to such further amount, not exceeding fifty per cent. of said loans, as the directors shall deem advisable.

14. The directors may refuse to loan on such articles as they may consider too bulky, perishable, susceptible of damage, or otherwise objectionable, or too valuable to be received in charge, or of whose ownership there may be reasonable grounds of suspicion.

15. A full statement of the operations of the association, and of its actual position, shall be made by the directors to the stockholders every year, at the regular annual meeting, on the third Wednesday in May.

16. There shall be chosen from the stockholders at large, at each annual meeting, three persons, whose duty it shall be to audit the accounts, and report to the corporation at its next annual meeting.

17. The directors may adopt such rules and regulations for the management of the association as they may deem expedient, not conflicting with any of the above by-laws, or with any of the provisions of the charter.

18. These by-laws may be amended by a vote of a majority of the directors at any general or special meeting, one month's notice having been previously given of the proposed amendments.

PROSPECTUS OF THE LOANERS' ASSOCIATION.

The directors of the Loaners' Association have the pleasure to submit herewith a copy of their charter and by-laws, together with some historical and statistical facts relating to similar institutions elsewhere, and some general considerations in reference to the advantages to be derived by both the stockholders and the customers of the corporation.

Establishments of this character have existed on the continent of Europe for centuries. They have never, however, been introduced into Great Britain, and only recently into this country; the "Pawners' Bank" of Boston, which was established a few years ago, and which has been conducted with marked and constantly increasing success, being the pioneer institution here, and the only one, as yet, in active operation. It is understood, that in Pennsylvania and Connecticut, and perhaps in other States, the example, so happily inaugurated, is likely to be soon followed; and before long we may expect to see the vicious and oppressive system of pawnbroking superseded throughout the country by responsible corporations, in whose integrity and ability to respond, under all circumstances,

the borrower may repose the most implicit confidence, while the lender secures an unusually safe and remunerative investment for his money.

The directors confidently appeal to the philanthropic capitalists of the city for a liberal subscription to the stock of the association, believing it to be one of the most benevolent and charitable nature, calculated to do an immense deal of good at all times, and especially at the present juncture.

The security offered is of the amplest and soundest character, being based upon actual property of a much larger value, and therein differing from the assets of most stock companies, which are predicated upon notes and evidences of indebtedness.

The coming winter is likely to be one of extraordinary severity for the poor and unemployed, and the association expect to use advantageously all the capital they can secure under the charter, or even ten times the amount, were it obtainable.

They will have it in their power to afford relief from the exactions of pawnbrokers, to secure the poor man from the loss of his pledges by fire, which the pawnbrokers cannot do, as they do not insure, and to do much to put a stop to the dishonest transactions, for which, at least in some instances, facilities are extended by them.

The person in difficulties, who has seen better days, and who requires temporary assistance, will not hesitate to address himself to a respectable bank, conducted upon fixed and undeviating principles, while he might shrink from subjecting himself to the questionable contact and doubtful integrity of a private professional lender. The class above referred to, composed largely of females, is now a very numerous one, and must shortly become still more so, if the present condition of the country continues. In a word, the Loaners' Association will be able to mitigate a great deal of hardship, often undeserved, and it claims to be eminently one of the humane and charitable institutions of the day.

Submitting these general considerations, and inviting attention to the illustrative extracts in the appendix, the directors confidently submit the claims of the "Loaners' Association" to a liberal and intelligent public.

A PAWNBROKER DONE OUT OF £30 BY A CURIOUS CONTRIVANCE.—An ingenious fraud was recently perpetrated on a London pawnbroker by a needy individual. The latter called on the money-lender with a sample of wine, asking a loan of forty pounds on two hogsheads of wine of the same quality. The wine was tasted, approved, and thirty pounds advanced. The casks were placed in the possession of the pawnbroker, who subjected the wine to an additional test, and was perfectly satisfied as to his bargain. But two weeks subsequently the casks were opened and found to contain about twenty-five pailfuls each of most excellent water, and the wine was carefully kept from the adulterating fluid by being confined in a small bladder neatly tacked around the spile-hole, from which the samples were drawn. The ingenuity of the needy individual not being properly appreciated by the magistrate before whom he was taken, he is now serving out a "penal servitude" of eighteen months hard labor.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.—IMMUNITY OF AMBASSADORS.

Before the Marine Court of the City of New-York, June, 1861.

THE STAMFORD BANK *vs.* JAMES WATSON WEBB.—SUPPLY C. THWING
vs. JAMES WATSON WEBB.

THESE two actions were brought on notes given by the defendant, then proprietor of the *New-York Courier and Enquirer*, to the commercial editor of said paper for salary. The notes having been transferred to the plaintiffs before maturity, they brought these suits. The defendant answered—

That he had been duly appointed minister of the United States to Brazil, and pleaded his privilege to be sued only in the United States courts.

The case presented this novel feature, viz.: The Constitution of the United States, article 3, section 2, provides, among other things, that the "judicial power" (of the United States) shall extend * * "to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls."

SEC. 2. "In these cases the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."

The question had been frequently before the courts as to the application of this section to ministers, consuls, &c., representing foreign powers, and its application had never been seriously questioned.

In the cases at bar, however, the question is, Does this privilege relate to our own ministers delegated to foreign countries?

The defendant contended that it did; that such was both the spirit and letter of the law; that from the time of appointment the appointee became a part of the government, and one of the officers thereof, and entitled to all its privileges, &c. The plaintiffs, in reply, claimed—

1. That under article 2, section 2, of the Constitution, the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may appoint. That until such consent, the nominee is not appointed.

2. That by ambassadors, public ministers and consuls are intended representatives of foreign countries. That such was the intent and spirit of the law. That the government meant to extend its protection over such representatives, and therefore gave them the privilege of being sued only in its Federal courts.

3. That until the said minister, so nominated and confirmed by the Senate, had received his exequatur, he could not be called such officer, and was not fully authorized, and could not claim this privilege.

4. That the Constitution did not design to protect its own ministers, and shield them from payment of their *just* debts, by giving them any such privilege.

The court, after advisement, held that the plea was well taken, and that State courts had no jurisdiction in such cases.

For the plaintiffs, MILLER, PEET & NICHOLS. For the defendant, EVARTS, SOUTHMAYD & CHOATE.

LIFE INSURANCE IN FRANCE.

A DISSERTATION BY M. REBOUL.

LIFE insurance is but little understood in France, and attempts are making to introduce it into practice in that country. The following article from the pen of EUGENE REBOUL, an eminent journalist of Paris, presents the subject in so interesting and original a light that it is worthy the attention of American readers, even though they are familiar with it as treated by our writers. It has been translated for the *New-York Evening Post*.

LIFE INSURANCE IN FRANCE.

Astonished at the prodigious variety of knowledge contained in the romances of Sir WALTER SCOTT, some one asked him one day where he had collected all those technical details, those curious observations which make his longest descriptions so fascinating. "I am very fond of travelling," said he, "and whoever may be my travelling companion, I ask him to talk of his trade; I am always sure to learn something." May I beg the reader to follow the example of Sir WALTER SCOTT, and permit me to converse with him a little about my trade?

From the closest study of life insurances I have arrived at the conviction that there exists in their organization no radical defect, no important imperfection which can explain the prejudice against them, and the apparent indifference with which they are regarded by a people who are justly considered as by far the most advanced in the high road of social progress. France is, in fact, the only civilized country in which life insurance has not been fully understood. Even at the present time, after an existence of half a century, it seems to be rather tolerated than decidedly adopted, when it ought to be, as it is in neighboring countries, the base of all credit, and one of the principal elements of public prosperity.

This institution, which addresses itself to the two main-springs of our nature, our interests and our affections; which aims at rescuing men from the uncertainty of fate, to develop in them order, economy and foresight; and finally, which creates immense wealth—such an institution is eminently useful, and also it is thoroughly moral and civilizing in its effects.

I will risk being charged with boldness in affirming that it is marked for progress, and that mistrust will not long prevail against it.

INSURANCE A RESULT OF CIVILIZATION.

Insurance will form an epoch in the history of humanity as one of the most glorious results of civilization; it is the accession in the economic order of mutuality, a law of peace and justice proclaimed eighteen hundred years ago. It is human reason which attains at least the realization of one of the divine principles.

The importance, the extent, the necessity of the services that life insurance is the means of rendering to individuals, to families, to society and to governments, give it the importance of an institution of public interest.

It has completely succeeded in England; why should it not succeed as well in France, where the distribution of wealth is better adapted to its application, where the companies offer more security and better conditions?

INSURANCE IS NOT A LOTTERY.

What is wanting with us is, that it should be fully discussed and brought into view. Above all, the disinterested and impartial sanction of science is necessary to draw upon it the attention and confidence of the public, to which science is a sovereign security. Now, in the manner of insurance, the public has a right to the most complete security. The subject should be brought to light, and all confusion should disappear.

Insurance is neither a stake nor a lottery; it is precisely the contrary. Gambling is a matter of chance, insurance of certainty. With such a palpable difference, what a deplorable error has been committed at the very outset in likening life insurance to a wager! Unfortunately for many persons deceived by words, there are few who go further than the surface; the name of contingent contract spoiled every thing; people saw in insurance only a kind of speculation, another variety of gambling, and condemned, under the same name, the evil and the remedy, the poison and the antidote. Strange mistake! One of the strongest points of insurance is that it can never become an abuse, while nothing can prevent speculation from degenerating into mere betting and gambling. One of the rules of insurance says: "No one can insure without showing that he has interest to do so, and interest at least equal to the value insured."

The laws of all the companies are unanimous on this point, and still the old prejudice exists. At present the law is silent, science is silent, authority is silent, and yet people are astonished that the public is also silent and indifferent, and should show a dislike to life insurance. But it is not surprising that it should not be well received; people have little affinity for what they do not understand. *Ignoti nulla cupido.*

In France they understand play, lotteries, tontines, speculation; but there is one thing they do *not* understand, and that is life insurance. I repeat, the subject must be brought fully to light. This once accomplished, success is certain; for an institution so useful, so advantageous to morality, and approved, besides, by the enlightened experience of other civilized nations, must necessarily triumph over every prejudice and every obstacle. Good sense tells us this, logic proclaims it, reason requires it, and in France good sense, logic and reason always carry the day.

ADVANTAGES.

To bring out all the usefulness of the different kinds of life insurance, to have appreciated all its advantages with regard to society, credit, liquidation, &c., and that its benefits should be known to all, to explain its entire principles, mechanism and application—such is the task that we propose to ourselves.

But it is not enough to proclaim the benefits of insurance; to assert

the morality of the institution, the wide philosophical scope of its principles; it is not enough to remark that transactions concerning life-interest are perfectly fair, lawful and secure; that they are advantageous and satisfactory to everybody and in every respect; that they create wealth; that they are useful to government and to society in increasing security, order, morality, wealth; in opposing an excess of fluctuation and speculation, &c. We must place these truths beyond all doubt, spread them abroad, publish them under every form, and, since repetition—said NAPOLEON I.—is the most effective figure of rhetoric, we must cease to repeat them only when they shall have ceased to be misunderstood.

Our task, as may be seen, is not wanting in importance and in difficulty; it is nothing less than to bring forward an idea which is far behind the other elements of civilization and progress.

To bring forward an idea, you will say, is as well as to try to move a mountain to MOHAMMED.

My reply is: Efforts well directed, above all, followed up and repeated, will triumph over the greatest difficulties, even indifference to the subject of insurance.

Let us unite our efforts. The time is favorable, and now we may hope more than ever to see life insurance rise from stagnation, and take the rank assigned to it among the useful institutions of a great nation. The opportunity of reform is manifest; to the intoxication of speculation, to the fever of play, should succeed the salutary routine of labor, economy and foresight, the only true sources of prosperity.

Industrial anarchy has done away with interests; it remains for insurance to re-establish them. The general scrambling system should give place to joint responsibility.

ORGANIZATION OF COMPANIES.

We will study with care the organization and functions of insurance companies. Their mechanism should be closely examined, and people should be convinced that all their operations turn upon certain given principles and strict and close calculations. These calculations result from attention to the laws of mortality, and from comprehensive analytical theory, fruit of the immortal works of such men as PASCAL, ZERMAT, BERNOVELLI, EULER, LAPLACE, D'ALEMBERT, JONDORCET, &c.

It is this admirable theory, originating in France, and which a celebrated geometrician has defined as "good sense reduced to figures," will show us that the solidity of a company increases with the amount of risk assumed by it; in other words, that millions of subscribers are a better security than millions of joint capital; that this capital not being necessary, the security in the worst circumstances must be more than sufficient to make bankruptcy impossible; good sense will further show us how a company must choose, divide and balance its risks, how it can account for its situation, and know whence come its profits, and finally how, by a progressive reduction of the contingencies in its operations, it constantly tends to become a bank, with this difference, that it has nothing to fear from financial or political crises, nor even from the scourges which increase mortality in an alarming proportion.

When we have seen all this, a life insurance company, well organized

and working regularly, will appear to us as the most admirable, the most solid, the most ably-conceived financial machine in existence.

We hope to render this fact so clear and apparent, that in the mind of the most prejudiced person there shall no longer remain the shadow of a doubt of the faithful execution of the engagements undertaken with him, however distant may be the term.

Is a proof of this firmness wanting? I should call it rather a sign than a proof, but it is a striking one: (I should undervalue the perspicacity of the reader if I added a single word:) all the most noted financiers are engaged in insurance and have made in it enormous fortunes.

INSURANCE CREATES WEALTH.

Let us pass in review the different ways of investing money. We shall see that life insurance is one of the safest and least known, and that it is the one of all others which best suits the largest number of persons, because it lends itself better than any other to the different conditions of life, and is equally within the reach of the smallest and largest savings. To gain an idea of the true economical worth of life insurance, and of the exaggeration to which we have yielded in saying that it creates wealth, it is enough to open the catechism of political economy by J. B. SAY:

D. "What is the only source of capital?"

R. "Economy."

Now life insurance may be defined as the consolidation of economy, that is to say, economy in its most useful form, elevated to its greatest power. But these are, you will say, mere economic theories at bottom, brilliant hyperboles, in reality, pure abstractions. And now for a fact. Tell me that I have exaggerated, and that insurance is a chimera!

There are in England four millions of human beings who would not exist without insurance.

Four millions! . . . To give a certain means of existence to four hundred thousand families!

Shall I now astonish my readers if I tell them that there is an organization of credit in life insurance? This theory has no place here, but I may be permitted to advance some of its principles under form of axioms:

1. All credit occasions an insurance.
2. Death should be the limitation of debt.
3. Unless refused by the insurance company, no one has a right to die insolvent.

All institutions of credit are interested in the prosperity of insurance. We shall see how loans on estates, among others, can extend their operations by the application of life-time redemptions, that is to say, by substituting life annuities for perpetual annuities. Government loans have made annuities popular; loans on estates will do the same for life insurance.

If insurance is an imperious duty to the head of a family, it is also of grave interest to the director of industry, upon whose shoulders often rests the entire fate of a vast enterprise. Evidently if all those who make use of loans, whether as creditors or debtors, knew the advantages they might gain from life insurance, the resources and the new securities which it might procure them, the losses of all kinds which it might spare

them, and the confidence which it merits, there is not one who would not instantly have recourse to it.

Confidence—that is the delicate point. . . . Many persons who, in fact, appreciate fully the advantages of insurance, do not doubt the utility of their principles, but they do not set the example. . . . Confidence is wanting. “I would practice if I had faith,” said an unbeliever to PASCAL. “Practice and you will have faith,” replies the celebrated thinker; and he adds, “I cannot give you the faith which you want, but you can renounce your habits and prove the truth of what I have told you.” To this simple lesson in good sense I see nothing to reply; but “proofs only convince the mind, and custom best strengthens our proofs.” We must, then, expect to see many lack faith, and wilfully perish in sight of the promised land.

INSURANCE IN FRANCE.

But what shall we say of those who pretend that insurance is not in our line? Might it not be so without our suspecting it? Looking at it closely I am inclined to think so, for I find a little of it every where, only it is not always apparent and is not seen. Mr. JOURDAIN did not suspect either that prose writing was in his line.

Setting aside the superannuation fund and the mutual aid societies, which are all insurances, is a bank really any thing else than an insurance enterprise? What is the Bank of France, in particular, if not an insurance company, which, with a capital based upon government security, warrants three or four millions of annual business? Interest, that is, the rent of money, is, in itself, subject to little fluctuation; that which varies in discounts, in reports, in bottomry loans, large or small—in short, in all transactions at extra-legal interest, is precisely the excess of this so-called *usurious* interest above the legal rate, an excess which is nothing more nor less than an insurance premium that the borrower pays to the capitalist to indemnify him for the risks that he must run. This consideration, by the way, simplifies particularly the question of usury.

The circulating note, with its successive endorsements—a rough kind of solvency insurance.

The surcharge that we pay at the post for a registered letter—an insurance premium in case of loss of declared goods, &c., &c.

To our knowledge many ways exist of establishing life insurances. We firmly believe that it is possible without calling upon government to command confidence and to give definitely to these operations the unalterable credit which they justly enjoy in neighboring countries.

To conclude: At the present time, in France, life insurance seems to be the privilege of a few well-informed, thinking persons; it must, if I may say so, become a privilege in general use.

NATIONAL LOAN ACT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Approved July 17, 1861.

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE A NATIONAL LOAN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury be and he is hereby authorized to borrow, on the credit of the United States, within twelve months from the passage of this act, a sum not exceeding two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, or so much thereof as he may deem necessary for the public service, for which he is authorized to issue coupon bonds, or registered bonds, or treasury notes, in such proportions as he may deem advisable; the bonds to bear interest not exceeding seven per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, irredeemable for twenty years, and after that period redeemable at the pleasure of the United States; and the treasury notes to be of any denomination fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury, not less than fifty dollars, and to be payable three years after date, with interest at the rate of seven and three-tenths per centum per annum, payable semi-annually. And the Secretary of the Treasury may also issue, in exchange for coin, and as part of the above loan, or may pay for salaries or other dues from the United States, treasury notes of a less denomination than fifty dollars, not bearing interest, but payable on demand by the Assistant Treasurers of the United States at Philadelphia, New-York or Boston, or treasury notes bearing interest at the rate of three and sixty-five hundredths per centum, payable in one year from date, and exchangeable at any time for treasury notes for fifty dollars and upwards, issuable under the authority of this act, and bearing interest as specified above: *Provided,* That no exchange of such notes in any less amount than one hundred dollars shall be made at any one time: *And provided further,* That no treasury notes shall be issued of a less denomination than ten dollars, and that the whole amount of treasury notes, not bearing interest, issued under the authority of this act, shall not exceed fifty millions of dollars.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That the treasury notes and bonds issued under the provisions of this act shall be signed by the First or Second Comptroller or the Register of the Treasury, and countersigned by such other officer or officers of the treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may designate; and all such obligations, of the denomination of fifty dollars and upwards, shall be issued under the seal of the Treasury Department. The registered bonds shall be transferable on the books of the treasury on delivery of the certificate, and the coupon bonds and treasury notes shall be transferable by delivery. The interest coupons may be signed by such person or persons or executed in such manner as may be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall fix the compensation for the same.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted,* That the Secretary of the Treasury

shall cause books to be opened for subscription to the treasury notes for fifty dollars and upwards, at such place as he may designate in the United States, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to be superintended by the Assistant Treasurers of the United States at their respective localities, and at other places by such depositaries, postmasters and other persons as he may designate, notice thereof being given in at least two daily papers of this city, and in one or more public newspapers published in the several places where subscription books may be opened; and subscriptions for such notes may be received from all persons who may desire to subscribe, any law to the contrary notwithstanding; and if a larger amount shall be subscribed in the aggregate than is required at one time, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to receive the same, should he deem it advantageous to the public interest; and if not, he shall accept the amount required by giving the preference to the smaller subscriptions; and the Secretary of the Treasury shall fix the compensations of the public officers or others designated for receiving said subscriptions: *Provided*, That, for performing this or any other duty in connection with this act, no compensation for services rendered shall be allowed or paid to any public officer whose salary is established by law; and the Secretary of the Treasury may also make such other rules and regulations as he may deem expedient touching the instalment to be paid on any subscription at the time of subscribing, and further payments by instalments or otherwise, and penalties for non-payment of any instalment, and also concerning the receipt, deposit and safe-keeping of money received from such subscriptions, until the same can be placed in the possession of official depositaries of the treasury, any law or laws to the contrary notwithstanding. And the Secretary of the Treasury is also authorized, if he shall deem it expedient, before opening books of subscription as above provided, to exchange for coin or pay for public dues or for treasury notes of the issue of twenty-third of December, eighteen hundred and fifty-seven, and falling due on the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, or for treasury notes issued and taken in exchange for such notes, any amount of said treasury notes, for fifty dollars or upwards, not exceeding one hundred millions of dollars.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That, before awarding any portion of the loan in bonds authorized by this act, the Secretary of the Treasury, if he deem it advisable to issue proposals for the same in the United States, shall give not less than fifteen days' public notice, in two or more of the public newspapers in the city of Washington, and in such other places of the United States as he may deem advisable, designating the amount of such loan, the place and the time up to which sealed proposals will be received for the same, the periods for the payment and the amount of each instalment in which it is to be paid, and the penalty for the non-payment of any such instalments, and when and where such proposals shall be opened, in the presence of such persons as he may choose to attend; and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to accept the most favorable proposals offered by responsible bidders: *Provided*, That no offer shall be accepted at less than par.

SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That the Secretary of the Treasury may, if he deem it advisable, negotiate any portion of said loan, not ex-

ceeding one hundred millions of dollars, in any foreign country, and payable at any designated place, either in the United States or in Europe, and may issue registered or coupon bonds for the amount thus negotiated, agreeably to the provisions of this act, bearing interest payable semi-annually either in the United States or at any designated place in Europe; and he is further authorized to appoint such agent or agents as he may deem necessary for negotiating such loan, under his instructions, and for paying the interest on the same, and to fix the compensation of such agent or agents, and shall prescribe to them all the rules, regulations and modes under which such loan shall be negotiated, and shall have power to fix the rate of exchange at which the principal shall be received from the contractors for the loan; and the exchange for the payment of the principal and interest in Europe shall be at the same rate.

SEC. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That whenever any treasury notes, of a denomination less than fifty dollars, authorized to be issued by this act, shall have been redeemed, the Secretary of the Treasury may reissue the same, or may cancel them and issue new notes to an equal amount: *Provided*, That the aggregate amount of bonds and treasury notes issued under the foregoing provisions of this act shall never exceed the full amount authorized by the first section of this act; and the power to issue or reissue such notes shall cease and determine after the thirty-first of December, eighteen hundred and sixty-two.

SEC. 7. *And be it further enacted*, That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, whenever he shall deem it expedient, to issue, in exchange for coin, or in payment for public dues, treasury notes of any of the denominations hereinbefore specified, bearing interest not exceeding six per centum per annum, and payable at any time not exceeding twelve months from date: *Provided*, That the amount of notes so issued or paid shall at no time exceed twenty millions of dollars.

SEC. 8. *And be it further enacted*, That the Secretary of the Treasury shall report to Congress, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the amount he has borrowed under the provisions of this act, of whom and on what terms, with an abstract of all the proposals, designating those that have been accepted and those that have been rejected, and the amount of bonds or treasury notes that have been issued for the same.

SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted*, That the faith of the United States is hereby solemnly pledged for the payment of the interest and redemption of the principal of the loan authorized by this act.

SEC. 10. *And be it further enacted*, That all the provisions of the act entitled "An act to authorize the issue of treasury notes," approved the 23d day of December, 1857, so far as the same can or may be applied to the provisions of this act, and not inconsistent therewith, are hereby revived or re-enacted.

SEC. 11. *And be it further enacted*, That, to defray all the expenses that may attend the execution of this act, the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, be and the same is hereby appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.

Approved July 17th, 1861.

AN ACT SUPPLEMENTARY TO AN ACT ENTITLED "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE A NATIONAL LOAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

Approved August 5th, 1861.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to issue bonds of the United States, bearing interest at six per centum per annum, and payable at the pleasure of the United States after twenty years from date; and if any holder of Treasury notes bearing interest at the rate of seven and three-tenths per centum, which may be issued under the authority of the act to authorize a national loan and for other purposes, approved July 17th, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, shall desire to exchange the same for said bonds, the Secretary of the Treasury may, at any time before or at the maturity of said Treasury notes, issue to said holder, in payment thereof, an amount of said bonds equal to the amount which, at the time of such payment or exchange, may be due on said Treasury notes; but no such bonds shall be issued for a less sum than five hundred dollars, nor shall the whole amount of such bonds exceed the whole amount of Treasury notes bearing seven and three-tenths per centum interest, issued under said act; and any part of the Treasury notes payable on demand, authorized by said act, may be made payable by the Assistant Treasurer at Saint Louis, or by the depositary at Cincinnati.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That the Treasury notes issued under the provisions of the said act to authorize a national loan, and for other purposes, or of any other act now in force authorizing the issue of such notes, shall be signed by the Treasurer of the United States, or by some officer of the Treasury Department, designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, for said Treasurer, and countersigned by the Register of the Treasury, or by some officer of the Treasury Department, designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for said Register, and no Treasury notes, issued under any act, shall require the seal of the Treasury Department.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted,* That so much of the act to which this is supplementary as limits the denomination of a portion of the Treasury notes authorized by said act at not less than ten dollars, be and is so modified as to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to fix the denomination of said notes at not less than five dollars.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted,* That, in addition to the amount heretofore appropriated, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, be, and the same is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay such expenses, commissions or compensation as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, to carry into execution the provisions of this act, and of the act to which this is supplementary.

SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted,* That the Treasury notes authorized by the act to which this is supplementary, of a less denomination than fifty dollars, payable on demand without interest, and not exceeding in amount the sum of fifty millions of dollars, shall be receivable in payment of public dues.

SEC. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That the provisions of the act entitled "An act to provide for the better organization of the Treasury, and for the collection, safe-keeping, transfer and disbursements of the public revenue," passed August six, eighteen hundred and forty-six, be and the same are hereby suspended, so far as to allow the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit any of the moneys obtained on any of the loans now authorized by law to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, in such solvent specie-paying banks as he may select; and the said moneys, so deposited, may be withdrawn from such deposit for deposit with the regular authorized depositaries, or for the payment of public dues, or paid in redemption of the notes authorized to be issued under this act, or the act to which this is supplementary, payable on demand, as may seem expedient to, or be directed by, the Secretary of the Treasury.

SEC. 7. *And be it further enacted*, That the Secretary of the Treasury may sell or negotiate for any portion of the loan provided for in the act to which this is supplementary, bonds payable not more than twenty years from date, and bearing interest not exceeding six per centum per annum, payable semi-annually, at any rate not less than the equivalent of par, for the bonds bearing seven per centum interest, authorized by said act.

Approved August 5th, 1861.

AMERICAN COUNTERFEITS OF TURKISH MONEY.—It is an unfortunate fact, that whenever the police of Constantinople discover any counterfeiting establishments, there are almost always one or more American citizens or protégés concerned in them. Not long ago a Moldavian lady had an immense amount of false paper money made in New-York city, which she attempted to introduce into Constantinople in her trunks and skirts. She was discovered, and has met a well-merited punishment. In this case no blame could be laid upon the highly respectable engraver who did the work, as he was altogether unaware of the nature of the bills he made. But soon after this a large manufactory of counterfeit gold coin was discovered here, and one of the chief managers was a native born New-Yorker. Fortunately for the honor of the country, he escaped and has gone home, very likely to practice his trade there.

And now, again, the police of Pera have found a counterfeiting establishment on a still larger scale, with ten machines for making false *caimè* (the paper money) and two or three gold coins. The four chief partners are under arrest, and again one of them is an American subject.

The unfortunate thing about the counterfeits is, that no man here is able to distinguish good *caimè* from bad. It is all such wretched stuff that there is no way of certainly determining the genuineness of any given bill.

If the government should follow its own accounts, and redeem only the amount of *caimè* which is registered there as having been issued, an immense amount will remain worthless upon the hands of the holders, the greater part of which will undoubtedly be genuine. This being the case, the government will probably be compelled to buy up the whole, false and all.—*Constantinople Cor. of the N. Y. World.*

BANK STATISTICS.

NEW-YORK.

THE following table illustrates the increase of banking capital, deposits, loans and specie, since the year 1849, at this city. The most marked increase was in the number of banks and amount of capital during the years 1852—1853, and from September, 1855, to March, 1857 :

Date.	Capital.	Due other Banks.	Deposits.	Loans.	Specie.	No. of Banks.
September, 1849,....	\$ 25,068,000 ..	\$ 12,392,000 ..	\$ 28,482,000 ..	\$ 51,079,000 ..	\$ 8,022,000 ..	25
September, 1850,....	27,440,000 ..	16,412,000 ..	37,018,000 ..	62,886,000 ..	9,056,000 ..	28
September, 1851,....	34,603,000 ..	10,777,000 ..	36,957,000 ..	70,516,000 ..	6,082,000 ..	37
September, 1852,....	86,791,000 ..	22,434,000 ..	49,608,000 ..	94,855,000 ..	8,702,000 ..	41
June, 1853,....	44,196,000 ..	24,961,000 ..	59,078,000 ..	102,714,000 ..	12,174,000 ..	52
September, 1855,....	48,668,000 ..	18,525,000 ..	58,657,000 ..	103,924,000 ..	9,747,000 ..	52
March, 1857,....	59,703,000 ..	22,888,000 ..	70,760,000 ..	122,790,000 ..	10,786,000 ..	56
June, 1858,....	67,041,000 ..	28,275,000 ..	74,806,000 ..	127,662,000 ..	31,704,000 ..	53
September, 1859,....	68,933,000 ..	18,379,000 ..	75,497,000 ..	115,708,000 ..	20,556,000 ..	54
March, 1860,....	69,420,000 ..	29,039,000 ..	79,526,000 ..	125,949,000 ..	23,172,000 ..	55
June, 1860,....	69,758,000 ..	26,243,000 ..	80,536,000 ..	125,139,000 ..	23,054,000 ..	55
September, 1860,....	69,290,000 ..	21,271,000 ..	81,283,000 ..	120,271,000 ..	20,116,000 ..	54
December, 1860,....	69,907,000 ..	22,792,000 ..	84,823,000 ..	130,351,000 ..	24,597,000 ..	55
March, 1861,....	69,914,000 ..	23,219,000 ..	83,512,000 ..	117,069,000 ..	37,458,000 ..	55
June, 1861,....	69,650,000 ..	25,006,000 ..	77,153,000 ..	105,822,000 ..	39,972,000 ..	55

*Comparative Table of the Banks of the State of New-York, 1859—1861,
from the quarterly reports.*

RESOURCES.	Sept., 1859.	Sept., 1860.	Dec., 1860.	March, 1861.	June, 1861.
Loans,.....	\$ 182,420,134	\$ 200,113,834	\$ 202,241,003	\$ 186,130,600	\$ 168,477,371
Overdrafts,.....	886,317 ..	423,392 ..	430,441 ..	362,211 ..	373,279
Due from banks,.....	12,218,953 ..	17,167,040 ..	13,962,096 ..	14,611,956 ..	13,324,077
Real estate,.....	8,647,503 ..	8,865,800 ..	8,816,649 ..	8,967,823 ..	8,938,312
Specie on hand,.....	22,026,187 ..	21,710,828 ..	26,427,334 ..	39,229,285 ..	41,824,079
Cash items,.....	19,716,121 ..	22,913,841 ..	16,044,322 ..	18,114,840 ..	13,636,564
Stocks, bonds and mortgages,	34,742,237 ..	36,609,787 ..	37,086,115 ..	37,775,737 ..	41,527,496
Bills of other banks,.....	1,965,325 ..	2,509,601 ..	2,259,865 ..	1,955,477 ..	2,066,343
Loss and expense account,...	1,124,173 ..	931,432 ..	1,757,862 ..	1,058,219 ..	1,221,482
Miscellaneous,.....	841 ..	980 ..	968
Total resources,.....	\$ 283,246,930	\$ 311,245,555	\$ 309,056,528	\$ 308,207,128	\$ 291,390,271
LIABILITIES.	Sept., 1859.	Sept., 1860.	Dec., 1860.	March, 1861.	June, 1861.
Capital,.....	\$ 110,997,040	\$ 111,834,347	\$ 111,821,957	\$ 111,755,491	\$ 109,912,209
Circulation,.....	27,970,968 ..	31,759,127 ..	28,239,950 ..	27,827,965 ..	25,617,151
Profits undivided,.....	12,514,598 ..	13,316,468 ..	15,083,257 ..	12,929,192 ..	14,597,241
Due banks,.....	23,992,116 ..	29,706,606 ..	29,492,678 ..	34,007,310 ..	30,013,723
Due other than banks,.....	943,505 ..	2,252,961 ..	5,600,519 ..	1,214,942 ..	1,045,466
Treasurer of the State,.....	1,873,226 ..	3,569,907 ..	4,180,794 ..	2,609,426 ..	2,171,120
Due depositors,.....	103,106,666 ..	116,190,466 ..	110,664,578 ..	116,183,469 ..	106,815,093
Miscellaneous,.....	1,848,811 ..	2,615,673 ..	3,972,795 ..	1,679,333 ..	1,718,269
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 283,246,930	\$ 311,245,555	\$ 309,056,528	\$ 308,207,128	\$ 291,390,271

BOSTON.—42 Banks—Capital, January, 1859, \$35,125,433; June, 1861, \$38,231,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due to Banks.	Due from Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 62,025,734 ..	\$ 4,204,610 ..	\$ 7,082,018 ..	\$ 18,719,190 ..	\$ 7,663,862 ..	\$ 8,371,304
Jan. 12,....	62,720,067 ..	4,199,155 ..	6,825,825 ..	18,422,650 ..	8,082,942 ..	7,605,680
Jan. 19,....	63,275,167 ..	4,425,256 ..	6,706,045 ..	18,366,511 ..	8,346,141 ..	7,094,438
Jan. 26,....	63,237,796 ..	4,532,019 ..	6,374,476 ..	18,185,128 ..	8,477,340 ..	6,714,029
Feb. 2,....	63,264,318 ..	4,629,063 ..	6,247,643 ..	18,184,009 ..	8,485,680 ..	6,563,176
Feb. 9,....	63,484,332 ..	4,373,614 ..	6,387,552 ..	18,074,598 ..	8,313,692 ..	6,299,117
Feb. 16,....	63,113,532 ..	4,651,803 ..	6,216,299 ..	17,795,444 ..	8,312,101 ..	6,791,101
Feb. 23,....	62,765,038 ..	4,738,981 ..	6,384,383 ..	17,833,065 ..	8,451,939 ..	6,522,815
Mch. 2,....	62,725,101 ..	4,731,291 ..	6,372,201 ..	17,931,201 ..	8,111,201 ..	6,921,107
Mch. 9,....	62,649,600 ..	4,836,600 ..	6,345,600 ..	18,182,000 ..	7,978,000 ..	7,082,600
Mch. 16,....	62,511,727 ..	5,367,722 ..	6,166,253 ..	18,126,034 ..	8,269,601 ..	6,550,262
Mch. 23,....	62,359,922 ..	5,601,571 ..	6,059,548 ..	17,811,827 ..	8,611,882 ..	6,450,362
Mch. 30,....	62,666,800 ..	5,605,400 ..	6,108,600 ..	18,029,000 ..	8,345,500 ..	7,269,900
Apl. 6,....	62,561,820 ..	5,809,425 ..	6,996,996 ..	19,918,855 ..	9,198,022 ..	8,596,667
Apl. 13,....	62,734,600 ..	5,875,600 ..	6,900,500 ..	19,697,500 ..	9,383,000 ..	8,167,000
Apl. 20,....	62,896,500 ..	5,780,700 ..	6,733,000 ..	19,440,700 ..	9,482,000 ..	8,210,500
Apl. 27,....	61,507,597 ..	5,633,790 ..	6,610,560 ..	18,571,856 ..	9,640,246 ..	8,131,220
May 4,....	61,884,400 ..	5,832,000 ..	6,875,000 ..	18,846,700 ..	9,223,000 ..	8,168,400
May 11,....	61,156,500 ..	5,997,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,303,600 ..	8,660,000 ..	7,625,600
May 18,....	61,206,000 ..	6,172,500 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,616,600 ..	8,331,000 ..	7,299,500
May 25,....	60,525,000 ..	6,402,700 ..	6,280,800 ..	18,586,000 ..	8,300,800 ..	7,144,500
June 1,....	60,213,500 ..	6,461,800 ..	6,139,700 ..	18,536,500 ..	8,206,000 ..	7,135,800
June 8,....	60,625,800 ..	6,013,800 ..	6,460,800 ..	18,204,500 ..	8,093,000 ..	7,193,000
June 15,....	60,074,100 ..	5,438,700 ..	6,452,500 ..	18,293,000 ..	8,000,000 ..	7,203,000
June 22,....	60,180,500 ..	5,831,000 ..	6,322,800 ..	18,240,300 ..	7,758,600 ..	7,423,000
June 29,....	60,095,675 ..	5,874,353 ..	6,106,524 ..	18,264,575 ..	7,609,614 ..	7,093,610
July 6,....	60,231,122 ..	6,090,012 ..	6,881,142 ..	18,521,267 ..	7,965,908 ..	8,173,089
July 13,....	60,324,993 ..	6,395,797 ..	6,607,102 ..	18,267,317 ..	8,173,713 ..	7,627,453
July 20,....	60,252,940 ..	6,662,661 ..	6,735,623 ..	18,541,111 ..	8,530,619 ..	8,071,750
July 27,....	60,276,822 ..	6,523,420 ..	6,804,533 ..	17,968,838 ..	8,324,698 ..	7,013,456
Aug. 3,....	61,263,745 ..	6,199,104 ..	6,831,199 ..	18,111,086 ..	8,423,709 ..	6,553,754
Aug. 10,....	61,138,331 ..	6,412,156 ..	6,450,374 ..	18,044,723 ..	8,558,647 ..	6,606,025
Aug. 17,....	60,898,110 ..	6,665,929 ..	6,366,466 ..	18,235,061 ..	8,523,538 ..	6,801,296

PITTSBURGH.—7 Banks—Capital, \$4,464,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 7,254,136 ..	\$ 1,356,392 ..	\$ 2,609,006 ..	\$ 1,891,947 ..	\$ 217,103
Jan. 12,....	7,164,457 ..	1,403,357 ..	2,609,056 ..	1,927,290 ..	208,148
Jan. 19,....	7,215,916 ..	1,400,485 ..	2,662,671 ..	1,733,946 ..	233,553
Jan. 26,....	7,123,312 ..	1,425,592 ..	2,686,706 ..	1,657,037 ..	242,595
Feb. 2,....	7,099,421 ..	1,449,036 ..	2,642,821 ..	1,701,427 ..	233,634
Mch. 2,....	6,929,720 ..	1,583,104 ..	2,550,981 ..	1,614,658 ..	243,038
Mch. 9,....	6,847,153 ..	1,611,121 ..	2,557,021 ..	1,666,118 ..	259,739
Mch. 16,....	6,966,490 ..	1,654,416 ..	2,893,191 ..	1,703,449 ..	234,589
Mch. 23,....	7,161,834 ..	1,663,240 ..	2,919,311 ..	1,662,043 ..	183,967
Mch. 30,....	6,570,905 ..	1,697,560 ..	3,024,751 ..	1,655,558 ..	186,069
Apl. 6,....	6,906,519 ..	1,741,545 ..	3,120,256 ..	1,680,975 ..	185,705
Apl. 13,....	6,863,931 ..	1,738,595 ..	3,045,446 ..	1,707,703 ..	145,015
May 1,....	6,962,898 ..	1,795,678 ..	3,175,181 ..	1,831,785 ..	188,152
June 1,....	7,107,820 ..	1,806,394 ..	3,526,532 ..	1,715,579 ..	240,413
July 1,....	7,120,869 ..	1,997,626 ..	3,631,289 ..	2,393,198 ..	249,123
Aug. 1,....	7,201,913 ..	2,095,934 ..	3,537,767 ..	2,540,508 ..	148,586

NEW-YORK.—54 Banks—Capital, August, 1861, \$69,907,000.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Weekly Clearings.	Sub-Treasury.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 129,625,465 ..	\$ 24,839,475 ..	\$ 8,698,288 ..	\$ 86,454,430 ..	\$ 95,994,868 ..	\$ 3,645,500
Jan. 12,....	129,125,515 ..	26,460,988 ..	8,357,198 ..	88,148,883 ..	123,308,183 ..	2,584,400
Jan. 19,....	126,034,520 ..	29,598,783 ..	8,067,570 ..	89,678,696 ..	121,218,782 ..	2,166,000
Jan. 26,....	123,935,153 ..	28,968,941 ..	7,920,298 ..	87,386,046 ..	123,070,984 ..	5,751,300
Feb. 2,....	121,907,024 ..	31,054,509 ..	8,099,376 ..	87,879,743 ..	122,138,525 ..	4,828,000
Feb. 9,....	120,368,050 ..	34,655,645 ..	8,361,305 ..	88,988,631 ..	121,525,631 ..	3,664,900
Feb. 16,....	119,880,371 ..	37,119,000 ..	8,273,840 ..	91,547,158 ..	111,387,663 ..	3,856,000
Feb. 23,....	119,236,290 ..	38,044,229 ..	8,128,792 ..	91,628,626 ..	118,142,167 ..	3,836,700
Mch. 2,....	121,893,963 ..	34,450,407 ..	8,290,755 ..	89,635,298 ..	126,728,532 ..	9,166,030
Mch. 9,....	122,705,094 ..	33,892,768 ..	8,585,783 ..	88,711,448 ..	129,303,550 ..	7,524,000
Mch. 16,....	122,609,925 ..	36,219,676 ..	8,392,347 ..	90,520,779 ..	119,500,573 ..	6,720,000
Mch. 23,....	120,750,455 ..	39,480,734 ..	8,345,011 ..	91,940,228 ..	120,133,015 ..	6,240,510
Mch. 30,....	120,958,165 ..	41,403,308 ..	8,484,344 ..	93,611,898 ..	119,040,819 ..	6,092,841
Apl. 6,....	122,118,496 ..	41,705,558 ..	8,930,141 ..	94,859,810 ..	123,277,671 ..	8,486,494
Apl. 13,....	123,108,885 ..	41,764,748 ..	8,801,429 ..	96,626,078 ..	124,284,307 ..	10,441,278
Apl. 20,....	124,701,259 ..	40,620,720 ..	8,825,057 ..	97,804,762 ..	124,020,087 ..	11,058,653
Apl. 27,....	124,817,154 ..	38,991,688 ..	8,840,476 ..	96,788,759 ..	106,948,819 ..	10,773,106
May 4,....	124,610,166 ..	38,054,254 ..	9,296,399 ..	94,977,881 ..	106,413,816 ..	9,761,752
May 11,....	123,132,298 ..	38,801,545 ..	9,304,241 ..	94,879,967 ..	104,163,420 ..	8,558,902
May 18,....	120,007,506 ..	39,567,980 ..	9,061,181 ..	93,179,526 ..	98,102,519 ..	7,867,542
May 25,....	118,141,356 ..	39,622,791 ..	8,793,882 ..	91,334,877 ..	94,155,277 ..	6,886,008
June 1,....	118,290,131 ..	37,502,402 ..	8,683,780 ..	90,197,459 ..	88,847,249 ..	11,468,789
June 8,....	117,509,075 ..	36,837,025 ..	8,963,007 ..	87,656,760 ..	95,465,614 ..	10,753,608
June 15,....	115,494,821 ..	38,280,211 ..	8,707,318 ..	87,992,791 ..	86,467,176 ..	9,488,884
June 22,....	113,667,640 ..	39,480,189 ..	8,444,330 ..	87,602,343 ..	88,188,062 ..	8,004,656
June 29,....	112,404,012 ..	42,078,011 ..	8,888,559 ..	88,721,752 ..	83,279,416 ..	6,094,283
July 6,....	112,134,668 ..	45,630,025 ..	8,862,799 ..	90,579,753 ..	83,313,280 ..	4,616,620
July 13,....	112,445,542 ..	45,016,836 ..	8,499,699 ..	91,805,937 ..	86,393,087 ..	7,055,543
July 20,....	112,086,103 ..	46,602,295 ..	8,354,192 ..	93,298,195 ..	96,566,821 ..	6,573,193
July 27,....	112,311,832 ..	46,900,721 ..	8,324,368 ..	93,687,933 ..	85,965,067 ..	7,359,272
Aug. 3,....	111,719,111 ..	46,226,181 ..	8,585,574 ..	92,229,384 ..	81,415,525 ..	6,738,059
Aug. 10,....	109,983,942 ..	48,630,116 ..	8,730,452 ..	92,016,057 ..	80,417,332 ..	5,629,641
Aug. 17,....	108,717,434 ..	49,733,990 ..	8,521,426 ..	92,046,308 ..	80,172,670 ..	4,380,239

PHILADELPHIA.—19 Banks—Capital, June, 1861, \$11,810,520.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 26,891,280 ..	\$ 4,020,266 ..	\$ 2,689,812 ..	\$ 15,261,925 ..	\$ 3,593,785
Jan. 12,....	26,555,986 ..	4,151,824 ..	2,694,217 ..	15,001,591 ..	3,464,167
Jan. 19,....	26,172,473 ..	4,263,105 ..	2,754,315 ..	14,750,382 ..	3,416,292
Jan. 26,....	25,892,265 ..	4,443,781 ..	2,737,638 ..	14,891,200 ..	3,143,795
Feb. 2,....	25,801,981 ..	4,588,054 ..	2,778,318 ..	15,295,453 ..	2,699,627
Feb. 16,....	25,344,076 ..	4,831,426 ..	2,809,865 ..	14,904,783 ..	2,864,874
Feb. 23,....	25,146,864 ..	4,901,704 ..	2,795,113 ..	14,335,806 ..	2,873,996
Mch. 2,....	25,085,310 ..	5,006,938 ..	2,811,491 ..	14,863,736 ..	2,811,491
Mch. 9,....	24,626,583 ..	5,295,314 ..	2,896,492 ..	14,501,214 ..	2,788,973
Mch. 16,....	24,627,504 ..	5,533,320 ..	2,802,414 ..	15,018,566 ..	2,897,500
Mch. 23,....	24,603,908 ..	6,059,320 ..	2,764,090 ..	15,464,754 ..	2,776,645
Mch. 30,....	24,973,496 ..	5,200,063 ..	2,811,263 ..	15,800,147 ..	3,010,776
Apl. 6,....	25,413,186 ..	6,452,093 ..	3,070,220 ..	16,006,115 ..	3,185,734
Apl. 13,....	25,415,442 ..	6,675,122 ..	2,820,813 ..	16,458,833 ..	3,543,153
Apl. 20,....	25,309,955 ..	6,796,011 ..	2,641,055 ..	16,633,231 ..	3,332,073
Apl. 27,....	25,296,942 ..	6,250,137 ..	2,546,305 ..	15,749,282 ..	3,273,704
May 4,....	25,438,065 ..	5,898,302 ..	2,716,602 ..	15,671,997 ..	3,107,893
May 11,....	25,715,318 ..	5,733,048 ..	2,607,421 ..	15,523,151 ..	3,017,655
May 18,....	25,496,530 ..	5,558,551 ..	2,435,552 ..	15,549,797 ..	2,798,670

PHILADELPHIA.—(Continued.)

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
May 25,....	25,091,226 ..	5,643,220 ..	2,408,518 ..	15,410,522 ..	2,554,385
June 1,....	24,671,294 ..	5,718,826 ..	2,317,067 ..	15,306,666 ..	2,491,024
June 8,....	24,585,244 ..	5,767,994 ..	2,294,862 ..	15,267,675 ..	2,548,406
June 15,....	24,282,443 ..	5,927,466 ..	2,198,037 ..	15,379,559 ..	2,477,029
June 22,....	24,240,983 ..	6,336,744 ..	2,147,212 ..	15,740,672 ..	2,460,557
June 29,....	23,967,200 ..	6,688,893 ..	2,101,312 ..	15,997,943 ..	2,412,862
July 6,....	24,127,173 ..	6,956,112 ..	2,190,035 ..	15,851,924 ..	2,610,189
July 13,....	23,996,828 ..	7,255,798 ..	2,154,812 ..	16,129,765 ..	2,789,490
July 20,....	23,942,341 ..	7,477,298 ..	2,128,922 ..	19,190,876 ..	2,881,735
July 27,....	23,927,433 ..	7,159,969 ..	2,091,770 ..	16,026,267 ..	2,783,565
Aug. 3,....	24,211,527 ..	6,743,321 ..	2,058,574 ..	15,941,861 ..	2,719,439
Aug. 10,....	24,064,070 ..	6,796,140 ..	2,074,009 ..	15,563,024 ..	2,767,679
Aug. 17,....	24,011,084 ..	6,765,120 ..	2,076,857 ..	15,335,838 ..	2,886,426

NEW ORLEANS.—13 Banks—Capital, January, 1861, \$24,674,844.

1861.	Short Loans.	Exchange.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Distant Balances.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 17,229,569 ..	\$ 6,969,916 ..	\$ 14,244,084 ..	\$ 6,204,384 ..	\$ 17,443,181 ..	\$ 1,235,375
Jan. 12,....	16,756,858 ..	7,017,014 ..	15,584,142 ..	6,377,069 ..	18,345,680 ..	1,292,183
Jan. 19,....	16,318,118 ..	7,356,586 ..	15,721,856 ..	6,664,554 ..	17,745,829 ..	1,469,546
Jan. 26,....	15,987,904 ..	8,987,904 ..	16,289,892 ..	6,988,081 ..	18,448,144 ..	1,263,522
Feb. 9,....	15,177,057 ..	9,846,136 ..	16,539,370 ..	7,404,926 ..	20,242,062 ..	1,440,016
Feb. 16,....	14,962,121 ..	10,615,597 ..	17,200,559 ..	7,523,141 ..	21,221,695 ..	1,586,860
Feb. 23,....	14,458,354 ..	10,749,661 ..	17,194,836 ..	7,599,521 ..	22,499,116 ..	1,481,108
Mch. 2,....	14,566,354 ..	10,501,496 ..	17,580,606 ..	7,945,461 ..	22,668,676 ..	1,532,484
Mch. 9,....	14,451,322 ..	10,560,005 ..	17,698,164 ..	8,112,711 ..	22,591,021 ..	1,653,598
Mch. 16,....	14,251,298 ..	10,632,419 ..	17,636,844 ..	8,175,656 ..	21,101,036 ..	1,650,659
Mch. 23,....	14,157,980 ..	10,619,296 ..	17,630,095 ..	8,286,886 ..	21,359,753 ..	1,677,292
Mch. 30,....	14,264,745 ..	10,426,483 ..	17,520,889 ..	8,486,746 ..	23,025,182 ..	2,100,694
Apr. 6,....	14,120,533 ..	9,972,205 ..	17,089,630 ..	8,776,616 ..	22,291,464 ..	1,740,632
Apr. 20,....	13,797,768 ..	8,518,500 ..	16,315,891 ..	8,509,266 ..	20,658,925 ..	1,375,133
Apr. 27,....	13,879,595 ..	7,828,354 ..	15,926,572 ..	8,170,161 ..	19,696,131 ..	1,208,536
May 4,....	13,413,744 ..	6,754,333 ..	15,384,300 ..	8,005,471 ..	19,835,638 ..	1,030,133
May 11,....	12,801,922 ..	6,257,454 ..	15,129,478 ..	7,565,796 ..	18,154,763 ..	889,764
May 18,....	12,379,731 ..	5,848,520 ..	15,095,458 ..	7,293,896 ..	18,263,349 ..	727,252
May 25,....	11,906,050 ..	5,565,064 ..	15,084,531 ..	7,132,211 ..	17,903,822 ..	739,112
June 1,....	11,604,523 ..	5,094,177 ..	15,303,387 ..	6,998,851 ..	18,870,435 ..	836,731
June 8,....	11,116,964 ..	4,805,527 ..	15,237,431 ..	6,904,581 ..	16,927,592 ..	822,864
June 15,....	10,737,982 ..	4,456,223 ..	15,144,920 ..	6,814,311 ..	17,142,732 ..	750,522
June 22,....	10,236,826 ..	4,276,479 ..	15,033,801 ..	6,663,561 ..	16,714,910 ..	743,607
June 29,....	9,795,740 ..	4,163,331 ..	15,086,991 ..	6,610,306 ..	16,506,373 ..	766,975
July 6,....	9,641,292 ..	4,052,231 ..	15,215,230 ..	6,780,426 ..	16,101,540 ..	753,332
July 13,....	9,502,688 ..	3,958,583 ..	14,932,432 ..	6,482,091 ..	16,053,134 ..	791,927
July 20,....	9,824,740 ..	3,783,519 ..	14,822,316 ..	6,427,721 ..	15,737,476 ..	744,032
July 27,....	9,766,118 ..	3,799,015 ..	14,726,547 ..	6,396,416 ..	15,724,851 ..	742,886
Aug. 3,....	9,859,342 ..	3,830,941 ..	14,631,633 ..	6,548,621 ..	15,543,171 ..	792,200
Aug. 10,....	10,010,560 ..	3,563,776 ..	14,614,215 ..	6,411,531 ..	15,452,093 ..	763,213

THE BANK OF EGYPT.

The Board of Control of the Bank of Egypt reside in London, where the stock is mainly held. In submitting the following semi-annual statement of the bank for the half year ending December 31st, 1860, the directors complain of special loans having been made by Mr. PASQUALI and the board of management in Egypt, to the late Prince EL HAMI PASHA, (son

of the late Vice Roy, **ABBAS PASHA**,) to the extent of £162,000, or nearly two-thirds of the entire capital. Since then **Mr. PASQUALI**, the manager, has resigned, and the board of management in Egypt has been entirely re-organized. The London report concludes:

"In conclusion, the directors are happy to state that the credit of the Bank of Egypt is entirely re-established, and that the current expenses in Egypt have been reduced by one-third. The crisis has been trying, but the directors confidently assure the shareholders that the business of the bank has now been put upon a sound basis. It is already, though cramped for the present in regard to capital, doing a highly profitable and really banking business, and the directors have no doubt that the bank will henceforth occupy a highly respectable local position, and yield an ample remuneration."

Balance-sheet of Liabilities and Assets, December 31, 1860.

LIABILITIES.		£	s.	d.
Capital paid up,.....		250,000	0	0
Reserve fund, (less balance of profit and loss,).....		10,671	2	4
Bills payable,.....		156,987	0	5
Current and other accounts,.....		85,934	0	10
Total liabilities December 31st, 1860,.....		£ 503,592	3	7
ASSETS.		£	s.	d.
Specie on hand,.....		59,722	6	4
Bills receivable,.....		60,305	13	6
Government securities, (Egyptian,).....		128,142	17	7
Other securities,.....		252,756	5	7
Office furniture,.....		665	0	7
Preliminary expenses,.....		2,000	0	0
Total assets December 31st, 1860,.....		£ 503,592	3	7

SOUTHERN BANK OF KENTUCKY, 1851—1861.

LIABILITIES.	July 1, 1851.	Jan. 1, 1855.	July 1, 1856.	July 1, 1861.
Capital,.....	\$ 367,000 ..	\$ 1,488,075 ..	\$ 1,495,600 ..	\$ 1,500,000
Circulation,.....	549,033 ..	2,130,129 ..	2,563,573 ..	736,577
Due to banks,.....	5,580 ..	213,467 ..	268,844 ..	58,598
Deposits,.....	63,312 ..	220,258 ..	299,999 ..	269,211
Profit and loss,.....	19,418 ..	285,836 ..	438,471 ..	527,702
Dividends unpaid,.....	4,054 ..	4,786
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 1,004,343 ..	\$ 4,337,767 ..	\$ 5,070,546 ..	\$ 3,096,874
RESOURCES.	July 1, 1851.	Jan. 1, 1855.	July 1, 1856.	July 1, 1861.
Notes discounted,.....	\$ 171,183 ..	\$ 295,484 ..	\$ 531,074 ..	\$ 400,613
Bills of exchange,.....	272,638 ..	2,001,286 ..	1,756,975 ..	1,118,013
Real estate,.....	9,776 ..	59,765 ..	50,977 ..	31,265
Due from banks,.....	43,003 ..	266,180 ..	287,474 ..	86,094
Eastern exchange,.....	65,604 ..	188,666 ..	644,760 ..	283,874
Notes of other banks,.....	77,218 ..	43,686 ..	155,817 ..	39,111
Specie,.....	214,966 ..	808,894 ..	963,543 ..	765,802
Suspended bills,.....	150,000 ..	73,806 ..	79,926 ..	244,563
State bonds,.....	600,000 ..	600,000 ..	133,039
Total resources,.....	\$ 1,004,343 ..	\$ 4,337,767 ..	\$ 5,070,546 ..	\$ 3,096,874

BANK OF KENTUCKY AND SEVEN BRANCHES.

LIABILITIES.	Jan., 1846.	July, 1849.	Jan., 1853.	Jan., 1855.	July, 1861.
Capital stock,.....	\$ 3,700,000	.. \$ 3,700,000	.. \$ 3,700,000	.. \$ 3,700,000	.. \$ 3,700,000
Over-issue by Schuylkill Bk.	470,300
Circulation,.....	2,586,672	.. 2,453,002	.. 3,528,403	.. 2,067,106	.. 913,781
Individual deposits,.....	740,984	.. 791,645	.. 877,947	.. 855,978	.. 983,188
Bank balances,.....	392,814	.. 283,907	.. 662,760	.. 901,673	.. 738,255
Reserve fund by charter,....	100,000	.. 100,000	.. 74,000	.. 74,000	.. 74,000
Schuylkill Bank fund,.....	55,137	.. 600,000	.. 285,500	.. 230,000
Contingent fund,.....	139,480	.. 114,826	.. 381,373	.. 323,347	.. 539,002
Due Treasurer of State,....	53,181	.. 49,674	.. 173,180	.. 605,525	.. 196,477
Dividends unpaid,.....	105,256	.. 154,070	.. 7,572	.. 6,614	.. 154,582
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 8,343,824	.. \$ 8,247,121	.. \$ 9,690,740	.. \$ 8,769,241	.. \$ 7,254,285
RESOURCES.	Jan., 1846.	July, 1849.	Jan., 1853.	Jan., 1855.	July, 1861.
Notes discounted,.....	\$ 3,093,840	.. \$ 2,645,581	.. \$ 2,349,805	.. \$ 2,000,491	.. \$ 1,632,029
Bills of exchange,.....	1,850,222	.. 2,137,700	.. 3,928,450	.. 3,971,166	.. 2,653,753
Suspended debt,.....	167,430	.. 107,625	.. 98,526	.. 80,146	.. 210,542
Real estate,.....	252,205	.. 197,382	.. 151,994	.. 135,701	.. 150,972
Kentucky State bonds,.....	250,000	.. 250,000
Louisville City bonds,.....	200,000	.. 200,000	.. 181,710	.. 101,000	.. 94,750
Bank balances,.....	465,131	.. 620,990	.. 703,501	.. 896,391	.. 672,828
Schuylkill Bank fund,.....	470,300 262,228	.. 212,500	.. 131,221
Gold and silver,.....	1,275,308	.. 1,241,063	.. 1,328,540	.. 935,527	.. 769,305
Notes of other banks,.....	319,388	.. 334,761	.. 218,692	.. 161,700	.. 172,563
Miscellaneous,..... 512,070	.. 30,094	.. 20,886	.. 7,579
Deposits N. Y., Phila., &c., 437,200	.. 253,733	.. 753,743
Total resources,.....	\$ 8,343,824	.. \$ 8,247,121	.. \$ 9,690,740	.. \$ 8,769,241	.. \$ 7,254,285

BANK OF LOUISVILLE AND TWO BRANCHES.

LIABILITIES.	Jan., 1847.	July, 1849.	Jan., 1853.	Jan., 1855.	July, 1861.
Capital,.....	\$ 1,082,000	.. \$ 1,080,000	.. \$ 1,080,000	.. \$ 1,080,000	.. \$ 1,930,000
Circulation,.....	939,822	.. 938,390	.. 1,603,500	.. 939,497	.. 837,607
Individual deposits,.....	163,980	.. 202,236	.. 225,235	.. 232,050	.. 658,228
Bank balances,.....	57,091	.. 222,362	.. 378,105	.. 613,795	.. 708,265
Profit and loss,.....	126,830	.. 162,933	.. 192,562	.. 210,731	.. 220,771
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 2,369,723	.. \$ 2,650,921	.. \$ 3,479,452	.. \$ 3,076,074	.. \$ 4,354,871
RESOURCES.	Jan., 1847.	July, 1849.	Jan., 1853.	Jan., 1855.	July, 1861.
Notes discounted,.....	\$ 736,700	.. \$ 608,381	.. \$ 586,142	.. \$ 323,164	.. \$ 533,383
Bills of exchange,.....	717,985	.. 893,521	.. 1,527,045	.. 1,301,538	.. 1,587,870
Louisville City bonds,.....	75,000	.. 75,000	.. 35,000	.. 6,300	.. 79,824
Bank balances,.....	132,830	.. 295,573	.. 471,640	.. 571,768	.. 690,996
Suspended debt,.....	88,443	.. 46,080	.. 30,198	.. 27,926	.. 24,108
Real estate,.....	97,271	.. 99,641	.. 95,510	.. 90,793	.. 72,450
Specie on hand,.....	445,844	.. 527,394	.. 638,890	.. 371,293	.. 587,412
Bank notes, &c.,.....	75,650	.. 104,876	.. 95,027	.. 173,953	.. 143,166
Eastern exchange,..... 209,336	.. 630,662
Total resources,.....	\$ 2,369,723	.. \$ 2,650,921	.. \$ 3,479,452	.. \$ 3,076,074	.. \$ 4,354,871

BANK OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.

LIABILITIES.	Jan., 1857.	July, 1858.	Jan., 1860.	July, 1860.	July, 1861.
Capital stock,.....	\$ 1,643,443	.. \$ 2,221,722	.. \$ 2,988,431	.. \$ 3,127,850	.. \$ 3,352,425
Surplus fund,.....	1,533	.. 450,426	.. 730,908	.. 890,628	.. 1,050,616
Individual deposits,.....	3,178	.. 796,321	.. 834,188	.. 942,503	.. 1,042,683
Circulation,.....	430,000	.. 3,779,180	.. 4,308,286	.. 4,699,968	.. 4,931,676
Due other banks,.....	181,939	.. 163,613	.. 81,654	.. 38,103	.. 60,556
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 2,210,093	.. \$ 7,416,262	.. \$ 8,938,467	.. \$ 9,699,052	.. \$ 10,437,956
RESOURCES.	Jan., 1857.	July, 1858.	Jan., 1860.	July, 1860.	July, 1861.
Loans,.....	\$ 3,050	.. \$ 4,226,314	.. \$ 6,213,660	.. \$ 6,281,415	.. \$ 4,963,242
Real estate,.....	25,089	.. 140,856	.. 207,850	.. 226,543	.. 271,796
Eastern deposits,.....	803,114	.. 955,670	.. 361,377	.. 728,213	.. 1,559,133
Other bank balances,.....	159,304	.. 567,843	.. 370,035	.. 514,416	.. 799,511
Notes of other banks,.....	482,863	.. 203,484	.. 264,964	.. 222,904	.. 186,861
Gold and silver,.....	716,411	.. 1,322,095	.. 1,411,500	.. 1,667,262	.. 2,657,413
Miscellaneous,.....	20,262 109,081	.. 58,299
Total resources,.....	\$ 2,210,093	.. \$ 7,416,262	.. \$ 8,938,467	.. \$ 9,699,052	.. \$ 10,437,956

BANKS OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

*Liabilities and Resources of the Banks of South Carolina in July, 1858,
March and November, 1860, and January 1 and June 1, 1861.*

LIABILITIES.	July 1, 1858.	March 1, 1860.	Nov. 1, 1860.	Jan. 1, 1861.	June 1, 1861.
Capital,.....	\$ 14,888,152	.. \$ 14,962,062	.. \$ 14,952,487	.. \$ 14,952,487	.. \$ 14,952,486
Circulation,.....	5,912,048	.. 12,603,687	.. 6,435,242	.. 6,920,704	.. 6,185,684
Profits on hand,...	2,129,415	.. 1,872,689	.. 2,130,837	.. 2,090,375	.. 2,302,963
Due banks,.....	2,909,512	.. 3,885,428	.. 3,201,495	.. 3,024,021	.. 4,402,867
Deposits,.....	3,779,211	.. 5,001,054	.. 3,497,122	.. 3,629,879	.. 5,462,902
Due States,.....	3,409,205	.. 3,063,964	.. 2,925,012	.. 2,939,123	.. 2,868,276
Other items,.....	10,144	.. 199,507	.. 241,430	.. 77,964	.. 1,450
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 32,537,687	.. \$ 41,588,691	.. \$ 33,383,625	.. \$ 33,634,553	.. \$ 36,126,623
RESOURCES.	July 1, 1858.	March 1, 1860.	Nov. 1, 1860.	Jan. 1, 1861.	June 1, 1861.
Specie,.....	\$ 2,036,175	.. \$ 2,560,260	.. \$ 1,405,898	.. \$ 1,355,205	.. \$ 1,396,750
Real estate,.....	684,284	.. 679,421	.. 684,144	.. 685,096	.. 694,256
Bank notes,.....	833,660	.. 523,032	.. 376,080	.. 680,840	.. 492,256
Due from banks,...	1,825,577	.. 1,513,051	.. 778,937	.. 1,811,540	.. 3,210,581
Discounts,.....	11,633,113	.. 12,736,629	.. 12,674,949	.. 12,287,763	.. 11,837,008
Domestic exch'ge,	6,571,413	.. 14,815,041	.. 10,306,609	.. 8,173,855	.. 4,689,714
Foreign exchange,	1,425,810	.. 1,178,180	.. 258,192	.. 1,124,041	.. 4,304,947
Bonds and stocks,.	3,090,853	.. 2,818,376	.. 2,903,972	.. 2,914,039	.. 4,502,243
Suspended debt,...	1,723,554	.. 1,497,139	.. 1,489,977	.. 1,897,675	.. 2,537,386
Branches,..... 2,050,194	.. 1,674,048	.. 1,891,956	.. 1,402,109
State,.....	82,065	.. 414,543	.. 140,331	.. 213,589	.. 90,253
Other items,.....	2,626,183	.. 802,825	.. 695,538	.. 598,954	.. 968,870
Total resources,.....	\$ 32,537,687	.. \$ 41,588,691	.. \$ 33,383,625	.. \$ 33,634,553	.. \$ 36,126,623

THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

Tabular Statement of the Bullion Reserve, Circulation and Rate of Discount.

1861.	Bullion in Bank.	Notes in Circulation.	Discount.
March 6,.....	£ 12,059,783 £ 19,292,970 8
" 13,.....	12,329,142 19,035,330 8
" 20,.....	12,701,425 18,851,195 7
" 27,.....	12,855,456 19,409,075 7
April 3,.....	13,000,130 19,823,970 6
" 10,.....	13,122,432 20,158,340 5
" 17,.....	13,132,203 20,295,215 5
" 24,.....	13,116,949 20,038,985 5
May 1,.....	12,838,648 20,307,305 5
" 8,.....	12,873,619 20,174,685 5
" 15,.....	12,382,446 20,042,790 5
" 22,.....	11,433,413 19,814,560 5
" 29,.....	12,168,268 19,369,670 5
June 5,.....	11,940,817 19,865,695 5
" 12,.....	12,011,904 19,344,090 5
" 19,.....	12,395,793 19,184,870 5
" 26,.....	12,432,261 19,204,520 5
July 3,.....	12,071,772 20,063,080 5
" 10,.....	11,674,299 20,157,495 5
" 16,.....	11,578,143 20,447,860 5

BANK OF FRANCE AND ITS BRANCHES.

1861.	Bullion.	Circulation.	Rate of Discount.
January,.....	£ 13,986,827 £ 31,156,217 7
February,.....	15,897,000 29,436,000 7
March,.....	15,838,211 28,897,675 6
April,.....	15,114,203 29,188,883 5
May 10,.....	15,715,781 29,775,159 5
June 12,.....	16,500,000 19,535,159 5
July 10,.....	15,303,979 20,241,159 5

KENTUCKY.

From a consolidated statement of the Kentucky banks, compiled from the exhibits of the several institutions on the 1st of July, we gather the following:

Capital paid in,.....	\$ 13,470,623	Sight exchange and notes on other banks,.....	\$ 3,365,173
Surplus,.....	2,053,288	Bills of exchange,.....	10,405,890
Circulation,.....	6,490,486	Notes discounted,.....	5,451,531
Dividends and deposits,...	4,260,046	Debts overdue,.....	1,111,600
Immediate liabilities,.....	10,065,478	Real estate, &c.,.....	1,201,821
" resources,.....	8,328,068		
Coin,	4,699,408		

Annexed are the principal items in the statements of the several banks:

	Exchange.	Discounts.	Deposits.	Coin.	Circulation.
Kentucky,...	\$ 2,658,753 ..	\$ 1,632,030 ..	\$ 1,289,245 ..	\$ 769,306 ..	\$ 913,781
Northern,...	1,628,471 ..	1,263,895 ..	1,066,015 ..	727,345 ..	785,800
Southern,...	1,113,014 ..	340,613 ..	348,996 ..	765,302 ..	736,577
Louisville,...	1,587,871 ..	533,383 ..	725,426 ..	587,412 ..	837,607
Commercial,...	1,373,102 ..	496,875 ..	247,530 ..	699,096 ..	1,321,158
Farmers',...	1,531,869 ..	797,990 ..	473,714 ..	882,142 ..	1,317,058
People's,...	207,526 ..	164,881 ..	23,283 ..	120,640 ..	324,702
Ashland,...	305,374 ..	221,864 ..	85,837 ..	148,165 ..	253,803
	\$ 10,405,980 ..	\$ 5,451,531 ..	\$ 4,260,046 ..	\$ 4,699,408 ..	\$ 6,490,486

FOREIGN ITEMS.

I. *Financial Scandal in Paris.* II. *Pawnbrokers in Paris.* III. *Bankrupt in High Life.*

I. FINANCIAL SCANDAL.—The Paris correspondent of the *Times* says: Since the MIREs trial hardly a day has passed without the report of some new scandal. Superstitious people begin to look upon it as ominous. Not to speak of the Baron DE VIDIL's affairs, we hear of nothing but failures, defalcations, and the flight of financiers from their creditors. One person who had long held a place of trust is said to have fled from the consequences of a charge of misappropriating valuable diamonds. Another personage, also holding a respectable post, is said to be in the debtors' prison of Clichy. A third, a relation of one of the household, is proceeded against for the recovery of the trifling sum of 12,000,000f., said to be misapplied in a manner not dissimilar from that in the MIREs case. A fourth, a rich capitalist, is reported to have sought the hospitality of a foreign country from a wish to avoid the consequences of large defalcations. Count SIMEON means to stand on his privileges as a senator, and decline the jurisdiction of the Court of Police Correctionnelle, which pronounced him to be responsible in the MIREs case. Indeed, I believe a senator cannot be tried criminally but by the Haute Cour de Justice, just like Grand Crosses of the Legion of Honor and Princes of the blood.

II. PAWNBROKERS.—The Paris correspondent of the *Morning Herald*, writing on the 17th July, says: Another financial scandal. This time the defaulter is said to be the director the National Pawnbrokery. In this highly centralized country every pawnbroker is a government functionary, and the various district pawnbrokers are under the superintendence of a pawnbroker-general, who has the pay of a marshal of France, and perquisites innumerable. This much-coveted post is in the present possession of M. D——. It is expected that the *Moniteur* will announce, in a day or two, that he is called to other functions; but as the publication of the particulars would excite a dangerous feeling among the lower classes, I shall not be surprised if it is hushed up. M. D—— appears to have done in Paris only what the Marquis CAMPANA did at Rome, but I have not heard that he has a museum worth £160,000, like his Roman colleague, to offer as a security for the repayment of the sums he has conveyed to his own use. Report is also unpleasantly busy with the name of two banking houses, which bear some analogy with the late firm of MIREs & Co. As, however, their credit never stood very high, it is not likely they can have made many dupes.

III. BANKRUPT IN HIGH LIFE.—The *Gazette de France* says: "There is much talk in Paris of the disappearance of a rather high functionary, who, a dozen years since, was placed at the head of an important establishment. His furniture has been sold under an execution, and he leaves, it is said, debts to the amount of 600,000f. or 700,000f." It is understood that the personage alluded to is M. DE ST. GEORGE, the director of the imperial printing office, who, in December, 1851, rendered an immense service to the budding empire by printing the *coup d'etat* proclamations with such entire secrecy that no suspicion of their existence was entertained until they were posted at five o'clock in the morning. As to the alleged "disappearance" of M. DE ST. GEORGE, it is said that he has not gone further than Vichy. The Paris correspondent of the *Daily News* says: "The rumors in circulation regarding M. DE ST. GEORGE, the director of the imperial printing office, receive a certain amount of confirmation from the fact that M. ANSELME PETETIN, late prefect of Savoy, has been gazetted to his place. It is probably true that M. DE ST. GEORGE, immediately after his disappearance from Paris, re-appeared at Vichy, and no doubt any thing in reason would have been done to enable such an old and valued favorite to maintain his position. But the 'pasif,' as the French idiom has it, was too considerable; hence his summons to 'other functions.'"

BANK ITEMS.

NEW-YORK.—Mr. E. R. COOPER has been removed from the cashiership of the Market Bank, New-York.

Medina.—We learn that the Medina Bank, at the time of its failure, was in the hands of Mr. TIMOTHY BAKER, Jr., President, and K. M. KENNON, Cashier; Mr. BAKER having purchased control of the bank on the 23d May last.

Brockport.—The Brockport Exchange Bank suspended August 6th. Its securities in the Bank Department are nearly equal to its outstanding circulation. The receivers are G. R. and F. H. THOMAS. The claims of preferred creditors amount to about \$24,000, consisting of canal deposits, \$19,000; collections, \$2,300; savings bank, \$3,000. Besides the above stated liabilities, the bank is indebted to depositors about \$50,000, and owes balances amounting to several thousand dollars to the Metropolitan Bank, Albany Exchange Bank and Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Rochester. There are other liabilities to draft holders, &c., making a total amount of about \$100,000. The bills of the bank pass at ninety cents on a dollar, and New-York brokers pay that for them. The circulation of the bank, according to its June report, was \$41,516. The securities held by the department, according to the annual report of the superintendent, were, bonds and mortgages, \$18,896; New-York State 5's, \$4,000; New-York State 5½'s, \$2,000; New-York State 6's, \$25,000; total, \$49,896.

MASSACHUSETTS.—The Bristol County Bank, incorporated in the year 1832, has been authorized to increase its capital from \$350,000, its present sum, to \$500,000. Of this increase, \$125,000 was paid during the month of July, and \$25,000 will probably be paid in October. This is one of very few instances where increased capital stock has been paid or authorized during the present year.

VIRGINIA.—The Southern Bank Convention, which met in Richmond on the 24th July, embraced representatives from all the principal banking institutions of the Southern States. It was resolved to take Treasury notes in payment of dues, and to advance money for the use of the government until the Treasury notes could be issued. On motion of George A. TRENHOLM, Esq., the following resolutions were adopted:

Resolved, unanimously, That this meeting, representing a large proportion of the banking capital of the Confederate States, avail themselves of the occasion to express their hearty approval of the policy of the government, in prosecuting with the utmost vigor the war of our independence.

Resolved, unanimously, That it is the duty of the banks, capitalists and property-holders generally, to give the government all the support in money and other means demanded by the war.

Resolved, unanimously, That it is the opinion of this meeting that the capital resources of the country are abundantly adequate to supply all the demands created by the war, and that this convention will cheerfully contribute in its aid, to render those resources available to the people and the government.

Resolved, That a committee of one from each State be appointed to receive and report upon any measures that may be proposed for the adoption of this meeting.

The President appointed the following committee in accordance with the above resolution: GEORGE A. TRENHOLM, of South Carolina; THOMAS S. METCALF, of Georgia; G. W. MORDECAI, of North Carolina; G. T. POLLARD, of Alabama; G. C. TORBETT, of Tennessee; W. H. MACFARLAND, of Virginia, and W. C. TOMPKINS, of Louisiana.

GEORGIA BANK BILLS.—In the Superior Criminal Court of Boston, JEFFERSON DAVIS MOORE was arraigned and pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with passing a worthless \$10 bill on the Bank of Georgia. From the evidence of the officer who arrested the defendant, it appeared that he obtained the bill in ques-

tion, together with two others of the same description, from a broker for a watch. The watch was worth about \$12, and he received three ten-dollar bills for it, the broker telling him that he had been selling them at 50 per cent. discount. MOORE went to a liquor saloon at the West End, and tendered one of the bills for a drink. It was taken at the par value, and, with the good money which he had received, he went back and redeemed his watch for \$6, when he threw away the other two bills. Mr. W. F. DAVIS, the broker, was called as an expert, and testified that the bills of the Bank of Georgia were formerly current in Boston, at a considerable discount, but he was inclined to think they were not current just now.

Mr. SENNOTT, the defendant's counsel, did not dispute the fact that he passed the bill, but he put the defence entirely upon the ground that the bill had a value somewhere, being a genuine issue, and that, therefore, it could not be called worthless, although its actual worth here might not be more than five cents or one cent on a dollar. Judge PUTNAM ruled, for the purposes of this case, that if the jury were satisfied that the bill was uncurrent, it was sufficient to establish its worthlessness here. The jury, after a brief consultation, brought in a verdict of not guilty, and the defendant was discharged.

ILLINOIS.—When the Canada banks first introduced their bank notes as money into Chicago, we warned the people of that city not to take them, or any other bank note which did not perform its promise to pay specie on demand at par, and without one fraction of discount. Our warning was unheeded, and, large sums of Canada bank notes being distributed among the people of Chicago, they are suddenly found one day to be at a discount of two or three per cent. and difficult of sale; by which simple and by no means novel process to western men, speculators gain and the people lose. This experience, and the loss of six or seven millions of dollars by their own banks, owing to the same evil principle of receiving any bank note as money, which is at a discount as compared with specie, ought to teach Illinois wisdom, but they do not. The demand for currency is still very active among produce dealers, and the market continues exceedingly close. The banks generally kept the rate of exchange nominal at $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. premium; but some of them sold freely at $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., and others at par. On the street, in some cases it was difficult to dispose of exchange even at par—so great was the demand for currency. Gold was in fair request at $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. premium for currency. Owing to the stringency in the money market, there is more disposition to take Canadian currency, and it is now sold at 1 @ $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. discount for exchange.—*Chicago Tribune*, August 17.

Illinois Bank Law.—All new banks are required to redeem their circulation in Chicago or Springfield at a rate of discount not exceeding three-fourths of one per cent., and after the 1st of January next at a rate of discount not exceeding one-half per cent. discount. All old banks, that is, all banks which were in operation before the passage of the act last winter, are allowed, but not required, to adopt the practice of central redemption, and all such banks are allowed to increase their circulation indefinitely by the deposit of Illinois bonds at par, whether the market value of said bonds be 75 or 100, or any other supposable figure.—*Chicago Tribune*.

Chicago.—The Marine Bank of Chicago has issued a card announcing the determination of its managers to put the institution into liquidation and wind up its affairs. Its collection will be placed in the hands of Mr. S. Y. SCAMMON, subject to the approval of correspondents, and its letters of credit and circulating notes will be protected by him.

The Chicago Marine and Fire Insurance Company has issued a circular stating:

"It is the endeavor of the managers of the institution to pay to all parties what they are justly entitled to, and they would probably succeed in its accomplishment if none demanded more than their rights. But the directors cannot conceal from themselves, and they deem it their duty to communicate to their customers and correspondents, the fact that a portion of their depositors and correspondents have made such demands against the institution as, if sustained by the legal tribunals, would destroy the same, and have already commenced several suits to enforce these unjust claims, involving the company in extensive litigation, and compelling its managers to convert its assets into available means as speedily as a just regard for the rights of all parties will permit."

KANSAS.—The following letter from a new Kansas bank will be of interest to our readers, in showing a return of life in that rich but afflicted young State:

Atchison, Kansas, July 12, 1861.

We are not a bank of issue. Our legislature, at its last session, passed a general banking law, to be submitted, in November, to the people, when it will be approved. But no banks can do business and make money under our laws as long as our constitution remains as it is, which provides that bank capital shall be liable to be taxed for State, county, town, school, &c., the same as any other property. In many cases our counties, towns and cities are largely in debt, and the taxes are sure to be three per cent., and in some cases more. In all new States the law for banks should be strict, yet so liberal as to invite capitalists to furnish a currency sufficient for the business of the community, which is not in proportion to older States, as we have more coin in circulation than in older States.

The legal rate of interest in Kansas is ten per cent. when no other rate is agreed upon. Parties may agree in writing for any rate not exceeding twenty per cent.

Penalty for violation of usury laws, forfeiture of all interest. Damages on bills of exchange drawn within the State, six per cent. Grace is allowed on all bills not payable on demand.

MISSOURI.—The local banks and savings institutions at St. Louis made a loan of \$250,000, on the 16th August, to Major-General FREMONT, in behalf of the general government. The apportionment for each bank and institution was agreed on as stated in the annexed schedule:

	Coin.	Bankable Funds.	Total.
Bank of the State of Missouri,.....	\$ 10,000	.. \$ 42,000	.. \$ 52,000
Merchants' Bank,.....	10,000	.. 24,000	.. 34,000
Mechanics' Bank,.....	15,000	.. 15,000	.. 30,000
Union Bank,.....	10,000 10,000
Exchange Bank,.....	10,000	.. 17,500	.. 27,500
Southern Bank,.....	10,000	.. 12,000	.. 22,000
Bank of St. Louis,.....	5,000	.. 7,500	.. 12,500
State Savings Institution,	10,000	.. 14,000	.. 24,000
Boatmen's Institution,.....	10,000	.. 16,000	.. 26,000
Franklin Institution,..... 2,000	.. 2,000
German Institution,.....	10,000	.. 1,200	.. 11,200
Totals,.....	\$ 100,000	.. \$ 151,200	.. \$ 251,200

WISCONSIN.—At Milwaukee exchange is held at six per cent. premium, and the buying rates are one-half to one per cent. lower.

By an act of the legislature the banks are exempted from the obligation of specie redemption until after the 1st of December. The banks of this city, and a few in other parts of the State, be it said to their credit, have refused to take advantage of the suspension law, and in every instance where their notes have been presented, have willingly redeemed them in coin. It is not expected that all the banks will voluntarily resume specie payments, though such a step before the suspension act expires would certainly do more toward giving their currency a wide circulation, and, therefore, remove the chances of their being called upon to redeem, than any other course they could pursue, but it is believed that an arrangement to redeem their issues here in New-York, exchange at one-eighth or a quarter below the current rate, would tend to re-establish confidence in the currency outside of the State, and, therefore, have a tendency to keep down the price of exchange.—*Milwaukee Sentinel*.

LOUISIANA.—The Bank of Louisiana has declared its seventieth semi-annual dividend of 5 per cent., and an extra dividend of 5 per cent., payable to resident stockholders on and after the first Monday in August. Northern stockholders cannot receive their quota in person or through attorneys. Stockholders living in Europe will be paid at the counter. In like manner, the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway Company give notice that they are ready to pay their 1st July interest on their bonds, endorsed by the State of Tennessee, on presentation of the coupons, accompanied by the certificate of the Comptroller of the State that the payment may be lawfully made, the legislature having constituted him sole judge of the question as to whom such payment shall be made.

NEW-YORK BANK DIVIDENDS FOR AUGUST, 1861.

Capital, Dividends for 1861, Net Profits, June, 1861.

	Capital.	DIVIDENDS.		Amount, August, 1861.	Net Profits, June, 1861.
		Feb., '61.	Aug., '61.		
Bank of the Republic,.....	\$2,000,000 ..	5	4	\$80,000 ..	\$419,908
Citizens' Bank,	400,000 ..	4	4	16,000 ..	54,400
Corn Exchange Bank,.....	1,000,000 ..	3½	3½	35,000 ..	93,800
Leather Manufacturers' Bank,	600,000 ..	5	5	30,000 ..	244,197
Manhattan Bank,.....	2,050,000 ..	5	4	82,000 ..	662,220
Marine Bank,.....	399,000	3½	13,965 ..	25,850
Ocean Bank,.....	1,000,000 ..	3½	3	30,000 ..	63,774
Oriental Bank,.....	300,000 ..	3½	3	9,000 ..	29,977
St. Nicholas Bank,.....	750,000	48,087
Total,.....	\$8,499,000				\$1,642,213

PRIVATE BANKERS.

ILLINOIS.—The banking firm of Messrs. MITCHELL & CABLE, at Rock Island, was dissolved on the 1st July last, and is succeeded by that of Messrs MITCHELL & LYNDE.

OHIO.—Messrs. C. E. NOURSE & Co., Cincinnati, have relinquished business as bankers.

IOWA.—The co-partnership of MACKLOT & CORBIN, bankers, at Davenport, was dissolved by the withdrawal of Mr. AUSTIN CORBIN, August 1st. The business will be continued as heretofore by LOUIS A. MACKLOT, at the same place. The old business may be settled by either partner.

Recent Failure in Iowa.—Despatches, said to be from reliable sources, report that the extensive banking house of GREENE & STONE, of Muscatine, Iowa, had been obliged to suspend. The firm has long held a leading position among Western bankers, and, as the gentlemen connected with it had won the personal esteem of all who knew them, they will have the sympathy of our entire business public. We know nothing of the causes or the extent of the failure, or what per centage the assets will be likely to realize. We are assured that the failure will in no way affect the soundness of the State Bank of Iowa. They were the principal stockholders of one and it is thought two of its branches. The interests of the bank are said to be protected in every particular.

ANAMOSA.—Messrs. WRIGHT and HYGUM have commenced business as exchange dealers at Anamosa, Jones County, Iowa. Their New-York correspondent is the Chatham Bank.

MICHIGAN.—Mr. R. B. BRIGGS, banker, at Battle Creek, has suspended, and made an assignment to Messrs. WALLACE & COLLIER. Mr. W. H. COLEMAN, banker, at Battle Creek, has made an assignment to L. H. STEWART and W. C. SUTTON.

MINNESOTA.—Mr. D. C. GROH, banker, at Minneapolis, has relinquished business.

Notes on the Money Market.

NEW-YORK, AUGUST 24, 1861.

Exchange on London, at sixty days' sight, 107½ @ 107¾.

THE prominent feature of the month of August has been the successful negotiation in this market of the Government loan of fifty millions of dollars, the particulars of which are given in the early portion of this No., pp. 161—166, of August, 1861. Annexed is the apportionment of the late Government loan of fifty millions of dollars among the banks:

IMMEDIATE SUBSCRIPTION.

Bank of New-York,.....	\$ 1,547,000	Bank of the Republic,.....	\$ 1,025,000
Manhattan Bank,.....	1,050,000	Metropolitan Bank,.....	2,050,000
Merchants' Bank,.....	1,423,000	Chatham Bank,.....	230,000
Mechanics' Bank,.....	1,025,000	People's Bank,.....	210,000
Union Bank,.....	768,000	Bank of North America,.....	512,000
Bank of America,.....	1,546,000	Hanover Bank,.....	512,000
Phenix Bank,.....	922,000	Irving Bank,.....	256,000
City Bank,.....	512,000	Citizens' Bank,.....	205,000
Tradesmen's Bank,.....	512,000	Nassau Bank,.....	512,000
Fulton Bank,.....	307,000	Market Bank,.....	512,000
Chemical Bank,.....	154,000	St. Nicholas Bank,.....	384,000
Merchants' Exchange Bank,.....	632,000	Shoe and Leather Bank,.....	768,000
National Bank,.....	768,000	Corn Exchange Bank,.....	512,000
Butchers and Drovers' Bank,.....	410,000	Continental Bank,.....	1,025,000
Mechanics and Traders' Bank,.....	307,000	Bank of the Commonwealth,.....	384,000
Greenwich Bank,.....	102,000	Oriental Bank,.....	155,000
Leather Manufacturers' Bank,.....	307,000	Marine Bank,.....	204,000
Seventh Ward Bank,.....	256,000	Atlantic Bank,.....	205,000
Bank of the State of New-York,.....	1,025,000	Importers and Traders' Bank,.....	768,000
American Exchange Bank,.....	2,562,000	Park Bank,.....	1,025,000
Bank of Commerce,.....	4,687,000	Mechanics' Banking Association,...	256,000
Broadway Bank,.....	512,000	Grocers' Bank,.....	153,000
Ocean Bank,.....	512,000	Manufacturers and Merchants' Bank,	256,000
Mercantile Bank,.....	512,000	North River Bank,.....	205,000
Pacific Bank,.....	215,000	East River Bank,.....	103,000
Total by the banks of New-York,.....		\$ 35,000,000	
By banks of Boston,.....		10,000,000	
By banks of Philadelphia,.....		5,000,000	
Total immediate in three cities,....		\$ 50,000,000	
Contingent in October and December next,.....		100,000,000	
Grand total,.....		\$ 150,000,000	

An active demand for portions of the new loan has already sprung up among private capitalists, and from other moneyed institutions of the city and the interior. Our savings banks will probably be enabled to take three to five millions of this loan, which yields a rate of interest higher than has been known since 1815 for our Government bonds.

While the Government thus yields to the necessities of the times and pays 7.30 per cent. for money loans can be had temporarily on such securities at four to five per cent. Business paper of the best order is scarce, and finds buyers at 6 @ 7 per cent. ; endorsed paper, well known, 7 @ 10 per cent.

We annex the ruling rates for business paper at this date, compared with the last week in May, June and July:

	May 22. Per cent.	June 24. Per cent.	July 24. Per cent.	Aug. 24. Per cent.
Loans on call, State Stock securities,.....	5½ @ 7 .. 5 @ 6 .. 5 @ 6 .. 4 @ 5			
" other good securities,.....	8 @ 9 .. 6 @ 7 .. 6 @ 7 .. 6 @ 7			
Prime endorsed bills, 60 days,.....	7 @ 10 .. 6 @ 7 .. 5 @ 6 .. 6 @ 7			
First class single signatures, 4 to 6 months, .	8 @ 10 .. 8 @ 12 .. 7 @ 9 .. 7 @ 10			
Other good bills,.....	10 @ 12 .. 12 @ 15 .. 9 @ . .. 9 @ 12			
Names less known,.....	15 @ 30 .. no sale. .. no sale. .. no sale.			

Much credit is given to the committee at first organized to prepare the preliminaries of the recent loan by conference. The committee appointed consisted of the following gentlemen: Mr. JOHN A. STEVENS, of Bank of Commerce; Mr. GEORGE S. COZ, American Exchange Bank; Mr. JAMES PUNNETT, Bank of America; Mr. JAMES GALLATIN, National Bank; Mr. THOMAS TILESTON, Phenix Bank; Mr. R. W. HOWES, Park Bank; Mr. MOSES TAYLOR, City Bank; Mr. J. M. MORRISON, Manhattan Bank; Mr. JOHN Q. JONES, Chemical Bank; Mr. JACOB D. VERMILYE, Merchants' Bank. This committee met at the Bank of Commerce.

Mr. CISCO, the United States Assistant Treasurer, at New-York, has received information from the Treasury Department, that the issue of 7.30 per cent. Treasury notes will be printed with coupons attached. The present issue of fifty millions will bear the uniform date of August 19, 1861, and will have five coupons attached, payable February 19, 1862; August 19, 1862; February 19, 1863; August 19, 1863; February 19, 1864. The principal and last six months' interest will be paid on presentation of the bill, on or after 19th August, 1864. This matter being settled, they are ready at the office to receive individual subscriptions for the notes, on the basis of adding to the principal to be paid the accrued interest from the 19th inst. The engravers have commenced the preparation of these coupons, which will be completed with the least possible delay, but it will cause some postponement in the delivery of the notes, the first of which cannot be ready for issue until early in September.

The bank loans of the city having run down below 100 millions, the present loan to the Government is substantially an addition of thirty millions to their loan column, yielding a rate of interest materially above the market rate. There is no question of the ability of the banks, in the present state of the foreign exchanges, to spare, if need be, the whole sum in specie and overdue Treasury paper which they now hold, and then show an equal relative strength to their position at the close of last year, which was deemed a sufficiently safe and easy one. We submit the following figures of the bank movement on the 25th December, compared with the 17th of August:

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Deposits.
December 25,.....	\$ 132,152,299	\$ 20,326,970	\$ 83,214,394
August 17,.....	108,800,000	49,750,000	92,000,000

The weekly averages of the banks of the City of New-York, for the week ending August 17, 1861, compared with the previous week, and for the corresponding week for 1860, were as follows:

	Aug. 17, 1861.	Aug. 10, 1861.	Aug. 13, 1860.
Capital,.....	\$ 69,050,000	\$ 69,050,000	\$ 69,758,000
Loans,.....	108,717,434	109,983,942	129,950,346
Specie,.....	49,733,990	48,630,116	21,008,701
Circulation,.....	8,521,426	8,730,482	9,088,648
Gross deposits,.....	105,408,419	105,418,945	104,690,471
Exchanged,.....	13,362,111	13,402,888	22,934,355
Undrawn,.....	92,046,308	92,016,057	88,756,116
In Sub-Treasury,.....	4,880,239	5,629,641	5,902,358

The total value of importations into the port of New-York since January, 1861, have been \$88,653,826; for the corresponding period in 1860, \$151,643,064, showing a diminution of \$62,970,238. The contrast will be greater, in proportion, for the remainder of the year. The exports during the same period have been \$82,061,855, against \$55,658,632 for a corresponding period of 1860, showing an increase of \$26,403,223.

The total receipts of gold and silver at this port, from abroad, in July, were \$6,996,498, and for the seven months of this year, \$32,906,166, while the exports have been only \$3,260,458, thus adding \$29,645,708 to our stock of coin and bullion. This course of trade keeps the foreign exchanges

at a low point. Bankers' bills, at sixty days, on London, this week, are offered freely at $107\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}\%$; Commercial, $106\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}\%$; and with bills of lading, 105% @ 106% . The rates are sufficiently low to induce further shipments of gold from England to this port.

	May 22.	June 24.	July 24.	Aug. 24.
London, bankers' bills,.....	$105\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $106\frac{1}{2}\%$..	$105\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $105\frac{1}{2}\%$..	$107\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}\%$..	$107\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}\%$
Do. mercantile bills,....	105% @ 106% ..	$104\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ 105% ..	$105\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $106\frac{1}{2}\%$..	$106\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $107\frac{1}{2}\%$
Do. with bills of lading,.	$103\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $104\frac{1}{2}\%$..	$102\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ 104% ..	$104\frac{1}{2}\%$ @ $105\frac{1}{2}\%$..	105% @ 106%
Paris, bankers' bills,.....	5.45 @ 5.25 ..	5.40 @ 5.37 ..	5.80 @ 5.27½ ..	5.40 @ 5.30
Amsterdam, per guilder,....	39 @ 40 ..	39 @ 39½ ..	40½ @ 41 ..	39½ @ 40½
Bremen, per rix dollar,.....	77 @ 78 ..	75½ @ 76½ ..	77½ @ 78 ..	75½ @ 77
Hamburg, per marc banco,.	85 @ 85½ ..	84½ @ 85½ ..	85½ @ 86 ..	85 @ 85½

The values of State loans have fluctuated largely since our last monthly report, and the transactions have been heavy. There is a better feeling generally in this market in reference to these securities. It will be seen that Virginia sixes have gone up to $54\frac{1}{2}\%$; Georgia sixes were quoted $5\frac{1}{2}\%$ higher; North Carolina, $6\frac{1}{2}\%$; Louisiana, 5, up to the 20th inst. Since then the market values for Southern State loans has receded. In Government loans and Treasury notes the market is well sustained.

We annex quotations of the government and leading State securities in this market for the past eight weeks:

	June 22d.	29th.	July 6th.	13th.	20th.	30th.	Aug. 13th.	20th.
U. S. 6 per cents, 1867-8,....	$83\frac{1}{2}\%$	84	$85\frac{1}{2}\%$	89	$89\frac{1}{2}\%$	88	$86\frac{1}{2}\%$	87
U. S. 5 per cents, 1874,.....	$76\frac{1}{2}\%$	77	79	$81\frac{1}{2}\%$	$81\frac{1}{2}\%$	79	$80\frac{1}{2}\%$	81
Ohio 6 per cents, 1836,.....	86	88	$83\frac{1}{2}\%$	$90\frac{1}{2}\%$	92	92	$92\frac{1}{2}\%$	93
Kentucky 6 per cents,.....	80	72	76	$75\frac{1}{2}\%$	78	75	$77\frac{1}{2}\%$	77
Indiana 5 per cents,.....	76	76	74	76	77	75	76	75
Pennsylvania 5 per cents,...	$77\frac{1}{2}\%$..	75	$74\frac{1}{2}\%$	73	78	$77\frac{1}{2}\%$	$77\frac{1}{2}\%$
Virginia 6 per cents,.....	39	43	46	$47\frac{1}{2}\%$	47	$49\frac{1}{2}\%$	54	$54\frac{1}{2}\%$
Georgia 6 per cents,.....	53	$56\frac{1}{2}\%$	58	$62\frac{1}{2}\%$..	67	70	68
California 7 per cents, 1877,.	77	78	$74\frac{1}{2}\%$	$76\frac{1}{2}\%$	77	76	$76\frac{1}{2}\%$	$75\frac{1}{2}\%$
North Carolina 6 per cents,...	$44\frac{1}{2}\%$	50	$50\frac{1}{2}\%$	61	58	$60\frac{1}{2}\%$	65	$64\frac{1}{2}\%$
Missouri 6 per cents,.....	$87\frac{1}{2}\%$	88	$88\frac{1}{2}\%$	$42\frac{1}{2}\%$	$44\frac{1}{2}\%$	$40\frac{1}{2}\%$	44	42
Louisiana 6 per cents,.....	51	53	$52\frac{1}{2}\%$	59	57	56	$62\frac{1}{2}\%$	62
Tennessee 6 per cents,.....	86	$87\frac{1}{2}\%$	$88\frac{1}{2}\%$	44	$43\frac{1}{2}\%$	42	$45\frac{1}{2}\%$	$42\frac{1}{2}\%$

Rail-road securities are much lower than at our last month's report. We note a decline in New-York Central shares, 4; Erie, $1\frac{1}{2}\%$; Harlem, $\frac{1}{2}\%$; Reading, $3\frac{1}{2}\%$; Hudson River, $4\frac{1}{2}\%$; Michigan Central, $4\frac{1}{2}\%$; Michigan Southern, $1\frac{1}{2}\%$; Panama, 6, (after a dividend;) Illinois Central, $4\frac{1}{2}\%$; Cleveland and Toledo, 2; Chicago and Rock Island, 5; Galena and Chicago, 1; Chicago and Quincy, 3. Rail-road earnings for July show only a small increase in the same for 1860. The movement of produce continues to be very large, while that of general merchandise and passengers is very light. The low price of breadstuffs has also had a tendency to keep them in free hands. The returns upon our rail-roads are satisfactory, considering the state of the country and the general depression resting upon business of all kinds.

We annex the ruling cash rates for leading rail-road shares in this market during the past eight weeks. [Those with a star pay no dividend at present:]

	June 22d.	29th.	July 6th.	13th.	20th.	30th.	Aug. 13th.	20th.
N. Y. Central R. R. shares,....	$78\frac{1}{2}\%$	$73\frac{1}{2}\%$	$73\frac{1}{2}\%$	$76\frac{1}{2}\%$	77	$75\frac{1}{2}\%$	$74\frac{1}{2}\%$	78
*N. Y. and Erie R. R. shares,...	$22\frac{1}{2}\%$	$22\frac{1}{2}\%$	$22\frac{1}{2}\%$	$23\frac{1}{2}\%$	27	24	26	$25\frac{1}{2}\%$
*Harlem R. R. shares,.....	$9\frac{1}{2}\%$	10	$9\frac{1}{2}\%$	10	$11\frac{1}{2}\%$	$10\frac{1}{2}\%$	$10\frac{1}{2}\%$	$10\frac{1}{2}\%$
*Reading R. R. shares,.....	$82\frac{1}{2}\%$	$83\frac{1}{2}\%$	$83\frac{1}{2}\%$	87	$88\frac{1}{2}\%$	$85\frac{1}{2}\%$	86	85
*Hudson River R. R. shares,....	$52\frac{1}{2}\%$	$52\frac{1}{2}\%$	88	85	$87\frac{1}{2}\%$	83	$83\frac{1}{2}\%$	83
*Michigan Central R. R. shares,.	42	$44\frac{1}{2}\%$	43	$44\frac{1}{2}\%$	45	41	$42\frac{1}{2}\%$	$40\frac{1}{2}\%$
*Michigan Southern R. R. shares,	$11\frac{1}{2}\%$	$12\frac{1}{2}\%$	12	$13\frac{1}{2}\%$	14	$13\frac{1}{2}\%$	14	$12\frac{1}{2}\%$
Panama R. R. shares,.....	108	105	$107\frac{1}{2}\%$	109	112	106	107	106
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. shares,	42	$39\frac{1}{2}\%$	$37\frac{1}{2}\%$	$40\frac{1}{2}\%$	$40\frac{1}{2}\%$	40	40	42
*Illinois Central R. R. shares,...	$65\frac{1}{2}\%$	67	$65\frac{1}{2}\%$	67	$67\frac{1}{2}\%$	$62\frac{1}{2}\%$	$64\frac{1}{2}\%$	$63\frac{1}{2}\%$
*Cleveland and Toledo R. R.,...	$22\frac{1}{2}\%$	$24\frac{1}{2}\%$	24	27	$30\frac{1}{2}\%$	$26\frac{1}{2}\%$	$29\frac{1}{2}\%$	$28\frac{1}{2}\%$
*Chicago and Rock Island R. R.,	$85\frac{1}{2}\%$	85	$84\frac{1}{2}\%$	$88\frac{1}{2}\%$	$48\frac{1}{2}\%$	89	$40\frac{1}{2}\%$	$38\frac{1}{2}\%$
Galena & Chicago R. R. shares,	$60\frac{1}{2}\%$	$60\frac{1}{2}\%$	$61\frac{1}{2}\%$	$64\frac{1}{2}\%$	$65\frac{1}{2}\%$	$60\frac{1}{2}\%$	66	$64\frac{1}{2}\%$
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy,	56	..	54	58	$61\frac{1}{2}\%$..	58	$58\frac{1}{2}\%$

The New-York Central Rail-Road Company have declared their sixteenth semi-annual dividend, being on this occasion at the rate of three per cent. on the capital stock thereof, payable on the twentieth day of August instant, upon stock registered at New-York, Boston or Albany, and on the twentieth day of September next upon stock registered at London. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company have declared a semi-annual dividend of five per cent., payable August 22. The Pennsylvania Coal Company have declared a semi-annual dividend of three and a half per cent.

The Comptroller of the City of New-York invites bids for a corporation loan of \$500,000 in aid of the families of volunteer soldiers from the City of New-York engaged in defending the integrity of the National Union. Bonds of the corporation for the above purpose, in sums of \$100 and upwards, will be issued by the department on application for the same, at par, redeemable on the 1st day of July, 1862, with interest at seven per cent. per annum.

Bids will be received by the Comptroller until the 6th September, for \$100,000 of the Croton water stock of the City of New-York. The said stock will bear interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, payable quarter yearly, and the principal will be redeemable on the first day of November, 1883.

The yearly tax on incomes will be levied early in 1862 on the incomes of the year 1860, the act approved August 5th providing that, from and after the first day of January next, there shall be levied, collected and paid upon the annual income of every person residing in the United States, whether such income is derived from any kind of property, or from any profession, trade, employment or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any other source whatever, if such annual income exceeds the sum of eight hundred dollars, a tax of three per centum on the amount of such excess of such income above eight hundred dollars."

Under this section the tax will be as follows:

ANNUAL		ANNUAL		ANNUAL		ANNUAL	
Income.	Tax.	Income.	Tax.	Income.	Tax.	Income.	Tax.
\$ 850 ..	\$ 1 50	\$ 1,050 ..	\$ 7 50	\$ 1,250 ..	\$ 13 50	\$ 1,450 ..	\$ 19 50
900 ..	3 00	1,100 ..	9 00	1,300 ..	15 00	1,500 ..	21 00
950 ..	4 50	1,150 ..	10 50	1,350 ..	16 50	1,550 ..	22 50
1,000 ..	6 00	1,200 ..	12 00	1,400 ..	18 00	2,000 ..	36 00

The Bank of England has reduced its rate of interest to five per cent., and money is abundant in the London market at a fraction below. Of this important change the London "*Money Market Review*," under date of 8d inst., says: "On Thursday, August 1st, the Bank of England rate of discount was reduced from 6 to 5 per cent. The reverse movement—namely, a rise from 5 to 6—took place on the 16th of May last. Comparing the present returns of the bank with those then published, we find the following changes:

The coin and bullion are.....	£ 12,196,708, being	£ 185,738 less than on May 15.
The reserve (notes and coin) is.....	6,548,768, "	265,888 less " "
The public deposits are.....	3,701,952, "	3,023,235 less " "
The private deposits are.....	12,194,650, "	603,111 more " "
The total of deposits is.....	15,896,602, "	2,420,124 less " "
The government securities are.....	9,466,279, "	714,659 less " "
The private securities are.....	18,547,711, "	1,249,046 less " "
The grand total of securities is.....	28,013,990, "	1,963,705 less " "

Foreign government loans in the English market were quoted, early in August, at the following rates:

	Offered.	Asked.		Offered.	Asked.
Brazilian 5 per cent.,.....	99	100	Russian 5 per cent.,.....	101½	102½
" 4½ "	87	88	" 4½ "	89½	90½
Buenos Ayres 6 per cent.,.....	80	83	" 3 " 1859,....	60½	61½
" " deferred,....	25	27	Spanish 3 per cent.,.....	48½	48¾
Chilian 4½ per cent.,.....	80½	81½	" deferred,.....	41	41½
Dutch 4 per cent.,.....	100	101	Sardinian 5 per cent.,.....	78½	79½
" 2½ "	63½	64½	Turkish 6 per cent., 1854, ..	79	79½
Mexican,.....	22	22½	" 6 " 1858, ..	69	69½
Peruvian 4½ per cent.,.....	97½	98½	" guaranteed 4 pr ct.,	99½	100½ xd
" 3 "	73½	74½	Venezuela 3 per cent.,.....	17½	18½

NAMES OF PRIVATE BANKERS

AND OTHERS,

Whose Cards (with their references) may be found on the cover of "The Bankers' Magazine," or "The Merchants and Bankers' Almanac" for 1861.

New-York,.....**Mut. Life Insur. Co.**
 ".....Guardian Life Insurance Co.
 ".....New-York Life Insurance Co.
 ".....Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
 ".....Bk. of British N.A. (Agency.)
 ".....National Bank Note Co.
 ".....American Bank Note Co.
 ".....Bradstreet's Reference Guide.
 ".....D. Plumb & Co's Ref. Guide.
 ".....Coleman & Co., Wm. T.
 ".....Duncan, Sherman & Co.
 ".....Samuel Hallett & Co.
 ".....Peters, Campbell & Co.
 ".....E. Morrison, 17 Nassau.
 ".....Schuchardt & Gebhard.
 ".....Merklee & Thatcher.
 ".....Locke & Craigie, Plumbers.
 ".....Taylor Brothers, Bankers.
 ".....Wm. A. Wheeler.
Geneva,.....Schell & Hemiup, Bankers.

Mass.—Boston,..**Burnett, Drake & Co.**
 ".....Chickering & Sons.
 ".....Walker, Wise & Co.

Conn.—New-Haven, **W. W. Bacon.**

Pa. Philada.,...**Davis & Birney.**
 ".....Work, McCouch & Co.
 ".....Peterson & Brothers.
Bradford,.....E. P. Steers & Co.
Pittsburgh,.....N. Holmes & Son.
 ".....Semple & Jones.
Scranton,.....Mason, Meylert & Co.
 ".....Geo. Sanderson & Co.
Towanda,.....Russell & Co., B. S.,

Md.—Baltimore, **Johnston Bros. & Co.**
 ".....McKim & Co.
 ".....Brothers McKim.
 ".....John S. Gittings & Co.

Wash. City**Lewis Johnson & Co.**

Va.—Fred'burg,..Franklin Slaughter & Co.
Richmond,.....William B. Isaacs & Co.
 ".....C. W. Purcell & Co.

Cal.—Sacramento,**Thos. S. Fiske & Co.**
San Francisco,.....Tallant & Wilde.

Ill.—Chicago,...**A. C. Oertel.**
Chicago,.....A. C. Badger & Co.
Carlinville,.....Chesnut, Blackburn & Dubois.
Moline,.....Gould, Dimock & Co.
Ottawa,.....Eames, Allen & Co.
Quincy,.....Quincy Savings & Ins. Co.
 ".....Moore, Sherman & Co.
Rockford,.....Lane, Sanford & Co.

Springfield,.....**N. H. Eldgely & Co.**
 ".....J. Bunn.

Ind.—Richmond, Morrison, Blanchard & Co.

Io.—Cedar Rapids, Carpenter, Stibbs & Co.
Clinton,.....Budd & Baldwin.
Davenport,.....Macklot & Corbin.
Fairfield,.....Bernhart Henn & Co.
Fort Dodge,.....Charles A. Sherman.
Iowa City,.....J. H. Gower & Co.
Keokuk,.....Wm. Thompson & Co.
Sioux City,.....Weare & Allison.

My.—Louisville,..Tucker & Co.

Mich.—Battle Ok., **Loyal C. Kellogg.**
Ann Arbor,.....Hale & Smith.
Grand Rapids,.....Daniel Ball & Co.
 ".....William J. Welles.
Niles,.....R. C. Paine.

Mo.—Independence, **Thornton & Co.**
St. Louis,.....Allen, Copp & Nisbet.
 ".....Barlow & Taylor.
 ".....Geo. H. Loker & Bro.
 ".....Tesson & Danjen.
 ".....National Insurance Co.
 ".....St. Louis Building Association.
 ".....State Savings Association.

Ohio.—Cin......Gillmore, Dunlap & Co.
 ".....Homans & Co.
Dayton,.....Harshman & Gorman.
Sandusky,.....Moss Brothers.
Zanesville,.....Gattrell & Brown.

Oregon.—Portland, **Ladd & Tilton.**

Tenn.—Mem.,...**Gayoso Sav's Instit'n.**

Tex.—Galveston, **R. & D. G. Mills.**
 ".....E. P. Hunt.
Houston,.....John Dickinson.
Palestine,.....John G. Gooch.
San Antonio,.....John C. French.

Wis.—Fond du Lac, Exch. Bk. Darling & Co.
Milwaukie,.....Marshall & Ilsley.

London,.....**Bank of British N. A.**


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
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For List of Sizes, Prices, &c., Bankers are referred to my Circular. Nearly all the principal Banking Institutions in the United States are using my Safes, to whom those desirous of purchasing are respectfully referred.

THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

EDITED BY J. SMITH HOMANS, JR.

ACTUARY OF THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, OF NEW-YORK.

"No expectation of forbearance or indulgence should be encouraged. Favor and benevolence are not the attributes of good banking. Strict justice and the rigid performance of contracts are its proper foundation."

"The Revenue of the State is THE STATE; in effect, all depend upon it, whether for support or for reformation."

OCTOBER, 1861.—CONTENTS.

	Page
ART. I. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN COINAGE. BY JOHN H. HICKCOX. WITH ENGRAVINGS. COINS OF COLONIAL PERIOD:—1. MASSACHUSETTS. 2. MARYLAND. 3. CAROLINA. 4. OTHER COLONIES. 5. THE CONFEDERATION. 6. CONNECTICUT. 7. NEW-JERSEY,.....	241
II. Report on the Finances of Belgium,.....	256
III. Recent Bank Fraud in London,.....	257
IV. The London Joint Stock Banks—Annual Report on Capital, Deposits, Profits, Dividends,...	258
V. History of the London and Westminster Bank,.....	264
VI. Improvements in Savings Banks—Suggestions as to Keeping Accounts. By J. F. ENTZ, Accountant, of New-York,.....	267
VII. Suggestions as to Taxes on Income. By J. R. McCULLOCH, Esq. Contributed to the <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i> ,.....	279
VIII. Reports of Savings Banks—Seventh Annual Report of the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank,...	286
IX. Coins, Coinage and Bullion:—1. Boston Numismatic Society. 2. Great Increase in the Silver Currency. 3. Gold on the Saskatchewan. 4. Coinage and Exports of Gold and Silver from Great Britain,.....	288
X. The National Loan of 1861—Address of the Secretary of the Treasury to the People of the United States, September, 1861,.....	290
XI. Review of the New-York Stock Market for August, with the Lowest and Highest Prices for 1860 and 1861,.....	294
XII. Monthly Fluctuations of Stocks and Bonds in the Boston Market,.....	296
XIII. The great Frauds of late years in England:—1. WALTER WATTS. 2. JOHN SADLEIR. 3. The Royal British Bank. 4. WILLIAM JAMES ROBSON. 5. LEOPOLD REDPATH. 6. Colonel WAUGH and others,.....	298
XIV. Review of the English Money Market for August, 1851, '55, '59, '60, '61; with the Leading Features of the Bank of England, and the Continental Exchanges,.....	302
XV. FOREIGN ITEMS.—1. The New Exchequer Bill, 263. 2. The Mont de Piété, 266. The Western Bank of Scotland, 289. The Sultan's Jewels, 293. An old Debt,.....	301
XVI. Gold and Silver Bullion and Coinage.—1. Coinage and Exports of Gold and Silver from Great Britain. 2. Gold and Silver Movements of 1861. 3. The Bullion Trade of the World. 4. The Specie Export from Great Britain to the United States. 5. Counterfeit Coins and Bank Bills. 6. Decimal Coinage in Denmark,.....	304
XVII. BANK STATISTICS. 1. Ohio. 2. Philadelphia. 3. New-York. 4. Boston,.....	311
XVIII. Private Bankers—Changes in Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Michigan, &c.,.....	316
XIX. BANK ITEMS—New Banks—Bank Failures—Bank Dividends—Foreign Banks,.....	314
XX. Notes on the Money Market and Stock Market of New-York, for September, 1861,.....	317

NEW YORK:
PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY J. SMITH HOMANS, JR.

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ISSUE LETTERS OF CREDIT ON EUROPE.

July, 1861.

COLLECTIONS IN THE SOUTH AND WEST.

Several new banking houses have commenced operations lately. The cards of these may be found on the cover of this work, or in the Bankers' Almanac for 1861, and a complete list of all the banking houses, as well as of all the banks in the United States, may be found in the "Merchants and Bankers' Almanac," for 1861. The cards of bankers in the following places may be found on the cover of this Magazine, or in the Bankers' Almanac, for 1861:

MASSACHUSETTS.—Boston.—New York.—New York City, Geneva, Phelps.

PENNSYLVANIA.—Philadelphia, Seranton, Bradford, Towanda.—MARYLAND.—Baltimore.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.—Washington.

VIRGINIA.—Fredericksburg, Richmond.

CALIFORNIA.—Sacramento, San Francisco.

ILLINOIS.—Chicago, Carlinsville, Moline, Ottawa, Rockford, Quincy, Springfield.

INDIANA.—Richmond.

IOWA.—Cedar Rapids, Clinton, Fairfield, Davenport, Fort Dodge, Iowa City, Keokuk, Muscatine, Sioux City, Washington.

KENTUCKY.—Louisville.

MICHIGAN.—Ann Arbor, Battle Creek, Grand Rapids, Niles.

MINNESOTA.—Minneapolis, St. Paul.

MISSOURI.—St. Louis.


OHIO.—Cincinnati, Dayton, Sandusky, Toledo, Zanesville.

TENNESSEE.—Memphis.—TEXAS.—Galveston, Palestine, San Antonio, Houston.

WISCONSIN.—Milwaukee.

CANADA.—Kingston, &c.

KANSAS.—Leavenworth City.





THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

VOL. XI. NEW SERIES. OCTOBER, 1861.

No. 4.

THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN COINAGE.

BY JOHN H. HICKCOX.

WITH ENGRAVINGS.

COINS OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD.

I. *Massachusetts*.—THE establishment of a mint in Massachusetts may be ascribed to several causes: First, the settlers brought very little money with them, and that which was obtained from other countries was continually exported, in order to pay debts due in England. By means of a mint they expected to retain the money which was brought into the colony, by converting it into a currency of a less sterling value than that of England. Secondly, there was a continual loss from the introduction of counterfeit money; and thirdly, a very considerable amount of plate and bullion, taken by the buccaneers and other pirates from the Spaniards, was brought into New-England by means of the Dutch West India trade.* A spirit of independence, perhaps, or rather a desire to have a standard currency without calling upon England for it, may have had weight in the matter.

The early trade of the colony was carried on by means of English,

* HUTCHINSON.

Dutch and Spanish coin, wampum, produce of various kinds, live stock, bullets, and even gunpowder.

The act which authorized the coinage of silver was passed on the 10th of June, 1652.* It provided that the then existing laws in regard to currency should be in force until the date of the passage of this act, and that "the money hereafter appointed and expressed should be the current money of the Commonwealth, and no other, unless English, except the receivers themselves consent;" that a mint should be established for the coinage of shillings, sixpences and threepences, that N. E. should be stamped on one side, and XII., VI. and III. on the reverse of the pieces, representing these amounts. (*Plate 1, figs. 1, 2.*) In addition to these stamps, the coins had a private mint mark, designated every three months by the governor and the officers of the mint. A committee was appointed to select a situation for a mint-house, administer the oath to JOHN HULL, the master of the mint,† approve of the subordinate officers, and "determine what else should appear to them necessary to be done for the carrying out of the whole order."

HULL, with the consent of the General Court, associated with him ROBERT SANDERSON. The mint-house was of wood, sixteen feet square, ten feet high, and erected upon HULL's land. It was agreed, that in case he ceased to be master, the land should be possessed by the Commonwealth, on the valuation of two commissioners, chosen by the Commonwealth and HULL. All persons having bullion, plate or Spanish coin were allowed to bring it to the mint, to be present while the same was being melted, refined and alloyed, and, upon taking a receipt for the same from the mint-master, they received the like weight in current money.

The irregular shape of the coins, and the fact that so small a portion of the surface was impressed with the stamp, afforded opportunities for fraud, such as filing and clipping.‡ The General Court, at its next session, (October,) directed that the device should be altered to that of a double ring on either side, with MASSACHUSETTS for an inscription, and a tree in the centre on one side, and NEW-ENGLAND and the year on the other. Considering the short time that intervened between the passage of these acts, including the time necessary to erect buildings and make presses for coinage, a very small number of the coins first authorized could have been made. The shillings and sixpences are very rare, and

* There are specimens of pine-tree shillings, of undoubted genuineness, with the date 1650. They are better executed than those struck in 1652. It is not improbable, therefore, that the subject of coinage was agitated for some years prior to this date, and that pattern-pieces were struck in England.

† JOHN HULL was born December 18, 1624, in Market Hareborough, Leicestershire, and removed to New-England with his father in 1635. He was by trade a goldsmith, and served the public in many important capacities. He died in 1683. His public and private diary, which is of rare interest and importance, was presented by the Rev. Dr. SPRAGUE, of Albany, to the American Antiquarian Society, and published in 1857, in the third volume of that Society's collections.

‡ In Great Britain this practice was so extensive that the new coinage which CHARLES II. ordered on his restoration, before three years were ended, so much diminished in value that 572 bags, of 100 lbs. each, which should have weighed 221,419 oz. 16 pwts. 8 grs., yielded only 113,771 oz. 5 pwts.

the threepence, if ever coined, has never yet been found. In 1662 two-penny pieces, with devices similar to those last described, were ordered. (*Plate 1, fig. 3, 4, 5, 6.*)

It is by no means certain that the *pine* was the tree intended to have been represented on these coins. The term was never applied in any official language to the device. During the operation of the mint, the dies were undoubtedly frequently altered, and the figure of the tree varied, as is evident from the numerous specimens now in the cabinets of collectors. Mr. FELT, in his account of Massachusetts currency, supposes that the pine was a favorite symbol with the authorities of the colony. By a proclamation of Governor SHIRLEY, of March 14, 1775, it was ordered that one of the devices for stamped paper, as a revenue towards the support of our government, should be a pine tree. It was appointed on the State flag April 11, 1776, and continued so to the adoption of the thirteen stripes. It is narrated that the ancient Britons had a coin with a pine tree upon it while they paid taxes to the Romans, which CAMDEN supposes to have been money paid for assessment on woodland. As used by Massachusetts, it is suggested that it may have been used as a symbol of permanency.

As to the relative scarcity of these coins, a writer in the Essex Institute Historical Collections is of the opinion that those with a tree resembling an oak are the oldest, as it is found on all the two-penny pieces, most of which were probably struck in the year they were ordered, 1662. It is not likely that two different types were in use at the same time, and no account prior to 1662 speaks of them as pine-tree money. There is no statement extant as to the quantity struck, except the general remark by HUTCHINSON that a large amount was issued.

The difference by weight between the shilling and the current English coin of the same denomination was about 5 cents, the latter being worth about 22 cents. This difference was ordered, no doubt, in order to retain the Massachusetts money at home. It was ascertained, however, that it was largely exported, thus defeating one of the very objects for which the mint was established, and renewing the difficulties formerly experienced in carrying on trade with an insufficient currency. In 1654, therefore, a "water-bayly or searcher" was provided for every port, and every transgressor found carrying more than twenty shillings to pay his individual expenses, forfeited his whole visible estate.

The mint-master received about fifteen pence out of every twenty shillings coined by him, for his labor and expenses. The operation, which appears to have been a profitable one, did not escape the notice of the General Court. The free use of the mint-house having been allowed HULL for about eight years, a committee was appointed, in 1660, to treat with him for an annual allowance, for the benefit of the country, and in case of his refusal, to make a new contract with other parties. HULL and SANDERSON offered a bonus of ten pounds to the colony, but refused to make any agreement which should bind them to pay an annual rent. The committee reported the facts, and the court, as appears from the following record, accepted the proposition: "June, 6, 1661. The court judged it meet to order that this committee should be re-empowered to treat with the mint-masters, and to receive the ten pounds above men-

tioned, and what else they can get by way of recompense for the mint-house for the time past, and that it be delivered to the treasurer to be bestowed in powder."*

At about this period in the history of the Massachusetts mint comes the anecdote of Sir THOMAS TEMPLE and his reply to CHARLES II. Sir THOMAS was the first agent sent out by the authorities in an official capacity to London. As related by HOLLIS,[†] it is said that the king expressed great wrath against the colony, and said "that they had invaded his prerogative in coining money." Sir THOMAS told his majesty that the colonists had but little acquaintance with law; that they had no ill design, and thought it no crime to make money for their own use. In course of the conversation he took some of the money out of his pocket and presented it to the king. On one side of the coin was a pine tree, of that kind which is thick and bushy at the top. CHARLES inquired what tree that was. Sir THOMAS informed him it was the royal oak, adding, that the Massachusetts people, not daring to put his majesty's name on the coin during the late troubles, had impressed upon it the emblem of the oak which preserved his majesty's life. This account of the matter brought the king into good humor, and disposed him to hear what Sir THOMAS had to say in their favor, calling them "a parcel of honest dogs."

In 1667 another and a more successful attempt was made to obtain better terms from HULL and SANDERSON. The result was, that in consideration of the expense which the government had from time to time incurred in constructing and repairing the mint buildings, the mint-masters agreed to pay into the general treasury, for the seven succeeding years, ten pounds annually, and within six months from the date of the agreement, forty pounds in addition. At the same session the court declined the proposal of JOSEPH JENCKS for making money.

Neither the Massachusetts coin, nor that brought into the colony from foreign parts, could be retained at home. Foreign creditors absorbed it. At one time (1654) contracts could be paid in material similar to that contracted for, but this was not allowed after 1670; and in 1672, in order, probably, to increase the specie circulation, the following enactment was made: "October 8. Whereas pieces-of-eight are of more value to carry out of the country than they will yield to mint into our coin, by reason whereof, pieces-of-eight, which might else come to coining, are carried out of the country, it is therefore ordered by this court and the authority thereof, that all pieces-of-eight that are full weight and good silver—that is, six shillings of New-England money, of Mexico, Seville and Pillar, and so all lesser pieces of each sort—shall pass in this jurisdiction as current as our own money, pieces-of-eight at six shillings a piece, and all lesser pieces proportionately thereunto; provided, that all such pieces that shall pass in this jurisdiction have a stamp affixed upon them, which shall be N. E., to evidence that they are of right alloy and due weight."

At the same session the following section was added:

"Whereas pieces-of-eight weighing six shillings are ordered to pass for

* Massachusetts Records.

† Memoirs, vol. 1, page 397.

six shillings, and ordered to be stamped, &c., according to the said law, reference hereto being had; and forasmuch as few or no pieces-of-eight are of that weight, and so the intent of good to the country therein will be disappointed—as an addition to the said law be it ordered and enacted by this court and the authority thereof, that pieces-of-eight under the weight of six shillings shall likewise be passable for as much of New-England money as they shall weigh, and that it be impressed upon the stamp how much each piece doth weigh, in legible figures, with the other letters on the same, and of the same alloy.”

Some of these worn Spanish pieces which had wholly lost their original impression, stamped with N. E. on one side, and the figures 12, 6 or 3 on the other, exist in some of the English collections. By the last mentioned acts, the Spanish dollar was introduced into the Massachusetts currency; and its valuation then established, six shillings, is the same that it now carries in the New-England currency, one shilling still meaning one-sixth of a Spanish dollar.

In 1685 and 1686 reports against the mint in Massachusetts were made by the officers of the London mint, and by the Lord High Treasurer of England. The former complained of the lightness of the coin—that they were $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. lighter than that of England.* The latter report was made in reply to a petition for its re-establishment. The colonists endeavored variously to persuade the king of the innocency of their proceedings and of the value of the mint, as well to himself as to their commerce. They offered to waive any preference for the character or impress of the coins, and directed their London agent to request the king to “order such impress as shall be to him most acceptable.”

The institution existed about thirty-four years, the first date, 1652, having been retained on the shilling, sixpence and threepence, and 1662 on the twopence. This fact has by some been cited as an evidence of the strict compliance with the provisions of the statute of the General Court, but it was most probably intended to conceal from the authorities in England their persistence in a practice which had been repeatedly complained of, and at which the finger of royal displeasure had most unmistakably pointed. Although it was not abandoned until about 1688, money was not coined after the year 1686. It was probably suppressed by ANDROS, in compliance with the report already alluded to, made in 1685. After WILLIAM and MARY came to the throne its re-establishment was applied for, but the petition was unfavorably received. It was during this reign (in 1694) that a brass coin was struck, having on the obverse an elephant, and on the reverse, GOD PRESERVE NEW-ENGLAND, 1694. (*Plate 1, fig. 7.*) It was probably a private enterprise.

The subject of currency was one of continual attention and experiment in Massachusetts. Paper money was first introduced in 1690, when £7,000 were issued in bills from 5s. to £5, partly for purposes of defence, and partly on account of a scarcity of money. This practice was

* The following is the weight of six shillings of the oak type: four of seventy-two grains each, one of seventy-five, one as low as sixty-eight; sixpence, thirty grains; threepence, seventeen, and four twopence pieces, twelve grains each. (*Essex Inst. Hist. Coll. vol. 2, p. 153.*)

continued at intervals up to a late date. Such was the suffering for want of change in 1701, that some individuals stamped pieces of brass and tin, and passed them for a penny each, but they were obliged to withdraw them. In the same year a committee of the General Court reported in favor of issuing copper pence, but the proposition failed to receive the consent of the Council. In 1702 the General Court contracted for the importation from England of £5,000 worth of copper pence. As no pence were coined by the British government until 1722, the project undoubtedly failed.

In 1716, a plan was started for the coinage of base money, one-third copper and the rest silver; but the ministry in England would not allow it.*

There appears to have been no very considerable increase in the metallic currency of Massachusetts until 1749, when a large amount of coin was sent from England, on account of expenses incurred by the colonies in the expedition against Cape Breton. It consisted of 653,000 ounces of silver and ten tons of copper.

II. *Maryland.*—The coinage of Maryland grew out of, nearly, the same necessities which existed in the other American colonies. It originated with Lord BALTIMORE, who caused dies to be prepared in London, and sent specimens of the coins, which he proposed to put into circulation, to Maryland, to his brother, Lord CALVERT. The communications of Lord BALTIMORE, which accompanied the specimens, were read in council, March 3d, 1659–60, and were as follows:

“At a council held at Bushwood, Mr. SLYE’s house, in St. Mary’s County, on Saturday, the 3d of March, 1659–60:

“Present—The Gov., JOSIAH FENDALL, Esq., PHILIP CALVERT, Esq., Secretary, THOMAS GERRARD, Esq., Col. JOHN PRICE, ROBERT CLARKE, Esq., Col. NATHANIEL UTYE, BAKER BROOKE, Esq., Doctor LUKE BARBER.

“Then was read his lordship’s letter, directed to his lieutenant and council, dated 12th of October, and directed to the secretary, touching the mint, as followeth, viz.:

“After my hearty commendations, &c., having, with great pains and charge, procured necessities for a particular coin to be current in Maryland, a sample whereof, in a piece of a shilling, a sixpence and a groat, I herewith send you, I recommend it to you to promote, all you can, the dispersing it, and by proclamation to make current within Maryland, for all payments upon contracts or causes happening or arising after a day to be by you limited in the said proclamation; and to procure an act of Assembly for the punishing of such as shall counterfeit the said coin, or otherwise offend in that behalf, according to the form of an act recommended by me last year to my governor and secretary, or as near it as you can procure from the Assembly, and to give me your advice next year touching what you think best to be further done in that matter touching coin; for, if encouragement be given by the good success of it this year, there will be abundance of adventurers in it the next year.”

* Essex Inst. Hist. Coll. vol. 1, p. 156.

With this communication was also forwarded the following letter to his brother, PHILIP, then Secretary of State :

“To PHILIP CALVERT, Esq., at *St. Mary's, in Maryland* :

“I sent a sample of the Maryland money, with the directions for procuring it to pass; because I understood, by letters this year from the governor and you and others, that there was no doubt but the people there would accept of it; which, if we find they do, there will be means found to supply you all there with money enough; but though it would be a very great advantage to the colony that it should pass current there, and an utter discouragement for the future supply of any more, if there be not a certain establishment this year, and an assurance of its being vented and current there; yet it must not be imposed upon the people but by a law there made by their consents, in a General Assembly; which, I pray, fail not to signify to the governor and council there together, from me, by showing them this letter, from

“Your most affectionate brother,

“C. BALTIMORE.

“London, 12th October, 1659.”

Only a few days after the reception of this letter, Gov. FENDALL attempted to revolutionize the colony. The confusion occasioned thereby interrupted for a while the carrying out the money scheme; but when PHILIP CALVERT was appointed governor, he set about at once to procure the passage of an act for “the setting up of a mint within the Province of Maryland.” It was passed May 1st, 1661. Adopting the recommendations of the proprietor, it enacted that the money that should be coined for the province should be of as good silver as English sterling money—every shilling to weigh above nine pence, and other pieces in proportion. For counterfeiting, clipping or in any way diminishing the coin, the offender should suffer death, and the forfeiture of lands, goods, &c., to the lord proprietor. His lordship agreed to accept the said coin in payment of rents, and all other engagements due him. The act doubtless contemplated the establishment of a mint in the province; but there is no evidence to show that the intention was carried out.

Lord BALTIMORE proceeded directly to send an amount of coin sufficient to supply the immediate wants of the colonists. They had, on the obverse, a profile bust of Lord BALTIMORE; legend, CÆCILIVS: DNS: TERRÆ-MARIÆ: & Ct. Reverse, an escutcheon, with family arms; on either side of which the value of the coin* in numerals; legend, CRESCITE: ET MVLTIPlicAMINI. (*Plate 2, fig. 1, 2, 3.*)

Immediately on the receipt of this currency the legislature passed an act to provide for its circulation. Every householder and freeman within the province was required “to take up ten shillings per poll of it, for

* One variety of the shilling has the arms of his wife; a cross bottannée quartered on the reverse. This coin, which is supposed to be unique, was in the possession of the late Sir FREDERICK MORTON EDEN.—*Ruding.*

every taxable article under their charge and custody, and pay for the same in good casked tobacco, at 2d. per pound, to be paid upon tender of the said sums of money proportionably for every such respective family." There is in the British Museum a copper half-penny with the same obverse as the pieces above described; reverse, DENARIUM: TERRÆ MARLE: two flags on a ducal coronet, the Baltimore crest. (*Plate 2, fig. 4.*) It is the only one known.

As in Massachusetts, an adequate supply of money was rarely obtained. The currency continued in a state of disorder, which was a matter of much complaint and occasioned impediments to the trade of the province. Various suggestions, experiments and orders were made. The Assembly, in 1686, enacted that New-England shillings and sixpences should pass as sterling, (at an advance of 3d. in each shilling,) French crowns, pieces-of-eight and rix dollars at 6s., ducatoons at 7s. 6d., and all coins of silver or gold to be taken with the advance of 3d. sterling in the value of 12d. sterling. Later than this, tobacco was made a legal tender at one penny per pound, and Indian corn at twenty cents per bushel; and still later, paper money, as in the other provinces, constituted the principal currency.

III. *Carolina.*—Carolina, during the colonial period, had no special coinage of any considerable amount. A brass coin was struck in 1694, probably simultaneously with that already described, for New-England, and which it will be observed it very closely resembles. It had on the obverse an elephant; on the reverse, GOD PRESERVE CAROLINA AND THE LORDS PROPRIETORS, 1694. (*Plate 1, fig. 8.*) It certainly was not a domestic enterprise, and it is not known to what extent it circulated. Sterling money was the legal tender in this colony.

ARTHUR DOBBS, Governor of North Carolina in 1753, sent over to the treasury department a proposal to coin copper money for the colony, to consist of pieces of the value of two pence, one penny and a half-penny of their currency, which was in proportion to that of England as four to three. He proposed that the quantity to be coined should be determined by the governor and council, but not to exceed fifty tons; that they should deliver the copper into the mint, pay all expenses and fees attending the coinage, and have such a device upon the coins as should be thought proper. This proposal was sent down from the treasury to the officers of the mint for their consideration, who suggested that one-half of what should be coined should be in half-pence, of such a size as that sixty-one pieces should make a pound avoirdupois; that one-fourth should consist of two-penny pieces, and the other fourth of penny pieces of a proportioned weight to the half-pence; that the coinage should be performed at the same price as that for Ireland, viz., five pence per pound for the master, and twenty shillings per hundred for the comptroller. One side of the coin to have the king's effigy, with GEORGIUS II. REX; on the reverse the arms of North Carolina, inscribed SEPT. CAROLINA, and under it the date of the year. It is believed that this proposal was never carried out.

IV. *Virginia.*—The same charter which granted the territories commonly called Virginia, covered also what became subsequently known as

the territories of the Plymouth Company. The associates of Sir THOMAS GATES, the original grantee, were divided into two companies. The name of Virginia became gradually to be applied to the South Colony, while the north settlement assumed the name of Plymouth Company.

It was in the South Colony, or Virginia, that the earliest movement was made in America to establish a colonial mint. In 1645, seven years earlier than the Massachusetts authorities made provision for a metallic currency, the Assembly of Virginia "having maturely weighed and considered how advantageous a coin current would be to the colony, and the great wants and miseries which daily happen unto it by the sole dependence upon tobacco, resolved, that a coin of copper would be most beneficial to and with most ease procured by the colony," and enacted a law establishing a mint and coinage accordingly. All persons were thereby directed "to leave off trading for tobacco," under penalty of forfeiture of the articles so bought or sold. The law contemplated the purchase, at the public expense, of ten thousand pounds of copper as a stock, which was to be divided among those who should be constituted a company to coin the same. For the mintage 12d. per pound was allowed.

The copper coinage thus provided for was to consist of two, three, six and nine-penny pieces. The only device prescribed was, that "upon every piece of coin there be two rings, the one for the motto, the other to receive a new impression, which should be stamped yearly with some new figure, by one appointed for that purpose in each county." Captain JOHN UPTON was confirmed as mint-master; the appointment of other officers, as well as the regulation of the affairs of the mint, were entrusted to Governor Sir WILLIAM BERKELEY. Clearly this enactment was never carried into effect.

It is not certain that the colony of Virginia had at any time a currency of its own.* In the reign of GEORGE III. a copper coin of the following description was struck: obverse, the head of GEORGE III., legend, GEORGIUS III. REX; reverse, a shield in quarters, containing respectively the arms of England, Scotland, Ireland and the electoral dominions; legend, VIRGINIA, 1773. It is about the size of an English half-penny, and a well-executed piece. (*Plate 2, fig. 7.*) It has been found in silver.

V. *New-Hampshire.*—The province of New-Hampshire continued, down to the period of the revolution, to be governed by a commission, but enacted her own laws through a General Assembly. In providing for her currency, she pursued the usual course of the other colonies, and with the usual success. The House of Representatives, on the 28th of June, 1776, voted that the treasurer of the colony should receive into the treasury in exchange for the paper bills of the colony any quantity of copper coin made in the colony, of the weight of five pennyweights and ten grains each, to the amount of any sum not exceeding £1,000 lawful money, three of which coppers should be received and paid for two pence, in all payments. The coins contemplated by this order were to be of the following description, viz.: a pine tree, with the words, AMERICAN

* "In Virginia copper coins have never been in use."—JEFFERSON'S *Writings*, vol. 2, 136.

LIBERTY, on one side, and a harp and the date, 1776, on the other.* It is believed that the resolution was never carried into effect, although a collector in Philadelphia has a piece corresponding with the above description, except that the date is omitted.

VI. *Coinage of the Colonies at Large.*—Under this head there remains to be noticed several projects relating to the supply of coin for the American colonies prior to the era of the revolution.

During the reign of JAMES II., a tin piece, of the size of a half-penny, was issued, of the following description, viz.: obverse, King JAMES II. on horseback, with his name and titles; reverse, VAL. 24, PART. REAL. HISPAN. around four shields disposed as a cross, bearing the arms of England, Scotland, Ireland and France. It is claimed by some, that this coin was intended for circulation in the American plantations. We think it is questionable. At all events, it must have received little favor, as we are not aware that a copy has ever been seen in this country which was not lately imported.

On the 5th of July, 1700, the Board of Trade took into consideration the state of coin in the plantations. A memorial by Mr. JOHN FYSACK was then read, proposing the erection of a mint in some of the plantations on the continent of America, as a means of remedying many inconveniences in the trade of those parts. It was not considered expedient to erect a mint here, but the board resolved at some convenient opportunity to consider our currency difficulties. It is not probable that they proceeded further, for in 1707 the practice of different valuations still continued, notwithstanding a proclamation against it, which had been issued in 1704.

In the reign of GEORGE I. a new species of coins was struck, and it is believed to be the only issue for general circulation ever authorized by the British government for the use of the British American Colonies. They were made of a mixed metal resembling brass, and were of three sizes, one nearly as broad as a half crown, another about the size of an English half-penny, and a third about the size of a farthing, all bearing the same stamp, viz.: obverse, the king's head; the larger pieces had this legend: GEORGIUS D. G. MAG. BRI. FRA. ET HIB. REX. On the smaller pieces this inscription was abridged to GEORGIUS DEI GRATIA REX; reverse, a large double rose, legend, ROSA AMERICANA, UTILE DULCI, 1722 or 1723. (*Plate 5.*) The inscription on the smallest piece is merely GEORGIUS D. G. REX; reverse, ROSA AMERI. UTILE DULCI, 1722. Those with the date of 1723 have the rose crowned. (*Plate 5.*)

These coins were manufactured by WILLIAM WOOD and others, who obtained a patent for coining small money for the English plantations. The dies were engraved in London and struck at the French Change in Hog Lane. Some of the coins were brought to New-York by a Mr. WINTHROP. The influence of government was brought to bear on New-England in the hope that it would receive them; the Duke of Newcastle, then at the head of the Board of Trade, wrote to Lieut.-Governor DUM-

* American Archives, 5th series, vol. 1.

MER in 1725, informing him of the authenticity of Wood's patent for coining half-pence, pence and two pence "for the use of his majesty's dominions in America," and recommending the patentee to the favor of the Massachusetts Colony. The scheme was a failure, although it is probable the coins had considerable circulation, as specimens have been found as far south as Virginia and South Carolina. Another coin, similar in most respects to those just described, was struck in the time of GEORGE II., 1733. Not more than three copies of it are now known to be in existence; a fourth, purchased for a gentleman in the city of New-York, was lost on board the steamer ARCTIC during her last fatal voyage to this country.

Sir ALEXANDER CUMMING, in 1748, presented a memorial to Parliament, in which he proposed that, in order to preserve the dependence of the British plantations in America on Great Britain, the current specie of Great Britain should be made the current lawful money of the said plantations, and that £200,000 sterling be coined in the Tower for that purpose, which sum was to be made the foundation of a provincial bank for the British plantations in America, and thereby abolish the paper currency of New-England and Carolina.

COINS OF THE CONFEDERATION.

During the period of the Confederation, from 1778 to 1787, the right of coining money was vested in the individual States as well as in the general government. The privilege was exercised, to a considerable extent, generally in the manufacture of copper cents and half cents. Grants for this purpose were made by Vermont, in June, 1785, by Connecticut in October, 1785, by New-Jersey in June, 1786, by Massachusetts in October, 1786. The first coinage by order of the Congress of the Confederation was issued in the latter part of the year 1787.

Vermont.—The legislature of Vermont, at the June session, 1785, granted to REUBEN HARMON, Jr.,* of Rupert, the exclusive right to coin copper money within that State, for two years after the first day of July following. HARMON had already procured a quantity of copper suitable for coinage, and he found no difficulty in procuring an approval of his project by the General Assembly, which body appointed a committee to co-operate with him in the undertaking. He was required to give bonds to the amount of £5,000 for the faithful performance of his contract, and no coin manufactured by him was to weigh less than one-third of an ounce, troy weight.

* REUBEN HARMON, Jr., came, according to the relation of Mr. JULIAN HARMON, his son, from Suffield, Connecticut; according to another authority, from Sandisfield, Massachusetts. He accompanied his father and settled in the north east part of Rupert, somewhere about the year 1768. He was a merchant and a man of some note and influence, having held the office of member of the General Assembly, and of Justice of the Peace from 1780 to about 1790, besides several minor offices. In the year 1800 he left Rupert for that part of the State of Ohio called the Salt Spring Tract, in Wethersfield township, Trumbull County, where he was engaged in the manufacture of salt up to the time of his death, which took place October 29, 1806, when he was 56 years of age.

After considerable expense incurred in buildings, HARMON succeeded in getting his works in operation. The mint-house was located near the northeast corner of the town of Rupert, a little east of the main road leading from Dorset to Pawlet, on a small stream of water called Mill-Brook, which empties into Pawlet River. It was a small building, about sixteen by eighteen feet, made of rough materials, simply clapboarded, unplanned and unpainted. At the east end was a furnace for melting the copper and machinery for rolling the bars, in the middle of the room the machinery for cutting, and at the west end that for stamping. This was done by means of an iron screw, attached to heavy timbers above, and moved by hand, with the aid of ropes. Sixty coppers per minute could be stamped, although thirty was the usual number. The building was still standing in 1855, but its location is entirely changed, it having long since been removed to the edge of the adjoining town of Pawlet, where it is used as a corn-house.

The coins issued from this mint were of the following description: Obverse, a sun rising from behind the hills, and a plough in the foreground; legend, VERMONTENSIVM RES PUBLICA, 1786. Reverse, a radiated eye, surrounded by thirteen stars; legend, QUARTA DECIMA STELLA. (*Plate 2, fig. 9.*)

In October, 1786, HARMON, on the ground that in the short time granted him he would be unable to indemnify himself for the expense which he had incurred in the beginning of his enterprise, applied for and obtained an extension of his privilege for eight years from July, 1787. In June, 1787, HARMON's firm, which consisted of himself and WILLIAM COLEY, of Bennington Co., Vt., ELIAS JACKSON, of Litchfield, Conn., and DANIEL VOORHIS, goldsmith, of New-York, formed a copartnership with another company, consisting of THOMAS MACHIN, SAMUEL ATLEE, JAMES F. ATLEE, DAVID BROOKS, JAMES GRIER and JAMES GILES, all of New-York city, for the said term of eight years, for the coinage of copper. The New-York partners were required, by the first of July, "to complete, at their own cost, the works then erecting at the mills of THOMAS MACHIN, near the Great Pond, in the County of Ulster," while the other partners agreed, in the same time, to complete the works at Rupert, Bennington Co., Vt. The ten partners divided the affairs of the company between them, and agreed to meet on the first days of February, June and October of each year, at Rhinebeck, N. Y., for the purpose of general business.

It is supposed that WILLIAM COLEY, who had been a goldsmith in the city of New-York, but who afterwards removed to Rupert, cut the dies and assisted in striking the coppers. He was, at all events, actively engaged in the operations. How long the Vermont money was coined, or the quantity manufactured, is not known; but it is not improbable that coppers for other States and individuals were struck at the same mints.

For the privilege granted by the legislature to Mr. HARMON, in 1787, he was required, after three years of the eight had expired, to pay into the treasury of the State two and one-half per cent. on the amount of the copper coin he should manufacture during the remainder of the term. The first three years he was allowed the use of the patent without any compensation to the State. The legislature also prescribed the device, &c., for the

the coppers, which was as follows: On one side a head, with the motto, AUCTORITATE VERMONTENSIIUM, abridged; and on the reverse a woman, with the letters INDE. ET LIB. (*Plate 3, fig. 2.*) A few half-cents were also issued.

At the time the British in Canada were carrying on negotiations with the leading men in Vermont, to make Vermont a crown dependency, coppers were issued, having on the obverse a bust of GEORGE III., legend, VERMON AUCTORI; reverse, the figure of Britannia.

Connecticut.—Connecticut was the second State of the confederation that provided for a copper currency of her own. Vermont preceded her in legislation on the subject by only four months. At a session of the General Assembly, held in 1785, a memorial was presented by SAMUEL BISHOP, JOSEPH HOPKINS, JAMES HILLHOUSE and JOHN GOODRICH for permission to establish a mint to coin money for the State. On the 20th of October permission was granted, and the memorialists were authorized to manufacture coppers to an amount not exceeding ten thousand pounds sterling.

The grantees, on the 12th of the ensuing month, formed a copartnership with PIERPONT EDWARDS, JONATHAN INGERSOLL, ABEL BUEL* and ELIAS SHIPMAN, under the name of the Company for Coining Coppers, holding equal shares, and under equal obligations to conform to the regulations of the act of incorporation.

The weight and description of the pieces were defined by statute. Six pennyweights was the required amount of copper in each, and the impression and inscription directed were the following: obverse, a head and the words AUCTORI CONNec.; reverse, a female figure holding in her hand an olive branch; legend, INDE. ET LIB. 1785. (*Plate 3, fig. 3.*) For the term of five years, which was the length of the grant, the proprietors of the mint were required to pay semi-annually into the State treasury one-twentieth part of all the coppers which should be manufactured. A committee of the legislature was appointed to inspect and approve them before they were put in circulation. This committee inspected, during the three years the mint was in operation, 28,944 pounds weight of coined copper, and the company subsequently testified that they had not put into circulation any coppers except they had been inspected. A law was also passed prohibiting any person to coin coppers without license.

In 1786 JAMES JARVIS purchased the interest of EDWARDS and SHIPMAN and a part of INGERSOLL's, and became a partner, and in the same year the mint was leased to MARK LEAVENWORTH for six weeks. In June, 1787, the company ceased to carry on the business; but in the fall

* One of the most ingenious men of his time, a native of the town of Killingworth, Conn. His ingenuity was often turned to no good purpose. At an early age he was detected in altering five-shilling colony notes to five pounds, for which offence he was imprisoned, cropped and branded. Afterwards he constructed a lapidary machine, probably the first used in this country. BERNARD ROMANS, who was constructing a map of North America, employed him to make a survey of the coast of Pensacola, and he assisted also in engraving the map. During the revolution he constructed a type-foundry in New-Haven, employing fifteen or twenty boys in making type. Returning from a visit to England, he erected one of the first cotton factories in New-England. He died in the New-Haven almshouse.

of 1788 Maj. ELI LEAVENWORTH made there blank coppers, which he had stamped in New-York with various impressions. In 1789 an examination was made by a committee of the legislature, who found that the affairs of the company had been conducted in a satisfactory manner.

New-Jersey.—The manufacture of coppers in New-Jersey appears to have been founded upon the suggestions and operations of WALTER MOULD. Mr. MOULD had been employed in Birmingham, England, in an establishment where coppers were manufactured, and as the currency of the country and the scarcity of money were much talked about in New-Jersey, he communicated to his friends his knowledge of the process of coining, and proposed to manufacture a certain amount of coppers if the proper authority could be obtained.

On the suggestion of SILAS CONDUCT, he applied to the legislature for permission to coin money. He had brought with him from England many of his tools and implements of trade, and he represented that in the construction of the necessary manufactory but little time would be lost. The application of the petitioners, WALTER MOULD, THOMAS GOODSBY and ALBION COX, was referred to a committee of the legislature, and favorably reported upon, and, on the 1st of June, 1786, an act was passed authorizing the petitioners to coin coppers. It permitted their manufacture to an amount equal in value to £10,000, fifteen coppers to the shilling, each coin to be of pure copper, and to weigh six pennyweights and six grains. The justices of the Supreme Court, or any of them, should direct what inscription, &c., should be placed on the coin. Heavy bonds were required from the contractors, that within two years from the publication of the act, the said amount of £10,000 in coppers should be coined; that one-tenth of this amount should be delivered quarterly to the State Treasurer for the use of the State. The patent was exclusive; all persons were prohibited from coining money in New-Jersey without a grant from the legislature, under penalty of twelve pounds for each day's offence.

In November of the same year, GOODSBY and COX were authorized to coin two-thirds of the amount of the coinage and MOULD one-third; and in June, 1787, an act was passed which imposed a penalty upon any one who offered to pass coppers other than those coined under the authority of New-Jersey, or which might be issued by the United States Congress.

From the dates on the pieces it appears that coppers were coined during 1786, 1787 and 1788. There can be little doubt but that there were two establishments in operation. MOULD's coppers were manufactured in his own house at a place called Solitude, about two miles west of Morristown, on the turnpike leading to Sussex Court-House. Mr. COX and one GILBERT RIDDLE conducted their coinage at Elizabeth, in a building occupied by the widow of Col. MATTHIAS OGDEN, of the revolutionary army, and adjoining the residence of Col. FRANCIS BARBER. The business was carried on in a room behind the kitchen. In the middle of this room a pit was sunk, and in the centre of the pit the die was stationed, the top of which was about level with the floor of the room. The impression was made by means of a screw press, which was worked by two men and a horizontal lever about ten feet in length.

The coppers of the New-Jersey mint are described as follows: obverse, a horse head, beneath which a plough; legend, *NOVA CÆSAREA*, 1786, &c.; reverse, a shield, legend, *E PLURIBUS UNUM*. (*Plate 3, fig. 4.*)

Massachusetts.—The establishment of the second Massachusetts mint, in 1786, was not considered at the time a matter of any great importance. It appears to have excited very little interest and no public discussion. There was much derangement in business on account of the currency, and the attention of the legislature was largely taken up in considering matters growing out of this state of affairs. It is probable that the mint was established more as a pretext than from any important service that it was expected would be rendered by it. We are inclined to think so the more, because provision was made for coining only a small amount of copper, although the act contemplated as well the coinage of silver and gold. It was expected, moreover, that Congress would soon take active proceedings in the matter of the national currency. It had already, in 1782, approved of the establishment of a mint, in 1785 had fixed the money unit, and in 1786 had regulated the alloy and value of coin. The Massachusetts delegates in Congress having learned that the subject of coinage was under consideration in the legislature, suggested, that as provision would soon be made for the issue of an adequate supply of uniform currency, and as public confidence would be greater in a national coinage than in that of the separate States, a new issue by Massachusetts, under such circumstances, would scarcely be productive of much good. But an act was passed on the day succeeding the passage of one for the same purpose by Congress.

In the spring of 1787, JOSHUA WITHERAL was empowered to have the necessary buildings and machinery provided. The works were erected on Boston Neck and at Dedham. During the next year the coins were issued. On the obverse was an Indian, holding a bow and arrow; legend, *COMMONWEALTH*, and a star; reverse, an American eagle, having a bundle of arrows in its right talon, and in its left an olive branch, a shield on its breast, with the word, *CENT*; legend, *MASSACHUSETTS*, 1788. A few copies of the cent are found with the date 1787. Only a few thousand dollars worth of money was manufactured, a portion of which amount was made into half-cents of the same description. (*Plate 3, figs. 5, 6.*)

The second portion of this article, by Mr. HICKCOX, will be issued in our next No., comprising a review of the coins of the United States Mint and miscellaneous coins, with full engravings.—ED. B. M.

THE FINANCES OF BELGIUM.

A REPORT on the finances of Belgium, by Mr. HERRIES, the British Secretary of Legation at Brussels, gives a satisfactory view of their condition. The total expenditure of the country in the 18 years from 1830 to 1857 exceeded the receipts only by £300,000, and in 1858 a surplus was obtained of £445,000, while the accounts for 1859 and 1860, when fully made up, are expected to show a further favorable balance of £120,000. Of the national debt, which stood originally at £35,400,000, the sum of £9,880,000 has been paid off, leaving the present total £25,420,000. This, however, is exclusive of a $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. loan of £1,800,000, raised last year for the purpose of extending the fortifications of Antwerp. The annual cost of the entire debt is £1,620,000. The budget for 1861 shows an estimated income of £5,960,000, and an expenditure of £5,840,000, leaving a surplus of £120,000. Among the chief sources of revenue the customs figure for £600,000, the excise for £1,100,000, the duties on registration, mortgages and successions, for £1,040,000, and the railway receipts for £1,100,000. The capital of the National Bank of Belgium is £1,000,000, and it has a note circulation of between £4,000,000 and £5,000,000. The discount operations of this establishment last year represented a sum of upwards of £30,000,000, or more than double their amount eight years ago. With regard to shipping, it appears that in 1859 the total entrances and clearances were 6,727 vessels, having 1,142,421 tons burden, and manned by 70,853 seamen. Of these vessels the proportion under the Belgian flag was 14 per cent., and under the British 39 per cent. During that year, 15,633 passengers landed at Antwerp and Ostend, of whom 15,489 were from England. The importations of foreign produce for home consumption in 1859 were valued at £18,000,000, and the exports of Belgian produce at £16,500,000. The chief trade is with France, the imports and exports from and to that country having been respectively £3,740,000 and £6,000,000, or fully a third more than the aggregate amount either with Great Britain or Holland, which figure next on the list. The importations both from France and Great Britain are steadily increasing, but especially from the former. The exportation of coal was 3,140,000 tons—an increase of nearly 100 per cent. in ten years. Upwards of 20,000 persons are employed at Liege in the manufacture of fire-arms, and the number of guns, pistols, &c., annually proved at that place is about 500,000. The number of spindles in the Belgian cotton mills is reckoned at 550,000, and in the course of the last ten years wages have risen 20 or 25 per cent., a fact which may be accepted as a fresh corroboration of the results predicted from the Californian and Australian gold discoveries. Lace continues to be one of the most important manufactures in Belgium, and employs about 125,000 women and girls, whose average earnings are about 6d. per day. More than 30,000 hands are occupied in making the lace called "Brussels application." The number of spindles at work in

linen mills is reckoned at 180,000 or 190,000, and the extent of land under flax cultivation is 100,000 acres. The woollen productions of Verriers represent an annual value of £2,880,000. The silk manufacture is stationary, and the number of looms does not exceed 500. The exportation of paper, which ten years back amounted to less than £4,000, is now valued at £180,000. Of beet-root sugar the quantity produced in Belgium in 1845 was hardly equal to a fifth of the annual consumption of the country. It now exceeds the whole of the home consumption of sugar. As respects agriculture generally, it is stated that the cold and wet weather which in Belgium, even more, perhaps, than in England, prevailed throughout the year 1860, did not cause the injury to the crops that might have been expected. On the contrary, a majority of the principal kinds of agricultural produce were good in quality and abundant in quantity.—*London Times*, July, 1861.

BANK FRAUDS IN LONDON.

IN March, 1858, an opportunity was taken to caution the London public with regard to a concern styling itself the Deposit and Discount Bank and Life Assurance Treasury, of which a Mr. LAW was the manager, and a noble lord, since deceased, the chairman. It professed to have a subscribed capital of £500,000, and sought to induce persons to become shareholders by an announcement that under the deed of settlement their liability would be limited. According to the *London Times*, this was obviously a falsehood, and it was hoped that a prominent reference to the case would be sufficient to prevent any large number of persons from being drawn in. But the extent to which adventurers may rely upon the credulity of the public is beyond anything that could be supposed, and we are now presented with the fact that during a subsequent career of two or three years the undertaking has contrived to get into debt to depositors and others to an amount variously stated at from £55,000 to £85,000. Having attained this point, it stopped payment on the 15th July, when it seems the cashier had not sufficient means to meet a check for £10 which was presented. Messrs. HARDING, PULLEIN & Co., the accountants, have been called in to make an investigation, and it appears that the manager, Mr. LAW, admits that the liabilities may reach £55,000, and that the deficiency cannot be less than £30,000. There are, it is said, 220 shareholders, holding in the aggregate 285,000 shares, on which 2s. per share only has been called, and a petition has been presented to wind up the concern in the Court of Chancery. As the life assurance was mixed up with the banking business, and "persons in the humblest sphere of life" were invited to deposit their savings, and share the advantages of the institution equally with individuals "of a higher class," it may be feared that the misery that may ensue will be severe. In the printed prospectus the "Bank of England" appear as bankers to the concern, but it can hardly be supposed that that establishment can have permitted its name thus to be used in connection with a scheme which was from the first stamped with illegality, and whose objectionable practices had been distinctly brought to public attention.

THE LONDON JOINT-STOCK BANKS.

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1861.

THE London joint-stock banks having issued their half-yearly balance-sheets to the end of June last, we propose to place before our readers a brief outline of their respective positions up to that date, and to compare them with what they were on the corresponding date of the previous year. In our last number we referred to the difficulties which the promoters of joint-stock banks had to contend against at the outset of their career; but that which was, at one time, only an acorn, has now become a wide-spreading oak, the shadow of whose branches covers the land. There may be something grand in the high-sounding terms of "A Royal Charter;" but its practical meaning is, in too many instances, secret jobbery and monopoly, against which there is no appeal; as too many have found to their cost who have applied for banking charters. An improved system of legislation has substituted for these secret charters open laws, upon which the whole country is free to act; and we see in the progress of the London joint-stock banks how greatly superior is an open statute to a formal document, framed, signed and sealed under the secret influence of government, for the benefit of favored individuals. We are indebted to "*The Money Market Review*," published in London, for the following valuable summary:

The half-yearly meeting of the London and Westminster Bank was held on the 17th of July. The accounts for the half-year give the net profits to the 30th of June last at £131,591 16s. 4d., against £106,748 10s. 6d. in the corresponding six months of 1860; being an increase of £24,843 5s. 10d. The deposits and current liabilities amounted to £14,821,650 15s. 4d., against £11,919,571 0s. 1d. in 1860; being an increase of £2,902,079 15s. 3d. The dividend declared was at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, with a bonus of 7 per cent. for the half-year, which is equivalent to 20 per cent. per annum, and equal to the dividend and bonus in 1860. The reserve fund stands at £215,378 2s. 6d., against £205,000 in 1860. The paid-up capital remains the same as last year, namely, £1,000,000, or £20 per share on 50,000 shares.

The half-yearly meeting of the London Joint-Stock Bank was held on the 18th of July. The accounts for the half-year, ending June the 30th, give the net profits at £84,006 15s. 10d., against £62,034 13s. 9d. in 1860; being an increase of £21,972 2s. 1d. The deposits and current liabilities in the present year amount to £11,425,037 8s. 7d., against £9,826,506 8s. 8d. in 1860; being an increase of £1,598,530 19s. 11d. The dividend declared was at the rate of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum, the same as in June, 1860, with an additional bonus of 12s. 6d. per share, which is equivalent to 25 per cent. per annum, against a dividend of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum declared in June, 1860. In consequence of the loss that was estimated to arise from the heavy failures in the leather trade in

1860, the directors, after declaring a dividend at the rate of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum, set aside the sum of £24,534 13s. 9d., to provide for a portion of those losses estimated at about £40,000. The guarantee fund, after having been debited with £17,875 in consequence of the reduced value of the securities held by the bank on the 29th of June, stood at £198,458 5s. 9d., against £211,560 9s. 11d. in 1860. The paid-up capital is £600,000, or £10 per share upon 60,000 shares.

The half-yearly meeting of the Union Bank of London was held on the 10th of July. The accounts for the half-year give the total net profits at £95,616 18s. 2d., after paying £107,511 1s. 4d. for interest to customers on deposit and current accounts. The dividend declared is 12s. per share, or at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, the same as in July, 1860. We have already commented, in a previous number, on the financial position of this bank. The paid-up capital last year was £600,000, and £120,000 taken from the reserve was added, making the total £720,000; but this amount has since been debited with £120,000 to cover a portion of the loss sustained through PULLINGER, which has reduced the paid-up capital again to £600,000. The deposits and current liabilities of the bank amount to £10,415,020 3s. 9d., against £9,740,548 9s. 7d. in 1860, being an increase of £674,471 14s. 2d.

The half-yearly meeting of the London and County Bank was held on the 1st of August. The accounts for the half-year ended the 30th of June last, give the net profits at £44,473 3s. 3d., against £27,643 11s. 8d. in 1860, showing an increase of £16,829 11s. 7d. The deposits and current liabilities are given at £5,973,348 13s. 1d., against £5,366,127 7s. 11d. in 1860, being an increase of £607,221 5s. 2d. The dividend declared was at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, the same as in 1860. The reserve fund stands at £125,000, against £110,000 in 1860. The paid-up capital is £500,000, or £20 per share on 25,000 shares.

The half-yearly meeting of the Bank of London was held on the 24th of July. The accounts for the past half-year give the net profits at £17,543 13s. 9d., against £14,721 14s. 10d. in June, 1860, being an increase of £2,821 18s. 11d. The deposits and current liabilities amounted to £1,684,129 2s. 10d., against £1,594,631 8s. 10d. in 1860, being an increase of £89,497 14s. The dividend declared was at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, the same as in 1860. The reserve fund stands at £31,000, against £27,000 in 1860, and the paid-up capital is £300,000, or £50 per share on 6,000 shares.

The half-yearly meeting of the City Bank was held on the 16th of July. The accounts for the half-year just ended give the net profits at £22,196 15s. 1d., against £13,457 17s. 11d. in 1860, being an increase of £8,768 17s. 2d. The deposits and current liabilities stand at £2,840,346 8s. 6d., against £2,341,434 18s. 6d. in 1860, being an increase of £498,911 10s. The dividend declared for the past half-year was at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, with a bonus of 15s. per share, which is equivalent to 9 per cent. per annum, the same as in 1860. The reserve fund stands at £33,000, and the paid-up capital is £300,000, or £50 per share on 6,000 shares.

The half-yearly meeting of the Unity Mutual Joint-Stock Bank was held on the 26th of July. The half-yearly accounts, made up to the

29th June last, give a surplus balance of £4,066 2s. 4d., including the balance of the preceding half-year, against £2,626 6s. 2d. in June, 1860, when no dividend was declared, the directors considering it desirable to carry the amount forward. From the present balance a dividend of 12s. 6d. per share has been declared, which is at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum. The deposits and current liabilities stand at £155,826 2s., against £139,057 6s. 8d. in 1860—showing an increase of £16,768 15s. 4d. The paid-up capital of the bank is £141,015 0s. 5d., against £179,195 in 1860. The reduction exhibited under this head in the present half-yearly accounts, to the extent of £38,179 19s. 7d., has been in accordance with a resolution passed in January last, when it was thought desirable to write off certain losses sustained by the bank in the early stages of its career. Without this explanation a diminution in the paid-up capital of a bank declaring so small a dividend would appear a strange anomaly; but it was far more prudent in the directors to cancel any amount of capital that possessed only a fictitious value, than to carry it forward and give to it a claim from the profits which belong only to the legitimate shareholders.

The Commercial Bank of London, which commenced business in March, 1840, has now to be erased from the catalogue of the London joint-stock banks, through the dishonesty of DURDEN, a ledger clerk, employed at the West End Branch, in Henrietta-street, Covent-garden. The mode by which the frauds were carried on was by the use of fictitious entries, by keeping two accounts, and by falsely giving credit for moneys placed to various accounts. This circumstance was discovered in February last, and forced upon the bank the necessity of making some arrangement for the transfer of its business to some other bank. The London and Westminster Bank consented to an arrangement by which the shareholders, as well as the depositors, have been secured against losses that must otherwise have been inevitable. A proposition has been recently made to pay the shareholders £10 per share, or half the amount of the paid-up capital; and by giving time for the realization of the assets of the bank, it is anticipated that the remainder will be ultimately discharged in full, so that the loss to the shareholders will be limited principally to those who have purchased their shares at a premium.

The following summary of the principal figures relating to the London joint-stock banks during the past year will exhibit at a glance their position and progress:

<i>Banks.</i>	<i>Paid-up Capital.</i>	<i>Deposits and Current Liabilities.</i>	<i>Rate of Dividend for half-year. Per cent. per ann.</i>
London and Westminster, £ 1,000,000	.. £ 14,821,650	15 4 ..	20
London Joint-Stock,	600,000	.. 11,425,037 8 7 ..	25
Union Bank of London, ..	600,000	.. 10,415,020 3 9 ..	10
London and County,	500,000	.. 5,973,348 13 1 ..	10
City Bank,	300,000	.. 2,840,346 8 6 ..	9
Bank of London,	300,000	.. 1,684,129 2 10 ..	5
Unity Mutual,	141,015	.. 155,826 2 0 ..	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Totals,	£ 3,441,015	.. £ 47,315,358 14 1	

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the Commercial Bank from the above list, there has been an increase in the total amount of deposits and

current liabilities of the seven banks of no less than £6,387,483, when compared with the corresponding period of 1860. The distribution of these will be clearly seen by the following statement :

	<i>Deposits and Current Liabilities, June, 1860.</i>		<i>Deposits and Current Liabilities, June, 1861.</i>		<i>Increase.</i>
London and Westminster,....	£ 11,919,571	..	£ 14,821,651	..	£ 2,902,080
London Joint-Stock,.....	9,826,506	..	11,425,037	..	1,598,531
Union Bank of London,.....	9,740,548	..	10,415,020	..	674,472
London and County,.....	5,366,127	..	5,973,349	..	607,222
Commercial Bank,.....	979,709
City Bank,.....	2,341,435	..	2,840,346	..	498,911
Bank of London,.....	1,594,631	..	1,684,129	..	89,498
Unity Mutual,.....	139,057	..	155,826	..	16,769
Totals,.....	£ 41,907,584	..	£ 47,315,358	..	£ 6,387,483

The net profits of the half-year of each bank exhibit the following results, compared with those of the half-year ending June, 1860 :

	<i>Net profits for half-year, June, 1860.</i>		<i>Net profits for half-year, June, 1861.</i>		<i>Increase in 1861.</i>
London and Westminster,.....	£ 106,748	..	£ 131,592	..	£ 24,843
London Joint-Stock,.....	62,035	..	84,007	..	21,972
Union Bank of London,.....	64,682	..	95,617	..	30,935
London and County,.....	27,644	..	44,473	..	16,830
City Bank,.....	13,458	..	22,197	..	8,769
Bank of London,.....	14,722	..	17,544	..	2,822
Unity Mutual,*.....	2,626	..	4,066	..	1,440

These figures show that there has been a general increase in the profits of each bank when compared with the half-year ending June, 1860, arising not only from the higher value which has been obtained for money, but also from the increased amount of deposits at the command of the banks. The reports of the banks, however, owing to the form in which they are presented, do not permit us to arrive at any accurate deductions under each head of business transacted; in this respect the banking statistics of France are far more exemplary in their nature. For instance, the discounting of bills, which would show the progress of commerce and banking at each period of the year, has no distinct recognition in these reports. The same absence of information on this point is presented in the returns of the Bank of England, where advances and discounts are lumped together. It is probably from the jealousy of competition amongst the banks and discount houses that this information is withheld; nevertheless, it must be regarded as a defect in the statistics of commercial and banking transactions.

The increase in the profits of banking, witnessed of late years, has been promoted by a variety of circumstances, such as freedom of trade, the discoveries of gold, and the great extension of our commercial transactions with the British colonies and foreign countries. In fact, the import and export trade have both shown a prodigious advance. In 1850 the total value of our export trade was £71,367,885; in 1860 it was

* The disposable balance of this bank is given as the best means of comparing its present position with what it was under previous difficulties.

£135,824,817, being an increase of 90 per cent. Of this amount we exported to foreign countries in 1850 £51,938,994, and in 1860 £92,170,560, being an increase of 77 per cent. In 1850 we exported to British possessions £19,428,891; in 1859 £46,143,996, and in 1860 £43,672,257, being an increase of 137 per cent. These figures prove the extent of commerce carried on with our own colonies, British India alone receiving a greater amount in 1860 than we exported to the whole of the British possessions in 1850. The following statement shows the enormous range over which our external commerce extends, including exports and imports for the last three years :

	1858.	1859.	1860.
Exports,.....	£ 116,608,756	.. £ 130,411,529	.. £ 135,842,817
Imports,.....	164,583,832	.. 179,182,355	.. 210,648,643
Specie exports,.....	19,628,876	.. 35,688,803	.. 25,534,768
Specie imports,.....	29,493,190	.. 37,070,156	.. 22,978,196
Colonial and foreign exports,..	23,174,023	.. 25,281,446	.. 29,827,836
Totals,.....	£ 353,488,677	.. £ 407,634,289	.. £ 424,832,260

We have given due credit to the joint-stock banks for their energetic, prudent and successful management, the legitimate fruit of which is the almost implicit confidence reposed in them by the public, as testified by the deposits in their custody of the huge sum of forty-seven millions of money. This wonderful amount, be it remembered, consists exclusively of private balances and deposits of one kind or other. The amount of the private balances ("other deposits") in the Bank of England is only £11,818,980, or little more than one-fourth of this aggregate, notwithstanding the peculiar advantages enjoyed by that establishment as the recognised custodian of other bankers' surplus balances. The London and Westminster Bank holds a larger amount of private deposits by several millions than the Bank of England. Again, looking only to the deposits and current balances, two other London banks—namely, the London Joint-Stock and the Union—tread close upon the heels of the Bank of England. The latter, on the other hand, possesses the exclusive privilege of holding the government balance, the amount of which is at present £3,843,763. Who knows but some day we may have a Chancellor of the Exchequer enterprising enough to require that a nation shall receive some advantage in the shape of a moderate rate of interest for the use of the public money. That the competition of the London joint-stock banks with the Bank of England is a growing one, and trenches more and more upon the exclusive position hitherto held by the latter, is undeniable. If the verdict of public opinion, as tested by the amount of deposits, forms any criterion, the London and Westminster Bank is as fit to be trusted with the custody of the government balance as is the Bank of England. We believe that changes even more important than these will be witnessed in the course of the next few years, for there is a growing conviction in the public mind in favor of perfect freedom in all legitimate banking. The days of exclusive privileges and close monopolies of all kinds are drawing to a close.

The main point wherein the London joint-stock banks distance the Bank of England in the competition for deposits, consists in their allow-

ing a considerable rate of interest, (as a rule, one per cent. less than the Bank of England minimum rate of discount,) whilst the bank allows no interest whatever. Consequently, the seven joint-stock banks hold, in the aggregate, fourfold the amount of the private deposits of the Bank of England. The utility of the functions discharged in this way by the joint-stock banks is obvious. They collect, under the force of this attraction, a vast number of small capitals, which otherwise would, in part at least, lie idle. They turn a multitude of little rivulets into one great reservoir, whence the whole field of trade is irrigated and fertilized. But the system is, nevertheless, open to criticism at some points. We have never disguised our opinion that there is too much competition for deposits bearing interest, and, as a natural consequence, too much competition for securities wherein to employ those interest-bearing deposits. Money for which a high rate is paid, in relation to its current market value, must be kept largely and constantly employed. For the real good of the community at large, a rate of interest only one per cent. below the Bank of England minimum rate of discount is too much for the joint-stock banks and discount establishments to give. Witness, for example, the facts of the present moment, when the banks give four per cent. for deposits, whilst the real rate of discount for the best bills is only four and one-half. The margin is too narrow. It becomes narrower still when we remember that the present fixed rate of the discount establishments is actually as much as four and one-fourth per cent. for money at a few days' "notice." Were the general rate offered by the joint-stock banks and other houses to be fixed, by common consent, at one and one-half or even two per cent. below the Bank of England minimum, it would be quite high enough; there would probably be more deliberation in the selection of securities, and fewer "jerks" in the money market; and the public interest would be better served. Were such an arrangement to be come to by the London moneyed establishments by common accord, all difficulty would vanish. What is there to prevent such accord?

THE NEW EXCHEQUER BILL.—The new Exchequer Bill is as follows: "£100. This Exchequer Bill entitles ——— or order to claim payment of one hundred pounds, at the Bank of England, out of the consolidated fund, at the expiration of any period of twelve months, not later than five years from the date hereof. Interest on this bill will be paid half-yearly at the Bank of England, at such rate per centum per annum as shall be notified from time to time in the *London Gazette* by the Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury. This bill may be paid for the sum of one hundred pounds, and interest accrued thereon, to the receivers and collectors in the United Kingdom of any of the public revenues, aids, taxes or supplies, or to the account of her Majesty's Exchequer at the Bank of England, at any time in the last six months of every year, commencing from the day of the date hereof, in which it shall have currency by law." Coupons are added in the following form: "This coupon entitles the bearer to interest on the above sum for the half year to ——" It will be seen that the bills will be current for five years, and the interest may be changed at any time by notice in the *Gazette*. The coupon does not specify the rate of interest. From the operation of the last clause, the whole amount of the March and June Exchequer Bills may be paid into the Exchequer, for duties in the latter part of the financial year, but this will doubtless be rectified. The seventh section of the new act confirms the limit on Exchequer Bills fixed by a former act, confining the amount of Exchequer Bills to be issued to £13,230,000. By the 20th section, the Bank of England is empowered to advance £13,230,000 on the Exchequer Bills.

THE LONDON AND WESTMINSTER BANK.

THE London and Westminster is the oldest and most successful of the London joint-stock banks. To the perseverance of its original promoters we may ascribe the successful establishment of joint-stock banks in London. The panic of 1825 gave rise to a powerful expression of public opinion; and a paper forwarded to the Bank of England by Lord LIVERPOOL, the Prime Minister, and FREDERICK JOHN ROBINSON, Chancellor of the Exchequer, afterwards Earl of Ripon, brought the whole question of banking formally before the government. The Act 7th of GEORGE IV., cap. 46, was passed in May, 1826, to give power to joint-stock banks to issue notes payable on demand throughout England and Wales. This, however, was only an instalment of what the country required. Although permitted to issue their promissory notes payable on demand, there was a limitation fixed by the law to this privilege, in order to maintain the privileges which were enjoyed by the Bank of England corporation, and a radius of *sixty-five miles* from London in all directions was to be maintained, in which no joint-stock bank could be established, nor, therefore, could come into competition with that establishment. The limitation of this act did not terminate here, but it prohibited every joint-stock bank from having "any place of business, or establishment as banker in London, or at any place, not exceeding sixty-five miles" in distance from the metropolis. The same act even went further than this in regard to these banks, for it prohibited them also from "borrowing, drawing or taking up, in London, or within sixty-five miles thereof, any sums of money on their bills or notes payable on demand, or at any time less than six months from the time of borrowing." Although the government had partially extended the freedom of banking, the Bank of England was still hedged about with privileges that made it a close monopoly—a monopoly which has never since been done away with. In the memorial addressed to the bank at that time by Lord LIVERPOOL and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was expressly stated that "such privileges" as had been granted to the Bank of England by its previous charters "were out of fashion," and that it was "hoped that the bank would make no difficulty in giving up their exclusive privileges in respect to the number of partners engaged in banking as to any district — miles from the metropolis." In short, the law which conferred this enormous power upon the Bank of England was looked upon as such a strange anomaly, that Lord LIVERPOOL said, with much truth, "the present system allowed liberty to all that was rotten and bad, while restrictions were applied only to what was solid and good; for while we permitted any shoemaker, grocer or cheesemonger to establish a bank, if *more than six* respectable persons were joined, they could form no establishment if the crown did not grant them a charter." However strange this state of things may appear at the present day, such was the difficulty which joint-stock banking had to encounter in passing from the system of chartered privileges to that of open legislation in Parliament.

But the question of how to introduce the joint-stock plan into the metropolis had yet to be met. The power of the bank was still sufficient to keep the radius of 65 miles within its grasp against all new schemes in banking, binding within its influence a circle of 390 miles in circumference. Nevertheless, at each subsequent renewal of the charter, public opinion made new inroads upon its exclusive privileges. In 1833 joint-stock banks were permitted to have agents in London, or within 65 miles, and the exclusive privilege of the bank, by limiting banking partnerships to six persons, was abolished.

It was at this period that joint-stock banking, as distinguished from private banking, assumed a new phase; but the advantages of the new system were not unattended with dangers and difficulties. Soon after this there arose a kind of mania for the creation of joint-stock banks. From 1826 to 1832 only thirty banks were established in England and Wales; in 1833 there were ten; in 1834, eleven; in 1835, nine; and in 1836, no less than forty-two new banks of this kind were promulgated. To detail the fate of many of these is beyond the limit of our space. It will suffice to say that their failure, in most instances, was the result rather of an abuse of sound banking, than of any defect in the joint-stock principle of banking itself. This truth has been fully demonstrated by the metropolitan joint-stock banks. The London and Westminster, which we have made the subject of our remarks to-day, was the first established after the passing of the act of 1833, and commenced business in March, 1834, with a paid-up capital of only £50,000. We should mention here that the privilege of issuing its own notes, payable to bearer on demand, was not granted by this act, which confined its operations wholly to the other business of banking.

The progress which this bank has made exceeds that of any of the other joint-stock banks established in the metropolis. Taking as the basis of banking credit the deposits and current liabilities, those of the London and Westminster stand pre-eminent. In December, 1834, the amount under this head was £180,380. In 1837 it had reached £793,148. In 1838 it had nearly doubled, and stood at £1,387,855. With the exception of 1839, (a year not favorable to trade,) the increase, up to 1845, was regular, and the amount was then £3,590,014; but in 1846 and 1847, years of railway speculation, the potato rot and short harvests, the deposits became sensibly diminished. In 1850 the amount reached £3,969,648. In 1852 and 1853, years after the gold discoveries had begun to operate upon commerce, they stood at £6,259,450. In 1856 this amount had *nearly doubled*, having reached £11,438,461. We will pass over the intermediate years since that period. According to the latest balance-sheet of the company, the deposits and current liabilities have reached the enormous sum of £14,821,650 in the space of twenty-seven years. This shows an increase of no less than £2,902,079 since June, 1860. No doubt the transfer of the business of the Commercial Bank of London has added to this increase in the deposit account; but the general progress of the bank since its commencement is such as fully to convince the public of its good management, and of the soundness of the principles upon which it is conducted.

If we refer to the profits of the bank they are equally satisfactory. In

the year ending June, 1834, they were £3,540. In 1840 they had reached £48,951. It was not until the panic of 1847 that there was any serious decrease; they were then £58,223. In 1856 they rose to £170,607. The net profits for the half year ending December last were £105,413, and for the half year ending June last they were £131,592, making the total net profits for the past twelve months £237,005.

The dividends of the bank have gradually risen from two per cent., in 1834, to twenty per cent. in 1861, upon a paid-up capital, increased from £50,000 to £1,000,000. The profits thus realized exhibit the only real source of profitable banking—that of judiciously and wisely employing the customers' funds. Bankers are essentially agents for the safe custody and use of other persons' property; and, however desirable it may be to provide the necessary capital against certain contingencies, the capital of shareholders bears an insignificant proportion to the amount which they hold on the strength of their public credit. The history of joint-stock banks does not afford a more striking example than that presented in the London and Westminster balance-sheet in the present year. Implicit confidence seems to be reposed in those who have grown gray in the service of the bank, and who have placed it foremost in banking influence, after having long combated the prejudices and selfish ignorance of former times.

THE MONT DE PRÊTÉ, PARIS.—The Paris correspondent of the *Morning Herald*, under date 21st July, says: The financial scandals which have been the prevailing topic during the past week have ripened into bloom. The director of a great public establishment, who has been compelled abruptly to resign his post, M. DE ST. GEORGE, has been able, owing, it is said, to august interference, to compound with his creditors, by handing over to them a handsome sum down, and making arrangements for the ultimate liquidation of his debts. The pawnbroker-general, whose misdeeds I have alluded to, is M. DIEU. He has absconded. Among the charges against him one at least is romantic. A lady of high rank, the Duchess de —, being in want of a large sum of money, pawned her family jewels, including diamonds of great value. As a matter of course, they were soon afterwards redeemed, but instead of the diamonds and emeralds she had deposited with the untrustworthy M. DIEU, she received back only skilful imitations in paste and rock crystal. The flight of M. DIEU leaves government responsible for a sum of about half a million sterling. One of the bankers, whose embarrassments have been also referred to, is E. PEGOT-OGIER. His name appears to-day in the official list of bankrupts. His liabilities are said to be heavy, and nothing precise is known as to the nature of his assets. The correctional police is likely, ere long, to be engaged with an investigation of his affairs. Another case, that of E. CALLEY DE ST. PAUL, has also been the subject of many dark innuendoes; but as this gentleman has the good luck to be father-in-law to General FLEURY, aid-de-camp to the Emperor, first equerry, &c., it is probable that his difficulties will be smoothed over. A full investigation of his affairs might be compromising. M. BARON, banker of Balbec-Nointot, near Havre, has been declared a bankrupt. His liabilities are said to be heavy, and report asserts that three Paris bankers, who have made their names familiar to the public by copious advertising, are in flight. The names of these gentlemen are no secret, but I withhold them until something more definite has been ascertained.

IMPROVEMENTS IN SAVINGS BANKS.

SUGGESTIONS AS TO KEEPING ACCOUNTS.

Communicated to the Bankers' Magazine by J. F. ENTZ, Accountant, of New-York.

ALTHOUGH it will be universally admitted that the establishment of savings banks has proved a great blessing to the provident, particularly those belonging to the industrial classes, it will not be denied that they are susceptible of many improvements. I will endeavor to suggest some, and, at the same time, explain in what manner they will be beneficial, and remedy some imperfections in the old and almost generally-adopted system. These improvements will principally consist of—

1st. A different mode of allowing interest to depositors, by which some injustice will be avoided, and a near approach to a full allowance of what they are entitled to will be obtained.

2d. The addition of a guarantee capital, which will do away with the necessity of creating a surplus, belonging to nobody knows who, and increase the security of the depositors.

3d. The connection with the usual routine, of benefits of survivorship in various shapes, congenial to the primary object of savings banks.

The principal object of a savings bank is to gather the small sums offered, and to invest them collectively to the best advantage. This fundamental principle seems to imply that, after paying necessary expenses, the whole proceeds of the investments should be equitably and impartially distributed among those who have contributed towards them, in precise proportion of the amount and the time when it was deposited. These investments are mostly made at the legal rate of seven per cent., but a savings bank is obliged to keep a considerable sum, in some available shape, at perhaps a lower rate of interest, or even idle in the bank, to be always prepared for unexpected calls. Some will allow to depositors six per cent. on sums under \$500, and five over that amount, while others allow only five on the former and four on the latter; but all agree not to allow any interest at all on sums that have not been on deposit for the space of three months, nor on sums withdrawn between the dividends. Here we have a wide margin between the amount of interest actually received and the one returned to depositors, and a source of large profits, from which enormous surpluses have been derived, for which there would be no rightful owners if the bank should be wound up.

The *Cyclopedia of Commerce*, by J. SMITH HOMANS, Esq., furnishes a report of the situation of the savings banks of the State of New-York, which shows that the aggregate of their assets was, on the 1st January, 1858, \$43,885,991, while the amount due to depositors, and all other liabilities, was only \$41,448,368, leaving an excess of \$2,437,623. This surplus has accumulated, for years back, from deposits of persons, many of whom have died or left, and will never receive any benefit from it. I was told by an officer of one of our largest savings banks, that it is

indispensable to keep such a surplus, as a guarantee fund in case of any future deficiency, by depreciation or otherwise; and on my question, who it would go to in case of a liquidation of the bank, he answered, it would probably be divided among the present depositors, who would consequently receive an advantage which only belongs in part to them. No other party has the slightest shadow of a right to it, but the legislature has already, at various times, shown a disposition to claim it for the benefit of the State.

The refusal to pay interest on sums withdrawn or deposited within the periodical settlements is probably more an act of convenience than a wish to be unjust, as it would involve considerable clerical labor to calculate the interest for fractional parts of the time, except by the mode which I now propose to explain; and it may also be urged in defence of the measure, that these deposits have to lay idle until invested, and that the bank is obliged to keep some money ready for the withdrawals.

The remedy which I propose is somewhat similar to the mutual system adopted by the life, fire and marine insurance companies, and which has made them so popular. Unable to foretell the amount of their future losses, they base their premiums upon the principle of average, in such a manner that they will probably fully cover them and leave a surplus, which is returned to the insured in a dividend, in proportion to the premiums paid. The same principle may be applied to a savings bank, which, unable to know beforehand what may be the eventual results of its investments, may allow to depositors a provisional "minimum" rate of interest, and increase the amount allowed by such an extra dividend as the actual result ascertained may afterwards justify.* Let us suppose that the aggregate amount of interest credited to depositors at the minimum rate be \$40,000, but the bank has actually realized, after paying all expenses, \$60,000, it is evident there will be an excess of \$20,000, equal to an extra dividend of 50 per cent. beyond the ordinary dividend. Again, if A. has been credited with \$4, his extra dividend will amount to \$2; together, \$6.

This makes it a very simple operation. It matters very little what this minimum rate is fixed at; whatever it may be, it will settle the question of each depositor's share, in regard to amount as well as the time when deposited. For deposits at any intermediate period, I would, however, suggest the rate of one cent for every one hundred dollars, which would be equal to 3 65-100 per cent. a year. This would render it exceedingly easy to calculate the interest. With the assistance of a table showing the number of days to the 30th of June or 31st of December, a single clerk would be able to calculate the interest on several hundred deposits every day before night, setting the amount of interest opposite to the amount of principal, so that both could be posted at once into the ledger. After the 30th June or 31st December, all the calculations would be ready made, and nothing remain but to add up and bring forward the balances. A list of all these balances would show the amount due to

* This principle is substantially adopted by the savings bank in Bleecker-street, New-York.—Ed. B. M.

each depositor for principal and interest, and a general balance-sheet would indicate the surplus which had accrued.

It will be observed that I advocate the principle of allowing interest from the very day when the deposit is made. It will prove more satisfactory and prevent much delay, as it is well known that many keep their money back until it will be productive, and then crowd the bank to excess. Many a dollar will then find its way to the bank for safe-keeping, which would be spent otherwise, knowing that as soon as deposited the interest will commence.

This plan will offer advantages to a most numerous class, who now find but little advantage. They are those living upon an income derived from dividends on stocks, interest on bonds and mortgages, annuities, salaries, &c., which furnish them the means not only for their daily expenses, but also for paying rents, taxes, clothing, or for the education of children, for physicians' bills, &c. Not like the mechanic or the servant, they receive their income in larger sums, and keep it until wanted for the above purposes. They would deposit these funds if they received interest therefor, and draw them out gradually.

The adoption of one cent a day for every hundred dollars, makes the calculation perfectly simple, requiring only a multiplication of the number of days by the sum, as, for instance, from the 3d of March to the 30th of June, inclusive, there are 119 days. The interest on \$100 is, therefore, \$1.19; on \$40, 47 cents; on \$12, 14 cents; on \$1, 1 cent, leaving out fractions.

This rate I recommend on account of its simplicity for all deposits made between the periods of settlement, but for the reasons already given, it is just that a discrimination should be made between them and those that will remain or have remained for longer periods.

On all balances standing to the credit of the depositor at the preceding settlement, the minimum rate might be established at 4 or 5 per cent., which, for six months, would be quite an easy calculation.

The above alterations in the mode of allowing interest apply to all parts of the Union, not only to the Eastern States, where the value of money is lower and more regular, but also, and more particularly to the West, where perfectly safe investments can be made at 10, 12 and 15 per cent., and I am told that in California even 25 per cent. can be obtained. A savings bank established at Chicago, St. Louis or San Francisco may, therefore, equally adopt the proposed minimum rates. On closing the accounts, the only difference will be, that instead of making in New-York a dividend of 30 per cent., after having allowed 5 per cent. on balances, one of 200 or 300 per cent. can be made in those countries.

Money is withdrawn from a savings bank for various reasons, viz. : temporary want, with the intention of replacing it; death or departure from the city, or in case of a panic. In the first two cases it seems hard to take advantage of the necessities of the poor, who are compelled, by circumstances, to forego certain advantages they expected and are entitled to. In the last, the bank may be placed in a very awkward position, and it is prudent to devise some means to prevent danger from too sudden a run. The clause adopted by some banks, that no amount exceeding one hundred dollars shall be withdrawn without giving thirty days'

notice, seems to me scarcely a sufficient safeguard, but as every corporation has a right to make its own terms, it might be stipulated that no money shall be withdrawn except on the first days of January and July, and only upon previous notice of thirty days for all sums under \$250, and sixty days or three months beyond that amount; but that the bank will, on application, make loans to the depositor at any time for any sums not exceeding the amount standing to his credit, and which loans will be charged with interest at the rate of seven per cent., until the period of the next settlement, and then deducted from the balance, unless returned. My principal object is to leave the deposit account and the calculations of interest undisturbed, and to render the accounts more simple. This will satisfy the depositor who is in temporary want, and borrows his own money, paying therefor the same rate that the bank expects to realize for its funds.

As for those who are desirous to close the account entirely, some other arrangement can be made, satisfactory to all parties, without depriving them wholly of the interest accrued.

The following specimen of an account will show the practical working of the plan :

DR.				Principal.	Time.	Interest 7 per cent.
February 20,	To loan,		\$ 20 00	.. 130	.. 50
May 16,	" "		46 00	.. 45	.. 40
June 15,	" "		30 00	.. 15	.. 09
June 30,	Interest,		99
June 30,	Balance,		155 82
				<hr/>		<hr/>
				\$ 252 81		99

CR.				Principal.	Time.	Nominal Interest.
January 1,	Balance 5 per cent.,		\$ 112 40	.. 6 mos.	.. \$ 2 81
March 10,	Cash,		40 00	.. 112	.. 45
April 22,	"		25 00	.. 69	.. 17
April 28,	"		4 00	.. 63	.. 02
May 13,	"		22 50	.. 48	.. 10
June 16,	"		45 30	.. 14	.. 06
June 30,	Interest,		3 61
				<hr/>		<hr/>
				\$ 252 81		\$ 3 61

June 30,	Balance,		\$ 155 82		
June 30,	Extra 30 per cent. on \$3 61,		1 08		

It will be observed that the old balance is credited at the rate of 5 per cent., which, with a dividend of 30 per cent., is equal to $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., while the subsequent deposits are credited at the nominal rate of $3\frac{65}{100}$ per cent., which, increased by the dividend, makes nearly $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. The whole amount of interest credited is \$4 69; on the old method it would be, at 6 per cent., only \$2 98. On the debit side the interest is charged at the fixed rate of 7 per cent., and amounts to 99 cents.

I have submitted this same account to two clerks of different savings banks, to ascertain the interest which it would bear. One made it \$2 98,

while the other made it \$3 36, although both computed it at 6 per cent. But what convinced me more strongly that my method is more simple and less liable to error, was that they had no little trouble in clearing the receipts from the payments to find out the amounts entitled to six months' and to three months' interest, and differed entirely in the mode of deducting the payments, which caused the above discrepancy.

I was also shown the large book in which the allotment of interest is made, and told that it requires six clerks for nearly three weeks to make up the accounts. By my method the accounts and calculations of interest are all ready for balancing. It is true, that the rule of stopping the interest on sums withdrawn causes complicated accounts to be in small number, otherwise the labor would be much greater, and could scarcely be accomplished in the short time allotted for making up the accounts, if the privilege were given to withdraw, or, as I call it, to borrow at pleasure.

For many years I intended to suggest this new mode of keeping accounts in savings banks through the columns of your magazine, but other arduous engagements have been the cause of my delaying it until now. The usefulness and practicability of the method would, no doubt, have ere this been fully appreciated, and have procured me the gratification of furnishing further information, and perhaps personal assistance.

The second question relates to a guarantee capital.

This will appear a new idea, as, to my knowledge, there is no savings bank in this country or in Europe endowed with a capital. Still, I cannot perceive any reason why there should not be one, but, on the contrary, many reasons can be offered in favor of it.

Perfect security is the principal condition to render a savings bank a great blessing to the community, and to secure this, it is not only necessary to be extremely careful in the choice of investments, but it is equally indispensable that there should be the strictest vigilance observed in the management in general of a concern to whom millions of dollars are entrusted, and belonging to the poor, who can ill afford to lose, perhaps, the earnings of many years. Let us examine how savings banks are generally gotten up. Some benevolent gentlemen procure the co-operation of a number of others, sufficient to form a board of trustees, selecting particularly such as stand very high in reputation, some of whom are, perhaps, in the midst of a busy life, while others have retired from business. Neither are likely to devote much time to an association in which they have no particular interest, except by lending their name. The former have their own engagements that require their whole attention, and the latter are generally unwilling to undertake such work. The whole general management is thus left to a few charitable men, who take pride in superintending the noble undertaking; but it is also true, that in most cases, the responsibility is left entirely to the officers, probably known as perfectly trustworthy, but who have the whole control of these millions of dollars. These officers make their regular reports, which are read and approved, but how often are they also strictly examined? I know of some savings banks where, for several years, no meetings of trustees has been held, or even been called, and no investigation has been made to see if the reported assets and liabilities are correct.

A corporation, with a capital, is in an entirely different position. The trustees or directors are responsible to the stockholders. They are all interested in having their money safe, and have a watchful eye in every direction, because their own property is in jeopardy. Benevolence and public spirit are fine virtues, and we have fortunately many who practice them; but they are too apt to be sluggish, while self-interest is a never-ceasing, powerful stimulus.

The public would have an additional assurance that the greatest care would be taken in the selection and supervision of the officers, that every precaution would be used in the investments, and there would be the confidence-inspiring prospect that, in case of any difficulty, the capital would be liable and secure them from loss or delays.

The question will perhaps be asked, What inducement there would be for stockholders to furnish a capital and to guarantee the safety of the deposits? As a perfectly safe investment, even without any extra profits, the inducement should be sufficient, as the capital would be permanently invested at 7 per cent. Few bank stocks yield more, although, dealing in a dangerous article—commercial paper—there is much more risk, and we know of many failures of banks, but very seldom, or ever, of a well-conducted savings bank. But there are sources of profit in the latter, and they may become exceedingly rich if well patronized. Of course, the surplus now retained by the savings banks, and produced by the excess of interest actually received, and the lower rate allowed to depositors, would then belong to the stockholders. Supposing the deposits to amount to two millions of dollars, invested at 7 per cent. they would yield \$140,000; and allowing to depositors as high as 6 per cent. all round, which is higher than would be done, they would receive \$120,000; excess, \$20,000; equal to a dividend of 20 per cent. on a capital of \$100,000, out of which expenses must be met, besides the 7 per cent. realized from its investment.

We have, in the city of New-York, eleven savings banks, holding deposits exceeding one million of dollars. Of these,

The Bank for Savings held, on the 1st of January, 1861,...	\$ 10,062,616
Bowery Savings Bank,.....	10,294,995
Seamen's Savings Bank,.....	8,922,634
Greenwich Savings Bank,.....	3,898,339
Manhattan Savings Institution,.....	2,794,934
Merchants' Clerks' Savings Bank,.....	2,103,285
And the German Savings Bank, not yet two years old, had	759,367

It may be hoped that a savings bank, offering additional security by a guaranteed capital and a board personally interested, with many new facilities and advantages, would soon command the attention of all classes, and receive a very liberal support from the public.

The capital might be, for the beginning, \$100,000; but with the increase of deposits, this sum would soon appear out of proportion to the magnitude of its transactions. It would, perhaps, be prudent to imitate the example of some insurance companies, of making a cash dividend to stockholders of at least 7 per cent., and to apply the extra dividend, if any, to the increase of capital, or to issue a scrip dividend for it.

Some may think that these innovations would make a trust company of it, but they would be very much mistaken, as there is still a broad line of demarkation. A trust company is principally intended for the larger capitalists; for those who have money waiting for investment; for executors, trustees, &c., who wish to avoid the responsibility of keeping other people's money in their own hands, and for moneys deposited by order of court. It receives deposits of any sums exceeding one hundred dollars, and must be ready at any moment to pay out whatever is called for, and frequently in very large sums. It is, therefore, obliged to keep its funds invested in such a shape that it will be able to respond to any sudden demand. A large proportion must remain idle in bank, or employed in temporary call loans. Another large part may be used for commercial paper or other floating securities, while scarcely a moiety may, with any safety, be used for loans on bonds and mortgages.

The savings bank, on the contrary, may invest nearly all its funds in the latter, or in perfectly safe government, State or city bonds, as no large sums can be withdrawn at the pleasure of the depositors, and the daily receipts will probably more than suffice to meet ordinary demands.

It is a depository for persons whose object is accumulation, and who furnish their mites with the intention of adding to them whenever they can, and to preserve them for a future day. It would not be prudent to receive large sums except with the same restrictions in the withdrawal as before recommended, and this would not suit that class who patronize the trust companies.

A trust company must also have a large capital to secure the confidence of the public, while a moderate one will be sufficient for a savings bank. Both may have the same amount of money to handle, but while the latter can use nearly all of it in longer and more profitable loans, the same amount of profit divided among the small capital will make a larger dividend than among a large one. A savings bank can, therefore, offer the most liberal terms to the depositors and still give a satisfactory result to its stockholders, while the trust company must endeavor to make the most it can in order to create some profit for its many stockholders, and to make up for expenses, much larger taxes and frequent loss of interest. It will be observed by these remarks that they are entirely distinct from each other, and will not come into competition. Still, I would not say that in places where there are no trust companies, both kinds of business could not be harmoniously united together.

The third point, relating to benefits of survivorship, is something entirely new, at least in the shape in which I propose them. They are a combination of the Tontine principle with what is technically called endowments and temporary annuities, but are, in fact, nothing more than a different mode of accumulation from the one usually in practice. Instead of adding compound interest and paying the amount of principal, with the accumulations, to the owners or their legal representatives whenever they claim it, the deposits are made for a specific term, and to the compound interest is added another element, viz., co-inheritance, or benefit of survivorship, provided the depositor be alive at the end of the term. Should he die before its expiration, he may lose all or only the

accumulations, according as the contract stipulates beforehand, as will be perceived in the following explanations :

Tontine associations have been introduced many years ago in Germany, under the name of "*Rentenanstalten*," and in France of "*Sociétés de Prévoyance ou Tontinières*," and have proved exceedingly popular, many millions being invested in them. I have carefully examined their rules, but I have discovered many imperfections, it being almost impossible to obtain a strict observance of the principle of equality in regard to ages and their respective chances. For those readers who may be unacquainted with Tontines, I will say, in a few words of explanation, that depositors of nearly the same age, say from 20 to 30, from 30 to 40, &c., are placed into one class, and at the end of 20, 30, &c., years, all the money belonging to the same, with the accumulations, is divided among those who are so fortunate to survive the term, or in some other cases, the interest only is divided among them, increasing in proportion to the number of deaths that will occur in the course of time. The objections to this plan is, that but one kind of benefit can be granted to all members alike, and that the youngest of the class are benefited at the expense of the older, receiving precisely the same advantage, but have a greater chance of reaching and enjoying it.

To avoid these difficulties, and to establish the nicest balance in the respective chances of all parties, I propose to form classes, expiring in five, six, seven, eight, nine or ten years, admitting in the same all ages, and granting a variety of benefits, but I equalize their interests properly and most accurately, by a carefully-calculated scale of contributions, based upon a well-selected table of mortality, favorable to a longer life than will probably be the case in reality, leaving, therefore, some margin in favor of the company. The effect will be, that the classes will be composed of a larger number of members, and a nearer approach to a fair average will be secured. The child, the middle-aged and those advanced in years are all grouped together, and so are those who are willing to sink the principal, in order to receive a greater accumulation if they survive, and those who are satisfied with less, but prefer to preserve their money for the benefit of their heirs.

Those who wish to procure a present increased income, and those desirous of letting their money accumulate, will also belong to the same class, and thus every desire and want is provided for, but all will participate only in the exact proportion of their age, and even their sex. A person may secure any of these benefits, selecting the class he wishes to belong to, by depositing any sum, not under five dollars, and may, at any time, make further additions to it. At the expiration of the term fixed for that class, all the parties interested in it will come forward to claim their shares, and the fund belonging to the class is then divided among them in conformity with the stipulated conditions. The money may be entirely withdrawn, or replaced by joining a new class.

The advantage of this arrangement over annuities granted in the usual way is, that by the latter system there is no termination, and a company will never know exactly how it stands, except by making a valuation, which can never be made very accurately, although made by the proper mathematical rules.

By the first mode the class becomes definitely closed at its termination, and the survivors can be paid off, and, if any surplus has resulted, it may be considered as clear gain.

For the public it is much more satisfactory, as the members can select any term, not exceeding ten years, and withdraw their money if they should not be satisfied at the end of the term. In making the contracts for so short a time we may, with perfect safety, assume the value at six per cent., and allow this rate in the calculations, while it would be very imprudent to make a bargain for a longer or indefinite period at this rate, as no one can tell how long money will preserve its present value. Our annuity officers allow five per cent. on their rates for annuities, which renders them unprofitable and nugatory for all ages under sixty. Several companies have made an unsuccessful attempt to introduce the system of endowment, but not daring to go beyond five per cent., the universal reply has been, we can do better by putting the money in the savings bank, and, if the sums were large enough, by investing them in State stocks or bonds and mortgages.

Allowing six per cent., which leaves still a margin of one per cent., these objections are entirely removed, and it will make these investments attractive and beneficial. It must be remembered that the company assumes no risk, except by bad investments, or if the mortality upon which the tables are based should prove less than anticipated. The former danger is very small, if proper care is observed, and the latter scarcely to be feared, by the margin which has been secured through the selection of a table most suitable and reliable for the purpose. The great advantages offered to the public will secure large transactions, and one per cent. per annum will prove a very fruitful source of profit.

The proposed benefits consist of six divisions, viz.:

A. Temporary Annuities during any Number of Years, not exceeding Ten.—For a deposit of \$1,000 a male

Aged.....	40,	50,	60,	70,	80,
Will receive annually...	\$72 85	\$82 06	\$101 14	\$148 25	\$262 77

And in that proportion for any other sum. If he is alive at the end of ten years, the \$1,000 are returned to him, and he may then join a new class for ten years and receive a higher per centage; but if he dies in the interval, the money is forfeited to the company. It will be perceived that there is a great advantage over the usual immediate annuities, which remain the same during his whole lifetime, while they are here increasing every ten years, with the privilege of withdrawing all the money paid at the end of each term, if there is no desire to continue and the annuitant is still alive. For females the annuity is somewhat smaller, their chances of life being greater after a certain age.

B. Temporary Annuities, with Return of Principal in case of Death.—In a ten years' class, a male

Aged.....	40,	50,	60,	70,	80,
Will receive annually..	\$63 52	\$66 09	\$71 25	\$85 13	\$125 10

If he lives, he can withdraw the \$1,000 paid, and join a new class at the

advanced age and benefit; and if he dies, they will be paid over, at the end of the term, to his heirs.

The thought that death might happen perhaps the next day, and the principal be sacrificed, prevents many from securing a sure and permanent income for life by an annuity, and they are generally taken by those only who have no relatives they care for, and wish to make the most of their money. This entirely new feature opens a field for all wishing to make sure of an income, guaranteed by a safe company, and of which no contingencies can deprive them, increasing from period to period if they live, and at their death the money is still preserved to the family or friends, the only loss in that case being of interest from the time of death to the termination of the class.

C. Temporary Annuities with no Return.—A deposit for ten years of \$1,000,

At the age of.....	10,	20,	40,	50,	70,
Will receive annually..	\$140 63	\$141 12	\$143 83	\$149 66	\$192 80

These annuities are calculated to absorb principal, interest and co-inheritance, and to leave nothing at the end of the term. A renewal would then require a new deposit. There are many cases where this arrangement may prove useful.

D. Temporary Annuities, with Return of Principal at the end of the Term, or at the time of Death.—This is, of course, similar to an ordinary deposit, with the only difference, that the money can only be withdrawn after ten years, or at the death of the party, and not *ad libitum*. The annual per centage is, in all cases and at all ages, 6 per cent. per annum.

This division is of greater importance than is perhaps supposed, being particularly useful for the settlement of a life-interest or a dower-right, which offer now so many difficulties, of which I have a daily proof by the many applications I receive from the city and country for calculations of their value. A fictitious case will best illustrate the obstacles which present themselves:

A. owns a house which he wishes to sell or to improve, but it is encumbered with a dower-right held by a widow, B., aged forty, amounting to \$1,000 per annum. At her death it expires, and A. becomes full owner. She is not willing to give up her rights, except on condition to be placed into the same position. An annuity of \$1,000 would require a cash payment of \$14,224 75; but if she dies, even the next day, the money is lost. The value by the Northampton table, at 6 per cent., as per chancery rule, would give her a sum of \$10,705, but this would only produce an income of \$749 35, even if she were able to invest it at 7 per cent., clear of expenses. She would not be satisfied, and still it would appear a bad bargain for A. if she happened to die soon afterwards. But A. can deposit, in this division, \$16,666 67, which would procure her an income of \$1,000, and when she dies the amount is returned to him. Or he can purchase an annuity, by table B., for a smaller sum, returned to him at the end of the term.

A similar arrangement is applicable to an "inchoate dower-right," where the wife is only entitled to the one-third of the income after the

death of the husband. During his lifetime he can draw the income, and if she dies before him, the contract is ended and the money returned. If she lives, she takes it until her death.

Again, there are many sums intended for investment, but they are perhaps too small, and it is difficult to find the borrower for the exact amount. By depositing them at once, the loss of time is avoided, no examination of titles is required, there is no risk of depreciation of the property, no foreclosure, no commissions to pay for collections. The income is paid the very day when due, and no failure can take place. The per centage is perhaps less than might be otherwise obtained, but, considering the safety and simplicity of the operation, and the perfect reliance that can be placed in the certainty of the income, the small difference may well be overlooked. Such advantages will certainly be duly appreciated by the public, and procure the company a very liberal patronage.

Should, at some future time, money become depreciated, or the legal rate be reduced, the company may also reduce the interest in proportion for all new contracts, reserving for itself the same difference of one per cent., a compensation which, on a large scale, will prove a large source of profit.

E. Endowments, with loss of Principal in case of Death.—A deposit of \$100 for ten years will produce to the survivors, if made at the age of

10,	20,	30,	40,	50,	60,	70,
\$ 191 12	\$ 193 56	\$ 196 47	\$ 202 62	\$ 222 05	\$ 268 03	\$ 432 92

And any sum from \$5 upwards in the same proportion.

This is a most excellent mode for preparing for old age, depositing as often as a small amount may be easily spared, and adding it to former deposits in the same class. At the expiration of the same the whole amount, with the accumulations, are returned to the owner, if then alive, who can re-deposit them in a new class for a similar or other benefit. A man depositing at the age of forty, \$100, will find them increased in ten years to \$202 62, and, leaving them for ten years more, to \$448 91. This amount left for another period, to the age of seventy, he will find it accumulated to \$1,203 21.

Had he, at the age of sixty, converted the \$448 91 into a temporary annuity, by table A., they would have given him an annual income of \$45 52.

The same \$100 deposited in a savings bank at 5 per cent., compounded half-yearly, would produce, in twenty years, \$268 51, and in thirty years, \$439 98.

For children it would be a most advantageous way of providing for their establishment, or a marriage portion for a daughter, and no better employment could be found for a new-year's or birth-day gift.

F. Endowments with return of Principal only, to the heirs of those who die, and Principal with accumulations, to those surviving.—A deposit made at

The age of...	10,	20,	30,	40,	50,	60,
Will produce..	\$182 23	\$183 38	\$183 13	\$184 13	\$189 04	\$192 13

Many would deprecate the loss of their money in case they should die, but would be willing to renounce the accumulations. The latter cannot, of course, be so large as in the former division, as they are only entitled to a co-inheritance in the interest lost by those who will drop.

I have prepared, with much labor, a set of tables for the above benefits, calculated for all ages, and for classes ending in from one to ten years, distinguishing also the sexes. They are all based upon an interest of six per cent., but where money can be invested at higher rates, as in the West, an enhanced rate, according to circumstances, would materially increase the advantages offered, but would require new tables, which I would be glad to furnish on application. With the assistance of these tables any company would find the execution of this plan perfectly simple. They establish the conditions on which an endowment or temporary annuity is granted, at any time, even at any intermediate period. Nothing more is done but to credit the class with interest at the end of every year, and after the 31st December of the year in which the class is to terminate, the survivors presenting themselves are paid according to agreement. If after one year more no other claims are made, the account is finally closed, and the surplus carried to profit and loss account.

In these operations no medical examination is required, but as good proof as can be obtained of the exact age of the applicant, and of his identity at the time of final settlement. It must be presumed that none but healthy lives will offer themselves, but still the table of mortality selected as the basis of the calculations offers a good margin, particularly where a large number of members secures a better average than a small one would allow. It is probable that the shortest class would be preferred to try the experiment, although the advantages are less, the principle of co-inheritance having less room for effect, but it would have a tendency to increase the magnitude of the classes, which would grow larger by the constant accession of new depositors.

These suggestions are well worthy the attention of our philanthropists; one or more wealthy men putting the necessary amount of capital together would not only become public benefactors, but they would find a perfectly safe investment for their money. At this time the heavy liabilities of our savings banks, and the peculiar nature of their deposits, demand that great caution shall be used in new investments. The deposits of foreigners have been materially lessened this year; a large amount, in the aggregate, having been remitted to Europe, through fear of insecurity in the banks. This new feature in the condition of our savings banks will compel greater caution than heretofore in new investments, and induce them to maintain a larger reserve of cash than heretofore. The stockholders, on the principle "to live and to let live," could be liberal with the public and make an extra dividend, equal to all the actual receipts, deducting only expenses, and full seven per cent. on the amount of capital, and thus benefit the depositors, who would never think of changing the investment. The other branch of endowment and temporary annuities offering such great advantages and inducements would soon grow to such an extent that the difference between the interest received and the one allowed, and the margin in the table of mortality used, would produce a considerable profit.

Thus, while doing an act of charity, in offering the poor classes a perfectly sure place of safe-keeping for their small earnings, and advantages never before rendered by other savings banks, they would secure to themselves a safe and highly remunerative investment.

SUGGESTIONS AS TO TAXES ON INCOME.

By J. R. McCulloch, Esq. Contributed to the Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 21, pp. 50-54.

ALL incomes being derived from rent, profit or wages, it may seem that to estimate the operation of the tax, in any particular instance, we have merely to ascertain the source whence the income of the party is derived. But this would be a fallacious conclusion. Taxes on professional incomes, or the wages of professional men, differ widely in their operations from taxes on the wages of common laborers. And, besides this, there are many nice and difficult questions to be examined before we are in a condition satisfactorily to appreciate the operation of taxes on income.

In considering this question, we may begin by admitting that an income tax is, at first sight, apparently the fairest of all taxes. It seems to make every one contribute to the wants of the State, in proportion to the revenue which he enjoys under its protection; while by falling equally on all, it occasions no change in the distribution of capital in the natural direction of industry, or in the prices of commodities. It were much to be wished that any tax could be imposed having such effects; but we are sorry to be obliged to state that none such has hitherto been discovered, and those who believe that they may be expected to result from the imposition of taxes on income, are very wide indeed of the mark. An income tax would no doubt have the supposed effects, were it possible fairly to assess it. But the practical difficulties which hinder this being done are not of a sort that can be overcome. So much is this the case that taxes on income, though theoretically equal, are, in their practical operation, the most unequal, oppressive and vexatious of any that it is possible to imagine.

The difficulties in the way of assessing income are of two sorts: 1st. The difficulty of ascertaining the income of different individuals; and 2d. Supposing them to be known, the difficulty of laying an equal tax on income derived from different sources:

1. It would be useless to dwell at any considerable length on the first of these heads. Incomes arising from the rents of land and houses, mortgages, funded property and such like sources, may be learned with tolerable precision; but it has not been, and, we are bold to say, never will be possible to determine the incomes of farmers, manufacturers, dealers of all sorts, and professional men, with anything like even the rudest approximation to accuracy. It is in vain to attempt to overcome this insuperable difficulty by instituting an odious inquiry into the affairs

of individuals. It is not indeed very likely that any people not altogether enslaved, would tolerate, in ordinary circumstances, such inquisitorial proceedings; but whether they did or did not, the result would be the same. The investigations would be worthless; and the commissioners of the income tax would in the end have nothing to trust to but the declarations of the parties. Hence it is that the tax falls with its full weight upon men of integrity, while the millionaire of "easy virtue" may well nigh escape it altogether. It operates, in fact, as a tax on honesty, and a bounty on, and an incentive to perjury and fraud; and, if carried to any considerable height—to 10 or 15 per cent., for example—it would undoubtedly generate the most barefaced prostitution of principle, and do much to obliterate that nice sense of honor which is the only sure foundation of national probity and virtue.

2. But supposing it were possible (which it is not) to get over this fundamental objection, and that means were devised for ascertaining the incomes of individuals with facility and precision, we should have made but a very small progress towards the fair assessment of the tax. On one point, indeed, there can be no difficulty. Property taxes ought undoubtedly to be laid on all sorts of property, and income taxes on all sorts of income. But the question immediately occurs, whether the tax should be of the same magnitude on all incomes, how different soever their sources. And if this question be answered in the negative, we have next to inquire into the principle on which distinctions are to be made.

Those who affirm that an income tax should be laid equally on all incomes, from whatever source derived, contend that the hardship of such a proceeding is not real but apparent. According to them, the incomes of lawyers, physicians, clergymen, and other professional men, always bear a certain relation to the incomes of the other classes of the community; but if the former were not taxed to the same extent as the latter, this relation would be subverted, the condition of professional men would be relatively improved; and it is alleged that, under such circumstances, there would be a greater influx of members into professional business, whose competition would depress the incomes of those engaged in them, so as to place them once more on a level with landlords, capitalists, &c., on whom the full weight of the tax is supposed to fall. On this ground it is contended that the tax should be made to press equally on all incomes, and that there is no injustice in making the same deduction from the fees of the lawyer or physician that is made from the rent of a landlord, or the profit of a capitalist; for the former would be as much injured by the greater competition that would grow out of his exemption from the tax as he would be were he subjected to its full amount.

But these statements, though in some degree true, are in the main fallacious. Professional fees, when once fixed, are not easily altered. Notwithstanding the heavy fall of rents and profits, after the peace of 1815, the fees of professional men did not materially vary; nor did they vary materially during the period of depreciation. We doubt whether the imposition of a peculiar tax, of a moderate amount, on professional incomes, or their total exemption from such tax, if laid on incomes arising

from other sources, would have any sensible influence over fees. If it were very heavy, it might, and most probably would, in the long run, affect them to a greater or less extent; but its operation could not be, in any case, immediate; and unless the tax exceeded all reasonable bounds, there is but little ground for thinking that it would very materially affect them.

But, suppose it were really true that professional incomes vary at the same time and in the same degree as other incomes, that would not justify the laying an equal tax on them all. A landlord receives £500 a year of rent, and an attorney or an apothecary makes £500 a year by his business; but though the income of each be at present the same, their ability to pay taxes is materially different; for the income of the first arises from a comparatively lasting source; whereas that of the latter is dependent on his life and on his health; and hence, in order to lay the same burden on both parties, we must calculate the present value of the income enjoyed by each, and lay the same tax on it; or, which would come to the same thing, we must deduct from the income of the professional man such a portion as would effect an insurance on his life for a sum equivalent to the present value of his income, and assess the tax on the remainder. This is the only way in which, supposing incomes to be known, it is possible fairly to tax them. In point of fact, however, it would be all but impracticable to proceed in this way. To illustrate the principle: Suppose that a clergyman (A.) is forty years of age, that he has an income of £1,000 a year, and that it is required to decide how much he should contribute to a tax of ten per cent. on all incomes considered as perpetuities. Here we are met at the very outset by the difficulty of deciding as to the standard by which to estimate A.'s expectation of life. If we take the Northampton table, we shall obtain a certain result; if we take the Carlisle table we shall have another; and if we take Mr. FINLAISON's table we shall have a third result, all differing widely from each other. But suppose that the Carlisle table is selected, A.'s expectation will be 27.61 years. Having got thus far, we have next to decide upon the rate of interest at which the present value of A.'s annuity or income is to be estimated. Everybody knows that the answer to the question which we are endeavoring to solve depends materially on the assumed rate of interest; and there would be endless disputes as to which rate should be fixed upon. In the event, however, of four per cent. being selected, the present value of A.'s income would be £16,500, yielding a perpetual revenue of £660; so that he ought to contribute £66 annually to the tax.

This is the way in which taxes on income must be assessed, if they be imposed with any pretensions to fairness. It may be objected, perhaps, that the fundamental supposition on which the income is valued and the tax imposed, viz., that A., being at present forty years of age, will live twenty-seven and a half years longer, is quite gratuitous—that it is merely an average rule, deduced from observations made on a large number of individuals, and that for anything we can affirm to the contrary, A. may die to-morrow. But all this may be admitted without impeaching the principle laid down above; for the difference between A.'s actual income of £1,000 and the corresponding perennial income of

£600—that is, £340—will, if accumulated for twenty-seven years and a half, at four per cent., produce £16,500, and an insurance office would transact with A. on that footing, or on one not very different.

These statements show how taxes on professional incomes ought to be imposed; and they also show how very difficult, or, rather, how impossible it would be fairly to assess such incomes, even if there were any means of learning their amount with so much as an approach to precision. It is to no purpose to talk about establishing uniform rates of deduction. Unless wholesale injustice is to be perpetrated, all uniformity in cases of this sort must be rejected. Each case must be judged of separately. The incomes of two lawyers may be the same; but if their ages differ, they cannot be taxed to the same amount without trampling on every principle of justice; nor when interest is four per cent. is the tax to be the same as when it is three or five per cent.

But it is said that the difficulty of taxing professional incomes is a good reason for exempting them wholly from the tax, which should fall only on the incomes of those possessed of real property. We take leave, however, to dissent entirely from the conclusion. The difficulty of assessing professional incomes may be a sufficient reason for rejecting an income tax altogether, but it is assuredly no reason for making it partial, and consequently unjust. Professional men contribute to taxes on commodities, and if these be repealed, and an income tax, from which professions are exempted, be imposed in their stead, an obvious injustice will be done to the other classes, who will be saddled with the whole of a burden of which they have hitherto borne a part only, and which should press equally on all ranks and orders.

And it is further to be observed, were professional incomes exempted, because of the difficulty of fairly assessing them, that the principle would require to be carried a great deal further, for many incomes derived from real property are quite as evanescent as those of professional men, and must be computed in the same manner. It is needless to say that no proposal for exempting the owners of cotton or flax mills, ships, warehouses, houses, &c., from taxes laid on the property or incomes of landlords, fund-holders, mortgagers, &c., would either be tolerated or, indeed, thought of for a moment. But in assessing the incomes of the owners of ships, mills and similar property, most part of the difficulties would have to be encountered that make the taxing of professional incomes so impracticable. An estate, abstracting from the buildings and improvements made upon it, may be regarded as a lasting source of revenue; but a ship, a house, a mill, &c., are all perishable, and before the latter can be taxed in the same ratio as the former, the degree of their durability must be determined, and the income arising from them reduced to a perpetuity. Suppose, for example, that a tax of 10 per cent. is imposed on income arising from lands, funds and mortgages, and that it is required to lay an equivalent tax on income arising from houses, shops, warehouses, mills, ships, canals and such like property. In this case we should be obliged to begin by estimating the present value of the shop, mill, ship or other property yielding the revenue proposed to be taxed. Having done this, we should next have to estimate the probable duration of such property, and then, in order to get the net or taxable in-

come, we should have to deduct from the gross income such a sum as would suffice, being accumulated at the ordinary interest of the day, to replace the shop, mill, &c., when it was worn out. If an income tax be imposed on fair principles, and made to press with the same severity on all classes according to their ability to bear it, this is the mode in which it must be laid on. But the difficulties in the way of such a course are almost as great as those in the way of taxing professional incomes. There would evidently be great room for doubt, evasion and fraud in the valuation of the property, and though this were got over, how is its probable duration to be ascertained? The power to determine a point of this sort could not be entrusted to officers, for if so, it would open a door to every sort of abuse. Neither is there any standard to which it is possible to refer in estimating durability, seeing that it must vary in every case from a thousand local and almost inappreciable circumstances. Although, therefore, it were conceded that taxes on income are in principle the best of any, the above statements show that this circumstance should go for nothing in the way of recommending them. It is of excessively little consequence whether a tax be theoretically good or bad; it is in a practical point of view only we have to deal with it; and however well it may look in demonstrations on paper, if it be practically impossible fairly to assess it, it ought, in all ordinary cases, to be rejected without hesitation.

Even as applied to the rent of land, an income tax is in most instances grossly unfair. Two estates yield the same rent, but one is naturally very inferior to the other; its deficiencies having been balanced by the execution of expensive improvements. Where, then, would be the fairness or the policy of laying the same tax on the rental of both estates?

A half or perhaps two-thirds of the rent of the one really consists of the interest of capital laid out on improvements, most of which are even less durable than either shops or cotton mills. Hence the obvious injustice of laying the same tax on the rent of an improved as on that of an unimproved estate, and yet, as has been already seen, we could adopt no other criterion; for all the tax-collectors of the empire, even if they were assisted by as many farmers, would not be able to resolve the rent of an improved farm into its constituent parts; that is, to separate what is really paid for the natural inherent powers of the soil from what is paid for the capital laid out in improvements, and to estimate the duration of the latter.

It is unnecessary, we think, to say more on this branch of the subject. It has been seen, in the first place, that it is not possible to acquire any accurate information as to the magnitude of the incomes enjoyed by some of the largest and most important classes; and it has next been seen, that though such information were obtained, the sources whence different incomes arise are so very various and they are so very different in their degrees of durability, that all attempts to impose on them a really equal income tax must prove utterly abortive. The truth is, that an income tax, pressing equally on all classes, is a *desideratum* which is not destined ever to be applied. After the legislature has done all that can be done to make it equal, it will be grossly unequal. ⁿ

To impose it only on certain classes of incomes, or to impose it on all incomes, without regard to their origin, is alike subversive of every prin-

ciple of justice. Nothing, therefore, remains but to reject it altogether; or, at all events, to resort to it only when money must be had at all hazards—when it is better that injustice should be deliberately perpetrated than that the public treasury should be empty. An unreasoning necessity of this sort, and nothing else, can ever justify either taxes on income or property.

It has been contended by SAY and others, that a tax on income should be imposed according to a graduated scale, and made to increase according to the increase of the incomes subject to its operation. A tax of £10 is said to be more severely felt by the possessor of an income of £100, than a tax of £100 or £1,000 by the possessor of an income of £1,000 or £10,000; and it is argued that, in order fairly to proportion the tax to the ability of the contributors, such a graduated scale of duties should be adopted as would press lightly on the smaller class of incomes, and increase according as they become larger and more able to bear taxation. We take leave, however, to protest against this proposal, which is not more seductive than it is unjust and dangerous. No tax can be a just tax unless it leaves individuals in the same relative condition in which it found them. It must, of course, depress, according to its magnitude, all on whom it falls, and it ought to fall on every one in proportion to the revenue which he enjoys under the protection of the State. If it either pass entirely over some classes, or press on some less heavily than on others, it is partial and unjust. Government, in such case, has stepped out of its proper province and has assessed the tax, not for the legitimate purpose of meeting the public exigencies, by appropriating a certain proportion of the revenues of its subjects, but that it might vary this proportion according to the presumed amount of the latter, that is, that it might depress one class and elevate another. A proceeding of this sort would be destructive of all sound principles. That an equal tax on property or income will be more severely felt by the poorer than by the richer classes is undeniable. But the same may be said of every imposition which does not subvert the relations subsisting among the different orders of society, and of all pecuniary obligations. The hardship in question is, in truth, a consequence of that inequality of fortune and condition which makes a part of the order of Providence, and to attempt to alleviate it by adopting such a graduated scale of duties as has been proposed, would really be to lay taxes on the wealthier part of the community for the benefit of their less opulent brethren, and not for the sake of the public revenue.

Let it not be supposed that graduation may be carried to a certain extent, and then stopped.

Nullus semel ore receptus
Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.

There is no halting-place in the practice of confiscation. Having once admitted that greater may be taxed at a higher rate, than smaller incomes, on what pretence can you refuse to seize upon all above £500 or £600 a year, before you tax those that are less? And should this not be enough, you will be compelled to fix the limit of immunity at some lower point—at £300, £200 or £100 a year, and confiscate all larger

amounts. Wherever graduated taxes on income or property are adopted, there must be an end of all security—Socialism is in the ascendant. You are at sea without rudder or compass; there is no amount of folly you may not commit, and bankruptcy or revolution is the natural and all but inevitable consequence of your proceedings.

To furnish the means of defraying the enormous cost of the war begun in 1793, Mr. PITT proposed, in 1797, to treble the amount of the assessed taxes or duties on houses, windows, horses, carriages, &c. This plan, however, did not answer the expectations of its projectors, and next year it was abandoned, and a tax on income substituted instead. According to the provisions of the act imposing this tax, incomes of less than £60 a year were exempted from assessment; an income of from £60 to £65 was taxed one one hundred and twentieth part, and the rate of duty increased through a variety of gradations, until the income reached £200 or upwards, when it amounted to a tenth part, which was its utmost limit—a variety of deductions being at the same time granted, on account of children, &c. The commissioners to whom the management of this tax was intrusted were chosen by the freeholders of counties and the electors of boroughs, in the same way as their representatives in Parliament, only that a smaller qualification was sufficient to enable any one to be elected a commissioner.

The services of these functionaries were gratuitous, and they were sworn to preserve inviolable secrecy with respect to the affairs of individuals. They were authorized to call for returns from every person whose income they supposed to exceed £60 a year; and in the event of their being dissatisfied with these returns, they were empowered to call for written explanations, and ultimately for the oath of the party. But this examination was rarely necessary, except in the case of incomes derived from professions, manufacturing and commercial businesses, or from interest—the rental of landlords being, in most cases, learned from the terms of the leases held by their tenants, while the profits or incomes of the tenants were estimated to amount, in England, to three-fourths, and, in Scotland, to half the rent paid the landlords. The commissioners were assisted, or, rather, overlooked by the tax-surveyors appointed by government, who were required to see the provisions of the act strictly enforced, and whose duty it was to scrutinize all returns of income, to challenge such as they considered fraudulent, to object to the deductions allowed by the ordinary commissioners, and to bring the matter under the review of the commissioners of appeal, whose sentence was final. Infinite fraud and evasion were practiced, and nothing could be more palpably unjust than the rule for estimating farmers' income. But the peculiar circumstances of the country at the time made this injustice be submitted to with comparatively little reluctance, and, on the whole, the provisions of the act were enforced better than could have been anticipated.

REPORTS OF SAVINGS BANKS.

SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOSTON FIVE CENTS SAVINGS BANK.

At the annual meeting of the corporation of the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, held at its banking rooms, No. 38 School-street, April 2, 1861, the old Board of Directors was re-elected, and Mr. JOHN P. HEALY was elected a Trustee, in place of Mr. GEORGE F. BROWN. The Treasurer made the following report:

In making our seventh annual report, it is gratifying to observe the same increasing interest which has ever been manifested in the success of this institution.

Although the occurring events of the past year have tended greatly to unsettle all the usual calculations in relation to business and finance, it is an evidence of the undiminished public confidence in this institution that its depositors and deposits, as in previous years, have been steadily increasing.

	<i>Depositors.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>		<i>Depositors.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>
Close of 1855,.....	6,583 ..	\$ 269,933	Gain in 1859,.....	4,153 ..	\$ 662,573
Gain in 1856,.....	3,222 ..	294,848	" 1860,.....	3,730 ..	611,397
" 1857,.....	2,771 ..	315,237	" 1861,.....	2,400 ..	372,012
" 1858,.....	1,990 ..	221,293			

Now we have accounts opened with 24,849 depositors, and the total amount standing to their credit is \$2,747,296 31.

The number who have on deposit less than \$5 is 6,950; \$5 and less than \$50, 8,599; \$50 and less than \$100, 2,386; \$100 and less than \$500, 5,415; \$500 to \$1,000, inclusive, 1,499.

The number of mechanics is 5,585; clerks, 2,838; laborers, 1,489; merchants, 318; servants and waiters, 1,188; professional men, 638; printers and pressmen, 920; seamen, 387; public officers, 239; rail-road and expressmen, 133; women, children, and others whose occupations are unknown, 11,114.

It is gratifying to know that the larger portion of the funds of the institution is invested in real estate securities, and the remainder in public funds, bank stock, and personal securities of the most substantial character. The investments are as follows:

Public funds,.....	\$ 145,400	Loaned on personal security, ..	\$ 116,700
Real estate,.....	85,441	" to counties and towns,	147,800
Mortgages,.....	1,629,050	" to banks,.....	50,000
Bank stock,.....	307,542	Deposits in banks, bearing int.,	260,678
Loaned on bank stock,.....	94,910		

The aggregate number of loans on mortgage of real estate is 275, the average amount on each loan thus made is \$5,923 82, and the whole arranged in number and amount appears as follows: 75 from \$1,000 to \$3,000, inclusive; 108 from \$3,000 to \$5,000, inclusive; 64 from \$5,000 to \$10,000, inclusive; 18 from \$10,000 to \$20,000, inclusive; and 10 of \$20,000 and more.

The average cost of bank stock per share was \$102 36, and the present market value per share is \$102 86, showing an increase in the value of the same of about \$1,500.

On the second Wednesday of the month of April we shall have declared and paid, in dividends to depositors, more than \$400,000. Our first ordinary dividend, it will be remembered, was at a rate of interest only 4 per cent. per annum; but our Trustees, in their anxiety to better equalize the profits of the bank among all its depositors, proposed an amendment to our by-laws, thus enabling us to pay an annual dividend of 5 per cent. After paying all our regular dividends at this rate up to 1859, an extra dividend was then declared of 2 per cent. additional, making the average amount of dividends paid to long depositors 7 per cent. per annum. And at a meeting held on the 25th ult., our Trustees were encouraged to believe that a still larger amount could be safely divided annually among depositors. In order, therefore, to equalize as nearly as practicable the division of the profits among all the depositors, whether for a long or short term, they proposed and adopted an amendment to our by-laws, under which we can pay a dividend of 6 per cent. per annum. Thus it will be seen that the interest of the great mass of our depositors have always been considered in the disposition of the profits of the bank, and that hereafter the large number who are necessarily compelled, from poverty or otherwise, to withdraw their deposits before the declaration of an extra dividend, will receive a fair and more equitable portion of the earnings of the institution.

Again we would congratulate the corporators and Trustees on our present condition. Nothing has been lost—no security is doubtful—and everything is hopeful for the future.

COINS, COINAGE AND BULLION.

- I. *Boston Numismatic Society.* II. *Great Increase in the Silver Currency.* III. *Gold on the Saskatchewan.* IV. *Coinage and Exports of Gold and Silver from Great Britain.*

I. BOSTON NUMISMATIC SOCIETY.

The regular meeting of this society was held on Friday, August 2d, at the usual hour. The secretary read his report, and made a small donation of coins to the cabinet. Mr. DAVENPORT read a paper originally prepared for the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, by Mr. W. E. DUBOIS, of that city, upon the universal distribution and admixture of gold over the surface of the earth. Mr. PRATT exhibited a curious silver medal with a scene from Biblical history, and the date 1551 on each side. Mr. DAVENPORT exhibited a valuable collection of ancient coins and gems. It contained nine beautiful gold pieces of ALEXANDER and PHILIP of Macedon, and a large number of silver coins of Greece, Rome, Egypt and other countries. They attracted great attention and were much admired.

The secretary exhibited his series of medals struck in honor of Admiral VERNON's victories at Porto Bello and Carthage. It comprises nine varieties, one of which bears the inscription "I. W. FECIT," but this is the only clue to the name of the engraver. He also exhibited a Russian amulet, such as is worn for the protection of soldiers and travellers. It is of brass, and contains small enamelled figures of the Madonna and saints, and an inscription, which only a priest could fully elucidate. An engraving of a similar but much inferior amulet, which was a trophy of the Russian war, may be found in the *Illustrated London News* for 1854 or 1855. The society voted to omit the next monthly meeting, and adjourned till the regular meeting for October.

II. RE-APPEARANCE OF OLD SILVER COIN IN FRANCE.

The Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* writes:

"Every one is astonished at the sudden and overwhelming re-appearance amongst us of the old-fashioned and almost forgotten silver five-franc pieces. For several years past this coin had been completely superseded by a small gold currency of the same value—a change extremely obnoxious to the *ouvriers*, who not only persisted in believing that the new money was less intrinsically valuable than the *gros écus*, which took up so much more room and made so much more cheerful a chinking in their breeches pocket, but also strongly objected to the facility of losing and the difficulty of picking up with their horny fingers a coin whose edge is not much thicker than the blade of a penknife. Now, however, we have once more gone back again to the *bon vieux temps*, when French bank notes were exceedingly scarce, and looked shily upon even when seen, when seven or eight sous were paid as a premium for the convenience of a single Napoleon, and when it was necessary to take a canvas bag and a hackney coach to bring home one's money from the changeur.

"The Bank of France once more pays its way only in silver. Five-franc silver pieces are as plentiful as gold ones lately were, and gold coin is again a luxury which must be purchased. This seems strange, when only a few months back the bank begged as a favor, from London and St. Petersburg, the exchange of one hundred millions of silver against one hundred millions of gold, and was in a state of alarm lest the thin stratum of gold which then overlaid its metallic reserve of silver should be exhausted, and all the money-changers of Paris should hasten to cash their bills and notes in order to profit by the higher value of the latter coinage.

"Various causes are alleged for this sudden change of purpose and the re-issue of silver money. Amongst others it is affirmed that the one hundred millions of silver which ought to have gone to Russia never really left this country, but remained to meet Russian acceptances in Paris. Then came the termination of the war with China, the cessation of the drain of silver in that direction, and the contrary current setting in by the payment to Europe of the war indemnity. Another and third reason given is that America now draws much gold from us, while Cali-

fornia sends back none in return. All these causes combined, and probably many others, have brought it about that a thousand francs are once more handed to you in a bag which requires a commissionaire to carry it, instead of in a roll of Napoleons which you can conveniently put in your own pocket."

III. GOLD ON THE SASKATCHEWAN.

Messrs. LOVE and McLEAN passed through our town last week, direct from the mines on the north fork of the Saskatchewan river. They brought seventy-four ounces of the dust, which has been forwarded to New-York by Messrs. BURBANK & Co. From the information imparted by the gentlemen from the mines and from a letter which we have been permitted to see from a member of Messrs. BURBANK's firm to their house in this place, no doubt is longer entertained of the fact that gold exists in quantities that will pay for working, for four or five hundred miles along the north fork of the Saskatchewan river and its tributaries, east of the Rocky Mountains.—*St. Cloud (Minn.) Union, July, 1861.*

IV. AMOUNT OF GOLD, SILVER AND COPPER MONEYS COINED

At the Royal Mint of Great Britain, from 1846 to 1860, with the Total Export of Gold and Silver each year, 1846—1860.

	<i>Gold.</i>	<i>Silver.</i>	<i>Copper.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Exports.</i>
1846,...	£ 4,334,911 ..	£ 559,548 ..	£ 6,496 ..	£ 4,900,955 ..	£ 2,937,266
1847,...	5,158,440 ..	125,730 ..	8,960 ..	5,293,130 ..	8,602,597
1848,...	2,451,999 ..	35,442 ..	2,688 ..	2,490,129 ..	8,596,990
1849,...	2,177,955 ..	119,592 ..	1,792 ..	2,299,339 ..	8,912,467
1850,...	1,491,836 ..	129,096 ..	448 ..	1,621,380 ..	6,940,346
1851,...	4,400,411 ..	87,868 ..	3,584 ..	4,491,863 ..	9,059,551
1852,...	8,742,270 ..	189,596 ..	4,312 ..	8,936,178 ..	10,295,464
1853,...	11,952,391 ..	701,544 ..	10,190 ..	12,664,125 ..	18,906,753
1854,...	4,152,183 ..	140,480 ..	61,538 ..	4,354,201 ..	22,586,568
1855,...	9,008,663 ..	195,510 ..	41,091 ..	9,245,264 ..	18,828,178
1856,...	6,002,114 ..	462,528 ..	11,418 ..	6,476,060 ..	24,851,797
1857,...	4,859,860 ..	373,230 ..	6,720 ..	5,239,810 ..	33,566,968
1858,...	1,231,023 ..	445,896 ..	13,440 ..	1,690,359 ..	19,628,876
1859,...	2,649,509 ..	647,064 ..	8,512 ..	3,305,085 ..	35,688,803
1860,...	3,121,709 ..	218,403 ..	37,990 ..	3,378,102 ..	25,534,768
	£ 71,735,274 ..	£ 4,431,527 ..	£ 219,179 ..	£ 76,385,980 ..	£ 254,937,392

Western Bank.—A meeting of the shareholders in the Western Bank of Scotland is to be held at Glasgow for the purpose of receiving a report from the liquidators, who recommended the shareholders to accept an offer of £200,000, made by the directors. A conditional agreement has been entered into, subject to the approval of the shareholders, the heads being, 1. That the parties named shall, on or before the 14th of June next, assign to the bank their whole shares therein, being 842 in number, and make payment in cash of the sum of £162,900. 2. That the said parties shall be discharged of all claims against them in connection with the affairs and management of the bank. 3. That there shall be paid to the associated shareholders the sum of £15,000, and to other parties who purchased their shares after June 24, 1857, and whose calls have been paid, a sum of £20 per share; the balance to form part of the funds of the bank. 4. Should the arrangement not be acceded to by the shareholders on or before the 14th of June next, the directors shall have power to declare it at an end.—*London paper.*

THE NATIONAL LOAN OF 1861.

ADDRESS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

*Washington, September, 1861.**To the Citizens of the United States:*

YOUR national government, compelled by a guilty conspiracy, culminating in causeless insurrection, is engaged in war for the security of liberty, for the supremacy of law, for the defence of Union, and for the maintenance of popular institutions. For means to defray the necessary expenses of this war, your Congress has directed that an appeal be made to you, by opening a subscription to the national loan of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars.

Already the enlightened and patriotic capitalists of the great cities of New-York, Boston and Philadelphia have manifested their clear sense, both of duty and interest, by the subscription of fifty millions of dollars.

The act of Congress under which this subscription was received wisely provides, however, that the advantages as well as the patriotic satisfaction of participation in this loan shall be offered, not to the capitalists of the great cities only, but to the people of the whole country.

In order to secure a substantial reward for their public spirit to those whose patriotism prompts them, in this hour of trial, to place their means at the disposal of the government, Congress has directed that an interest of seven and three-tenths per centum be paid on the several amounts subscribed, an interest not liable to State taxation, but constituting for the subscribers a revenue, not only certain in receipt, but greater in amount than can be expected from any ordinary investment.

And, in order to afford to all citizens equal opportunities of participation in these advantages, Congress has further directed that subscriptions be received for sums as small as fifty dollars, as well as for larger amounts; and that, should the subscription exceed the whole sum desired, the smaller be preferred in the distribution.

Each subscriber, on payment of his subscription, will be entitled to receive Treasury notes of equal amount, in such denominations as he may prefer, whether of fifty, one hundred, five hundred, one thousand or five thousand dollars.

The interest, at seven and three-tenths per annum, will be, on the notes of fifty dollars, one cent; on one hundred dollars, two cents; on five hundred dollars, ten cents; on one thousand dollars, twenty cents, and on five thousand dollars, one dollar each day.

All Treasury notes issued will bear date on the 19th of August, 1861, and will carry interest from that date. Each note will have coupons attached, expressing the several amounts of semi-annual interest; which coupons may be detached from the note and presented for payment separately.

Each subscriber may pay the whole amount subscribed at the time of subscription, or, if he prefers to do so, may pay one-tenth at that time

and one-third every twentieth day thereafter. At each payment the accrued interest on the amount from the 19th of August to the date of payment must also be paid; and the amounts of interest thus paid will be reimbursed in the payment of the first coupon.

In order to secure, beyond peradventure, the punctual payment of interest and the gradual reduction of the principal, Congress has provided by law for an annual revenue amply sufficient not only for these purposes, but for the prompt payment of all demands on account of ordinary expenditures.

It will be seen at a glance that not only is the whole property of the country pledged for the interest and final reimbursement of this loan, but that an adequate specific proportion of the annual production is set apart, by taxation, for the redemption of this pledge. Prompt payment, beyond contingency, is thus insured.

Nor can this taxation be thought great, when compared with the magnitude of the objects of the contest, or with the amount of property and production. The objects are Union, popular government, permanent peace, security at home, respect abroad—all imperilled by unprovoked rebellion. The intelligence of the people comprehends at once their magnitude. They rise above party. They belong to no administration. They concern the whole country, during all time, under every administration, and every relation, foreign or domestic.

And the means for the attainment of these great objects can be readily supplied from the property and production of the country. The real and personal values in the United States reach the vast aggregate of sixteen thousand millions of dollars; and in the States now loyal to the Union this aggregate is eleven thousand millions.

The yearly surplus earnings of the loyal people are estimated, by intelligent persons conversant with such investigations, at more than four hundred millions of dollars; while the well-considered judgments of military men of the highest rank and repute warrant a confident expectation that the war, prosecuted with energy, courage and skill, may be brought to a termination before the close of the next spring; in which event, the cost, beyond the revenue, will hardly exceed the amount of the two hundred and fifty millions loan authorized by Congress. With due economy in all branches of the public service, the total expenditures for all objects, military, naval and civil, in this year of war, need not exceed the ordinary expenditures of Great Britain or France in years of peace.

And is it unreasonable to hope that the auspicious result of peace may be hastened by the reflections of the citizens of the States in insurrection? That they will review their action, weigh their own welfare, consider the disposition of the people of the whole country to recognise all their constitutional rights, and to allow them full share in the benefits of the common government, and renew that allegiance to the Union which, in an evil hour, they have been tempted throw off? Will they not reflect that the war, into which the government of the Union has been constrained, is not a war for their subjugation, but a war for national existence, and that an auspicious result to the Union will benefit as largely the States in insurrection as the States which have remained loyal?

However this may be, the duty of the national government, as the constitutionally constituted agent of the people, admits of no question. The war, made necessary by insurrection, and reluctantly accepted by the government, must be prosecuted with all possible vigor, until the restoration of the just authority of the Union shall insure permanent peace.

The same good Providence, which conducted our fathers through the difficulties and dangers which beset the formation of the Union, has graciously strengthened our hand for the work of its preservation.

The crops of the year are ample. Granaries and barns are everywhere full. The capitalists of the country come cheerfully forward to sustain the credit of the government. Already, also, even in advance of this appeal, men of all occupations seek to share the honors and the advantages of the loan. Never, except because of the temporary depression caused by the rebellion, and the derangement of business occasioned by it, were the people of the United States in a better condition to sustain a great contest than now. Under these favoring circumstances, and for these grand objects, I shall, in pursuance of the act of Congress, cause books of subscription to be opened as speedily as practicable in the several cities and principal towns of the United States, in order that all citizens who desire to subscribe to the loan may have the opportunity of doing so. Meanwhile, those who prefer that course can remit any sum which they may desire to invest in the loan to the Treasurer of the United States at Washington, or to either of the Assistant Treasurers at Boston, New-York, Philadelphia or St. Louis, or to the Depositary at Cincinnati, whose certificates will entitle the holders to Treasury notes on the terms already stated. The patriotism of the people, it is not to be doubted, will promptly respond to the liberal wisdom of their representatives.

S. P. CHASE, *Secretary of the Treasury.*

PLAN ADOPTED BY THE TREASURY-NOTE COMMITTEE IN BOSTON, FOR A
DIVISION OF THE TEN MILLION LOAN.

1. Each bank connected with the Clearing-House in Boston shall report on Tuesday and Friday morning of each week, at 10 o'clock, to the manager of the Clearing-House, the whole amount of Treasury notes sold by said banks since the last report.

2. The Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company, the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, and the several banks who have become associated in this loan, but are not connected with the Clearing-House, shall report on Tuesday and Friday morning, through some bank which is in the Clearing-House, the amount of sales made by them since the previous report.

3. Each bank shall pay at the Clearing-House, at the time when balances are paid, the several amounts which they shall have reported on the morning of the same day as having been received by them; and banks representing other institutions not in the Clearing-House, shall also at the same time pay, in their behalf, the sums reported by them as

received; and, for this purpose, bills of the Boston banks may be received and paid.

4. The manager of the Clearing-House shall, on Tuesday and Friday of each week, apportion to each bank, as nearly as possible, but in sums not less than five hundred dollars each, the amount it is entitled to receive of the amount paid to the Clearing-House, in the proportion which the subscription of each bank bears to the whole amount to be distributed.

5. The manager shall make no payment of a less sum than five hundred dollars, or of a fraction of five hundred dollars, until a final settlement shall be ordered; and he shall require negotiable Treasury notes, constituting a part of the ten million loan, to be surrendered to him for an equal amount to the sum paid; and the manager shall hand such notes to the banks paying to him as aforesaid in equal amounts to the sums paid by each party respectively, except that any bank, acting in behalf of any institution or institutions, shall, in addition to paying and receiving in their own behalf, also pay and receive in behalf of the institutions which they may be authorized to represent.

6. Each bank is expected to keep an accurate account of the amount of accrued interest received, and the dates of receipt, so as to be prepared to render an account when a settlement is to be made of the fifty million loan with New-York and Philadelphia, or with the associated banks of Boston.

7. Any bank or institution which may elect to retain, as a permanent investment, the amount of Treasury notes received by them, can do so by giving notice to the manager of the Clearing-House, and shall not be included in the distribution provided for by these articles.

Names of the Treasury-Note Committee, viz.:

FRANKLIN HAVEN, President of Merchants' Bank.
J. AMORY DAVIS, President of Suffolk Bank.
ANDREW T. HALL, President of Tremont Bank.
BENJAMIN E. BATES, President of Commerce Bank.
THOMAS LAMB, President of New-England Bank.
ALMON D. HODGES, President of Washington Bank.
WILLIAM THOMAS, President of Webster Bank.
SAMUEL H. WALLEY, President of Revere Bank.
JAMES H. BEAL, President of Granite Bank.

THE SULTAN'S JEWELS.—A valuable assemblage of mounted diamonds, in various ornaments, from Constantinople, the property of the late Sultan, is now being dispersed under the hammer, at Mr. ROBINSON'S Auction-rooms in Old Bond-street, London. These magnificent jewels comprise a great variety of ornaments in the form of necklaces, ear-rings, bracelets, brooches, stomachers and headdresses, many of them of great magnitude and splendor, and of exquisite designs, representing wreaths and groups of flowers, of natural sizes, composed entirely of fine brilliants and rose diamonds, and in some cases surmounted with diamond birds; presentation boxes of gold, beautifully enamelled, and richly set with brilliants and rose diamonds, in clusters of flowers and other designs; watches and chatelaines, presenting to the eye masses of diamonds of the greatest taste and beauty; the whole forming a more splendid assemblage of jewels than has ever before been offered for public competition. There were 65 lots in the first day's sale, which realized the sum of £8,760.

LOWEST AND HIGHEST SALES FOR CASH, FOR YEARS 1860 AND 1861.

BONDS AND STOCKS.	YEAR 1860.		FEB., 1861.		MARCH, 1861.		APRIL, 1861.		MAY, 1861.		JUNE, 1861.		JULY, 1861.		AUG., 1861.		YEAR 1861.	
	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.
United States six per cents, 1863,...	95	109½	94	100	95	95½	89	95	80	95	80	95	89	90	81½	90	80	100
United States six per cents, 1871,...	86½	89½
U. S. Treasury Notes, six per cents,	85	104½	85	98½	85	90	75	89½	76	79½	75	78½	76	82	78½	81	75	97
U. S. five per cents, 1874, coupon,...	88	98	88	88	85	87½	88	93	80	80	78	80	75	77½	75	75½	75	98
Indiana State five per cents,.....	73	95	72	80	74	81	86	76½	43½	51½	39	48	44	50	50	56½	86	81
Virginia six per cent. bonds,.....	64	93	67	76½	72	77	41	75½	40½	47½	34½	41½	37	45½	42	46½	84½	77
Tennessee six per cent. bonds,.....	102	105	60	60½	58	60	57	70	65	77	58	77
Georgia six per cent. bonds,.....	76	100	74	89½	78	83	45	81	53	62	44	53	43	62	54	70	44	82½
North Carolina six per cent. bonds,	82	95	88	88	87½	88	78½	87½	71½	75	76½	78	74½	78½	75	77	71½	88
California seven per cent. bonds,...	61	84½	64	70½	63½	69½	87½	66	85	42	36	40½	37½	40½	41	45	35	72½
Missouri six per cent. bonds,.....	14	23½	14	15	14	15	8	14½	8½	10	8½	9	9	9½	9	10	8	15
Canton Company shares,.....	8	17½	7	8½	7	7½	6	7½	4	5½	4½	4½	4½	5½	4	9½
Cumberland Coal Co., preferred,...	70	107½	80½	88	82	86½	50	86	60½	71	59	69	69	77	70	78½	50	94
Pacific Mail Steamship Company,...	70	92½	75½	80½	75½	80	68	78½	71½	78½	71½	74½	73½	79½	72½	77	68	82½
New-York Central Rail-Road,.....	8½	43	30	36	30	35	17	32½	19½	23½	21½	23½	22½	29	24	26½	17	40½
Erie Rail-Road shares,.....	36	66	40½	48½	43	47	83	45½	34	87½	81½	81½	82	83	82½	84½	81½	49½
Hudson River Rail-Road,.....	8	24	14	16½	15½	16½	11½	16½	10½	12½	8½	10½	9½	12½	10½	11	8½	16½
Harlem Rail-Road shares,.....	27	55	34	43	38	41½	28	41½	25½	31½	26½	25½	22½	29½	24½	26½	20½	43
Reading Rail-Road, preferred,.....	80	49½	88½	47½	89	46	29½	44½	80½	82½	30½	35½	33	39½	35	37½	29½	48½
Michigan Central Rail-Road,.....	24½	73½	49½	60½	54	60	40	58½	40	46	39½	44½	41	47½	40½	48	39½	61½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana R.R.,...	5	25	12½	15½	14½	18½	12½	17½	10½	13½	10½	12½	12	15½	12½	14	10½	18½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana, guar.,...	12½	50½	27½	34	33	39½	26	39½	24½	29½	22½	27½	26½	33½	27½	30	22½	39½
Panama Rail-Road shares,.....	106	146½	112	116	115	117½	97½	116½	99	107	104	109	105	111½	104½	108	97½	117½
Illinois Central Rail-Road shares,...	51½	89½	69	84½	75½	83	55½	81½	57	71	62	69	62	69½	63	65	55½	88½
Galena and Chicago Rail-Road,...	55	82½	66½	74½	68½	74	55	73½	55½	61	56	61½	60½	66½	62½	66½	55	74½
Cleveland and Toledo Rail-Road,...	18½	49½	27½	38	33	37	22½	36½	20½	25½	20½	21½	23½	33	27½	30½	20½	39
Chicago & Rock Island Rail-Road,...	42½	84½	52½	61½	56	61	84	58	30½	39	32½	35½	34	45	37½	41½	30½	62
Illinois Central Construction bonds,	81	100½	95	97	97	102½	85	98	89	92½	89	92	89	93	89½	90	85	102½
Pennsylvania Coal Company,.....	78½	87	76	80	76	80½	72	81	75	77	76	77½	73	79	75	80	72	80½
aw are and Hudson Canal Co.,...	80	101½	87	92	85	90	82	90	80	84	79	83½	80	86½	82½	85½	79	92

THE NEW-YORK STOCK MARKET FOR AUGUST.

THE stock market has been unusually active throughout the month. The successful negotiation of the new government loan, authorized by the act of Congress under date of July 17th, 1861, (and published in our last No., pp. 219—223,) has given a fresh impetus to business in numerous departments, and has already added largely to the volume of the circulation; and the prospective issue of over one hundred millions additional by the Treasury gives, in advance, new confidence as to the money and stock markets. There has been a decided improvement in stock values during the month of August, and the closing prices, on the 31st, compare favorably with those at the close of July.

Government six per cent. loan of 1868 has ranged from $87\frac{1}{2}$ to 90, with few transactions. The five per cents have been in demand at $78\frac{1}{4}$ @ 81; the extremes for which, in the year 1860, were 85 and $104\frac{1}{2}$, and this year 75 @ 97; the lowest price having been reached in April last. Government treasury notes, bearing six per cent. interest, and available for custom-house duties, have been sold at $95\frac{1}{2}$ @ 98.

There was a much better feeling at the close of the month of August as to the loans of the Southern States, showing an advance of $\frac{5}{8}$ in Tennessee six per cents; $5\frac{1}{4}$ in Virginia; $\frac{3}{4}$ in North Carolina, and a fraction in Missouri. Virginia six per cents at one period this year (April) sold as low as 36; and in the month of August reached 50 @ $56\frac{1}{4}$. Tennessee six per cents, in June last, were, for a time, reduced to $34\frac{1}{4}$, but have recovered, in August, to 42 @ $46\frac{1}{2}$. In North Carolina six per cents the range has been still greater, falling to 44 in June, and selling at 54 @ 70 in August, closing at $61\frac{1}{4}$ @ $61\frac{1}{2}$. The lowest price for Missouri six per cents this year was 36. More confidence is now felt in the recovery of the State, and their bonds, in August, were quoted 41 @ 45 cash. California seven per cents have not reached a lower figure this year than $71\frac{1}{2}$. Few of these bonds are on the market, and are quoted, at the close of August, $75\frac{1}{2}$ @ 76. Indiana five per cents are steady at 75 @ $75\frac{1}{2}$, with limited amounts on the market.

Coal company shares are not quoted as high as in July. Delaware and Hudson had reached then $86\frac{1}{2}$, and closed, in August, at 82 @ 83. Pennsylvania Coal Company sold, in July, at 75 @ 80, closing at 75 @ 76, which are 4 per cent. below those at the close of July.

The rail-road revenues for the month of August have been favorable, and promise to be more so for the fall months. New-York Central shares, after a dividend of three per cent., closed, on the 31st, at $72\frac{5}{8}$ @ $72\frac{3}{4}$. The fluctuations in Erie shares were less than in July, being a range of $2\frac{1}{4}$ in August and $6\frac{1}{4}$ in July. The same remark applies to Hudson River Rail-Road shares, in which the range for July was 6 per cent., and in August only $2\frac{5}{8}$. There has been much more steadiness throughout the month in rail-road shares generally. In Reading Rail-Road shares, for instance, the range was 35 @ $37\frac{1}{4}$, against 33 @ $39\frac{1}{2}$ in July. Michigan Central, $40\frac{1}{2}$ @ 43, against 41 @ $47\frac{1}{4}$. Michigan Southern, $12\frac{1}{4}$ @ 14

in August, against 12 @ 15½ in July. Panama, 104½ @ 108 in August, against 105 @ 111½ in July. Illinois Central shares have been steady at 63 @ 65, whereas in July the difference was 7½. Chicago and Rock Island shares have dropped some from the high prices of March, 56 @ 61, and have sold at 37½ @ 41½.

In order to make our tabular summary more complete, we add a column showing the lowest and highest cash sales at the Board the whole year, 1860, comprising thus far eight months—January to August.

MONTHLY STOCK FLUCTUATIONS IN BOSTON.

Reported by J. G. MARTIN, Broker, 8 State-street, Boston.

PRICES were well sustained early in the month of August, but began to fall off by the middle of it, and our list shows quite a general depression, solid as well as fancy. August, however, is usually the hardest month of the year for the stock market, and a general wilting is commonly anticipated. As a whole, the market has been wonderfully well sustained through the summer, owing, in a great measure doubtless, to the abundance and cheap rates for money; and although this continues still, the great depression in all branches of business is having a steady and certain effect on the earnings of corporations of every description, and of course future dividends will have to be reduced or "passed," which is the main point in the view of most permanent or temporary investors.

The following tabular statement presents the fluctuations for the month of August, 1861, in sixty-three different stocks sold at the Boston Brokers' Board, showing their highest and lowest points, and the date, with the present market value:

STOCK VALUES, AUGUST, 1861.

STOCKS.	Highest Sales.	Day of Month.	Lowest Sales.	Day of Month.	Value July 31.	Value Aug. 31.
Boston and Lowell R. R.,...	93	.. 24 ..	92	.. 24 ..	96	.. 90
Boston and Maine,.....	107¾	.. 3 ..	104¾	.. 22 ..	108½	.. 104
Boston and Providence,.....	109	.. 8 ..	106	.. 27 ..	109	.. 105½
Boston and Worcester,.....	109	.. 6 ..	107½	.. 29 ..	108½	.. 106½
Cambridge,	112½	.. 1 ..	112	.. 26 ..	112½	.. 112
Concord, (par \$50,).....	55	.. 7 ..	51½	.. 29 ..	55	.. 51¾
Connecticut River,.....	80½	.. 10 ..	80	.. 30 ..	78*	.. 80
Eastern,	62	.. 7 ..	58½	.. 30 ..	61	.. 58½
Fitchburg,	97½	.. 8 ..	91	.. 30 ..	97	.. 91
Malden and Melrose,	63	.. 6 ..	58½	.. 29 ..	57	.. 56
Manchester and Lawrence, ..	102	.. 8 ..	100	.. 29 ..	100½	.. 100
Metropolitan, (par \$50,).....	54	.. 13 ..	52½	.. 24 ..	54½	.. 53
Middlesex,	95	.. 7 ..	93	.. 28 ..	95	.. 92
Northern, (N. H.),.....	50	.. 6 ..	48¾	.. 13 ..	50	.. 49¼
Old Colony,	104½	.. 5 ..	103½	.. 15 ..	104	.. 102

STOCK VALUES, AUGUST, 1861.—(Continued.)

STOCKS.	Highest Sales.	Day of Month.	Lowest Sales.	Day of Month.	Value July 31.	Value Aug. 31.
Portland and Saco,.....	100 $\frac{1}{4}$	15	100	10	100 $\frac{1}{4}$	100 $\frac{1}{4}$
Vermont and Canada,.....	101*	6	100*	15	105	98*
Vermont and Mass.,.....	11	15	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	29	10 $\frac{3}{8}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$
Western,	112 $\frac{1}{4}$	1	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	31	112 $\frac{1}{4}$	107 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wilmington, (par \$50,)....	34 $\frac{1}{4}$	10	32 $\frac{3}{4}$	31	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	32 $\frac{3}{4}$
Boston Water Power Co.,...	28	19	27	1	27	27 $\frac{1}{2}$
Cary Land Co.,	3 $\frac{3}{8}$	21	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	5	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	3 $\frac{3}{4}$
East Boston Co.,.....	8 $\frac{1}{8}$	2	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	18	9	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
Essex Co.,.....	57	2	56	12	57	56 $\frac{1}{2}$
Blackstone Bank,.....	98	2	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	95
Commerce Bank,.....	96	22	95 $\frac{3}{4}$	14	96	96
Eliot Bank,.....	97	2	96	20	97	97
Exchange Bank,.....	109	19	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	7	108 $\frac{3}{4}$	109
Hide and Leather Bank,....	94	7	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	91 $\frac{1}{2}$
Howard Bank,	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	24	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$
Maverick Bank,.....	92	90
Merchants' Bank,.....	90	3	85	13	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	85
National Bank,.....	91	7	87 $\frac{1}{4}$	21	92	87 $\frac{1}{2}$
North America Bank,.....	95	94
Safety Fund Bank,	96	94
Shoe and Leather Bank,....	115	22	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	21	113	115
State Bank, (par \$60,)....	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	62	23	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	62 $\frac{1}{2}$
Suffolk Bank,.....	122	123
Tremont Bank,.....	108	2	103	31	108	108
Webster Bank,.....	100	3	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	21	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$
Bohemian Copper Co.,.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
Central Copper Co.,.....	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	2 $\frac{3}{4}$
Copper Falls,.....	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	19	2 $\frac{3}{8}$	23	2 $\frac{3}{8}$	2 $\frac{3}{8}$
Franklin,	12	21	11 $\frac{3}{4}$	26	12	11 $\frac{3}{4}$
Hancock,	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	31	1	7	1 $\frac{1}{8}$	1 $\frac{1}{4}$
Isle Royale,.....	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	31	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	5 $\frac{5}{8}$	6 $\frac{1}{4}$
Mesnard,.....	$\frac{3}{4}$	31	$\frac{1}{2}$	13	1	$\frac{3}{4}$
Minnesota,	54	31	50	5	50 $\frac{1}{4}$	54
National,	23	2	21	24	23*	23
North Cliff,	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Petherick,	1 $\frac{3}{8}$	20	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	26	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	1 $\frac{3}{8}$
Pewabic,.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	19	22	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	19
Pittsburg, (Cliff,)	45	6	42*	20	44	44*
Pontiac,	$\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{3}{8}$
Quincy,.....	23	13	21	22	22	22
Rockland,	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	23	13	13
South Side,.....	$\frac{1}{4}$	13	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$
Superior,.....	2	5	1 $\frac{1}{8}$	23	2 $\frac{1}{8}$	2
Toltec,	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	15	1	23	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	1
Ogdensburg 1st mtg. 7's, ...	65 $\frac{3}{4}$	3	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	27	66	61 $\frac{1}{2}$
Rutland 1st mortgage 7's,...	31	31	32	31
Vermont Central 1st 7's,....	10	13	11	10
Vermont & Mass. 6's, 1865,...	90	88

* Ex-dividend.

THE GREAT FRAUDS OF LATE YEARS IN ENGLAND.

I. WALTER WATTS. II. JOHN SADLEIR. III. THE ROYAL BRITISH BANK. IV. WILLIAM JAMES ROBSON. V. LEOPOLD REDPATH. VI. COLONEL WAUGH AND OTHERS.

At a meeting of the British Social Science Association, August, 1861, a paper on "Joint-Stock Frauds" was read, from which we clip the following historical sketch concerning "defaulters" whose names are known in this country :

I. WALTER WATTS.

The result of the extraordinary success of the joint-stock principle, within the last twenty years, has been that numbers of persons of humble origin, of indifferent moral principles, have been brought into contact with enormous sums of money, the appropriation of which has been extremely easy, and these persons have appropriated enormous sums, careless about detection, and ready to pay the penalty of their liberties or their lives if detection should follow. The first case to which I think it right to call attention is the case of WALTER WATTS. He was a clerk in the Globe Insurance Company in London, at a salary of £200 per annum. Between the months of August, 1844, and February, 1850, he abstracted £70,000. When he commenced the system of defalcations, he was only 25 years of age, but the life he led during his six years of public plunder was remarkable. In 1844 the name of WALTER WATTS suddenly became associated with fashionable and Corinthian life in London. He became a patron of art and pleasure in its most extravagant form; he kept an establishment at the West End, and a country house in Brighton; he had one of the best cellars in London, stocked with the rarest vintages; he had some of the best horses in London; he was a devoted attendant on the theatres. In 1847 he became lessee of the Marylebone theatre, and during that year the celebrated Mrs. WARNER appeared there as the star of the unsuccessful legitimate drama.

During the season of 1848 and 1849, Mrs. MOWATT and Mr. DAVENPORT, two American artists, played at WATTS' theatre. WATTS spared no expense. Mrs. MOWATT's dressing-room, beneath the stage, was fitted up like a bower of the Genii in "The Arabian Nights." In fact, the brilliancy of the expenditure on the Marylebone theatre was the subject of conversation all over London during the year 1849. The only persons who knew nothing about it appeared to be the Directors of the Globe Office, in which WATTS, spending £10,000 a year, was a clerk at £200 a year. In 1849 he opened the Olympic theatre, but the extravagant and splendid management of this Temple of Thesis only lasted a few months before his frauds were detected. The defalcations during the year 1849 alone amounted to upward of £18,000. In the receipt department of the office there was no effective check against fraud, although, owing to

the integrity of the officials, no fraud took place, and in the accountant's office, in which WATTS was employed, the lax practice prevailed of making the bankers' pass-book the foundation of the entries in the books of the company, instead of the documents referring to the payments ordered, so that if the persons having the custody of the pass-book chose to falsify it, the false entries were transferred to the general books of the office, and thus made to cover abstractions effected through the bankers. WATTS, being tried and convicted, committed suicide.

II. JOHN SADLEIR.

The next case of a similar character is that of JOHN SADLEIR. JOHN SADLEIR, in 1836, was admitted as an Irish attorney, and practiced with success in the country and in Dublin. In 1847, he was elected a member of Parliament. In 1853, he was appointed Lord of the Treasury under Lord ABERDEEN. He looked forward to be Chief Secretary for Ireland or Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had a fair chance of either of these great offices. All this splendid position he owed to the fact of being enabled to use the money of the Tipperary Joint-Stock Bank. He, himself, was a man of simple and inexpensive habits, and the only relaxation he took was hunting, which he did not carry on in an extravagant manner. His resignation of his place at the Treasury, and retirement from the government, were followed by his resignation of the post as Chairman of the London and County Bank. His credit was then gone in London. His forgery of the title-deeds of the Irish Encumbered Estates Court was detected, and, on the 16th February, 1856, JOHN SADLEIR committed suicide, at the age of forty-two. From the Tipperary Bank JOHN SADLEIR abstracted over £200,000. As Chairman of the Royal Swedish Railway Company he issued false shares to the amount of £150,000, the whole proceeds of which he appropriated. The most singular part of JOHN SADLEIR's frauds is this—that over a quarter of a million of money he received is unaccounted for; that is, there is no tangible method of explaining how the money was spent or who received it from him.

III. THE BRITISH BANK DIRECTORS.

The Royal British Bank was started in the year 1850, with a capital of £100,000, one-half of which was paid up. The board managed its affairs in the way every dishonest board in every joint-stock bank can do if they please. Mr. CAMERON, the manager, became indebted to the amount of £30,000; Mr. M'GREGOR, £8,000; Mr. MULLINS, £7,000; Mr. GWYNN, (another of the old directors and original projectors,) £13,000; of which no account was rendered to the shareholders, and of which it is extremely problematical whether the creditors have recovered one penny. And one of the auditors who, it may be presumed, was a little too prying, found it more convenient to accept an advance of £2,000 than to enter into disagreeable questions of vouchers and checks. Mr. HUMPHREY BROWN, M. P., on the day he opened his account, paid in £181 14s., and he drew money until he was debtor to the company to the amount of £70,000. The bank stopped on the 3d of September, 1856; during its existence of six and a half years it exhausted the whole of the £158,000 subscribed by the shareholders, and left them besides

half a million in debt. The British Bank directors were tried for a conspiracy to defraud, and they were convicted. Still, the heaviest sentence was only twelve months, and there are thousands of persons who would submit to twelve months imprisonment for £50,000.

IV. WILLIAM JAMES ROBSON

Has immortalized himself in the annals of crime by his frauds on the Crystal Palace Company. In 1853 he obtained a salary there at £1 per week, and in June, 1854, he was appointed chief clerk in the transfer department, at a salary of only £150 per annum. But ROBSON was a well-educated, refined and gentleman-like man, 34 years of age, with literary tastes; the author of several plays, and having a large circle of expensive acquaintances in London. The simple plan by which he obtained £27,000 by false pretences was this: ROBSON directed a Mr. CLEMENT, a stockbroker, to sell 100 shares in the company, and the broker accordingly sold them—50 to a Mr. JOSEPH LOWE and 50 to another person. For these shares the broker received £295, which he paid over, less commission, to ROBSON. The document by which these shares were transferred purported to convey the shares from JOHNSON to the purchasers. The signature to the deed, where the name of the transfer should be, was that of HENRY JOHNSON, nominally, of course, written by that gentleman, who, however, had no existence, the whole thing being a forgery on the part of ROBSON. Like WATTS, ROBSON lived in a most extravagant style. He was sentenced to be transported for twenty years.

V. LEOPOLD REDPATH

Commenced his career as a lawyer's clerk; he then was appointed a clerk in the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company. Leaving his office he set up business as an insurance broker, but shortly afterwards failed for £5,000. About the age of thirty-five he obtained the appointment of clerk in the service of the Great Northern Railway Company, and in that office exhibited one of the most extraordinary instances of successful swindling, combined with high moral reputation and a truly benevolent career. REDPATH's simple plan was, like ROBSON's, to create fictitious shares; and all the while the directors, though they found themselves paying dividends which they could not account for, appeared to entertain no suspicion of the fact that they were daily being robbed to a large extent. Nay, so far duped were they, that some three years after REDPATH had commenced his swindling, the following document was actually placed upon record by the auditors of the company:

"Accountant's Department, August 7, 1856.

To the Chairman and Directors of the Great Northern Railway Company:

Gentlemen,—The accounts and books in every department continue to be so satisfactorily kept that we have simply to express our entire approval of them, and to present them to you for information of the shareholders, and with our usual certificate of their correctness. We have the honor, &c. (Signed,)

JOHN CHAPMAN, }
J. CATTELY, } *Auditors.*

REDPATH was a public subscriber to all the great charities of London. He had a splendid house at Weybridge, part of it a pleasure ground, and fifteen servants. The anecdote of the occurrence that led to his discovery is remarkable. Mr. DENISON, the chairman of the line, was standing on a station platform conversing with Lord D——, when REDPATH happened to come up, and lifted his hat to Mr. DENISON. The nobleman, however, was on easier terms. Taking REDPATH cordially by the hand, "Ah, my dear fellow," said he, "how are you?" Having parted, the chairman turned to Lord D——, and asked him what he knew of their clerk. "Oh," said he, "he is the jolliest fellow in life. He gives the most sumptuous dinners and capital balls that I know of." REDPATH was sentenced to be transported for the term of his natural life; stock to the amount of £220,000 having been fraudulently issued by him.

VI. COLONEL WAUGH AND OTHERS.

Numerous other instances might be given, but the result is this, that nothing appears more easy, either for a dishonest servant or for a dishonest director, than to rob a joint-stock company. In fact, for the last ten years, every species of robbery and fraud has been practiced on the shareholders and creditors of these bodies. The evil is increasing. The London and Eastern Banking Company was instituted in 1854, on the principle of extending the joint-stock banking system in England. Colonel WAUGH was one of the first directors, and in two years he, without security, drew £244,000, almost the entire subscribed capital of the company. The bank failed in 1857. WAUGH's case resembles SADLEIR's in this: there was no tangible account of what became of the money. Many other cases might be given in detail for the last ten years.

PULLINGER's fraud on the Union Bank, to the amount of over £400,000, and divers others.

The most recent is the fraud on the Commercial Bank of London, discovered only in February, 1861, and in consequence of which the business of the Commercial Bank was transferred to the London and Westminster Bank.

SAVINGS BANKS.—We hear that many persons are withdrawing their money from the Boston savings banks, and converting it into gold, to the great injury of themselves. At this time the five years' dividend is making up, and will shortly be paid to those who permit their money to remain. Those who take out their money lose this dividend. We have heard of a case where a poor woman took her money out of the Provident Institution for Savings, converted it into gold, and tied it around her body. Some sharper heard of it, and followed her until he got her into a beer shop, drugged her and stole her money, leaving her penniless. She was advised by the excellent Treasurer, PETER C. WAINWRIGHT, Esq., to leave her money in the bank, but to no purpose. The day after she went to the bank and told her sorrowful story, regretting she had not taken the worthy Treasurer's advice. Those who take their money out now lose their five years' dividend, and those who leave their money in the bank are the gainers.—*Boston Pilot*.

THE ENGLISH MONEY MARKET.

SUBJOINED is a comprehensive table, from the London *Economist*, affording a comparative view of the Bank of England returns, the bank rate of discount, the price of Consols, the price of wheat, and the leading exchanges, during a period of four years, corresponding with the fourth week in August, as well as ten years back, viz., in 1851 :

	Aug., 1851.	Aug., 1858.	Aug., 1859.	Aug., 1860.	Aug., 1861.
BANK OF ENGLAND—					
Circulation,	£ 20,965,000	£ 21,093,000	£ 22,425,000	£ 21,877,000	£ 20,423,000
Public deposits,	7,607,000 ..	5,627,000 ..	7,816,000 ..	5,949,000 ..	4,064,000
Other deposits,	8,525,000 ..	13,674,000 ..	12,740,000 ..	14,168,000 ..	12,774,000
Government securities,	13,464,000 ..	10,913,000 ..	11,220,000 ..	9,643,000 ..	10,135,000
Other securities,	13,391,000 ..	15,453,000 ..	18,991,000 ..	19,996,000 ..	17,401,000
Reserve of notes and coin, ..	8,645,000 ..	11,969,000 ..	9,476,000 ..	9,247,000 ..	8,000,000
Coin and bullion,	14,362,000 ..	17,797,000 ..	16,540,000 ..	15,914,000 ..	13,104,000
Bank rate of discount,	3 per ct. ..	3 per ct. ..	2½ per ct. ..	4 per ct. ..	4 per ct.
Price of Consols,	96½ ..	96½ ..	95½ ..	98 ..	92¾
Average price of wheat,	39s. 1d. ..	42s. 6d. ..	44s. 5d. ..	59s. 6d. ..	50s. 3d.
Exchange on Paris, (short,)...	25 10 ..	25 15 ..	25 7½ ..	25 15 ..	25 40
Amsterdam, (short,)	11 17½ ..	11 17 ..	11 14¾ ..	11 18½ ..	11 18½
Hamburg, (3 mos.),	13 9 ..	13 8 ..	13 5½ ..	13 5¼ ..	13 10¼

1851. The second week of August, 1851, new revelations of the atrocities of Italian despotism were appearing both in the foreign and British press. The French Assembly had just been prorogued. The accounts from the Cape stated that the Caffre war continued, but that fresh bodies of troops would be required to effect the subjection of the rebels. At home there had been a slight diminution in the visitors to the Great Exhibition, owing to the commencement of the harvest.

The third week of August, 1851, the reactionary proceedings of the German and Italian sovereigns were exciting considerable attention. The arbitrary conduct of the Roman police was causing great misery and discontent, and the city of Rome presented a melancholy and deserted appearance. Revolutionary movements were taking place in Cuba, with the aid and abetment of the population of the neighboring United States. At home, the commissioners for the Great Exhibition had decided on closing the building to the public on the ensuing 11th of October. The Roman Catholics had held a great meeting at Dublin to form a Defence Association on account of the change in their position through the passing of the Ecclesiastical Titles Act.

The fourth week of August some important failures had taken place in Liverpool, owing to heavy losses on consignments to India and a general system of overtrading. No effect, however, was exercised on the London money market, the rate of discount being only 3 per cent. The Italian revelations of Mr. GLADSTONE had considerably annoyed the Neapolitan government, and at one time it was proposed to publish a refutation, but, after a discussion, the ministers concluded that no good would be gained by such a course. The National Guard of Austria

had been dissolved throughout the empire by Imperial ordinance. The advices from California announced that the Vigilance Committee was in full operation and accomplishing much good, the authority of the courts and legal executive being for the present completely set aside.

1858. The second week of August, 1858, the other securities of the bank were steadily running off, and the rate of discount in the general market was one-half per cent. below the bank minimum, notwithstanding the impending payment of half a million on the Indian debenture loan. The war in China was on the point of terminating. The Atlantic Telegraph Cable was still capable of transmitting messages, but not with regularity.

The third week of August, 1858, the continental exchanges had recovered from the fall which followed the reduction in the value of money from the previous panic point, and gold was still flowing into the bank in large quantities. The first instalment was upon the point of being paid upon the Brazilian $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. loan of £1,526,000. The loan by the Bank of England to the East India Company of one million on India bonds had just been renewed for another twelvemonth, at $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.

The fourth week of August, 1858, Messrs. DENT, PALMER & Co.'s Turkish loan of £3,000,000, in a 6 per cent. stock at 80, had just been taken. The application in excess of this sum amounting to more than a million, subscribers were allowed the option of taking another two millions until the ensuing 8th of October. The final instalment had been paid on the Brazilian loan of one and a half millions. The influx of gold to the bank continued to be very rapid. The funds were strengthened by a steady rise in French Rentes.

1859. The second week of August, 1859, the money market was very easy, notwithstanding great activity in the manufacturing districts, a considerable drain of silver for India, an impending loan of £12,000,000 for Russia, and an Indian loan of £5,000,000. Large arrivals of gold from Australia were announced.

The third week of August, 1859, the negotiation of the Indian and Russian loans had been concluded. The total number of tenders sent in for the latter was about 800, forming an aggregate of £7,550,000, or 50 per cent. more than was wanted. The minimum price fixed was 97, but the loan was, for the most part, subscribed for between £97 0s. 3d. and £97 10s. The quotation on the stock exchange immediately went to a premium.

The fourth week of August, 1859, large arrivals of bullion were announced. It was ascertained that the average rate at which the Indian loan had been taken was £97 3s. 2d., and the price had risen to $2\frac{1}{2}$ premium. Messrs. THOMPSON, BONAR & Co. had communicated to the London stock exchange a notification from the Russian government, to the effect that the whole of the £12,000,000 three per cent. Russian loan had been taken.

1860. The second week of August, 1860, the Indian Budget had been discussed in Parliament, and authority taken for the issue of a loan of £3,000,000. The Syrian and Italian questions were exciting uneasiness,

especially in Paris. Some small expeditions of Garibaldians had made a descent on the main land of Naples. The advices from America described great enthusiasm to be prevailing in the British colonies during the progress of the Prince of Wales.

The third week of August, 1860, increasing uneasiness was beginning to be felt at the continued bad weather, which was seriously jeopardizing the harvest. A report had arrived of the landing of Garibaldi in Calabria. The London money market was easy, and business generally at a stand still.

The fourth week of August, 1860, apprehensions still prevailed respecting the harvest, although the weather had for the time been rather less unfavorable, and there was a general belief that the crops would prove very deficient. The Great Eastern had arrived from New-York. The invasion of Calabria by Garibaldi was successfully progressing, the royal troops having been beaten in at least one important action. The committees of the Vienna Reichsrath had considered their reports, and political reforms were expected to be shortly initiated by the Emperor of Austria.

GOLD AND SILVER BULLION AND COINAGE.

I. *Coinage and Exports of Gold and Silver from Great Britain.* II. *Gold and Silver Movements of 1861.* III. *The Bullion Trade of the World.* IV. *The Specie Export from Great Britain to the United States.* V. *Counterfeit Coins and Bank Bills.* VI. *Decimal Coinage in Denmark.*

I. COINAGE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE FOREIGN EXPORT OF GOLD AND SILVER FROM GREAT BRITAIN, 1843—1860.

Year.	Great Britain.		Export of Gold and Silver from Gt. Britain.		Total Coinage United States.
1843,.....	£ 6,607,849	or \$ 33,035,000	\$ 12,025,037
1844,.....	3,563,949	.. 17,815,000	7,663,780
1845,.....	4,244,608	.. 21,220,000	5,629,647
1846,.....	4,334,911	.. 21,670,000	..	£ 2,937,266	6,592,757
1847,.....	5,158,440	.. 25,790,000	..	8,602,597	22,595,835
1848,.....	2,451,999	.. 12,255,000	..	8,596,990	5,815,562
1849,.....	2,177,955	.. 10,885,000	..	8,912,467	11,122,711
1850,.....	1,491,836	.. 7,455,000	..	6,940,346	33,847,838
1851,.....	4,400,411	.. 22,000,000	..	9,059,551	63,388,889
1852,.....	8,742,270	.. 43,710,000	..	10,295,464	57,845,597
1853,.....	11,952,391	.. 59,760,000	..	18,906,753	64,291,477
1854,.....	4,152,183	.. 20,760,000	..	22,586,568	60,713,865
1855,.....	9,008,663	.. 45,040,000	..	18,828,178	44,060,302
1856,.....	6,002,114	.. 30,010,000	..	24,851,797	64,283,963
1857,.....	4,859,860	.. 24,295,000	..	33,566,968	51,813,572
1858,.....	1,231,023	.. 6,155,000	..	19,628,876	60,869,965
1859,.....	2,649,509	.. 13,245,000	..	35,688,803	24,476,642
1860,.....	3,121,709	.. 15,605,000	..	25,534,768	27,039,919

II. GOLD AND SILVER MOVEMENT OF 1861.

The receipts of gold from California during the first six months of 1861 were \$17,121,000, and foreign imports \$25,909,000, of which the following is a summary :

	From California.		Foreign Imports.		Total.
January,.....	\$ 4,186,000	..	\$ 7,262,000	..	\$ 11,448,000
February,.....	3,623,000	..	2,274,000	..	5,897,000
March,.....	2,370,000	..	5,546,000	..	7,916,000
April,.....	2,951,000	..	1,953,000	..	4,904,000
May,.....	1,978,000	..	3,487,000	..	5,465,000
June,.....	2,013,000	..	5,387,000	..	7,399,000
	<u>\$ 17,121,000</u>	..	<u>\$ 25,909,000</u>	..	<u>\$ 43,030,000</u>
Specie in Bank and Sub-Treasury, January 1, 1861,.....					30,100,000
Total supply, 1861,.....					\$ 73,130,000
Deduct estimated export to the interior,.....			\$ 14,181,000		
Foreign exports,.....			<u>3,249,000</u>		
					17,430,000
					<u>\$ 55,700,000</u>

III. THE BULLION TRADE OF THE WORLD.

During the monetary crisis which prevailed some three years ago, the Bank of France purchased all the silver it could obtain both in France and abroad. It was indeed at one moment so overstocked with silver as to have reason to fear of touching the reserve. It then made an arrangement with the Bank of England to deposit with it fifty millions of silver, to receive in return a similar sum in gold. The contract was scarcely concluded when the news arrived that the war with China was ended, and the crisis in the United States took place. Gold was wanted for America and also for Italy, and the bank employed that which it had procured. Meanwhile, China, instead of drawing silver from Europe as previously, sent us considerable quantities in payment of the war indemnity. On the other hand, the expedition to Syria was drawing to a close, so that at the same time the demand for silver ceased and the demand for gold became more active; and this occurred at the very moment when the Bank of France was taking back the silver it had deposited with the Bank of England. Thus the metallic crisis, caused by the scarcity of silver money, now threatens to recur through the scarcity of gold coin. But on this side the danger is less great, owing to the immense quantity of gold coined of late in all the mints of Europe. Gold will continue in circulation on account of its small volume and relatively high value. It is a certain fact, that the very persons who but yesterday complained of the scarcity of silver coin are now greatly annoyed at having to receive a heavy bag of 1,000 francs in silver instead of a convenient roll of Napoleons. If LYCURGUS returned to this lower world he would find people just as reluctant to use his cumbersome money as to live on his disagreeable black broth.—*Bulletin of Paris, July 21.*

IV. THE SPECIE EXPORTS OF GREAT BRITAIN TO THE UNITED STATES.

In less than six months—that is to say, since the 28th of November, when these shipments commenced—we have sent the large sum of £5,800,000 in specie to America. That hoarding is going on in that country is indicated by the fact, that after the absorption of this sum, and of some large amounts drawn from the continent, as well as of the whole of the heavy consignments of gold which have continued to come forward to New-York with the usual regularity from California, we can trace an addition of less than five millions sterling to the stock of the precious metal in the banks at that city and elsewhere. [The editor of the *London News* was ignorant of the redemption and disuse of from three to five millions of dollars of Western currency and its replacement by specie.—*Ed. B. M.*]

In the face of a constant fall in the exchange, arguments have been used, the drift of which would apparently be, that we shall pay America in the forms of rifles and munitions of war for the rest of the grain which we shall need from her. In some of our midland districts the orders pressed by the agents of the contending American governments have unquestionably given an impulse to certain branches of industry; but who ever heard of an adverse balance of trade being redressed in such a fashion? Munitions of war, we fear, will go but a small way towards liquidating our debt to America for corn and flour. Supposing, even, that we undertook the entire task of arming a quarter of a million of men, what proportion would its cost bear to that of providing, if only partially, for the daily sustenance of 36,000,000?

No one can doubt for a moment that the real cause of the fall in the New-York exchange to 104, recently announced, and upon which the Bank of England have acted, is the grain movement. Again: we see the argument used, that under the distrust inspired by the existing civil dissensions, capital will flow from America for investment in safety here. Isolated transactions of this kind will doubtless be effected by individuals, but to imagine that there will be any displacement of capital of sufficient importance to obviate the pressure from which we are now suffering, seems to be a very unsafe view indeed. It is most unlikely that the investments by Americans, in our comparatively high-priced English securities, will amount to a tithe of the English investments in the wretchedly depreciated American securities.

Had the Americans a superabundance of capital to dispose of, they might, of course, transfer it for investment here. But how does the case stand? Why have they thrown down the prices of their securities to so serious an extent? Simply because, in their present condition, they do not want securities at all, but capital in its most available form. A severe fall in prices in their stock markets is one means of attracting capital from the foreigner. Hereafter we shall probably realize large profits upon these investments, for as soon as the present troubles have passed away, the Americans will buy back from us at high prices the securities which, for their immediate accommodation, they are now transferring to us at low ones; but the present effect of these transactions is unquestionably to increase the amount of the balance against us.—*London Daily News.*

V. DISCOVERY OF COUNTERFEIT COIN AND BILLS.

The arrest of several active counterfeiters, by the name of HADLEY, was effected at Medford, Mass., the last week in August. The police officers visited Medford, and searched a house where they had lately resided. In the cellar they found \$175 in counterfeit halves and quarters, and \$3,855 in counterfeit (photograph) bills on the Orange County Bank, Chelsea, Vt., and a number of figures designed for altering the denomination of bank notes. The officers also found a lot of metals, models, crucibles and other articles used for counterfeiting. The metal was buried, and the coin was in a bean pot covered over with green cranberries. The counterfeit coins are well stamped.

VI. DECIMAL COINAGE IN DENMARK.

In the kingdom of Denmark a decimal system of coinage has just been adopted. It comprises four denominations of silver and one of bronze coins. These are named respectively twenty, ten, five, three and one cent pieces. The largest coin of the series, which corresponds closely in value with the franc of the French empire, has for its obverse the well-engraved and massive looking head of the king in profile, and surrounded by the legend "FREDERICK III., Konge Af Danmark," with the date. The reverse represents a ship in full sail over a rippled sea, and bears the inscription, which we leave Danish scholars to translate, "Dansk Vestindisk Mout," with the value of the coin, "20 cents," underneath. The ship, no doubt, is emblematical of the commerce of the country, and the superiority of its inhabitants as navigators. The next coin in point of value, although decorated with the head of the monarch for its obverse, and having the same legends, has a reverse design of quite a different character, namely, a tall shrub or plant, in flower, which is, of course, indigenous to Denmark. It presents a rather singular appearance. As, however, agriculture is largely pursued by the people, it is not an inappropriate device. The five cent piece is a reduced *fac simile* of the first named, whilst on the three cent coin neither ship nor shrub appears, but in their place a conspicuous figure 3 is seen, with the word cents below it. The one cent bronze bears no family likeness to its silver relatives. In place of the royal head, it has for its obverse the royal arms, which consists of three lions, each surmounted by three hearts on a shield, and with a crown placed above the whole, the inscription being "FREDERICK VII., Konge Af Danmark." The reverse exhibits simply a wreath of oak leaves, encircling the value of the coin, "1 cent," and has the inscription "Dansk Vestindisk," immediately within the ingrained edge. The coins are all well proportioned as regards thickness and diameter, and well engraved; and while the edges of the silver pieces are milled or grained, in a manner resembling our own gold and silver moneys, those of the bronze coins are plain.

We cannot but congratulate our Danish friends on having obtained a system of decimal coinage which, while it will facilitate marvellously the transactions of trade, will economize to no inconsiderable extent the time of the schoolmaster and the book-keeper. When will Great Britain follow suit?—*London Mechanics' Magazine, June, 1861.*

THE NATIONAL LOAN OF SEPTEMBER, 1861.

List of Agents for the National Loan, designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, up to the 17th September, 1861.

MAINE.

Auburn,..... J. H. Roak.
Bangor,..... Samuel F. Hersey.
Bath,..... D. C. Magoun.
Belfast,..... Thomas Marshall.
Calais,..... George Darnes.
Eastport,..... O. S. Livermore.
Gardiner,..... N. Wood.
Portland,..... W. M. Thomas.
Skowhegan,..... Abner Coburn.
Thomaston,..... William Singer.
Waterville,..... D. L. Millikin.

NEW-HAMPSHIRE.

Concord,..... Hale Roberts.
Dover,..... Joseph H. Smith.
Keen,..... T. H. Leverett.
Manchester,..... John S. Kidder.
Nashua,..... Isaac Spaulding.
Portsmouth,..... Samuel Lord.

VERMONT.

Brattleboro,..... N. R. Williston.
Burlington,..... Vernon P. Noyes.
Montpelier,..... E. P. Jewett.
St. Albans,..... Hiram B. Sowles.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Boston,..... James G. Carney.
Boston,..... William Gray.
Charlestown,..... Edward Lawrence.
Dorchester,..... Oliver Hall.
Fall River,..... Jefferson Borden.
Fitchburg,..... Ebenezer Torrey.
Gloucester,..... Isaac Somes.
Greenfield,..... W. B. Washburn.
Haverhill,..... George Cogswell.
Lawrence,..... Charles S. Storrow.
Lowell,..... S. W. Stickney.
Lynn,..... M. C. Pratt.
Newburyport,..... Micajah Lunt.
New-Bedford,..... Charles R. Tucker.
Northampton,..... J. H. Butler.
Pittsfield,..... Julius Rockwell.
Plymouth,..... J. H. Loud.
Quincy,..... Josiah Brigham.
Roxbury,..... Samuel Guild.
Salem,..... L. B. Harrington.
Springfield,..... P. F. Wilcox.

South Danvers, .. Ebenezer Sutton.
Taunton,..... Lovett Morse.
Westfield,..... E. B. Gillett.
Worcester,..... S. Salisbury.

CONNECTICUT.

Bridgeport,..... Philo C. Calhoun.
Bridgeport,..... Clapp Spooner.
Birmingham,..... Edward N. Shelton.
Danbury,..... Samuel Tweedy.
East Haddam,..... S. Arnold.
Hartford,..... Henry A. Perkins.
Middletown,..... John H. Watkinson.
Meriden,..... Joel H. Guy.
New-Haven,..... Ezra H. Read.
New-London,..... W. H. Chapman.
Norfolk,..... E. T. Butler.
Norwalk,..... Charles Isaacs.
Norwich,..... Franklin Nichols.
Rockville,..... Allen Hammond.
Stonington,..... Stiles Stanton.
Stamford,..... John W. Leeds.
Waterbury,..... J. P. Elton.
Westport,..... Horace Staples.
West Winstead, .. Wm. H. Phelps.
Windham,..... S. H. Walcott.

RHODE ISLAND.

Bristol,..... Byron Diman.
Cranston,..... W. V. Daboll.
Coventry,..... C. A. Whitman.
Fall River,..... Oliver Chase.
Newport,..... R. B. Kinsley.
North Kingston, .. J. J. Reynolds.
South Kingston, .. Elisha P. Potter.
North Providence, S. Benedict.
Warren,..... N. M. Wheaton.
Westerly,..... H. N. Campbell.
Woonsocket,..... Ezekiel Fowler.
Providence,..... Amos D. Smith.
Providence,..... Josiah Chapen.
Providence,..... Seth Paddleford.

NEW-YORK.

Albany,..... S. K. Alden.
Albany,..... Thomas W. Olcott.
Auburn,..... James S. Seymour.
Bath,..... John Magee.
Binghamton,..... Ammi Doubleday.

Buffalo, Gibson T. Williams.
 Catskill, Rufus H. King.
 Cooperstown, W. H. Averell.
 Elmira, John Arnott.
 Geneseo, James S. Wadsworth.
 Havana, Charles Cook.
 Hudson, E. Gifford.
 Lockport, Wm. Keep.
 Newburg, George W. Kerr.
 Norwich, James H. Smith.
 Oswego, James Platt.
 Poughkeepsie, James E. Mott.
 Rochester, Asa Sprague.
 Syracuse, J. Wilkinson.
 Troy, D. T. Vail.
 Utica, T. Walker.
 Watertown, T. H. Camp.
 New-York City, .. Morris Ketchum.

NEW-JERSEY.

Belvidere, J. J. Blair.
 Camden, J. Gill.
 Hackettstown, ... William Rhea.
 Jersey City, John Cassedy.
 Morristown, Jesse Smith.
 Newark, Joseph A. Hasley.
 New-Brunswick, .. John B. Hill.
 Princeton, R. S. Field.
 Somerville, J. Doughty.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Bristol, A. Burton.
 Chambersburg, ... Wm. Keyser.
 Doylestown, C. E. Dubois.
 Gettysburg, G. Swope.
 Harrisburg, W. M. Kerr.
 Lancaster, C. Hager.
 Lebanon, J. W. Gleninger.
 Lewisburg, Wm. Cameron.
 Middletown, George Smuller.
 Norristown, J. Boyer.
 Northumberland, J. B. Packer.
 Pittsburg, Joshua Hanna.
 Philadelphia, Jay Cooke.
 Pottsville, J. Shippen.
 Washington, C. M. Reed.
 Waynesburg, Jesse Hook.
 Reading, Isaac Eckert.
 Wilkesbarre, G. M. Hollenback.
 York, Henry Welsh.

DELAWARE.

Wilmington, Thomas M. Rodney.

MARYLAND.

Baltimore, Johns Hopkins.

INDIANA.

Indianapolis, C. S. Stevenson.
 Bedford, G. A. Thornton.

Connersville, E. J. Claypool.
 Evansville, Samuel Bayard.
 Fort Wayne, Chas. D. Bond.
 Jeffersonville, ... W. H. Fogg.
 Lafayette, J. C. Brockenbrough.
 Laporte, U. C. Follett.
 Lawrenceburg, ... C. B. Burkam.
 Lima, J. B. Howe.
 Logansport, James Cheney.
 Madison, George D. Fitzhugh.
 Muncie, John H. Burson.
 New-Albany, Walter Mann.
 Richmond, Charles F. Coffin.
 Rushville, W. C. McReynolds.
 South Bend, Horatio Chapin.
 Terre Haute, Preston Hussey.
 Vincennes, J. F. Bayard.
 Franklin, R. T. Overstreet.
 Lima, S. P. Williams.

ILLINOIS.

Chicago, Julius White.
 Chicago, D. R. Holt.
 Belvidere, A. C. Fuller.
 Freeport, James Mitchell.
 Galena, W. W. Huntington.
 Rockford, M. Starr.
 Waukegan, James Y. Cory.
 Rock Island, N. B. Buford.
 Quincy, N. Bushnell.

OHIO.

Ashtabula, O. H. Fitch.
 Athens, E. H. Moore.
 Akron, N. W. Goodhue.
 Bridgeport, John C. Tallman.
 Bellefontaine, ... James Walker.
 Cincinnati, Robert Buchanon.
 Columbus, W. G. Deshler.
 Chillicothe, Henry Massie.
 Cadiz, C. Dewey.
 Cleveland, H. B. Hurlburt.
 Cuyahoga Falls, .. E. N. Gill.
 Circleville, O. Ballard.
 Coshocton, W. K. Johnson.
 Dayton, Peter Odlin.
 Delaware, Hosea Williams.
 Eaton, H. C. Heistand.
 Elyria, Elijah De Witt.
 Hillsborough, ... Wm. O. Collins.
 Hamilton, Wm. Beckett.
 Logan, John Madera.
 Lebanon, A. H. Dunlevy.
 Marion, J. Ault.
 Millersburg, R. K. Enos.
 Mansfield, James Purely.
 Marietta, John Mills.
 Mount Pleasant, .. Jonathan Binns.
 Mount Vernon, ... H. B. Curtis.
 Massillon, Isaac Steese.

Norwalk,..... John Gardiner.
 Newark,..... Willard Warner.
 Piqua,..... Joseph G. Young.
 Portsmouth,..... W. Kinney.
 Painesville,..... S. S. Osborne.
 Ripley,..... Daniel P. Evans.
 Ravenna,..... E. S. Comstock.
 Salem,..... J. J. Brooks.
 Steubenville,..... Wm. Spencer.
 Springfield,..... F. F. McGrew.
 Sandusky,..... O. Follet.
 Toledo,..... A. Stone, Jr.
 Troy,..... John G. Telford.
 Toledo,..... Paul Jones.
 Urbana,..... Henry P. Espy.
 Wooster,..... E. Quimby, Jr.
 Warren,..... Henry B. Perkins.
 Xenia,..... A. Hirling.
 Youngstown,..... David Tod.
 Zanesville,..... D. Applegate.

MICHIGAN.

Detroit,..... H. K. Sanger.

WISCONSIN.

Beloit,..... L. G. Eisher.
 Elkhorn,..... J. A. Pury.
 Fond du Lac,.... Edward Pies.
 Green Lake,..... E. B. Smith.
 La Crosse,..... C. C. Washburne.
 Milwaukie,..... Edward D. Holton.
 Racine,..... George S. Wright.

MISSOURI.

St. Louis,..... Benjamin Farrar.

KENTUCKY.

Louisville,..... William Richardson.
 Louisville,..... Joshua F. Speed.

VIRGINIA.

Wheeling,..... D. Lamb.

CALIFORNIA.

San Francisco,... D. W. Cheeseman.

THE KOSSUTH NOTES.—A case of considerable interest, bearing on the revolution which is brewing in Hungary, was raised in the Vice-Chancellor's Court in London. It appears that LOUIS KOSSUTH has engaged the eminent lithographers, the Messrs. DAY, to lithograph an immense number of notes, mainly of a single florin each, but amounting, it is said, to 100,000,000 florins in all, in the Hungarian language, (in which no Austrian paper money is ever issued,) and running as follows:—"One Florin.—This monetary note will be received in every Hungarian State and public pay office as one florin in silver—three zwanzigers being one florin—and its whole nominal value is guaranteed by the State in the name of the nation. (Signed,) LOUIS KOSSUTH." The royal arms of Hungary are placed at the bottom of this document. We believe that, before authorizing the engraving of his name, KOSSUTH took legal advice, and was positively assured that the engraving of such notes contravened no law of that country. The Austrian ambassador, however, had in some way got news of his proceeding, and the home authorities sent, we believe, through Sir R. MAYNE, the head of the Metropolitan Police, a warning to the engraver that until hearing further on the matter he must regard himself as liable to a summary government interference. The advice of the law officers of the crown was taken, and the result was, as we understand, that the cabinet came to the conclusion that the administrative government, at least, had no power to interfere, and the notice to the lithographers was withdrawn.

In the House of Commons, March 5th, Mr. WHITE asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the alleged manufacture of notes in this country, in the name of Hungary, had been brought to the notice of her majesty's government by the government of Austria, and what steps had been taken thereupon by the order or advice of her majesty's government. Lord J. RUSSELL said that the fact of the manufacture of notes in England, with the signature of KOSSUTH and the royal crown of Hungary on them, was, on the 5th of last month, brought under the notice of her majesty's government by the ambassador of Austria. The question was immediately referred to the law officers of the crown, and they gave an opinion at some length that it was not possible—that it was hardly possible—to obtain a conviction, though they considered that the fabrication of those notes was contrary to the laws of that country. According to their advice, he wrote to the ambassador of Austria, in London, stating that her majesty's government felt unable to take any steps in the matter. The Austrian ambassador then said that he hoped her majesty's government would consider him justified in taking steps, if he thought proper; and he (Lord J. RUSSELL) replied that he was quite free to do so.

BANK STATISTICS.

STATE BANK OF OHIO AND BRANCHES, 1860—1861.

LIABILITIES.	May 7, 1860.	June 3, 1861.	July 1, 1861.	Aug. 5, 1861.
Capital,.....	\$ 501,070	.. \$ 628,490	.. \$ 785,642	.. \$ 655,185
Circulation,.....	644,851	.. 689,819	.. 988,073	.. 996,517
Due other banks and bankers,.....	15,519	.. 41,401	.. 37,522	.. 19,880
Deposits,.....	718,904	.. 1,212,046	.. 1,002,306	.. 881,189
Other items,.....	59,286	.. 125,584	.. 126,219	.. 124,481
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 1,984,630	.. \$ 2,606,840	.. \$ 2,889,762	.. \$ 2,627,202
ASSETS.	May 7, 1860.	June 3, 1861.	July 1, 1861.	Aug. 5, 1861.
Safety fund,.....	\$ 115,262	.. \$ 153,940	.. \$ 154,049	.. \$ 163,249
Specie,.....	325,172	.. 509,500	.. 547,868	.. 593,799
Notes of other banks,.....	304,609	.. 337,715	.. 324,082	.. 266,579
Due from banks,.....	258,754	.. 414,090	.. 386,710	.. 303,489
Loans,.....	843,615	.. 1,086,193	.. 1,117,146	.. 1,030,540
Other items,.....	87,218	.. 195,402	.. 360,412	.. 264,596
Total assets,.....	\$ 1,984,630	.. \$ 2,606,840	.. \$ 2,889,762	.. \$ 2,627,202

PHILADELPHIA.—19 Banks—Capital, September, 1861, \$11,811,485.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 26,891,280	.. \$ 4,020,266	.. \$ 2,689,812	.. \$ 15,261,925	.. \$ 3,593,785
Jan. 12,....	26,555,986	.. 4,151,824	.. 2,694,217	.. 15,001,591	.. 3,464,167
Jan. 19,....	26,172,473	.. 4,268,105	.. 2,754,815	.. 14,750,382	.. 3,416,292
Jan. 26,....	25,892,265	.. 4,448,781	.. 2,787,688	.. 14,891,200	.. 3,143,795
Feb. 2,....	25,801,981	.. 4,588,054	.. 2,778,818	.. 15,295,458	.. 2,699,627
Feb. 16,....	25,344,076	.. 4,831,426	.. 2,809,865	.. 14,904,783	.. 2,864,874
Feb. 23,....	25,146,864	.. 4,901,704	.. 2,795,113	.. 14,835,806	.. 2,873,996
Mch. 2,....	25,085,810	.. 5,006,938	.. 2,811,491	.. 14,868,736	.. 2,811,491
Mch. 9,....	24,626,583	.. 5,295,814	.. 2,896,492	.. 14,501,214	.. 2,788,978
Mch. 16,....	24,627,504	.. 5,538,320	.. 2,802,414	.. 15,018,566	.. 2,897,500
Mch. 23,....	24,603,908	.. 6,059,820	.. 2,764,090	.. 15,464,754	.. 2,776,645
Mch. 30,....	24,973,496	.. 5,200,063	.. 2,811,263	.. 15,800,147	.. 3,010,776
Apl. 6,....	25,413,186	.. 6,452,098	.. 3,070,220	.. 16,006,115	.. 3,135,784
Apl. 13,....	25,415,442	.. 6,675,122	.. 2,820,813	.. 16,458,833	.. 3,543,158
Apl. 20,....	25,809,955	.. 6,796,011	.. 2,641,055	.. 16,633,231	.. 3,332,073
Apl. 27,....	25,296,942	.. 6,250,187	.. 2,546,805	.. 15,749,282	.. 3,273,704
May 4,....	25,438,065	.. 5,898,802	.. 2,716,602	.. 15,671,997	.. 3,107,898
May 11,....	25,715,818	.. 5,738,048	.. 2,607,421	.. 15,523,151	.. 3,017,655
May 18,....	25,496,580	.. 5,553,551	.. 2,435,552	.. 15,549,797	.. 2,793,670
May 25,....	25,091,226	.. 5,648,220	.. 2,408,518	.. 15,410,522	.. 2,554,885
June 1,....	24,671,294	.. 5,718,826	.. 2,317,067	.. 15,806,666	.. 2,491,024
June 8,....	24,585,244	.. 5,767,994	.. 2,294,862	.. 15,267,675	.. 2,543,406
June 15,....	24,282,443	.. 5,927,466	.. 2,195,087	.. 15,879,559	.. 2,477,029
June 22,....	24,240,983	.. 6,336,744	.. 2,147,212	.. 15,740,672	.. 2,460,557
June 29,....	23,967,200	.. 6,688,893	.. 2,101,812	.. 15,997,943	.. 2,412,862

PHILADELPHIA.—(Continued.)

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
July 6,....	\$ 24,127,178 ..	\$ 6,956,112 ..	\$ 2,190,085 ..	\$ 15,851,924 ..	\$ 2,610,189
July 13,....	23,996,828 ..	7,255,798 ..	2,154,812 ..	16,129,765 ..	2,739,490
July 20,....	23,942,341 ..	7,477,298 ..	2,128,922 ..	19,190,876 ..	2,881,735
July 27,....	23,927,483 ..	7,159,969 ..	2,091,770 ..	16,026,267 ..	2,788,565
Aug. 3,....	24,211,527 ..	6,748,321 ..	2,058,574 ..	15,941,861 ..	2,719,439
Aug. 10,....	24,064,070 ..	6,796,140 ..	2,074,009 ..	15,568,024 ..	2,767,679
Aug. 17,....	24,011,084 ..	6,765,120 ..	2,076,857 ..	15,835,838 ..	2,886,426
Aug. 24,....	27,457,117 ..	6,457,587 ..	2,046,614 ..	18,217,914 ..	2,988,213
Aug. 31,....	28,557,264 ..	6,179,482 ..	2,074,048 ..	19,080,712 ..	3,132,796
Sept. 7,....	28,828,496 ..	5,617,370 ..	2,111,439 ..	18,826,887 ..	3,064,097
Sept. 14,....	27,871,497 ..	5,046,536 ..	2,148,865 ..	16,976,017 ..	2,981,495

NEW-YORK.—54 Banks—Capital, August, 1861, \$69,907,000.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Weekly Clearings.	Sub-Treasury.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 129,625,465 ..	\$ 24,889,475 ..	\$ 8,698,288 ..	\$ 86,454,430 ..	\$ 95,994,868 ..	\$ 3,645,500
Jan. 12,....	129,125,515 ..	26,460,988 ..	8,357,198 ..	88,148,883 ..	123,808,188 ..	2,584,400
Jan. 19,....	126,034,520 ..	29,598,738 ..	8,067,570 ..	89,658,696 ..	121,218,782 ..	2,166,000
Jan. 26,....	123,935,153 ..	28,968,941 ..	7,920,298 ..	87,886,046 ..	123,070,934 ..	5,751,300
Feb. 2,....	121,907,024 ..	31,054,509 ..	8,099,876 ..	87,879,743 ..	122,188,525 ..	4,823,000
Feb. 9,....	120,368,050 ..	34,655,645 ..	8,861,305 ..	88,988,681 ..	121,525,681 ..	3,664,900
Feb. 16,....	119,880,371 ..	37,119,000 ..	8,278,840 ..	91,547,159 ..	111,887,668 ..	3,356,000
Feb. 23,....	119,236,290 ..	38,044,229 ..	8,128,792 ..	91,628,626 ..	118,142,167 ..	3,336,700
Mch. 2,....	121,893,963 ..	34,480,407 ..	8,290,755 ..	89,635,298 ..	126,728,832 ..	9,166,030
Mch. 9,....	122,705,094 ..	33,892,763 ..	8,585,783 ..	88,711,448 ..	129,808,550 ..	7,524,000
Mch. 16,....	122,609,925 ..	36,219,676 ..	8,892,847 ..	90,520,779 ..	119,500,578 ..	6,720,000
Mch. 23,....	120,750,455 ..	39,480,784 ..	8,845,011 ..	91,940,223 ..	120,188,015 ..	6,240,510
Mch. 30,....	120,953,165 ..	41,408,308 ..	8,484,844 ..	93,611,898 ..	119,040,819 ..	6,092,841
Apr. 6,....	122,118,496 ..	41,705,558 ..	8,930,141 ..	94,859,810 ..	123,277,671 ..	8,486,494
Apr. 13,....	123,108,885 ..	41,764,748 ..	8,801,429 ..	96,626,078 ..	124,284,307 ..	10,441,278
Apr. 20,....	124,701,259 ..	40,620,720 ..	8,525,057 ..	97,804,762 ..	124,020,087 ..	11,058,653
Apr. 27,....	124,817,154 ..	38,991,658 ..	8,840,476 ..	96,788,759 ..	106,948,819 ..	10,773,106
May 4,....	124,610,166 ..	38,054,254 ..	9,296,899 ..	94,977,881 ..	106,418,816 ..	9,761,752
May 11,....	128,132,298 ..	38,801,545 ..	9,304,241 ..	94,879,967 ..	104,163,420 ..	8,588,902
May 18,....	120,007,806 ..	39,557,980 ..	9,061,181 ..	93,179,526 ..	98,102,519 ..	7,867,542
May 25,....	118,141,856 ..	39,622,791 ..	8,798,882 ..	91,334,877 ..	94,155,277 ..	6,886,008
June 1,....	118,290,181 ..	37,502,402 ..	8,688,780 ..	90,197,459 ..	88,847,249 ..	11,468,789
June 8,....	117,509,075 ..	36,887,025 ..	8,963,007 ..	87,656,760 ..	95,465,614 ..	10,753,608
June 15,....	115,494,821 ..	38,280,211 ..	8,707,818 ..	87,992,791 ..	86,467,176 ..	9,488,884
June 22,....	118,667,640 ..	39,480,189 ..	8,444,830 ..	87,602,843 ..	88,183,062 ..	8,004,656
June 29,....	112,404,012 ..	42,078,011 ..	8,383,559 ..	88,721,752 ..	83,279,416 ..	6,094,283
July 6,....	112,184,668 ..	45,630,025 ..	8,862,799 ..	90,579,758 ..	88,818,280 ..	4,616,620
July 13,....	112,445,543 ..	45,016,836 ..	8,499,699 ..	91,805,937 ..	86,898,087 ..	7,055,548
July 20,....	112,086,103 ..	46,602,295 ..	8,354,192 ..	93,298,195 ..	96,566,821 ..	6,573,193
July 27,....	112,311,832 ..	46,900,721 ..	8,324,868 ..	93,687,938 ..	85,965,067 ..	7,359,272
Aug. 3,....	111,719,111 ..	46,226,181 ..	8,585,574 ..	92,229,884 ..	81,415,525 ..	6,788,059
Aug. 10,....	109,938,942 ..	48,680,116 ..	8,730,452 ..	92,016,057 ..	80,417,832 ..	5,629,641
Aug. 17,....	108,717,434 ..	49,733,990 ..	8,521,426 ..	92,046,808 ..	80,172,670 ..	4,380,239
Aug. 24,....	137,663,988 ..	47,119,481 ..	8,489,714 ..	118,456,807 ..	82,946,028 ..	6,993,296
Aug. 31,....	141,081,474 ..	45,098,113 ..	8,440,155 ..	120,436,010 ..	83,446,771 ..	8,851,608
Sept. 7,....	139,158,280 ..	41,887,280 ..	8,890,581 ..	114,091,061 ..	89,058,896 ..	13,094,909
Sept. 14,....	136,565,624 ..	37,529,412 ..	8,792,620 ..	106,760,876 ..	95,611,078 ..	14,293,222
Sept. 21,....	130,192,258 ..	36,805,177 ..	8,707,693 ..	99,316,581 ..	97,104,420 ..	15,541,307

BOSTON. — 42 Banks—Capital, January, 1859, \$35,125,433; June, 1861, \$38,231,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due to Banks.	Due from Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 62,025,734 ..	\$ 4,204,610 ..	\$ 7,032,018 ..	\$ 18,719,190 ..	\$ 7,663,862 ..	\$ 8,371,804
Jan. 12,....	62,720,067 ..	4,199,155 ..	6,825,325 ..	18,422,650 ..	8,082,942 ..	7,605,680
Jan. 19,....	63,275,167 ..	4,425,256 ..	6,706,045 ..	18,366,511 ..	8,346,141 ..	7,094,433
Jan. 26,....	63,237,796 ..	4,532,019 ..	6,374,476 ..	18,185,128 ..	8,477,340 ..	6,714,029
Feb. 2,....	63,264,318 ..	4,629,068 ..	6,247,643 ..	18,184,009 ..	8,485,630 ..	6,568,176
Feb. 9,....	63,434,332 ..	4,573,614 ..	6,387,552 ..	18,074,698 ..	8,318,692 ..	6,299,117
Feb. 16,...	63,118,532 ..	4,651,803 ..	6,216,299 ..	17,795,444 ..	8,312,101 ..	6,791,101
Feb. 23,....	62,765,038 ..	4,738,981 ..	6,334,383 ..	17,533,065 ..	8,451,939 ..	6,822,815
Mch. 2,....	62,725,101 ..	4,751,291 ..	6,372,201 ..	17,981,201 ..	8,111,201 ..	6,921,107
Mch. 9,....	62,649,600 ..	4,836,600 ..	6,345,600 ..	18,132,000 ..	7,978,000 ..	7,032,600
Mch. 16,....	62,511,727 ..	5,867,722 ..	6,166,253 ..	18,126,034 ..	8,269,601 ..	6,550,262
Mch. 23,....	62,359,922 ..	5,601,371 ..	6,059,548 ..	17,811,827 ..	8,611,882 ..	6,350,362
Mch. 30,....	62,666,800 ..	5,605,400 ..	6,108,600 ..	18,629,000 ..	8,345,500 ..	7,269,900
Apr. 6,....	62,561,820 ..	5,809,425 ..	6,996,996 ..	19,918,855 ..	9,193,022 ..	8,596,667
Apr. 13,....	62,734,600 ..	5,875,600 ..	6,900,500 ..	19,697,500 ..	9,388,000 ..	8,167,000
Apr. 20,....	62,396,500 ..	5,780,700 ..	6,738,000 ..	19,440,700 ..	9,482,000 ..	8,210,500
Apr. 27,....	61,807,897 ..	5,633,790 ..	6,610,860 ..	18,571,856 ..	9,640,246 ..	8,181,220
May 4,....	61,334,400 ..	5,832,000 ..	6,875,000 ..	18,846,700 ..	9,223,000 ..	8,168,400
May 11,....	61,156,500 ..	5,997,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,309,600 ..	8,660,000 ..	7,625,600
May 18,....	61,206,000 ..	6,172,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,646,600 ..	8,331,000 ..	7,299,800
May 25,....	60,525,000 ..	6,402,700 ..	6,280,800 ..	18,586,000 ..	8,300,800 ..	7,144,500
June 1,....	60,213,500 ..	6,461,800 ..	6,139,700 ..	18,536,900 ..	8,206,000 ..	7,135,800
June 8,....	60,625,800 ..	6,013,800 ..	6,460,800 ..	18,204,500 ..	8,093,000 ..	7,198,000
June 15,....	60,074,100 ..	5,438,700 ..	6,452,500 ..	18,293,000 ..	8,000,000 ..	7,208,000
June 22,....	60,180,500 ..	5,831,000 ..	6,322,800 ..	18,240,300 ..	7,758,600 ..	7,428,000
June 29,....	60,095,675 ..	5,874,358 ..	6,106,524 ..	18,264,375 ..	7,609,614 ..	7,093,610
July 6,....	60,251,122 ..	6,090,012 ..	6,881,142 ..	18,521,267 ..	7,965,908 ..	8,178,039
July 13,....	60,324,993 ..	6,395,797 ..	6,607,102 ..	18,267,317 ..	8,173,713 ..	7,627,453
July 20,....	60,252,940 ..	6,662,661 ..	6,735,623 ..	18,541,111 ..	8,530,619 ..	8,071,750
July 27,...	60,276,822 ..	6,528,420 ..	6,304,533 ..	17,968,358 ..	8,324,698 ..	7,013,456
Aug. 3,....	61,263,745 ..	6,199,104 ..	6,331,199 ..	18,111,086 ..	8,423,709 ..	6,553,754
Aug. 10,....	61,133,351 ..	6,412,156 ..	6,450,374 ..	18,044,728 ..	8,558,647 ..	6,606,025
Aug. 17,....	60,893,110 ..	6,665,929 ..	6,366,466 ..	18,235,061 ..	8,523,538 ..	6,801,296
Aug. 24,....	61,775,707 ..	6,734,426 ..	6,153,273 ..	19,505,417 ..	8,376,735 ..	6,370,252
Aug. 31,....	64,530,296 ..	6,434,053 ..	6,160,153 ..	22,396,635 ..	8,459,272 ..	7,497,432
Sept. 7,....	64,341,903 ..	7,073,145 ..	6,500,354 ..	22,661,619 ..	7,916,574 ..	7,369,914
Sept. 14,....	64,292,297 ..	6,670,849 ..	6,445,849 ..	22,161,256 ..	8,011,214 ..	7,171,901

Ohio.—The reference to the Ohio Valley Bank [alluding to the charge of their intending to drive home the Treasury notes for redemption] is without the shadow of foundation in fact. We may say further, that the Valley Bank has done more, in proportion to its capital, to aid the government than any banking institution in the country; and the charge, therefore, does great injustice to its liberal and patriotic managers. As for the Bank of the State of Indiana, we learn that it is its intention to treat the Treasury notes as other currency; and this policy will be adopted, we have no doubt, throughout. The paper will be subject to the laws of trade, and when the issues perform their functions they will be returned, and not before. If the government expects any thing better than this it will be disappointed. Any thing worse need not be anticipated. There will be no combination or special effort to crowd the notes home. On the contrary they will constitute a favorite circulating medium with both the people and the banks.—*Cincinnati Gazette*.

BANK ITEMS.

NOTICE.—Owing to the rebellion at the South and the revulsion in commercial and financial affairs, the subscriptions to the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* have lessened in number so materially during the present year as not to meet at present the actual expense of publication from month to month.

Under these circumstances we deem it necessary to appeal to the remaining subscribers to exert their influence in extending the circulation of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* in their vicinity, and aid in upholding a journal devoted to banking interests. There are in every State numerous banking institutions THAT HAVE NEVER TAKEN THE WORK, although expressly adapted to the use of bank officers, and especially to bank clerks. When it is considered that the president, cashier, tellers, book-keepers and other officers, and the directors of a bank, have the use of the single copy usually taken, the cost is a mere trifle.

TO BANKING INSTITUTIONS.—We have the address of a gentleman, qualified by experience as a teller for some years, to discharge the duties of teller, book-keeper or cashier of a bank. Any banking association in need of such services may address the editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*.

NEW-YORK.—The new Bank of Columbia, recently established at Chatham Corners, Columbia County, in this State, has arranged for the redemption of its notes of \$10 and upwards, at par, by the Metropolitan Bank. The whole circulation of the bank is secured by the pledge of the public stocks of New-York and the United States with the Bank Department. The notes, which are a beautiful specimen of art, were engraved by the National Bank Note Company of this city.

MASSACHUSETTS.—The following table shows the amount subscribed by each of the Boston banks to the 7 3-10 per cent. United States Treasury Loan. Some ten or a dozen other financial institutions in the different cities of the State also shared in the subscription to the extent of from \$30,000 to \$50,000 each, making, with those named below, an aggregate of \$10,000,000:

<i>Banks.</i>	<i>Amount.</i>	<i>Banks.</i>	<i>Amount.</i>
Atlas Bank,.....	\$ 265,000	Massachusetts Bank,.....	\$ 210,000
Atlantic Bank,.....	50,000	Maverick Bank,.....	105,000
Blackstone Bank,.....	200,000	Mechanics' Bank, (So. Boston,) ..	30,000
Boston Bank,.....	245,000	Merchants' Bank,.....	1,110,000
Boylston Bank,.....	100,000	Metropolis, Bank of the,.....	10,000
Broadway Bank, (So. Boston,) ..	35,000	Mutual Redemption Bank,....	190,000
City Bank,.....	260,000	National Bank,.....	200,000
Columbian Bank,.....	300,000	New-England Bank,.....	275,000
Commerce, Bank of,.....	254,000	North Bank,.....	228,000
Continental Bank,.....	80,000	North America, Bank of,....	200,000
Eagle Bank,.....	260,000	Republic, Bank of the,.....	125,000
Eliot Bank,.....	100,000	Revere Bank,.....	270,000
Exchange Bank,.....	300,000	Shawmut Bank,.....	200,000
Faneuil Hall Bank,.....	145,000	Shoe and Leather Dealers' Bk., ..	100,000
Freeman's Bank,.....	100,000	State Bank,.....	485,000
Globe Bank,.....	300,000	Suffolk Bank,.....	275,000
Granite Bank,.....	230,000	Traders' Bank,.....	160,000
Hamilton Bank,.....	125,000	Tremont Bank,.....	400,000
Hide and Leather Bank,.....	175,000	Union Bank,.....	262,000
Howard Bank,.....	125,000	Washington Bank,.....	200,000
Market Bank,.....	160,000	Webster Bank,.....	420,000

VERMONT.—Among the applications that are to come before the legislature of Vermont at its approaching session, bank matters will be quite prominent. The Bank of Black River, at Proctorsville, the Woodstock Bank, the White River Bank, at Bethel, the Bank of Newbury, and the Farmers' Bank of Orwell, all ask for a re-charter, and new banks are asked for at Wells River and at Rutland.

VIRGINIA.—A Virginia correspondent of the New-Orleans *Delta*, August, 1861, says: "Every bank, every town and village corporation, even the State itself, and private bankers are deluging the State with wretched currency in notes from five cents to one dollar. Gold and silver are eagerly bought at eight per cent. premium for these notes and carefully hoarded away. Of course this currency never can and never will be redeemed, and when it begins to decline it will be bought up by those who have issued it at an enormous shave, all of which will fall upon the people and enure to the benefit of the corporation. And yet it was gravely proposed that our banks should agree to co-operate with banks which sanction and are engaged in this gigantic fraud, and receive and pay out these worthless rags as they do their own notes. Fortunately it is a constitutional and not merely a statutory barrier. The convention of last March, in consenting to allow the legislature to create new banks, enforced conditions and restrictions which cannot be evaded, and ought never to be. Louisiana will surrender one of her most valuable institutions, and our great city lose one of its most efficient agencies in controlling and directing the vast commerce of the South, when they give up or surrender any essential feature of their admirable banking system. It may be practicable for our banks to aid in giving value and strength to the issues of the Confederate government, but when it is proposed to seduce or drive them into an alliance with banks managed on the false principles which prevail in this and other parts of the South, the people ought to be aroused to vigilance and stern resistance to all such schemes."

IOWA.—J. B. DOUGHERTY, Esq., has been elected President of the Muscatine Branch Bank, in place of GEORGE C. STONE, Esq., resigned.

Washington.—JOSEPH KECK, Esq., has been elected President of the Iowa State Branch Bank of Washington, in place of J. A. GREEN, Esq., resigned.

ILLINOIS.—The attempt to circulate the issues of certain of our Illinois banks is still being prosecuted with some vigor; but, fortunately, the public are fully aware of the risk which is run in handling them, and, so far, the operators have met with very limited encouragement. At this date but few of the banks have filed the additional securities required by the auditor, or have appointed the agents indicated in the amended banking law. And it is to be hoped that even these few will ere long be compelled to wind up from sheer inability to get out a paying circulation. We believe the fiat has gone forth, and that *all* banks organized under the present banking law are worse than useless, either to the public or the owners.—*Chicago Times*, 14th.

Shawneetown.—The State Bank of Illinois, at Shawneetown, has discontinued business. Messrs. PEEPLES & RIDGWAY, at that place, will carry on the banking business.

PENNSYLVANIA CURRENCY.

Pennsylvania Country Bank Notes at par in Philadelphia.

Allentown Bank, Allentown.	Easton Bank, Easton.
Bank of Catasqua.	Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Easton.
Bank of Chester County, Westchester.	Farmers' Bank of Bucks Co., Bristol.
Bank of Delaware County, Chester.	Farmers' Bank of Lancaster, Lancaster.
Bank of Germantown, Germantown.	Lancaster County Bank, Lancaster.
Bank of Montgomery County, Norristown.	Mauch Chunk Bank, Mauch Chunk.
Doylestown Bank, Doylestown.	Miners' Bank of Pottsville, Pottsville.

Delaware Bank Notes at par and redeemed in Philadelphia, in fives and upwards. Small notes $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. discount.

Bank of Delaware, Wilmington.*	Branch at Wilmington.*
Bank of Newark, Newark.	Branch at Newcastle.*
Bank of Smyrna, Smyrna.*	Branch at Georgetown.*
B'k of Wilm. & Brandywine, Wilm'ton.*	Mechanics' Bank, Wilmington.*
Citizens' Bank, Middletown.	New-Castle County Bank.*
Delaware City Bank, Delaware City.*	Real Estate Bank of Delaware.
Farmers' Bank of Dover.*	Union Bank, Wilmington.*

* Five dollars and over.

New-Jersey Bank Notes at par in Philadelphia, in fives and upwards. Small notes $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. discount.

Bordentown Banking Company.*	Mechanics and Manufacturers', Trenton.*
Burlington Bank.*	Millville Bank.*
Burlington County Bank, Medford.*	Mount Holly Bank.*
Cumberland Bank of N. J., Bridgeton.*	Princeton Bank, Princeton.*
Egg Harbor Bank.	Salem Banking Company, Salem.*
Farmers' Bank of N. J., Mt. Holly.*	State Bank, Camden.*
Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, Camden.*	State Bank, New-Brunswick.*
Gloucester County Bank, Woodbury.*	State Bank, Newark.*
Lambertville Bank, Lambertville.	Trenton Banking Company, Trenton.*
Mechanics' Bank of Burlington.*	Union Bank of Frenchtown.*

LOUISIANA.—The banks in the city of New-Orleans are reported to have suspended payment on Monday, September 16th.

LONDON BANKS.—At the half-yearly meeting of the London Joint Stock Bank the report was adopted and a dividend declared at the rate of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum.

A meeting of the Bank of London was held, when the report, announcing a dividend at the rate of five per cent. per annum, free of income tax, was carried unanimously.

At the half-yearly meeting of shareholders of the City Bank a dividend at the rate of six per cent. per annum, and a bonus of 15s. per share were declared, both free of income tax.

At the half-yearly meeting of the London and Westminster Bank the report was adopted unanimously, and a dividend and bonus were declared at the rate, together, of twenty per cent. per annum, free of income tax.

The Committee of the six associated Australian Banks have issued the notice for tenders for Victorian Railway Debentures, amounting to £1,000,000, on Thursday, the 25th instant, at the London and Westminster Bank. The bonds will be in sums of £500 and £100, carrying interest at six per cent. from the 1st of April last.

The liquidation of the estates of the failed Greek firms is considered to be proceeding satisfactorily. Bills sent back to Constantinople have been met; and it is believed that the Greeks themselves will ultimately arrive at some satisfactory arrangement of their large claims upon the Turkish government.

PRIVATE BANKERS.

ILLINOIS.—Col. N. B. BUFORD, of the firm of N. B. BUFORD & Co., bankers, Rock Island, Illinois, has received an appointment in the army.

Chicago.—CHAPIN, WHEELER & Co. is the style of a new banking firm at Chicago—HORATIO CHAPIN, A. B. JUDSON, TOLMAN HIRAM and C. T. WHEELER.

E. H. HALL & Co., bankers, dissolved.

Messrs. HOFFMAN & GELPCKE, bankers, have made an assignment to Mr. H. G. MILLER, for the benefit of creditors. Messrs. WILLIAM H. RICE & Co., bankers, Chicago, have made an assignment.

OHIO.—Messrs. DAVIS & CUPPY, bankers, Cincinnati, suspended payment in August last.

Bucyrus.—Messrs. QUIMBY & REYNOLDS, bankers, at Bucyrus, Ohio, have suspended payment.

MICHIGAN.—Mr. WILLIAM J. WELLES, banker, Grand Rapids, Michigan, have suspended payment and made an assignment.

IOWA.—Messrs. EDWARD A. TEMPLE & Co., bankers in Ottumwa, Iowa, have been compelled to close their doors, owing to the "derangement in money matters."

* Five dollars and over.

Notes on the Money Market.

NEW-YORK, SEPTEMBER 24, 1861.

Exchange on London, at sixty days' sight, 108 @ 108½.

The depressed condition of business affairs during the past four months is now followed by a slight reaction. This may be attributed to the enlarged volume of circulation created by the new government loan. The fifty millions loaned to the Treasury have been largely used for disbursements among public creditors, troops and contractors, and thus enter into the various channels of trade. A slight impulse has been given to business in this city and neighborhood. Numerous manufacturing concerns show more activity. Army goods are now in active demand, and the Fall dry goods trade opens with better symptoms than were anticipated.

The large loan to the government by the banks of this city, as shown by their weekly statement of 24th ultimo, is precisely equivalent to an issue of circulation and loans, to a similar extent, to the people. The Treasury at Washington is merely the channel through which these fifty millions will reach the people, instead of being loaned directly by the banks to their own customers.

Private credit has suffered so much this season by failures, assignments and compromises, that capitalists and moneyed institutions exercise greater caution in their loans to the community. The large number of failures in the dry goods trade has crippled severely the credit of that class. The obvious evils arising from long credits, heretofore given by the dry goods trade, demand a reform in this matter; and it is to be hoped that shorter terms will be adopted. The grocery trade, which gives from two to four months' credit to their customers, has for years been in a more healthy condition.

We annex the ruling rates for business paper at this date, compared with the last week in June, July and August:

	June 24. Per cent.	July 24. Per cent.	Aug. 24. Per cent.	Sept. 24. Per cent.
Loans on call, State Stock securities,.....	5 @ 6 .. 5 @ 6 .. 4 @ 5 .. 5½ @ 6			
“ other good securities,.....	6 @ 7 .. 6 @ 7 .. 6 @ 7 .. 6 @ 7			
Prime endorsed bills, 60 days,.....	6 @ 7 .. 5 @ 6 .. 6 @ 7 .. 6 @ 6½			
First class single signatures, 4 to 6 months, .	8 @ 12 .. 7 @ 9 .. 7 @ 10 .. 6½ @ 7			
Other good bills,.....	12 @ 15 .. 9 @ .. 9 @ 12 .. 10 @ 12			
Names less known,.....	no sale. .. no sale. .. no sale. .. 12 @ 15			

Business paper is closely scrutinized by buyers. The best paper is readily taken at over six per cent., but of this very little is made, the ordinary rate being seven per cent. The lowest rate “on call” that we have heard of, during the month of September, was five per cent., with State bonds as collateral. These are exceptional cases; and while there are frequent transactions at 6 @ 7, it may be said that the bulk of business is done, in and out of bank, at seven per cent.

There has been a reaction in foreign exchange, with sales of bankers' bills on London, sixty days' sight, at 108 up to 109. This will, for the present, stop the export of gold from England to this country. On Paris the rates are firmer than at the date of our last month's report. Sixty day bills have been sold, during the month, as high as 5.40.

The annexed summary will show the changes at the close of each month since June last:

	June 24.	July 24.	Aug. 24.	Sept. 24.
London, bankers' bills,.....	105½ @ 105½ .. 107½ @ 107½ .. 107½ @ 107½ .. 108 @ 108½			
Do. mercantile bills,....	104½ @ 105 .. 105½ @ 106½ .. 106½ @ 107½ .. 107½ @ 108			
Do. with bills of lading, .	102½ @ 104 .. 104½ @ 105½ .. 105 @ 106 .. 106½ @ 107			
Paris, bankers' bills,.....	5.40 @ 5.37 .. 5.30 @ 5.27½ .. 5.40 @ 5.30 .. 5.37½ @ 5.30			
Amsterdam, per guilder,....	89 @ 89½ .. 40½ @ 41 .. 39½ @ 40½ .. 39½ @ 40			
Bremen, per rix dollar,.....	75½ @ 76½ .. 77½ @ 78 .. 75½ @ 77 .. 76½ @ 77½			
Hamburg, per mare banco, ..	34½ @ 35½ .. 35½ @ 36 .. 35 @ 35½ .. 35 @ 35½			
Frankfort, per florin,.....	.. @ @ @ 40½ @ 40½			

For the first time for twelve years the receipts of gold from Europe exceed those from California; the aggregate being within a fraction of forty millions from the former within the eight months of the current year, and twenty-three millions from the Pacific. The specie movement during that period is indicated by the following table:

Importations of Gold into New-York from California and from foreign ports, January 1st to September 1st, 1861, with the aggregate specie in the New-York banks and in the Sub-Treasury at the end of each month:

1861.	From California.	Foreign Imports.	Total.	SPECIE.	
				In Bank.	In Sub-Treasury.
January,.....	\$ 4,185,105 ..	\$ 7,262,229 ..	\$ 11,447,334 ..	\$ 28,968,000 ..	\$ 5,751,000
February,.....	3,622,893 ..	2,274,067 ..	5,896,960 ..	34,480,000 ..	9,166,000
March,.....	2,370,897 ..	5,546,406 ..	7,917,303 ..	41,408,000 ..	6,092,000
April,.....	2,951,253 ..	1,953,001 ..	4,904,254 ..	38,991,000 ..	10,773,000
May,.....	1,977,827 ..	3,486,812 ..	5,464,639 ..	37,502,000 ..	11,468,000
June,.....	2,012,062 ..	5,387,153 ..	7,399,215 ..	42,078,000 ..	6,094,000
July,.....	2,055,363 ..	6,996,498 ..	9,051,866 ..	46,900,000 ..	7,860,000
August,.....	4,245,755 ..	1,049,552 ..	5,295,307 ..	45,098,000 ..	8,852,000
Total,.....	\$ 23,421,160 ..	\$ 33,955,718 ..	\$ 57,376,878		
In banks and Sub-Treasury, January 1st,.....			30,100,000		
			\$ 87,476,878		
Deduct foreign exports, eight months, ..		\$ 3,264,058			
Sent inland, (estimated,).....		30,262,820			
			33,526,878		
On hand at the close of August,.....			\$ 53,950,000		

The sudden rise of exchange on Europe is, in part, attributable to the proclamation of the State Department, whereby balances here due parties in the rebellious States were ordered to be confiscated. Immediately there was a rapid transmission of funds to England and the Continent, which exhausted much of the exchange on hand. This measure of the government was subsequently repealed, the Treasury Department, under date of 21st September, having issued the following notice:

* * * "It will be seen, from an inspection of these provisions of the acts of Congress, that no property is confiscated or subjected to forfeiture except such as is in transit, or provided for transit, to or from insurrectionary States, or used for the promotion of the insurrection. Real estate, bonds, promissory notes, moneys on deposit and the like are, therefore, not subject to seizure or confiscation, in the absence of evidence of such unlawfulness."

We annex the ruling cash rates for leading rail-road shares in this market during the past eight weeks. [Those with a star pay no dividend at present:]

	July 20th.	30th.	Aug. 13th.	20th.	27th.	Sept. 3d.	10th.	21st.
N. Y. Central R. R. shares,.....	77	75½	74½	73	73½	73½	73½	73½
*N. Y. and Erie R. R. shares,...	27	24	26	25½	25	24½	26	26½
*Harlem R. R. shares,.....	11½	10½	10½	10½	10½	10½	10½	10½
*Reading R. R. shares,.....	38½	35½	36	35	35½	35	36	35
*Hudson River R. R. shares,....	37½	33	33½	33	32½	32½	33½	33½
*Michigan Central R. R. shares,.	45	41	42½	40½	41½	41½	44	42
*Michigan Southern R. R. shares,	14	13½	14	12½	13½	13½	14½	13½
Panama R. R. shares,.....	112	106	107	106	105	105½	110½	110
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. shares,	40½	40	40	42	42	41½	40	39½
*Illinois Central R. R. shares,...	67½	62½	64½	63½	64½	64½	67½	65½
*Cleveland and Toledo R. R.,...	30½	26½	29½	28½	28½	29½	30½	29½
*Chicago and Rock Island R. R.,	43½	39	40½	38½	40½	41½	45½	44
Galena & Chicago R. R. shares,	65½	60½	66	64½	65	66½	69½	69½
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy,	61½	..	58	58½	60	60	63½	62½

There has been continued activity during the month in Government loans and in State bonds; prices on the whole, for bonds of the northern States, are firmer than at the close of August. The new Treasury notes, "on demand," have made their appearance, and are readily taken by mer-

chants, being convertible into coin at the Sub-Treasury. Virginia six per cents are $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ below our last quotations in our September No.; Georgia, $8\frac{1}{2}\%$; North Carolina, 8; Louisiana, $7\frac{1}{2}\%$.

We annex highest cash prices, at the dates named, of the Government and leading State securities in this market:

	July 20th.	30th.	Aug. 13th.	20th.	27th.	Sept. 3d.	10th.	21st.
U. S. 6 per cents, 1867-8,....	89 $\frac{1}{2}$	88	86 $\frac{1}{2}$	87	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	88	90	90
U. S. 5 per cents, 1874,.....	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	79	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	81	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ohio 6 per cents, 1886,.....	92	92	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	93	93	92	93
Kentucky 6 per cents,.....	78	75	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	77	77	77	76	79
Indiana 5 per cents,.....	77	75	76	75	76	76	77	78
Pennsylvania 5 per cents,...	78	78	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	81	80	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	79 $\frac{1}{2}$
Virginia 6 per cents,.....	47	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	54	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	54	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	52
Georgia 6 per cents,.....	..	67	70	68	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	67	66	64 $\frac{1}{2}$
California 7 per cents, 1877,.	77	76	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	76	77	79
North Carolina 6 per cents,...	58	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	65	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	61 $\frac{1}{2}$
Missouri 6 per cents,.....	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	42	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	42	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$
Louisiana 6 per cents,.....	57	56	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	62	58	58	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	55
Tennessee 6 per cents,.....	48 $\frac{1}{2}$	42	45 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	43	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	43

There is a largely increased demand for the two-year six per cent. Treasury notes, and the quotations advanced to 98 $\frac{1}{2}\%$. The supply is fair, but not in excess of the wants of the importers and buyers on speculation. It is conceded that the banks must take the second \$50,000,000 of the National loan, in which case all these notes which can be had at any discount will be bought up to be paid in on the subscription.

The Ohio six per cent. war loan is quoted 85 @ 88; Michigan sixes, 81 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 82; New-York State six per cents, of 1872, are held at 99 @ 100.

The Treasurer of Massachusetts invites offers until the 25th of September for a loan to the Commonwealth, of one million of dollars, being the second issue of this sum under the act of 21st May, 1861, entitled, "An act for the maintenance of the Union and the Constitution." For this loan, certificates, with coupons attached, will be issued in sums of \$1,000 and \$500, bearing six per cent. interest. The whole loan will be repayable, \$100,000 in the year 1872; \$100,000 in 1873; \$100,000 in 1874; \$200,000 in 1875, and \$500,000 in 1876.

The business on our leading rail-roads during the month of September has been unusually large, thus giving more firmness to the market value of their shares. The monthly returns thus far for the year show a gain in the New-York Central receipts of eight per cent.; Erie, 10 per cent.; Illinois Central, 12 per cent.; Galena and Chicago, 25 per cent., and others in a less ratio. The following table embraces all the roads that are accustomed to report their earnings monthly, and are those that bear the most intimate relation to the internal trade of the country. Those with a star (*) show a slight decrease:

ROADS.		1861.	1860.	Increase.
New-York Central,.....	10 months,	\$ 6,614,298 ..	\$ 6,098,252 ..	\$ 516,046
New-York and Erie,.....	10 months,	5,091,403 ..	4,583,975 ..	508,428
Hudson River,.....	11 months,	1,843,263 ..	1,870,784 ..	*27,521
Cleveland and Toledo,.....	5 months,	872,492 ..	858,071 ..	19,421
Michigan Central,.....	8 months,	992,895 ..	954,499 ..	38,396
Galena and Chicago,.....	8 months,	992,842 ..	743,597 ..	249,245
Chicago and Rock Island,.....	8 months,	668,088 ..	722,423 ..	*54,335
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy,.....	8 months,	888,655 ..	931,736 ..	*43,081
Illinois Central,.....	8 months,	1,845,397 ..	1,615,786 ..	229,610
Milwaukie and Prairie du Chien,.....	8 months,	646,847 ..	360,660 ..	286,187
Milwaukie and La Crosse,.....	7 months,	524,752 ..	320,184 ..	204,568
Toledo, Wabash and Western,.....	8 months,	627,540 ..	566,705 ..	60,839
Chicago, Alton and St. Louis,.....	8 months,	635,045 ..	597,267 ..	37,778
Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne and Chicago,...	8 months,	1,554,812 ..	1,176,329 ..	378,484
Philadelphia and Reading,.....	8 months,	1,844,060 ..	1,951,971 ..	*107,911
Chicago and North Western,.....	5 months,	333,132 ..	230,482 ..	102,650
Harlem,.....	8 months,	741,364 ..	764,546 ..	*23,184
Erie Canal,.....	5 months,	3,366,822 ..	2,381,301 ..	985,521
Totals,.....		\$ 29,543,707 ..	\$ 26,242,568 ..	\$ 3,301,139

The preceding table shows that the earnings of the great lines of rail-roads and canals of the country, in this year of distress, are greater by nearly 18 per cent. than in 1860, a remarkably active and prosperous year. We commend this result, with some comparative statements of the condition of the internal and foreign commerce of the country, to the attention of our foreign and domestic bond and share holders. The activity of the internal trade of the country is strikingly illustrated by the enormously increased movement at the great centres.

Agents of the government have been appointed in the several loyal States, authorizing them to take subscriptions to the new loan, which bears an interest of 7.30 per cent. Already the subscriptions are large by the banks of the interior, by insurance companies, savings banks and other corporations, and by private capitalists. We have full confidence that the first loan of fifty millions of dollars will be re-distributed in the interior before the time specified for the second instalment.

It is announced that the New-Orleans banks suspended payment of specie on the 16th inst., having, at the time, over fourteen millions of specie on hand.

Of the English money market, the London *Money Market Review*, of September 7th, says:

"The discount market this week has continued decidedly easy. The rates for the best bills have been much the same as last week, namely, $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. So far as we can gather, the supply of money generally on offer has not increased. The contraction of trade and the steady influx of gold to the bank point to the probability of a continuance of ease. On the other hand, however, it must not be forgotten that during the next three or four weeks the gradual accumulation of the treasury balances in the bank will put more power in the hands of that establishment. The bank will probably be very reluctant to put their rate below four per cent. without strong cause. Meanwhile, the applications to the discount office have become very limited. The increase in the 'other' securities seems to have occasioned some speculation. In the Consol market the rate for loans has varied from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent."

Of the greater abundance of money in London, the *Economist*, of September 14th, says: "The money market has manifested increased ease throughout the week, and the rate for the best paper has fallen to $3\frac{1}{2}$ @ $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. Although to-day there was a slight increase in the demand, the majority of the transactions were at the former figure, with occasional bargains at even a fraction less. There was an expectation that the bank would have reduced their rate to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. yesterday, and some disappointment was expressed at no change having been announced, especially when the large augmentation in the reserve and bullion became known. On the Stock Exchange there is an abundant supply of capital, and short loans on government securities have been obtained as low as two per cent., but this afternoon the usual charge was three."

DEATHS.

AT NEW-YORK, on Thursday, August 29th, in the sixtieth year of his age, GIDEON DE ANGELIS, Esq., Cashier of the Mechanics' Bank of this city. Mr. DE ANGELIS first entered the Mechanics' Bank as check clerk in 1823, and was promoted from time to time until he became first teller, an office he filled with great ability, until he was invited to become the Cashier of the People's Bank, then recently established. He continued two or three years in that bank, when, in 1855, the cashiership of the Mechanics' Bank became vacant, and it was tendered to Mr. DE ANGELIS and accepted.

AT NEWPORT, R. I., on Sunday, June 23d, ROBERT P. LEE, Esq., Cashier of the Rhode Island Union Bank in that city, aged sixty-three years.

AT POTTSVILLE, PENN., on Saturday, September 7, HENRY POTTS, Esq., President of the Bank of Pottstown, aged sixty-four years.

AT NEW-HAVEN, CONN., on Wednesday, September 11, JOHN W. FITCH, Esq., President of the Mechanics' Bank in that city.

NAMES OF PRIVATE BANKERS

AND OTHERS,

Whose Cards (with their references) may be found on the cover of "The Bankers' Magazine," or "The Merchants and Bankers' Almanac" for 1861.

New-York,.....**Mut. Life Insur. Co.**
 ".....Guardian Life Insurance Co.
 ".....New-York Life Insurance Co.
 ".....Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
 ".....Bk. of British N.A. (Agency.)
 ".....National Bank Note Co.
 ".....American Bank Note Co.
 ".....Bradstreet's Reference Guide.
 ".....D. Plumb & Co's Ref. Guide.
 ".....Coleman & Co., Wm. T.
 ".....Duncan, Sherman & Co.
 ".....Samuel Hallett & Co.
 ".....Peters, Campbell & Co.
 ".....E. Morrison, 17 Nassau.
 ".....Schuchardt & Gebhard.
 ".....Merklee & Thatcher.
 ".....Locke & Craigie, Plumbers.
 ".....Taylor Brothers, Bankers.
 ".....Wm. A. Wheeler.
Geneva,.....Schell & Hemmup, Bankers.

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 ".....Chickering & Sons.
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Conn.—New-Haven, **W. W. Bacon.**

Pa. Philada.,.....**Davis & Birney.**
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Bradford,.....E. P. Steers & Co.
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 ".....Semple & Jones.
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 ".....J. Bunn.

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Io.—Cedar Rapids, Carpenter, Stibbs & Co.
Clinton,.....Budd & Baldwin.
Davenport,.....Macklot, Louis A.
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St. Louis,.....Allen, Copp & Nisbel.
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 ".....National Insurance Co.
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London,.....**Bank of British N. A.**


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
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THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
AND
Statistical Register.

EDITED BY J. SMITH HOMANS, JR.

ACTUARY OF THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, OF NEW-YORK.

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NOVEMBER, 1861.—CONTENTS.

	Page
ART. I. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN COINAGE. BY JOHN H. HICKCOX. WITH ENGRAVINGS. PART SECOND. COINS OF THE CONFEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES.—COINS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789.—MISCELLANEOUS COINAGE,.....	321
II. Adventures of M. MIREX, the Banker, of Paris,.....	338
III. Probable Reduction in the Rate of Discount in England,.....	348
IV. New Bank Law of Illinois—Days of Grace,.....	351
V. The Banks of Ohio and Indiana in 1861,.....	352
VI. Objections to Government Demand Notes. By a New-York Bank Officer,.....	353
VII. Considerations on Government Treasury Notes for Circulation,.....	358
VIII. The Armies of Europe—Austria—Prussia—Russia—France—Great Britain,.....	360
IX. Gold and Silver Coin and Bullion. 1. On the Natural Dissemination of Gold. 2. The Bullion Trade of the World. 3. Small Coin in France. 4. Export of Gold from England to the East. 5. Silver Mines of British Columbia. 6. New-York Assay Office,.....	362
X. The Public Debt of the United States in 1861,.....	365
XI. The United States Treasury Loan of October, 1861,.....	366
XII. The English Money Market—Bank Returns—Continental Exchanges—Consols—for September and October, 1851–1861,.....	369
XIII. Statistics of English Railway Capital, Profits and Stock, 1860–1861,.....	373
XIV. The Clearing House, New-York—Annual Election, 1861, and Statistics for eight years,.....	374
XV. MISCELLANEOUS.—1. Taxable Incomes, 347 2. Pickpockets, 350. 3. Secession Bank Bills,....	351
XVI. Operations of the Bank of France, 1860–1861,.....	375
XVII. The Bank Note Circulation of Great Britain, 1845–1861,.....	376
XVIII. FOREIGN ITEMS.—1. The Imperial Crown of Great Britain. 2. Evils from Extending Credit. 3. Statistics of Irish Wages. 4. Production of Australian Gold. 5. French Bank Law,...	377
XIX. Boston Bank Dividends, 1859, 1860, 1861,.....	380
XX. New-York Bank Stocks and Profits, 1859, 1860, 1861,.....	382
XXI. The New-York Stock Market, 1860–1861—Highest and Lowest Prices each Month,.....	384
XXII. BANK STATISTICS. 1. Indiana. 2. Ohio. 3. Philadelphia. 4. New-York. 5. Boston,.....	386
XXIII. The Poet and the Banker,.....	390
XXIV. Private Bankers—Changes in Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Indiana, &c.,.....	396
XXV. BANK ITEMS—New Banks—Bank Failures—Bank Dividends—Foreign Banks,.....	391
XXVI. Notes on the Money Market and Stock Market of New-York, for October, 1861,.....	397

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- V.—Governor, Directors and Officers of the Bank of England, 1861.
- VI.—List of Banks and Bankers in London, December, 1861.
- VII.—List of Bankers in Europe, Asia, South America, Australia, West Indies, &c.
- VIII.—Lowest and Highest Quotations of Stocks at New-York, each Month, 1861.
- IX.—Annual Report on Breadstuffs of the U. S., 1861.
- X.—Quotations of Foreign Exchange at New-York, each Month, 1861.
- XI.—The Usury Laws and Laws of Damages on Bills, of each State in the U. S.
- XII.—The Banks of New-York—Names of President, Vice-President, Cashier and Notary.
- XIII.—Marine Losses of each Month, January to December, 1861.
- XIV.—Journal of Financial and Commercial Events, year 1861.
- XV.—Comparative Tariffs of the U. S., 1842-1861.
- XVI.—The Cotton Crop of each year, and Foreign Exports, 1858-1861.
- XVII.—Table of the Values of all Foreign Gold and Silver Coins in U. S.

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THE
BANKERS' MAGAZINE,
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Statistical Register.

VOL. XI. NEW SERIES. NOVEMBER, 1861.

No. 5.

THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN COINAGE.

By JOHN H. HICKCOX, of Albany, N. Y.

PART SECOND.

VIII. *Coins of the Confederation and the United States.* IX. *Coins of the United States since 1789.* X. *Miscellaneous Coinage.*

VIII. COINS OF THE CONFEDERATION AND UNITED STATES.

The subject of a national mint for the United States was first introduced by ROBERT MORRIS, the patriot and financier of the Revolution. As head of the finance department, he was instructed by Congress to prepare a report on the foreign coins then in circulation in the United States.

On the 15th of January, 1782, he laid before Congress an exposition of the subject. Accompanying his report was a plan for an American coinage, which, it is claimed, originated with GOUVERNEUR MORRIS,* who was assistant or deputy superintendent of finance.

Mr. MORRIS, after noticing the inconveniences and disadvantages occasioned by the different values attached to the pound, the shilling and

* There was no relationship of family between ROBERT MORRIS and GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, at least none that could be traced by them. ROBERT MORRIS was born in England, and came to America when he was thirteen years old.—SPARKS' *Life of GOUVERNEUR MORRIS*.

the penny in the various States, and deprecating the fact that so many different coins were in circulation, considered that it was by no means of such importance to establish the relative value of different coins, as to provide a standard of our own, by which they might be estimated; and hence he urged the necessity of adopting a national coinage. He* recommended that the money unit should be very small, and that the money should be increased in a decimal ratio, which would afford easy calculation. He did not urge that the unit should be exactly represented in a coin, but as its value would be precisely known, a number of units might be represented in the lowest copper coin, which might contain eight units, the next five, and called respectively an Eight and a Five. A quarter of a grain of fine silver in coined money would equal the money unit, and proceeding as he suggested, in a decimal ratio, one hundred would be the lowest silver coin, and might be called a Cent. "It would contain twenty-five grains of fine silver, to which might be added two grains of copper, and the whole would weigh one pennyweight and three grains. Five of them would make a Quint, or five hundred units, weighing five pennyweights and fifteen grains; and ten would make a Mark, or one thousand units, weighing eleven pennyweights and six grains." He proposed, also, that there should be a Crown,† of gold, and other coins which should contain a precise number of the money unit.

A considerable amount of public copper was then lying unappropriated at Philadelphia, and Mr. MORRIS assured Congress, that if the plan for coining money was approved, he would immediately establish a mint, as machinery for that purpose could be easily constructed, and persons found who could carry on the necessary operations.

The letter was referred to a committee consisting of one delegate from each State, who subsequently reported; and Congress, on the 21st of February, 1782, approved of the establishment of a mint, and directed the superintendent to prepare and report a plan for the same. He did not do so, but in April, 1783, inclosed to the President of Congress specimens of coinage, "with a view that if that body should think proper to appoint a committee on the subject, he might confer with them and explain his ideas of the plan of establishing and conducting a mint," and suggested that such a plan, when reported by a committee, would more probably meet the ideas of Congress than any which he might prepare.

The subject remained in this state for another year, Congress being much occupied in devising plans for the pay of the army, &c. Mr. MORRIS having in the mean time resigned, THOMAS JEFFERSON, in behalf of a committee appointed in 1784 to consider the subject of an American coinage, went over the subject anew, reviewing and partially adopting Mr. MORRIS' views. MORRIS' idea of the money unit he did not adopt, believing that it could not practically be adopted; and even if it should be, would be decidedly inconvenient, on account of the number of figures

* According to JEFFERSON, this report was written entirely by GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. Indeed, the manuscript estimates and plans still exist in his handwriting.

† This name he suggested on account of the following idea of an impression for a gold coin, viz.: An Indian with his bow in his left hand, and in his right hand thirteen arrows, his foot on a crown; and for an inscription, *Manus Inimica Tyrannis*.

required to express a small amount.* The dollar he adopted as his money unit, and applied to it Mr. MORRIS' plan of decimal notation. Congress having heard a report from the committee to whom Mr. JEFFERSON'S paper had been referred, in 1785 adopted this plan, and in 1786 decided upon the following names and characters of the coins: An eagle, to contain $246\frac{2}{3}$ grains of fine gold, equal to ten dollars; a half-eagle, to contain $123\frac{1}{3}$ grains of fine gold, equal to five dollars—these two coins to be stamped with the impression of the American eagle; a dollar, to contain $375\frac{1}{10}$ grains of fine silver; a half-dollar, to contain $187\frac{1}{2}$ grains of fine silver; a double dime, to contain $75\frac{1}{2}$ grains of fine silver; a dime, to contain $37\frac{1}{2}$ grains of fine silver; a cent, of copper, equal to the 100dth part of the federal dollar; a half-cent, of the same metal, equal to the 200dth part of the dollar.

It was not until the 16th of October, 1786, that Congress passed an ordinance for the establishment of a mint of the United States, &c., the draft of which was reported by the Board of Treasury, agreeably to an order of August 8, 1786. The ordinance briefly designated the officers of the mint and their duties. It made no mention of devices; this matter and other details were probably committed to the Board of Treasury.

* Mr. MORRIS, in a letter to Dr. RAMSAY, a member of the Board of Treasury, subsequently modified his plan, adopting a larger unit. His idea was to have a money of account and a money of coinage. He assumed for his unit an amount equal to twelve shillings and sixpence sterling, which he called a pound, making this divisible by ten, and giving the names of pounds, shillings, pence and doits to the several divisions, thus:

One pound, equal to.....	1,000
One shilling, “	100
One penny, “	10
One doit, “	1

Now, the money of all the States, reduced to pence, may be expressed in this doit, without a remainder. For example, in the New England currency, five doits make a penny: hence, £10:9:5, reduced to pence, are equal to 2,633, which, multiplied by 5, give 13,165 doits, or 13 pounds and 165 doits of the new reckoning, or 13 pounds, 1 shilling, 6 pence, 5 doits. By an easy process the same result will follow with all the old currencies of the States; that is, any sum in pence may be reduced to doits without a fractional remainder, which is rarely the case with the cents now in use. The above unit is therefore taken, on account of its being susceptible of this division.

It will be seen that by omitting the names of shillings and pence, the mode of reckoning will be by dollars and doits, precisely like the present mode of dollars and cents, except that the place of doits takes three figures instead of two. By rejecting the last figure, as we now do the mills in common calculations, the reckoning would then stand in dollars and pence, and be exactly the same as the present mode.

The table of coins proposed in connection with this system of reckoning was as follows:

Crown of gold, value,.....	1,200 doits.	Shilling, of silver, value,.....	100 doits.
Half-Crown, “ “	600 “	Groat, “ “	20 “
Dollar, of silver, “	300 “	Doit, of copper, “	1 “

These coins were chosen for a double purpose, viz.: their convenient size and their measures of weight, and of the values of the old currency. Each coin weighs an exact number of grains, without a fraction, and its value in this respect might thus easily be proved. Each one is an expression of an exact number of pence in the old currencies of the States, as well as in that of England, and in the livres and sous of France. They are all, moreover, decimal parts of the new unit, and thus adapted to the money of account.—SPARKS' *Life of GOUVERNEUR MORRIS*.

Meanwhile great quantities of base coppers were being circulated, which of course were highly injurious to trade and the commerce of the States. This bad currency consisted as well of the coppers manufactured by permission of the several States of the confederation, as of the great quantities daily imported. Congress, therefore, ordained that no foreign copper coins should be current within the United States of America after September 1st, 1787, and that no copper coins struck under the authority of a particular State should pass at a greater value than one federal dollar for 2½ lbs. avoirdupois of such copper coin.

But though the several national coins had been specified, and a mint directed to be organized, the project does not appear to have been fully carried out, for in 1787, the Board of Treasury reported several proposals from certain coin manufacturers for coining copper. These proposals were referred to a committee, which subsequently reported in favor of that of Mr. JAMES JARVIS. Congress thereupon authorized the board to contract with Mr. JARVIS for 300 tons of copper coin of the federal standard, requiring that it be coined at his own expense, but under the inspection of an officer appointed and paid by the United States; that the obligations to be given for the payment of the coin be redeemable within twenty years after the date of the contract. The public copper on hand was to be disposed of, either by sale or contract, for the coinage of the same. On the 6th of July, 1787, it was ordered that the contractor for the copper coinage should stamp on one side of each piece the following device, viz.: Thirteen circles linked together, a small circle in the middle, with the words UNITED STATES around it, and in the centre the words WE ARE ONE; on the other side of the same piece the following device, viz.: a dial, with the hours expressed on the face of it, a meridian sun above, on one side of which the word FUGIO, and on the other the year 1787; below the dial the words MIND YOUR BUSINESS. (Pl. 3, fig. 7.)

Mr. JARVIS was one of the "company for coining coppers" in Connecticut; and as he was a shareholder at the time the company ceased to manufacture coppers for that State, it is very probable that the coin above described was manufactured by him at the Connecticut mint, in New-Haven. ABEL BUEL, who had been previously associated with Mr. JARVIS, assisted him in its manufacture; he cut the dies, and, indeed, it is said that he designed the same, which is not at all improbable, judging from his conceded ingenuity. The coins were struck at first in New-Haven, but for how long a time it is not known. Mr. BUEL left the country for Europe in 1788, having, previous to his departure, given to his son permission to coin coppers. WILLIAM BUEL fled* shortly after

* WILLIAM BUEL fled from New-Haven under the following circumstances: Having had occasion to use some *aquafortis*, he procured a quantity in a jug, from a druggist, and was returning to his residence when he was accosted by some Indians, who insisted upon drinking from the jug what they assumed to be rum. He assured them that he had no rum, and that what was contained in the jug would poison them. But the Indians were not satisfied, and supposing this a mere excuse, seized the jug, and one of them took a hearty swallow, which, of course, at once produced his death. Mr. BUEL was accused of killing one of their number, and they, in accordance with their notions of justice, claimed his life, and watched every opportunity to take it, but he evaded their vigilance by leaving that part of the country.

from New-Haven to Rupert, in Vermont, where, in connection with Mr. HARMON, he resumed the manufacture of the same piece, at the mint used in the coinage of Vermont coppers. He carried with him the original dies used by his father at New-Haven, and continued the business of coining coppers until they had depreciated so much in value as to be worthless, or nearly so, for circulation.

IX. COINS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

In September of the year 1787, Congress received from the convention which framed the first Constitution of the United States, the draft of that document. In accordance with a requirement therein contained, it was immediately submitted to the several States of the Union, for their assent and approval. One article of the instrument provided that Congress should have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coins; and another, that no State should coin money, emit bills of credit, or make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The Constitution was ratified by eleven of the States, and was finally adopted by Congress on the 13th of September, 1788.

The attention of the new Congress, which began its first session on the 4th of March, 1789, was quite taken up in organizing the several departments of government, and in framing laws necessary to carry out the more immediate designs of the Constitution. Anticipating the action of Congress in providing a currency for the country, a proposition was made by JOHN H. MITCHELL, a foreigner, to supply the United States with copper coinage "of any size and device, of pure unalloyed copper," for the sum of fourteen pence sterling the pound. He represented that his apparatus was such as to enable him to strike the edge at the same blow with the face. This invention, however, had before been brought to the notice of the Congress of the Confederation by Mr. JEFFERSON, while he was residing in Paris. In a letter to Mr. HOPKINSON, dated December 23, 1786, he writes: "a person here has invented a method of coining the French écu of six livres, so as to strike both faces and edge at one stroke."* He suggested, that in case Congress should establish a mint, one of the machines used in this process, and probably the services of Mr. DROST, the inventor, might be secured. Subsequent to the date of his letter to Mr. HOPKINSON, he sent to JOHN JAY specimens of this coinage, recommending very highly their perfection, and stating that from 25,000 to 30,000 pieces a day could be coined, with the assistance of but two persons, the pieces of metal being first prepared.

The propositions of Mr. MITCHELL were referred to the Secretary of State, (Mr. JEFFERSON,) who, for several reasons, reported on them unfavorably:

1st. Because they contemplated the coinage of the money in a foreign country.

* JEFFERSON'S Writings, Vol. 2.

2d. Because transportation of the coins would expose them to acts of piracy.

3d. We would lose the opportunity of calling in and re-coining the clipped money.

4th. We would lose the resource of coining up our household plate, in the instant of great distress.

5th. We would lose the means of forming artists to continue the works, when the common accidents of mortality should have deprived us of those who began them; and,

Lastly. The carrying on of a coinage in a foreign country, so far as he knew, was without example, and general example he considered weighty authority.

He therefore recommended that a mint, when established, should be established at home. Other propositions for coining money in foreign parts were similarly disposed of.

Mr. JEFFERSON at once entered into a correspondence, with a view to ascertain whether the Swiss inventor, DROST, could be induced to come to this country with his implements, and be employed at the United States Mint, if one should be established, or, at all events, to come over and "erect the proper machinery, and instruct persons to go on with the coinage. An agreement was made; two coining mills or screws were ordered by him, but in the end DROST declined coming."*

Immediately after hearing the report of Mr. JEFFERSON, on the proposition of MITCHELL, Congress, on the 15th of April, 1790, instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare and report a proper plan for the establishment of a national mint. To this important charge ALEXANDER HAMILTON gave full and attentive consideration, and at the next session of Congress presented an elaborate report thereon, discussing mainly the following points:

1st. What ought to be the nature of the money unit of the United States?

2d. What the proportion between gold and silver?

3d. What the proportion and composition of alloy in each kind?

4th. Whether the expense of coinage should be defrayed by the government or out of the material itself?

5th. What should be the number, denominations, sizes and devices of the coin?

6th. Whether foreign coins should be permitted to be current or not, at what rate, and for what period?

The resolution of the Congress of the Confederation, declaring the dollar to be the money unit of the United States, as well as that regulating the value of it, had never been practically carried out, so that it was difficult to say what our money unit really was. The pound was the unit of accounts, while the old Spanish piasters or "pieces of eight," with their various values, regulated our exchanges. It was on this account that it seemed most natural that the dollar, containing a specified exact amount of pure silver, should be adopted as the unit in all cases.

* JEFFERSON'S Writings.

But an objection suggested itself in the fact, that the silver dollar had no standard value, while gold had a fixed price according to its fineness, and Mr. HAMILTON regarded the unit as having been hitherto virtually attached to gold rather than to silver. He therefore urged that the money unit should not be attached to either gold or silver, because this could not be done effectually without destroying the office and character of one of them as money, and reducing it to the situation of mere merchandise. Indeed, it was his idea that if either was preferred, it ought to be gold rather than silver. His conclusions were, that the unit might correspond with $24\frac{3}{4}$ grains of pure gold, and with $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains of pure silver, each answering to a dollar of the money of accounts. The alloy in each case to be one-twelfth of the total weight, which would make the unit 27 grains of standard gold, and 405 grains of standard silver. Each of these, it has been remarked, would answer to a dollar in money of account. Applying to this the decimal subdivision as established August 8, 1786, the unit in the money of account would continue to be a dollar, and its multiples, dimes, cents and mills, or tenths, hundredths, thousandths. He proposed the following coins:

A gold piece, (eagle,) equal in weight and value to ten units or dollars.

A gold piece, (dollar,) equal to a tenth part of the former, and which shall be a unit or dollar.

A silver piece, which should also be a unit or dollar.

A silver piece, which should be in weight and value a tenth part of the silver unit or dollar.

A copper piece, which should be of the value of the hundredth part of a dollar.

A copper piece, which should be half the value of the former.*

HAMILTON's report was transmitted to Congress on the 28th of January, 1791. A concurrent resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives, passed on the third of March of the same year, declared that a mint should be established, and that the President should cause to be engaged such principal artists as should be necessary to carry out the resolutions, and also to procure such apparatus as should be requisite for the same purpose.†

The law "establishing a mint and regulating the coins of the United States," received the President's approval on the 2d of April, 1792. Its principal points were, the names of officers to be employed, viz.: a director, an assayer, a chief coiner, an engraver, a treasurer,‡ the names

* It is not at all improbable that individuals who had implements of coinage experimented on some of the above named suggestions, in advance of any action at the mint.

† WASHINGTON manifested a lively interest in the progress of this work, and frequently visited the mint. It is said that at one time he brought with him a quantity of silver bullion to be coined into half-dimes, not for currency, but intended as presents for friends. Many patterns for gold, silver and copper coins were in this and ensuing year, prepared and submitted for approval. Especially curious and interesting among these are the specimens for cents, a number of which, including those known as WASHINGTON cents, are described in the concluding part of this article, under *Miscellaneous Coinage*.

‡ The office of melter and refiner was created by the act of 1837.

of coins to be struck, viz.: Eagles, each to be of the value of ten dollars or units, and to contain $247\frac{1}{2}$ grains of pure, or 270 grains of standard gold; half-eagles, each to be of the value of five dollars, and to contain $123\frac{1}{2}$ grains of pure, or 135 grains of standard gold; quarter-eagles, each to be of the value of $2\frac{1}{2}$ dollars, and to contain $61\frac{1}{2}$ grains of pure, or $67\frac{1}{2}$ grains of standard gold;* dollars or units, each to be of the value of a Spanish milled dollar as the same is now current, and to contain $371\frac{1}{8}$ grains of pure, or 416 grains of standard silver; half-dollars, each to be half the value of the dollar or unit, and to contain $185\frac{1}{8}$ grains of pure, or 208 grains of standard silver; quarter-dollars, each to be of one-fourth the value of the dollar or unit, and to contain $92\frac{1}{8}$ grains of pure, or 104 grains of standard silver; dimes, each to be of the value of one-tenth of a dollar or unit, and to contain $37\frac{1}{8}$ grains of pure, or $41\frac{3}{8}$ grains of standard silver; half-dimes, each to be of the value of one-twentieth of a dollar, and to contain $18\frac{3}{8}$ grains of pure, or $20\frac{1}{2}$ grains of standard silver;† cents, each to be of the value of the one-hundredth part of a dollar, and to contain eleven pennyweights of copper;‡ § half-cents, each to be of the value of half a cent, and to contain $5\frac{1}{2}$ pwts. of copper.¶

The devices and legends to be stamped on the coins were prescribed also by law, and were as follows: Upon one side an impression emblem-

* Double-eagles, of the value of twenty dollars, and gold dollars, of the value of one dollar or unit, were authorized by a law passed in 1849. These were directed to be struck and coined conformably in all respects to law (except that on the reverse of the gold dollar the figure of the eagle should be omitted,) and conformably in all respects to the standard of gold coins then established. Three-dollar gold coins were coined under similar regulations, under an act passed in 1853, except that the devices and shape of the same should be fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury.

† By a law passed in 1851, a piece of the denomination and value of three cents, (a) to be composed of three-fourths silver and one-fourth copper, and to weigh $12\frac{3}{8}$ grains, (b) was authorized. The devices were to be conspicuously different from those of the other silver coins and of the gold dollar, but having the inscription "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA," and its denomination and date.

‡ January 26, 1796, President WASHINGTON issued a proclamation, that "on account of the increased price of copper and the expense of coinage," the cent would be reduced to 7 doits or 168 grains, and the half-cent in proportion.

§ "The standard weight of the cent coined at the mint shall be seventy-two grains, or three-twentieths of one ounce troy, with no greater deviation than four grains in each piece; the said cent shall be composed of 88 per centum of copper and 12 per centum of nickel, and of such shape and device as may be fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury; and the coinage of the half-cent shall cease."—*Act of 1857.*

¶ The contents of these several pieces have been altered by subsequent laws, viz.: In 1837—"The weight of the eagle shall be 258 grains; that of the half-eagle 129 grains; and that of the quarter-eagle $64\frac{1}{2}$ grains." "Of the silver coins, the dollar shall be of the weight of $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains." In 1853—"The weight of the half-dollar or piece of fifty cents, shall be 192 grains; and the quarter-dollar, dime and half-dime, shall be respectively one-half, one-fifth and one-tenth of the weight of said half-dollar."

(a) As early as 1807, JEFFERSON suggested that silver pieces of the value of two and three cents, and gold dollars, should be coined.

(b) Law of 1853: "Hereafter the three cent coin now authorized by law shall be of the weight of three-fiftieths of the weight of the half dollar, and of the same standard of fineness."

atical of liberty,* with an inscription of the word LIBERTY, and the year of the coinage; upon the reverse of the gold and silver coins a figure or representation of an eagle,† with the inscription, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;‡ and upon the reverse of the copper coins an inscription which should express the denomination of the piece. The standard for gold coins was fixed at 11 parts fine to 1 part alloy; for silver, 1,485 parts fine and 179 parts alloy.§

WASHINGTON proceeded at once to carry out the intentions of the act, and, as Philadelphia was then the seat of government, he caused the necessary buildings and machinery to be provided and put in a condition for the purposes of coining; and in the fall of the same year that the mint act was passed, he informed Congress that a small beginning had been made in the coinage of half-dollars|| and cents. The offices of artist, chief coiner and assayer were, of course, considered of great importance, and it was the intention to employ those who were most skilled in these professions; and, as these arts had been but little practiced in our own country, efforts were made to procure artisans from abroad. Mr. JEFFERSON again endeavored to secure the services of DROST, but not being successful, Mr. PINCKNEY, who was then our minister at London, engaged Mr. ALBION COXE as assayer. HENRY VOIGHT, an artist of the United States, performed the duties of the office of chief coiner, and also, for a considerable length of time, made the dies.

Copper coinage at the mint may be said to have been fairly commenced in 1793; silver was coined first in the latter part of 1794, and gold in the summer of 1795. In 1794 the director of the mint reported that nearly one million of cents had been coined. Many difficulties, however, attended the early minting operations. The establishment was more extensive than

* The words, "emblematical of liberty, with an inscription of the word LIBERTY," were substituted, in the House of Representatives, for the following, which had been adopted by the Senate, viz.: *A representation of the head of the President, which shall express the initial or first letter of his Christian or first name, and his surname at length, the succession of the Presidency numerically.* The Senate at first refused to adopt the amendment, but the House of Representatives persisting, the Senate receded.—*Journal of H. of R.*, 1791-2.

† "But on the reverse of the dime and half-dime, cent and half-cent, the figure of the eagle shall be omitted."—*Act of 1837.* The figure of the eagle was also omitted on the reverse of the three-dollar, one-dollar and three-cent pieces.

‡ The Latin motto, "E PLURIBUS UNUM," floated in a scroll over the eagle's head, until the change of standard in 1837, when it was discontinued.—ECKFELDT and DU BOIS.

§ "The standard for both gold and silver coins shall hereafter be such, that of 1,000 parts by weight, nine hundred shall be of pure metal and one hundred of alloy; and the alloy of the silver coins shall be of copper, and the alloy of the gold coins shall be of copper and silver; provided that the silver does not exceed one-half of the whole alloy."—*Act of 1837.*

|| A few half-dollars bearing this date are extant. They have on the obverse a bust of WASHINGTON in military costume; legend, G. WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT I., 1792; reverse, a spread eagle, holding in one talon a bundle of thirteen arrows, and in the other an olive branch; legend, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. The die of this piece is said to have been made by an engraver in Lancaster, Pa., named GÄTZ, by way of recommendation for the office of engraver in the mint, to which, however, he was not appointed.

any which had heretofore been erected in this country, and experiments had to be made at almost every step in its progress; workmen who had been engaged in Europe often failed to come, and others were not masters of their business. Materials for the machinery were with difficulty procured—even the tools necessary to make the machinery and implements were first to be made, and both were manufactured at the mint; the latter were prepared chiefly under the direction of Mr. VOIGHT. The construction of the mint was mainly upon theory, which, of course, created greater delay and expense than full practical knowledge would have found necessary. The cost of building, apparatus and machinery, up to February, 1795, was \$22,720. Up to that date there were three presses, one of which would coin 10,000 cents a day. The machinery was moved by horse-power.

The expectations of the public were not realized as regarded the economy in conducting, or in the relief the mint afforded to the now diminished copper circulation of the country. The expense or charge on the nation for its maintenance was considerable, and naturally, from year to year, increased, rather than diminished. An opinion generally prevailed that the establishment was unnecessarily expensive, and, in fact, "less productive than was rationally expected by its advocates and friends." There was some foundation for this complaint. One of the principles of the act establishing the mint was, that the whole coinage, including refining, was to be executed at the public expense, the depositor being fully indemnified.* The person who brought bullion in its debased state to the mint received as much coin for the standard metal contained therein as he whose bullion had been previously refined, so that the expense of assaying and refining was a public charge. Again, the mint had no means of purchasing bullion. Every deposit of metal had to be coined as soon as possible, in order that the depositor might not lose the benefit of the use of the coin; therefore, the clippings and grains of each deposit were necessarily, on each occasion of deposit, melted. With the means on hand of payment at once of the amount due on deposits, the coinage of such deposits might have been more conveniently and more economically carried on. The small deposits would then have been kept in the vaults until a large amount had accumulated, and then coined, as the expense of coining a small quantity of bullion was nearly as great as that of an amount many times larger.

Many of the leading men of the country began to doubt the propriety of continuing a government establishment which, as they contended, cost more than the benefits derived from it; and there was an opinion that the Bank of the United States could coin for the nation at a less expense, or that the work could be done by contract.†

* "The only subjects of charge of the mint to the depositor shall be the following: For refining, when the bullion is below standard; for toughening, when metals are contained in it which render it unfit for coinage; for copper used for alloy when the bullion is above standard; for silver introduced into the alloy of gold; and for separating the gold and silver when these metals exist together in the bullion."—*Act of 1837.*

† Propositions had been already made to the Secretary of the Treasury to undertake to supply the coins of the United States, in case the mint should be abolished.

Mr. GILES, accordingly, in the House of Representatives, on the 29th of January, 1802, submitted a resolution; declaring that the several acts in relation to the mint ought to be repealed. This he presented, not as pressing the repeal of the laws, but with a view to discover the opinions of the House on the subject. In the debate, however, he stated that he was for abolishing the institution altogether, as he could see no propriety in continuing it. The discussion on the subject was general and earnest, and the resolution finally passed the House. In the Senate it was promptly negatived, and thus the matter was put to rest for that session.

It was early taken up in the fall of 1802, by JOHN RANDOLPH, and repeal was strenuously urged, on arguments not unlike those advanced at the previous session. The Senate, it was quite well understood, would not sanction the repeal; and as the act establishing the mint would expire by limitation on the next 4th of March, if re-enacted, new and more ample accommodations would be required. The lots then occupied were too small; both the machinery and the horses were worn out, (!) and it would be necessary that steam-power should be provided. The property of the mint at that time was indeed meagre. All told, it was comprised in the following schedule, viz.:

Two lots on Seventh-street, between Market and Arch streets, with a dwelling-house on the north lot, and a shell of a house and a stable on the south lot; a lot on Sugar Alley; a frame building, improved for a large furnace, in the commons at the north end of Sixth-street; copper planchettes, about 22 tons; three horses, good for little but for the use of the mint; five striking presses, with machinery; three cutting presses; one milling machine; five pair of rollers, great and small; one drawing machine; three pair of smith's bellows; a set of blacksmith's tools; a large number of hubs and dies; carpenters' tools; seven stoves; one turning lathe; six scale beams, scales and weights; two sets assay scales, and sundry adjusting scales; furniture in the clerk's room; various implements used in the several departments; about 2,000 bushels of charcoal; engravers' tools, pots, bottles, &c.; an old horse, cart and gears; about 2,000 fire brick; a considerable quantity of old iron. The director of the mint thought that the horses might last another year.*

Considering this condition of affairs, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution directing inquiry as to the amount the whole property of the mint would probably sell for, and the expense of more suitable buildings, machinery, &c. At the same session a law was passed continuing the act of 1792 for five years, which was repeatedly renewed until 1828, when it was enacted that the act of March 3, 1801, should remain in force and operation until otherwise provided by law.

Branches of the mint of the United States were established in 1835 at the city of New-Orleans, for the coinage of silver and gold, and at the town of Charlotte, in Mecklinburg county, N. C., and at or near Dah-longa in Lumpkin county, Ga., for the coinage of gold only; in 1852 in California, for the coinage of gold and silver. By an act passed in 1853, an office for the receipt, and for the melting, refining, parting and assaying of gold and silver bullion and foreign coin, and for casting the same into bars, &c., was established at New-York.

* American State Papers—Finance, v. 1.

The director of the mint at Philadelphia, subordinate to the Secretary of the Treasury, has supervisory powers over these establishments, and the laws of the United States for the government of the mint and its officers, as far as the same are applicable, are extended to them. The Assistant Treasurer of the United States, in New-York, is the treasurer of the Assay Office.

X. MISCELLANEOUS COINAGE.

Concerning a large number of pieces which circulated in America during the early years of the republic, and which were manufactured from time to time without the authority or sanction of law, including, also, many which are known to have been struck only as patterns or specimens of coinage, simply a short description of each will be sufficient, and this will be restricted to those issued prior to the year 1800:*

1737. At Granby, Conn., about the year 1737, coppers circulated, called HIGHLEY'S coppers. They were manufactured by SAMUEL HIGHLEY, who carried on the business secretly, without any authority from the colony. The manufactory was an ordinary sized shop, situated in the vicinity of the copper mines, near which he resided. He continued the business only for a few years, and the number of coppers struck was not large. They bore the following devices:

Obverse: A deer. Legend: VALUE ME AS YOU PLEASE. Exergue: III. Reverse: Three sledge-hammers, surmounted each by a crown. Legend: I AM GOOD COPPER.

1737. Obverse: A deer. Legend: CONNECTICUT. Exergue: III. Reverse: same as last.

Obverse: A deer. Legend: VALUE ME AS YOU PLEASE. Exergue: III. Reverse: A broad-axe. Legend: I CUT MY WAY THROUGH. 1737.

There is another issue similar to the first, except that it is without date. (Plate 3, fig. 1.)

1766. Obverse: A bust of PITT. Legend: THE RESTORER OF COMMERCE. No STAMPS. 1766. Reverse: A ship under sail, and at the stern, AMERICA. Legend: THANKS TO THE FRIENDS OF LIBERTY AND TRADE. Designed by PAUL REVERE, of Boston. Artist, a Mr. SMITHERS, of Philadelphia.

1776. Obverse: A dial, and the motto, MIND YOUR BUSINESS, beneath. Legend: CONTINENTAL CURRENCY, 1776. In another ring within, a meridian sun, with the word FUGIO. Reverse: A circle formed with thirteen small rings, with the names of the States inscribed on them; within this circle, AMERICAN CONGRESS, and in the centre, WE ARE ONE. There are five varieties of this piece.

* There has recently been brought to my notice a cast of a token or coin, the original of which is in the Royal Museum at the Hague. It is struck in fusible metal. The obverse has an eagle with expanded wings, and a branch in its talons. Legend: NEW-YORKE IN AMERICA. Reverse: A group of five palm trees, with a figure on each side, probably intended for Venus and Cupid. It has no date, but was probably struck in Holland prior to the year 1706, and is, therefore, the earliest known specimen of New-York coinage. It is more particularly described in the *Historical Magazine* for October, 1861.

1776. Obverse: A Janus head. Legend: STATE OF MASSA.: $\frac{1}{2}$ D. Reverse: The Goddess of Liberty seated upon a globe. Exergue: 1776.

1776. Obverse: A pine tree. Legend: AMERICAN LIBERTY. Reverse: A harp.

1776. Obverse: An American eagle with extended wings, surrounded by a circle of thirteen stars. Reverse: A large shield, surrounded by thirteen stars. The three last said to have been originated by PAUL REVERE.

1776. Obverse: A pine tree. Legend: MASSACHUSETTS STATE. Reverse: A female seated upon a globe, holding in her right hand an olive leaf, and in her left a staff. Legend: LIBERTY AND VIRTUE, 1776.

1776. Obverse: Thirteen parallel bars. Reverse: The letters U. S. A. There are two sizes of this piece.

1778. Obverse: A bust. Legend: NON DEPENDENS STATUS. Reverse: A figure of an Indian seated upon a globe. In his right hand, which is extended, he holds a branch of tobacco; his left rests upon a shield, on which is the American flag and a sword crossed, and the fleur-de-lis of France. Legend: AMERICA. Exergue: 1778.

1781. Obverse: A female figure seated, and supporting with her left hand a harp. Legend: NORTH AMERICAN TOKEN, 1781. Reverse: A brig under sail. Legend: COMMERCE. Copper.

1783. Obverse: An eye with rays diverging from it, around which a circle of thirteen stars. Legend: NOVA CONSTELLATIO. Reverse: A wreath, encircling the letters U. S. Legend: LIBERTAS JUSTITIA, 1783.

1783. Obverse: Same as last. Reverse: A wreath, encircling the letters U. S. and 1,000. Legend: The same. Silver.

1783. Same as last, with 500 instead of 1,000. Silver.

1783. Obverse: A head with a wreath. Legend: WASHINGTON AND INDEPENDENCE, 1783. Reverse: A wreath, within which the words ONE CENT. Legend: UNITY STATES OF AMERICA. Exergue: $\frac{1}{100}$.

1783. Obverse: A laureated bust. Legend: GEORGIVS TRIUMPHO. Reverse: The Goddess of Liberty erect; in front a frame, with a fleur-de-lis at each corner and thirteen stripes. Legend: VOCE POPOLI. Exergue: 1783.

1783. Obverse: A bust in military costume. Legend: WASHINGTON AND INDEPENDENCE, 1783. Reverse: The Goddess of Liberty seated. Exergue: T. W. J., in small capitals on the left, and K. S. on the right hand side.

1783. Obverse: A bust in military costume. Legend: WASHINGTON. Reverse: Same as above, Legend: ONE CENT. Although this piece is without date, it was probably issued in this year.

1783. Obverse: A head with a wreath. Legend: WASHINGTON AND INDEPENDENCE, 1783. Reverse: A figure of Liberty seated, in her right hand an olive branch, and in her left a staff surmounted by a liberty cap. Legend: UNITED STATES.

1783. J. CHALMERS, a silversmith or watchmaker, of Annapolis, Md., issued money in this year. The pieces bearing his name consist of a shilling, sixpence and threepence. On the obverse was a wreath encircling two hands clasped. Legend: J. CHALMERS, ANNAPOLIS. Reverse: Two birds, with a branch in their beaks. Legend: ONE SHILLING, 1783. (Plate 2, fig. 6.) Silver.

1785. Obverse: An eye with rays diverging from it, around which a circle of thirteen stars. Legend: NOVA CONSTELLATIO. Reverse: A wreath encircling the letters (in scrip) U. S. Legend: LIBERTAS ET JUSTITIA, 1785.

1785. Obverse: Same as last. Reverse: A figure of Justice seated, supporting with her right hand a flag-staff, surmounted by a liberty cap. Legend: IMMUNE COLUMBIA, 1785. Gold, silver, copper and brass.

1785. Obverse: A bust of GEORGE III. Legend: GEORGIVS III., REX. Reverse: The Goddess of Liberty seated. Legend: IMMUNE COLUMBIA. Exergue: 1785.

1785. Obverse: An Indian standing beside a pedestal, his right foot resting upon a crown, an arrow in his right hand, a bow in his left, and a quiver on his back. Legend: INIMICA TYRANS AMERICANA. Reverse: A constellation of thirteen stars, with rays diverging. Legend: CONFEDERATIO, 1785.

1786. Obverse: A female figure seated, her right hand extended and suspending a pair of scales; in her left, a staff with a flag partially unfurled, and surmounted with a liberty cap. Legend: IMMUNIS COLUMBIA, 1786. Reverse: A shield, as on the New-Jersey copper. Legend: E PLURIBUS UNUM.

1786. Obverse: A bust, probably intended to represent WASHINGTON. Legend: NON VI VIRTUTE VICI. Reverse: The Goddess of Liberty. Legend: NEO EBORACENSIS. Exergue: 1786. (Plate 4, fig. 3.)

1787. Obverse: A bust in Roman armor, with a wreath. Legend: NOVA EBORAC. Reverse: the Goddess of Liberty seated, and at her side a shield, bearing the arms of the State of New-York. Legend: VIRT ET LIB. Exergue: 1787. (Plate 4, fig. 1.)

1787. Obverse: An Indian, with a tomahawk in his right hand and a bow in his left, a quiver with arrows on his back. Legend: LIBER NATUS LIBERTATEM DEFENDO. Reverse: The arms of the State of New-York. Legend: EXCELSIOR. Exergue: 1787. (Plate 4, fig. 2.)

1787. Obverse: Same as last. Reverse: An eagle on a half globe. Legend: NEO EBORACUS EXCELSIOR, 1787. (Plate 4, fig. 4.) The four last described specimens are commonly called the New-York Tokens, and were struck, of course, without the authority of law, as no enactment in relation to coinage was ever made by the State of New-York. The subject was probably repeatedly brought before the legislature. We find that JOHN BAILEY and EPHRAIM BRASHER, in 1787, petitioned the Assembly in relation to the manufacture of coppers. The matter was referred to a committee, with instructions to bring in a bill to regulate the circulation of copper coins within the State. When the committee reported the result of its inquiries, the proposition to contract with parties for a supply of coinage was generally regarded a matter of mere speculation, and the further consideration of the matter was, therefore, postponed. The New-York tokens are believed to have been manufactured in England.

1787. Obverse: A bust of Governor GEORGE CLINTON. Legend: GEORGE CLINTON. Reverse: The arms of the State of New-York. Legend: EXCELSIOR. Exergue: 1787.

1787. Obverse: The arms of the State of New-York, as found on the great seal of 1777, and on a scroll beneath, BRASHER. Legend: NOVA

EBORACA COLUMBIA EXCELSIOR. Reverse: A wreath encircling a spread eagle. Legend: UNUM E PLURIBUS, 1787. Gold. It was struck in New-York, by EPHRAIM BRASHER, a goldsmith, whose place of business was No. 1 Cherry-street.

1787. Obverse: A laureated head. Legend: AUCTORI PLEBIS. Reverse: A female seated, a globe in her right hand, and at her left an anchor. Legend: INDE ET LIBER. Exergue: 1787. It was probably coined in Connecticut.

1789. Obverse: A clock, supported by two columns, and surmounted by a small eagle. Legend: MOTTS, N. Y., IMPORTERS, DEALERS, MANUFACTURERS OF GOLD & SILVER WARES. Reverse: An eagle with expanded wings, holding an olive branch in one talon and three arrows in the other; a shield upon its breast, and above the eagle, 1789. Legend: WATCHES, JEWELRY, SILVER WARE, CHRONOMETERS, CLOCKS. Copper. Issued by the firm of WM. & JOHN MOTT, whose place of business was at No. 240 Water-street, New-York.

1790. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON, in military uniform. Legend: GEO. WASHINGTON, BORN VIRGINIA. Exergue: Feb. 11, 1702. Reverse: GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN ARMIES, 1775. RESIGNED, 1783. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789. Exergue: J. MANLY, &c., 1790. Copper.

1791. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON, in military costume. Legend: WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT, 1781. Reverse: A ship under sail. Legend: HALF PENNY. Edge: PAYABLE IN ANGLESY, LONDON OR LIVERPOOL. There are several varieties and dates of this piece.

1791. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON. Legend: WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT, 1791. Reverse: A ship under sail. Legend: LIVERPOOL HALF PENNY.

1791. Obverse: A hand holding a scroll, upon which is inscribed OUR CAUSE IS JUST. Legend: UNANIMITY IS THE STRENGTH OF SOCIETY. Reverse: A triangle of fifteen stars, and on each star the initial letter of one of the States. Legend: E PLURIBUS UNUM. It was struck in Lancaster, England, in 1791, and is called the Kentucky cent, from the fact that the star, with a K. for Kentucky, is placed at the top of the triangle. (Plate 2, fig. 8.) Copper and silver.

1791. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume. Legend: WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT, 1791. Reverse: A spread eagle, large, holding in its right talon thirteen arrows, in its left an olive branch; from its beak a scroll, inscribed UNUM E PLURIBUS; above the eagle's head, ONE CENT; on the edge, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

1791. Obverse: Same as the last, the date omitted. Reverse: A spread eagle, small, holding in its right talon arrows, and in its left an olive branch; clouds above the eagle's head and eight stars. At the top of the piece, ONE CENT; at the bottom, 1791; on the edge, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

1791. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume. Legend: WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT, 1791. Reverse: A spread eagle, small, holding in its right talon an olive branch; in its left thirteen arrows; six stars around the eagle's head, and the word CENT above it; on the edge, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

1792. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume. Legend: G. WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT I., 1792. Reverse: A spread eagle, with fifteen stars above its head; in its right talon a bunch of five arrows, and in its left an olive branch. Legend: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. A few specimens of this piece have been found in silver. (See page 329.) Designed and cut by PETER GÆTZ, of Lancaster, Pa.

1792. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume. Legend: G. WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT I., 1792. Reverse: A spread eagle, large, in its right talon a bunch of thirteen arrows, in the left talon an olive branch. Legend: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Silver. Probably by the same artist as the last.

1792. Obverse: A Roman bust. Legend: WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT, 1792. Reverse: An eagle spread, holding in its right talon an olive branch, in its left thirteen arrows; the word CENT above its head, and three stars on either side of its neck; on the edge, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

1792. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume. Legend: WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT, 1792. Reverse: A spread eagle, large, holding in its right talon a bundle of thirteen arrows, and in its left an olive branch; a scroll from its beak, inscribed UNUM E PLURIBUS; at the top of the piece, thirteen stars.

1792. Obverse: A bust of the Goddess of Liberty. Legend: LIB. PAR. OF SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY, 1792. Reverse: An eagle. Legend: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Exergue: HALF DISME. Silver. Struck at the mint by order of WASHINGTON.

1792. Obverse: A bust of the Goddess of Liberty. Legend: LIBERTY, PARENT OF SCIENCE & INDUS., 1792. Reverse: An eagle. Legend: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Exergue: DISME. Silver.

1792. Obverse: A bust of the Goddess of Liberty. Legend: LIBERTY, PARENT OF SCIENCE & INDUSTRY. Exergue: 1792. Reverse: A wreath inclosing a ring, within which the inscription ONE CENT. Legend: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Exergue: $\frac{1}{100}$. Copper.

1792. Another, same as the last, only much smaller, and the inscription on the obverse abridged.

1792. Another, same as the last, with a round piece of silver inserted in the centre.

1792. Obverse: A bust. Legend: LIBERTY. Exergue: 1792. Reverse: An eagle standing on a half globe. Legend: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Copper.

1794. In 1794 and 1795 the mercantile house of TALBOT, ALLUM & LEE, of New-York, procured a large quantity of copper from Birmingham, England. Obverse: A ship under full sail. Legend: TALBOT, ALLUM & LEE, NEW-YORK. Exergue: ONE CENT. Reverse: A full-length figure of Liberty, a bale of merchandise at her feet; in her right hand a pole surmounted by a liberty cap, while her left rests upon a rudder. Legend: LIBERTY & COMMERCE. Exergue: 1794. Edge, PAYABLE AT THE STORE OF. Another variety was issued in 1795.

1795. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON. Legend: GEORGE WASHINGTON. Reverse: A spread eagle over the American shield. Legend: LIBERTY AND SECURITY. Exergue: 1795. Copper.

1795. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume. Le-

gend: GEORGE WASHINGTON. Reverse: A shield surmounted by an eagle, in its right talon three arrows, and in the left a laurel branch. Legend: LIBERTY AND SECURITY. Exergue: 1795. Copper.

1795. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume. Legend: G. WASHINGTON, THE FIRM FRIEND OF PEACE AND HUMANITY. Reverse: A coal grate. Legend: PAYABLE BY CLARK & HARRIS, 13 WORMWOOD-ST., BISHOP'S GATE. Exergue: LONDON, 1795. Copper

1796. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON. Legend: GEORGE WASHINGTON. Exergue: 1796. Reverse: Military trophies. Legend: GEN'L OF THE AMERICAN ARMIES, 1775. RESIGN'D THE COMM'D, 1783. ELEC'D PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789. RESIGNED THE PRESIDENCY, 1796. Copper.

1796. Obverse: The Goddess of Liberty standing, her right hand extended toward two naked children, who are urged forward by another female figure. Legend: BRITISH SETTLEMENT, KENTUCKY, 1796. Reverse: Britannia seated, her left arm resting on a broken shield; in her right a spear, point downward, &c. Legend: PAYABLE BY P. P. P. MYDDLETON. Copper.

1796. Obverse: A bust with a laurel wreath, surmounted by a mural crown. Legend: FRANCO AMERICANA COLONIA. Exergue: CASTORLAND, 1796. Reverse: A figure of CERES, holding in her right hand a cornucopia, and in her left a carpenter's brace; at her feet a sheaf of wheat. She stands near a maple tree, from which the sap is flowing into a tub. Legend: SALVE MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM. Exergue: A beaver. (Plate 2, fig. 5.) Silver. This is a pattern for a half-dollar, struck in Paris by DUVIVIER, for a French settlement in the northern part of the State of New-York, called Castorland.

1799. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON. Legend: GEORGE WASHINGTON, Esq., LATE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Reverse: A wreath and stars, with thirteen arrows. Inscription: WITH COURAGE AND FIDELITY HE DEFENDED THE RIGHTS OF A FREE PEOPLE. DIED DEC. 14, 1799. AGED 69. Legend: MADE COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN FORCES THE 15TH JUNE, 1775. Copper.

1799. Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON in military costume, and a wreath. Legend: HE IS IN GLORY, THE WORLD IN TEARS. Reverse: An urn with G. W. on the side. Legend: B. F. 11, 1732. G. A. ARM. '75, R. '83, P. U. S. A. '89, R. '96, G. ARM. U. S. '98. Ob. D. 14, 1799. Copper.

Without date.—Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON, in military costume. Legend: GEORGE WASHINGTON. Reverse: A harp surmounted by a crown. Legend: NORTH WALES.

Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON, in military costume. Legend: GEORGE WASHINGTON. Reverse: An eagle, spread, holding in its right talon an olive branch, and in the left arrows, over a shield. Legend: LIBERTY AND SECURITY. Edge: AN ASYLUM FOR THE OPPERESSED OF ALL NATIONS.

Obverse: A bust of WASHINGTON. Legend: GE. WASHINGTON, ER. GENERAL OF THE CONTIN'L ARMY IN AMERICA. Reverse: A group of warlike instruments. Legend: REUNIT PAR UN RARE ASSEMBLAGE LES TALENS DU GUERRIER ET LES VERTUS DE SAGE.

ADVENTURES OF MIREs, THE BANKER.

Birth in December, 1809—Clerk with a Glass Dealer—Clerk with a Commission Agent or Broker—In a Real Estate Office in Bordeaux—Special Agency—Member of the Bourse of Paris—Railway Fever of 1845—Editor of the "Journal des Chemins de Fer"—"La Caisse des Actions Réunies"—Proprietor of "Le Pays" and "Le Constitutionnel"—Loan of Fifty Millions Francs to the City of Paris—"Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer," or General Railway Banking Company—Messrs. BLAISE and SOLAR, Bankers—Roman Railways—Spanish Loan—Turkish Loan—Baron DE PONTALBA—Arrest in February, 1861—Trial—Sentence.

A NARRATIVE of the early and the later life of Monsieur MIREs appears from the pen of Mr. DICKENS, in the August No. of "*All the Year Round*." We republish from that journal the following interesting *résumé* of the noted French banker and speculator:

It was in the ancient city of Bordeaux, and in the month of December, 1809, that JULES ISAAC MIREs, the offspring of Jewish parents, first saw the light. His father, a money-changer and watchmaker, kept one of those little shops which line the Exchange of Bordeaux; but the proverbial success of his nation does not seem to have accompanied his operations, as he left nothing to his son when he died but the charge of supporting three penniless sisters. When six years old young MIREs was sent as a day-scholar to pick up what education he might at the feet of a learned professor named JOLLY. This GAMALIEL, however, did not give himself much trouble with his pupil, or his pupil took little pains to learn; for Monsieur MIREs tells us that when he left school at the ripe age of twelve, he had acquired but a very imperfect knowledge of the French language. It is most likely that the elder MIREs had never heard of DOGBERRY's theory, that "reading and writing come by nature;" but he acted as if he had no great faith in tuition, removing JULES, at the age aforesaid, from Professor JOLLY's care, and placing him in the shop of Monsieur BERET, a dealer in glass. It is not on record that, like ALNASHAR, JULES MIREs kicked down his fortunes in a fit of presumptuous castle-building, but he admits that visions of future greatness made the details of the glass trade distasteful to him, and dreaming of a more important and profitable employment, "like a bird," he sentimentally says, "I quitted my happy nest to seek adventures"—and to feather another nest of his own making.

At eighteen years of age, then, the world was to JULES MIREs the "oyster," which he sought, in the best way he could, to open. On leaving Monsieur BERET he entered the office of Monsieur LEDENTU, a commission agent; but, at the end of three years, the business assumed proportions which the young clerk's limited education disqualified him from conducting, and he was consequently dismissed. His next employment was a clerkship in a government office, specially formed for ascertaining house and property value in and around Bordeaux, and the experience he acquired in this position enabled him to support himself and his three sisters, after the office was suppressed, for several years. But it was a

bare struggle for existence, and, at last, in the year 1841, when he had completed his thirty-first year, JULES MIREs took that step which is taken by nine Frenchmen out of ten when they are out of luck—he went to Paris.

A native of Bordeaux, his first thought was to do something in wines; but as he had neither capital, credit nor friends, he gave up that idea in less than a month. He then tried to turn to account the knowledge he had gained of house surveying, but the civic authorities of Paris were so little desirous of having their property looked up by an itinerant Jew, and were, moreover, so generally hostile to his project, that he was obliged, after trying it on for nearly two years, to give that up also. A third attempt, to get up a special agency for collecting direct taxes, was no more successful than either of the preceding ventures, and at the end of 1844 JULES MIREs was, as it were, high and dry in the streets of Paris.

Our speculator had hitherto kept as closely within the limits of honesty as circumstances and his natural tendencies would admit of; but, when, after roughing it for five-and-thirty years, he found himself without the cash of which he stood in need, he determined to trade upon the money of others. The very best opening for one who wishes to cultivate this line of business is the Bourse of Paris, and on the Bourse of Paris JULES MIREs accordingly went, commencing his speculative career as a dabbler in promissory shares. "This commerce," says Monsieur MIREs, in his recently published account of his life and his affairs, "was at that time in a very flourishing condition, and from the very first of my adopting it I obtained a relative success, which gave me a taste for financial operations which I had never before experienced for any other kind of business."

The year 1845 was, as many have good reason to remember, a year of crisis. The railway fever was at its height, collapse followed, and the law against over-speculation was accompanied by the express interdiction of promissory share negotiation. Those who had profited by this mode of conducting affairs—and Monsieur MIREs seems to have been one of them—were exposed—most unjustly, of course—to all sorts of virulent accusations; and some of these share-dealers, Monsieur MIREs tells us, went the length of actually "blushing like guilty persons, if it became known that they had gained money by shares, or the promise of shares!" But as hard words break no bones, so, blushing at irregular profits does not empty the full pocket; and a change having taken place in the manner of share-dealing, which passed into the regular "agents de change," Monsieur MIREs associated himself as an intermediate with one of these brokers, and occupied this position when the revolution of February broke out, completely upsetting every species of "financial operation"—a phrase of most convenient application, and one which Monsieur MIREs greatly delights in.

The ground again cut from under his feet—for intermediates seem no longer wanted when the principals had left off doing business—Monsieur MIREs listened to a proposition made to him by a certain Monsieur MIL-LARD, to purchase in conjunction a newspaper called the *Journal des Chemins de Fer*, and then, he says, he began "that series of enterprises

which has cost me so much unfriendly criticism, partial minds never considering that the very publicity to which I had recourse was the real proof of my sincerity." It is in this spirit of perfect openness that Monsieur MIREs goes on to relate the history of all the speculations in which he has been engaged, firmly convinced—or, at all events, appearing to entertain the conviction—that nothing could be more legitimate or financially correct than the operations which have ruined so many and brought him within the grasp of the law.

To "brazen it out" seems, in fact, to be an essential feature of the system which Monsieur MIREs acted upon, for the benefit of the public and of himself; and, drawing a marked line between "Ma Vie" and "Mes Affaires"—as if the mere physical had nothing in common with the financial existence—he enters into the amplest details, with a sincerity that would be truly astonishing if he only revealed the truth. "At the moment," he says, "of speaking of the affairs and enterprises which I have conducted from 1848 to 1860, I am naturally led—in order that the history of my financial career may be complete—to describe what my participation has been in the principal financial events which have occurred during this period. I may say with pride that I have greatly contributed to, if I have not actually initiated them; and that I have been at least the instigator of the practical thought which has brought them about." Let individuals suffer as they may, to the country at large Monsieur MIREs declares he is its greatest benefactor. "Happily for France," he continues, "the three great financial facts cannot be destroyed which have marked the last few years, and which both now and for the future will contribute to her greatness. These three facts are: the creation of the *Crédit Mobilier*; the adoption of the system of public subscription for loans, and the reconstitution of the capital of the Bank of France." Monsieur MIREs gives himself the credit—such as it is—of having suggested the first of these schemes, by the practical but incomplete attempt which he made between 1850 and 1853, under the title of *Caisse des actions Réunies*; his share in the second was not, he asserts, less direct; and he claims the merit of having set the third on foot by propositions made by him to the Bank of France, which, though not directly accepted, were afterwards partially adopted. These circumstances are recalled by Monsieur MIREs, "because they add to the services which he has rendered to industry since the month of September, 1848," when he undertook the direction of the *Journal des Chemins de Fer*, which had ceased to appear a few weeks after the revolution of February.

For this newspaper, on the editing of which he greatly prides himself—as well he may—Monsieur MIREs gave a trifle more than a thousand francs, (say forty-five pounds sterling.) His first care, he tells us, was to re-assure the public mind, to restore depressed confidence in the value of railway shares, and to prevent their being sold at a ruinous price. His process in editing resembles the literary arrangement between the King of Prussia and VOLTAIRE. "At first," says Monsieur MIREs, "I experienced some difficulty in rendering my thoughts so as to convey the impression I desired. I wrote the articles such as I conceived them, and then handed them to an editor, who corrected the style. But, thanks to daily

perseverance for several years, I succeeded at last in expressing my ideas with a facility I never expected when I first became the proprietor of the journal."

This was not his sole success. Monsieur MIREs succeeded in persuading the public that the best thing they could do was to take shares in certain companies of his formation. The first of these was called "La Caisse des Actions Réunies," and the object of it was the creation of a financial society, the capital of which was to be employed in buying shares at a favorable moment, in order to sell them again at a profit, to be divided amongst the subscribers. Incessant advertising, with the promise of a profit ranging from thirty to forty per cent., rendered this project successful—to Monsieur MIREs certainly, if not to the shareholders—for, at the expiration of three years, when the affairs of the society were wound up, he was in a condition to enter upon speculations of the greatest magnitude. By that time he had bought two more newspapers, *Le Pays* and *Le Constitutionnel*; and, having thus got two of the most influential organs of the press in his power—with Monsieur le VICOMTE DE LA GUERRONIERE as editor-in-chief of the first-named journal—he took his full swing. For these two newspapers Monsieur MIREs paid, he says, 2,700,000 francs, and having added 300,000 francs more, he created a company, with a capital of 3,000,000 francs, which, for nine years, produced an average of more than ten per cent. Something must have paid Monsieur MIREs well to put him in a condition, in the course of three years, of buying a property worth £120,000 sterling.

From this time forward we hear nothing more of operations on an ordinary scale; all figures not expressed in millions are passed over as "vulgar fractions." Thus, in 1852, the city of Paris wanted a loan of 50,000,000 francs; all the great financial influences contended for it, and the adjudication was made to a firm with which Monsieur MIREs had combined. Again, in 1853, Monsieur MIREs entered into arrangements with the "Crédit Foncier" of the two cities of Marseilles and Nevers to supply each of them with 24,000,000 francs; but here the contracts were annulled through the interposition of certain powerful financiers in Paris, and the result was a loss to Monsieur MIREs of 500,000 francs. He complains of this loss; but what was it to the man whose speculations "for the account," in the course of the four last years of his career, amounted to the incredible sum of £60,880,000 sterling? The grand affair of 1853 was the formation of the "Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer," (General Railway Banking Company,) the founders of which were the Baron DE PONTALBA and Messieurs BLAISE and SOLAR, the bankers. A project of this nature could not, as a matter of course, get on without the co-operation of Monsieur MIREs; and, in an evil hour, (according to his own account,) he consented to take the place of Monsieur BLAISE; the financial management (or "raison sociale") being constituted by J. MIREs & Co., the "Co." being Monsieur SOLAR, who had the wit not to wait for his trial when he and Monsieur MIREs were first inculpated.

The capital of this new company was originally only twelve millions of francs, but it was speedily increased to fifty millions; and, with this amount for the base of his operations, Monsieur MIREs "went at it."

There was, first of all, the purchase of the collieries of Portes and Senechas, with the construction of the necessary railway, for supplying Marseilles with coal at a greatly diminished rate. Then came the iron foundries of St. Louis, in the suburbs of Marseilles, worked with ores of Elba and the coke of Portes; an enterprise subsidiary to the collieries. After this ensued the contract for lighting Marseilles with gas—the four undertakings being fused into one company. There would have been two more schemes, the purchase of ground in Marseilles for new docks, and a network of railways, called “le Réseau Pyrenéen,” if, from some unexplained cause of hostility, the successive Ministers of Public Works (MM. MAGNE and ROUHER) had not refused their consent to the sale of the one or the cession of the other to Monsieur MIREs. That this refusal should have been persisted in surprises Monsieur MIREs excessively. “I never could discover how this hostility originated; the proprietor of journals devoted to the defence of the policy of the government, I had left the absolute direction of them entirely to the board of management, and only possessed the right of paying the political and literary editors, which cost me 300,000 francs a year. I interrogated my past life; I asked myself if there existed by chance any obscure passage in it which could justify the ostracism by which I was struck; but I found in it no single act contrary to honor or to simple delicacy. I knew, however, that the financial world was hostile towards me, and that cruel rivalries existed in that region; but I could not persuade myself that outside that circle I was exposed to significant enmity. Yet, how otherwise” (poor innocent!) “explain the constant animadversions of which I was the object, and the full expression of which I found in the affected disdain of my proposition with respect to the Réseau Pyrenéen?”

Let us turn, then, to these “foreign affairs,” which affect—not the honor of Monsieur MIREs—that is impossible—but his patriotism and his private feelings. First, figure in the list the Roman railways; then follows the Spanish loan of sixteen millions sterling; then the construction of the railway from Pampeluna to Saragossa; finally, the Turkish loan of also sixteen millions sterling. Monsieur MIREs contends that none of these were hazardous enterprises, and, had good faith presided over them, there might, perchance, have been no great difference of opinion between the public and himself; but when, as in the case of the Pampeluna Railway, six thousand three hundred and twelve shares, representing a value of one million three thousand one hundred and twenty pounds sterling, were issued in excess of the number originally subscribed for, it appears tolerably certain that the holders of the extra shares at least must have hazarded something considerable.

The Spanish loan, which was knocked on the head in consequence of the opposition it met with from the really great capitalists of Europe, furnishes Monsieur MIREs with the opportunity of writing up the Jews of the South of France at the expense of their co-religionists in the North; or, in other words, of falling foul of the house of ROTHSCHILD for transacting business in an honest, straightforward manner. The arguments he employed are curious; but, as we are dealing with the facts of Monsieur MIREs' case and not with his theories, we pass over a very amusing chapter, to come to the “financial re-action” which took place in the year

1857. Monsieur MIREs complains that the public mind was turned against him by the dramatists and political writers. First, appeared a piece written by Monsieur PONSARD, called *La Bourse*, which was highly approved of by the Emperor; then came the *Question d'Argent*, by ALEXANDRE DUMAS the younger; and, a few months afterwards, *Les Maineurs d'Argent*, by Monsieur OSCAR DE VALLEE, Advocate-General of the Imperial Court of Paris. At the same period Paris was inundated with biographies of the principal mushroom financiers, representing them in a most unfavorable light; and soon followed a deluge of pamphlets and newspaper articles, the outpourings of "a venal press," which, says Monsieur MIREs, "if they excited some indignation by their injustice and defamatory character, flattered at bottom the bad passions of the ignorant multitude, ever prone to raise its voice against riches and success. These publications," continues Monsieur MIREs, "some of which were encouraged and others tolerated, necessarily determined the vague instinct of opinion, gave them a form and body, and converted, finally, a general hostility into a question of persons." The principal object of these unjust attacks was the *Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer*, represented by Monsieur MIREs. But the heaviest blow dealt against him came from the government itself, in the shape of a warning, consequent upon the appearance of an article on the state of the money-market, which appeared in the *Journal des Chemins de Fer*. Monsieur MIREs had replied vigorously to the dramatists by whom he had been covertly assailed; but when the government turned against him it was too much; he resolved to retire altogether from business, and took that resolution on the very day the warning appeared. He accordingly convened a meeting of the shareholders in the *Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer*, and tendered his resignation, accompanying the act by a report, "which was, naturally, an energetic refutation of the dominant ideas and restrictive measures which had consecrated those ideas;" phrases not particularly intelligible, but, as it appears, highly effective in rehabilitating Monsieur MIREs, for the meeting unanimously insisted upon his remaining at his post; a proceeding which he agreed to, "much against his will." If 1857 was unlucky for Monsieur MIREs, 1858 was still more so; in fact, he dates all his misfortunes from it. The works at Marseilles were stopped, and a decree of the Council of State not only prevented the development of the Roman railways, but seriously affected the credit of the *Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer*, which could no longer, by issuing shares, procure the sums it stood in need of to meet its engagements. In spite, however, of the disastrous result, the works on the Pampeluna Railway (in 1859) were briskly prosecuted, and (in 1860) the Turkish loan was negotiated.

Without doubt, if we agree with Monsieur MIREs, these two last affairs would have set him on his legs more securely than ever; but, before this consummation of his hopes arrived, an untoward circumstance occurred. On the 15th of December, 1860—the identical day on which Monsieur MIREs sent out a notice to the shareholders in the *Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer*, informing them of the advantageous terms on which the Turkish loan had been negotiated for—came thundering down upon his devoted head a judicial instruction provoked by the Baron DE

PONTALBA, who, in the simplest and most positive terms, denounced his friend and colleague, Monsieur MIREs, as an unmitigated swindler. What in France is called a "descente judiciaire" immediately took place; the offices of the Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer were taken possession of by justice, and seals were set on all the books of Monsieur MIREs, whose credit disappeared from that day, and with it fell, "in the height of its prosperity, (!) the financial establishment which I had contributed to maintain in a favorable situation, notwithstanding the obstacles of every kind that were accumulated in my path."

The denunciation of the Baron DE PONTALBA was to the effect that Monsieur MIREs had, on his own personal account, made an operation for a fall in the funds, resulting in a loss of 206,000 francs, which loss Monsieur MIREs saddled upon the company; that he had liquidated the accounts of numerous clients without any previous intimation, the fact being only made known to them by the intimation of the liquidation itself; that in the course of the years 1857 and 1858, MM. MIREs and SOLAR had sold on their own account shares in the Caisse Générale des Chemins de Fer which either did not exist or which belonged to certain clients; that the sale of these shares had given rise to a double payment of coupons, which, instead of being paid by MM. MIREs and SOLAR, had been turned to their own profit; and that they had issued twelve millions' worth of bonds of the Port de Marseilles, when only ten millions ought to have been negotiated.

All these charges Monsieur MIREs severally denied, after stating that the Baron DE PONTALBA's denunciation was caused by the refusal of his exorbitant claims for certain services rendered—claims which were, however, eventually admitted. On their payment—to the tune of fourteen hundred thousand francs—the seals were taken off Monsieur MIREs' books, and the whole thing seemed to have blown over. But Monsieur MIREs made a mistake in supposing so; for, though he was led by the Prefect of Police to believe, on the 6th of January of the present year, that he might freely resume the management of his affairs, proceedings against him were resumed on the 13th of February; on the 15th and 16th of the same month his books were seized anew; and on the 17th he was himself arrested and taken to the criminal prison of Mazas.

How far it comports with English notions of justice to keep a man a close prisoner for months without allowing him to communicate with friend or advocate, or making him aware of the specific charges to be brought against him, we shall not stop to inquire; let it suffice that, after two postponements, to give Monsieur MIREs time to prepare his defence, he was finally put on his trial before the Tribunal Correctional of Paris, on the 27th of June, 1861. Monsieur SOLAR, who was included in the same indictment, did not answer to his name; he was consequently condemned in default; and the trial of Monsieur MIREs was separately proceeded with, so far as related to the charge of "escroquerie;" the other directors of the General Railway Banking Company being held civilly responsible for the acts of their manager.

MM. MIREs and SOLAR, then, were formally accused in court of making use of fraudulent manœuvres to create a belief in a chimerical event, by which they obtained various sums of money from divers persons, (named

in the indictment,) and receipts and discharges from others, thereby swindling them out of the whole or part of their fortunes; of having sold securities entrusted to them as soon as deposited without the consent of, and without notice to, depositors, this sale, affected at high prices, producing upwards of 10,000,000 francs, which sum was concealed from their clients, who were, moreover, carefully kept in error by the receipt of periodical accounts, sent to them by MM. MIREs and SOLAR, in which they were debited with interest on the sums advanced to them, and credited with the produce of supposed coupons belonging to securities which no longer existed in the *caisse*; of fraudulently liquidating their situation with regard to their clients, and fictitiously selling, at low quotations, the securities which they no longer had in their possession, since they had in reality sold them at an antecedent period when prices were high; of turning to their own account the difference between the prices of real and fictitious sales, &c., &c.—all of which constituted the acts of *escroquerie* for which they were indicted.

How some of these swindling manœuvres were carried out was shown by the evidence of the victims:

VICOMTE D'AURE, formerly an officer in a cavalry regiment, deposed that in 1858, being in want of money, he had obtained an advance from the *Caisse Générale* of 10,000 francs on a deposit of 35 Austrian railway shares. Some time after, he received a letter saying that they had been sold for 12,000 francs. As they were worth more, he complained, and was told that if he would pay back the 10,000 francs he should have his shares, or that, if he preferred, he might receive 2,000 francs to make up the 12,000 francs. "I am not a man of business," added the witness, "and as I had not 10,000 francs to give, and as I saw that I was fleeced, I took the 2,000 francs." The president stated that the shares of the witness had been sold for 14,000 francs.

A man named BERNARD, a shop-porter, said that he had deposited eight shares of the Victor Emmanuel Railway in the *Caisse Générale* as security for a loan. "After a while," continued the witness, "I received a letter announcing that my shares had been sold. I hurried to the *caisse* and asked, 'By what right have you disposed of my shares?' 'Ah!' was the answer, 'a general war is coming, and we fear a fall!' I subsequently learned that a long time before, my shares had been sold for more than 600 francs, and yet I was only paid 300 francs! I saw MIREs, and asked him how he could take on himself to sell my property? He replied, 'If we had not sold you would have lost all!' The place was full of people who had been treated as I was. They made a great tumult; some of them said they had been robbed, and a female, weeping bitterly, exclaimed that she was ruined!" The president, "You accepted what was offered to you?" "Yes, for what could I do? I had no means of going to law. I was the earthen crock against the iron pot." MIREs observed that when the last witness deposited his shares they were only worth 460 francs each.

M. BEAUVAIS stated that he had long known MIREs, and had deposited funds and securities in his *caisse*. In 1856, seeing that Western Railway shares had risen to 980 francs, he wrote to MIREs to order him to sell fifty-one which he possessed. The order was not obeyed. He then directed that the sale should be made at 975 francs, but none was effected. At last he ordered that it should take place on the best terms that could be obtained. He waited, and heard nothing more of the matter. In 1859 he was astonished to be informed that he had been "executed" (sold up.) He then learned, on inquiry, that his Western shares had been sold in 1856, also some Saragossa shares, and other securities at a later period, and he knew nothing of all that! MIREs said that if the order had really been given in 1856, and not executed, he would indemnify the witness for the loss he had sustained. He had received about six hundred letters a day, and had not had the time to read them.

M. COURTOIS, of Amiens, stated that in 1856 he had deposited thirty-two shares in the *caisse*, and that an advance had been made to him on them to pay some calls which had become due. In 1859 he received a letter saying he had been executed, but recommending him to authorize MIREs to buy back his shares at a lower rate than his had been sold for. His first impression was that the letter was a mystification, but he came to Paris and went to the *caisse*. "I found there," continued the witness, "a number of persons who were heaping imprecations on MIREs. I made a great noise. I said to every clerk I saw, 'By what right have you sold my shares?' But I could obtain no satisfactory answer. I insisted on seeing MIREs himself, and after a while some one said to me, 'There is M. MIREs.' I went up to the person indicated, and repeated my question, by what right my shares had been sold. 'Why,' said he, smiling with great affability, 'For your own interest.' On that I got into a passion, and even went, I believe, the length of calling him a swindler! 'And,' I added, 'you are making more dupes now, for there is at this moment a crowd at your doors on the pretext of subscribing for bonds in your Roman railways, but the crowd is a packed one.' (A laugh.) At last a great big fellow in green livery made me a sign to go away, and as I did not obey, I was turned out." MIREs.—This deposition is a painful example of all I have had to suffer. The loss which the witness has sustained cannot be ascribed to me. It is owing to his having bought at an excessively high price, and to the war having caused a heavy fall. He owed us money, and we wanted him to give additional security.

Further explanation followed on the part of Monsieur MIREs, and in the course of his observations the president dropped the word "spoliation." Monsieur MIREs fired at once. "No!" he exclaimed, "there was no spoliation. I will not permit that word to be employed. Accuse me of what you will, but I will not allow my honor to be attacked—I will not permit you to say that I am a dishonest man." This was very like what the Irish soldier said when a lady, with whom he was upon visiting terms, accused him of stealing her poker. He swore that he was innocent, by every conceivable oath; but at last the lady told him he had not given his honor. "Touch my honor, touch my life!" cried Paddy; but there he distanced Monsieur MIREs, for he added, "here, woman, take your poker!" Monsieur MIREs, on the other hand, did not make restitution, but, as the following instance shows, clamored for "more:"

Monsieur DETHIERRY, a cabinet courier, deposed that in 1857 he had a loan from MIREs on security of sixty-eight Western and thirty-four Caisse Générale shares. In 1859 he was told that the former had been sold for 436 francs, and the latter for 167 francs each, whereas he ascertained that in reality the sums realized were 750 francs and 375 francs. The proposition was afterwards made, that what had been received should be put in the scale against what he owed. "But," said the witness, "I answered that I preferred having recourse to the scales of justice. My poor wife," continued Monsieur DETHIERRY, "went in tears to Monsieur MIREs; and do you know what he said to her? 'Let your husband bleed; let him come down with new securities.'"

Here is another case: Colonel DONNAIRE stated that one hundred and fourteen Mobilier shares, which he had deposited with MIREs as security for an advance, had been sold. When he heard of the sale he was greatly astonished, and asked MIREs by what right he had made it. MIREs answered in a sort of a whisper, "On account of the war which is coming, but you can buy back the shares at a lower rate!" In presence of so much assurance, witness was silent. He afterwards learned that the sale had been made for 220,000 francs, and yet MIREs represented that it only realized 101,000 francs.

To conclude: A host of witnesses (there were three hundred and sixty-three altogether) severally deposed that they had been defrauded out of different sums by MIREs having sold their securities without their consent; some of them, being in humble life, added that they were ruined.

Monsieur MIREs and his advocates made a desperate stand against all this testimony, but it was too much for them. All their quillies and their quiddities, their special pleading and their technicalities, were of no avail in the presence of simple downright facts, and the blow, when it fell, was a heavy one. Three principal charges were proved against Monsieur MIREs: the swindling of three hundred and sixty-three shareholders, the fraudulent disposal of twenty-one thousand railway shares and other securities, and the illegal distribution of dividends which had not arisen from actual profits; the object of this last operation being to enhance the value of worthless shares, and then sell them at a premium. For these offences the highest penalty which the law prescribes was pronounced by the court, namely, five years' imprisonment and a fine of three thousand francs. The pecuniary penalty was nothing, but the sentence of imprisonment fell on MIREs like a thunderbolt. A letter from Paris states, that "while it was being read the agony of MIREs was so great that even those whose feelings are hardened by the daily task of passing severe judgments might have thought society sufficiently avenged by the sufferings he endured in that half-hour. Sometimes, as if to escape from them, he clutched at the bar with both his shrivelled hands, and sometimes let his head fall upon his left arm, that lay stretched along the balustrade, as if no longer able to support its weight. When all was over he threw his hands above his head, and clasping them tightly together, gave utterance to incoherent expressions of despair, and, to escape from the gaze of so many lookers-on, rushed towards the little door of the prisoners' waiting-room, without seeming to see that it was shut, while guards closed round to secure him. His paleness afterwards became so great that he appeared as if about to faint; but presently he recovered his self-possession, took up his hat, and pressing it violently on his head, he left the court, guarded by some policemen."

Thus vanishes the fortune of Monsieur MIREs. Like the gourd that sheltered JONAH, "It grew in a night, and in a night it withered."

TAXABLE INCOMES.—Great changes have taken place in the value of some kinds of property since the income tax was first imposed. In 1843 the mines of Great Britain were assessed on an income of £2,081,387; in 1860, on £4,015,455, or very nearly double the former amount. Iron works were assessed at £559,435 in 1843, and at £1,517,230 in 1860—a still greater increase. But the greatest of all is on railways; in 1843, £2,598,943; in 1860, no less than £12,032,562. But these are exceptions. The general progress is indicated by the sum produced by every penny of duty. In 1843, 1d. of duty produced £849,013, and in 1853 it had risen to £882,136; (the tax was then extended to Ireland, and to incomes of £100 a year;) and in 1854, 1d. of duty produced £1,101,334. It did not rise very much above that point until 1858, when it sprang up (from £1,138,355 in 1857) to £1,217,140. The produce of 1d. of duty was almost exactly the same in 1859 as in the previous year, but in 1860 it took another spring, and advanced to £1,239,764. On Schedule D., which comprises trades and professions, 1d. of duty produced £240,264 in the first year, 1843; and in 1853 it produced no more than £242,852; but on the extension of the tax to Ireland and to incomes of £100 a year, 1d. immediately produced £330,986; and in 1858 this amount rose suddenly (from £334,987 in 1857) to £353,786, was nearly the same in 1859, but in 1860 sprang up to £371,197.

PROBABLE REDUCTION IN THE RATE OF DISCOUNT.

WE print from the London *Economist* an article showing the probable reduction of the rate of money during the next four months, as the same reasoning will apply to our own market, with the one allowance to be made that much of our capital usually employed in trade will be held for some time in investment in government stocks and bonds. On the other hand, the depression of trade in this country is much greater than in England, and idle capital is and will be for a long time proportionally greater.—*Ed. B. M.*

THE state of the London money market, during the last few weeks, justifies an observation which we made at the commencement of them. In certain states of the market—in such a state as we now see—the rate of interest in the outer market rules the bank rate, instead of (as is commonly believed) the bank rate almost uncontrollably ruling the outer rate. The bill brokers *will* have a certain number of bills because they *must*. They pay highly for the sums in their care, and they must employ them, if not at 5 per cent. then at $4\frac{1}{2}$, if not at $4\frac{1}{2}$ then at $4\frac{1}{4}$, and so on. It is impossible for the Bank of England, which is under the pressure of no similar necessity, to contend with competitors who are obliged to employ their funds by the plain certainty of a serious loss if they do not contrive to do so. By a sure consequence of the fundamental rules of trade, those who want bills most will have most bills; and the power of the Bank of England is, in the present state of the money market, strictly limited by the competition of opponents who are more eager in the employment of money than itself.

But in such states of the market, what is the duty of the Bank of England? Is it to go down with the market step by step? Is it to pause at some rate, or if so, at what rate? Hardly any one will contend that the bank should keep its rate at such a high point as would practically prevent its sharing in the business of the discount market. The two rules that have been most prominently inculcated on the bank by the best authorities are—first, that they should follow in their charges the natural rate of interest as determined by the daily relations of supply and demand; secondly, that they should look to the interest of their own proprietors, which they can perceive, instead of following uncertain theories of national advantage which depend on questions too large and too mixed to be usefully debated at a board of merchants and traders. But if the bank kept out of the discount market by an artificially high rate, it would violate both maxims. It would impair the profits of the proprietors by neglecting remunerative business; it would be maintaining, as far as its own funds are concerned, a high value of money when the natural relations of the market dictated a low value.

Yet at what point is the reduction to stop? We say at the natural point. At some time, sooner or later, the market rate will certainly show a tendency to stop, and then the bank should stop. Until then—until by actual trial this precise point has been ascertained—the bank should continue to diminish their rate; and when the moment of cessation in the

outer market comes, they too should cease, and should, if necessary, begin to rise again.

One of two causes must, within a reasonable time, intervene to arrest the gradual decline in the value of money. First, the trade of the country will before long revive. To some persons it seems absurd, in the face of the large figures of our export and import trade, to speak of trade as stagnant. Those figures, they say, show but little sign of it—rather, on the contrary, tend to disprove it. We have often before analyzed the precise extent to which this is true, and we need not now recur to the results—our immediate purpose is different. We say that even if our foreign trade, both of export and import, were undiminished, there are two other mercantile causes which would tend to diminish the value of money just now as compared with former times.

First. The absolute amount of trade carried on by this country is only one element in determining the supply and demand of loanable capital. Trade regulates the demand for capital, but it does not regulate the supply. That supply is determined by quite different causes. Every year England saves something; in good years it saves much, in comparatively bad years it saves little, but in all it saves something. Last year, undoubtedly, our savings were less than usual—much less, probably; for the disastrous effects of a deficient harvest permeate through the nation far more generally than those of any other unfavorable cause. Yet still, if we take the country as a whole, the accumulations were doubtless greater than the losses. In spite of every unfavorable circumstance, the deposits of the London joint-stock banks materially increased in the course of the year. *These savings of capital are, therefore, pressing on the market.* Even though our foreign trade were precisely the same, yet still the capital seeking employment in that trade would be more. Though the debit side, so to speak, of the account was the same, the credit side would be different, and naturally, therefore, there would be an unoccupied surplus of capital, even if the external commerce, as shown by the Board of Trade tables, presented no diminution.

Secondly. The home trade of the country is not so good as it was. The dividends of our great railway companies show this; they have almost all had to reduce the income of their proprietors. And though much of this was certainly caused by the unfavorable weather of last winter, and the augmented outlay which it occasioned, yet still there is ample evidence in the reports that, under a brisk and prosperous state of the home trade, the traffic receipts would have been greater than they were.

Some time or other—how soon we do not venture to predict, and we are not at this moment concerned in predicting—the trade of the country, both foreign and domestic, will revive so far as to provide for the augmented capital of the country. Experience shows that the inherent energy and mercantile capacity of the industrial classes will soon absorb any probable accumulation of resources. For a moment they may be at fault: they may be harassed by the untoward confusion in America—an anomalous and perplexing result, to which there is no guiding precedent and scarcely an approximate analogy in the previous history of the world. But, in the long run, trading sagacity and trading industry will triumph. Whatever money they can obtain, that money they will employ.

When this event shall happen, when the natural augmentation of trade has outstripped the natural accumulation of uninvested capital, then the fall in the rate of interest will cease at once. The producing cause will be no longer in action, and the bank will not only be justified, but be bound to pause likewise, in its course of reduction.

And it may be compelled to pause by a second cause. In another way the fall in the market rate may be arrested. The effect of the recent high rate of interest was to attract much capital here from countries in which that rate was much lower. Now that the rate of interest is approaching to the rate of other countries, it is very possible that we shall part with much of this money, and it is very improbable that we shall retain the whole of it. For the most part it is invested in bills which will sooner or later become due, and when they do so, the foreign owners of the funds employed will have to begin a new transaction, in which they will be determined by the respective rates of interest of this country and of foreign countries, and by the other circumstances of the particular moment.

If, therefore, a foreign demand should spring up for the repayment of the capital which we formerly obtained from the continent by offering very high rates of interest, the rate of interest might again move upwards. The money market is very sensitive and delicate; a little too much will send it rapidly down, a very slight deficiency will cause it to rise just as rapidly. At present the foreign exchanges are extremely favorable to this country, and it is very probable that we shall see more than one reduction in the bank rate of discount. But it is probable, also, that the low rate of interest will produce the reverse effect of the recent high rate—that we shall not retain the whole of the money which we obtained by bidding high for it—and that, if the improvement in trade, and especially in the domestic trade, should be contemporaneous with a foreign demand, we may see the rate of interest rise again as rapidly as it has lately fallen, and as it at present seems likely to fall still further.

PICKPOCKETS.—The pickpockets of London and Paris have long enjoyed the reputation of being the most adroit in Europe; but, if we may believe the statement of M. CHARLES W——, Stuttgart can fully rival those cities. That gentleman was walking in the Konigstrasse, looking at the shops, when he was accosted by an obsequious little man, who offered his services to show him the lions of the capital, but the other refused the offer. The officious personage, however, was not offended, but politely asked him what o'clock it was. The other answered that he did not know, as his watch had stopped, and continued his walk toward the Museum of Natural History, which he entered. He had not been there many minutes before the same person came up with an air of an old acquaintance, and offered him a pinch of snuff. This M. W—— declined, saying he was no snuff-taker, and walked away; but some minutes after, having a presentiment of something being wrong, he felt for his snuff-box, but instead of it he found a scrap of paper in his pocket, on which was written, "As you are no snuff-taker, you do not require a box." He thought the logic of his unknown acquaintance rather impertinent, and resolved to bear his loss like a philosopher; but what was his amazement when, a moment after, he discovered that his watch had also disappeared, and in his other pocket was another note, in the following words: "As your watch does not tell the hour, it would be better at the watchmaker's than in your pocket." It is unnecessary to say that he never heard any further tidings of the two articles.

NEW BANK LAWS.

DAYS OF GRACE IN ILLINOIS.

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR UNIFORMITY IN CALCULATING DAYS OF GRACE, MATURITY OF BILLS, ETC., AND DECLARATORY OF THE LAW IN RELATION THERETO.

SECTION 1. *Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly,* That no promissory note, check, draft, bill of exchange, order, or other negotiable or commercial instrument, payable at sight, or on demand, or on presentment, shall be entitled to days of grace, but shall be absolutely payable on presentment. All other bills of exchange, drafts or promissory notes shall be entitled to the usual days of grace.

SEC. 2. The following days, to wit, the first day of January, commonly called new year's day, the fourth day of July and the twenty-fifth day of December, commonly called Christmas day; and any day appointed or recommended by the Governor of this State, or the President of the United States, as a day of fast or thanksgiving, shall, for all purposes whatsoever, as regards the presenting for payment or acceptance, the maturity and protesting and giving notice of the dishonor of bills of exchange, bank checks and promissory notes, or other negotiable or commercial paper or instruments, be treated and considered as is the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday; and all notes, bills, drafts, checks or other evidence of indebtedness, falling due or maturing on either of said days, shall be deemed as due or having matured on the day previous; and should two or more of those days come together or immediately succeeding each other, then such instruments, paper or indebtedness shall be deemed as due or having matured on the day previous to the first of said days.

SEC. 3. In computation of time and of interest or discount, when the calculation is by days or months, thirty days shall be a month; but a year shall be twelve calendar months, and interest for any number of days less than a month shall be estimated by the proportion which such number of days shall bear to thirty.

SEC. 4. This act shall be in force and take effect from and after its passage.

Approved February 22, 1861.

A SECESSION BANK BILL.—We have before us one of the bank bills found in Gen. GARNETT's military chest at the time of McCLELLAN's late victory in Western Virginia. It will be remembered that GARNETT carried along with him the president of the bank to sign those bills as they were wanted for the payment of the soldiers. The bill is on the Fairmont Bank, Virginia. It is shabbily engraved on wood, and is garnished in one corner with a grim likeness of Gov. LETCHER. The soldiers who could be taken in by such a transparent *sell*, must be sadly in want of the school-master.—*Boston Transcript*.

INDIANA AND OHIO BANKS.

WE have taken occasion heretofore to contradict a report that the Indiana and Ohio banks contemplated a suspension of specie payments. An improved edition of this rumor stated that the New-York banks would also suspend. Upon these points the President of the Bank of the State of Indiana addressed the annexed letter to the *Chicago Tribune*:

Unless the balance of trade, instead of bringing coin into the country, should be so changed as to cause a heavy exportation of it, (which is not likely soon to be the case,) a suspension of specie payments by the New-York banks (crippled though they may be by the failure of so many of their customers who have been engaged in the Southern trade) would be a blunder not likely to be committed by gentlemen so intelligent as are those who manage the banking institutions of that city.

As far as the "Bank of the State of Indiana" is concerned, I have only to say, that the subject of a suspension of specie payments has never been considered, and I trust never will be considered by our board. Our branches now hold about two millions and a half of dollars (\$2,500,000) in coin, and have some twelve hundred thousand dollars in New-York; while their actual circulation does not greatly exceed four millions. Many of them could pay, in coin and New-York exchange, their liabilities to the public in less than thirty days, and the rest of them in a not much larger period. Nor is the State Bank of Ohio more likely to suspend than we are.

The managers of both these banks are determined that the people of Ohio and Indiana shall continue to enjoy, as they have done for so many years, the benefit of a sound, convertible bank note circulation. Whether our people will have as much of this kind of circulation as is required by legitimate trade, will depend somewhat upon the influence of such articles as sometimes appear in such journals as yours.

A suspension of specie payments by solvent banks is not only a public calamity and a crime, but a financial blunder. Insolvent banks should be "wiped out," and the sooner the better.

Our friends "over in Illinois," if they have not already learned, will doubtless soon learn, that no combination of merchants and bankers, assisted though they may be by influential journalists, can give to inconvertible bank notes a value they do not possess, and that banks, without a good specie basis, are an imposition and fraud upon the public. I regard it as not a little strange and unfortunate that the writer of the "money articles" in the *Tribune* should suppose that your currency would be improved by a reduction of that of other States to your own low standard.

Chicago has a circulating medium, the best of which is from ten to fifteen per cent. below specie, and is only kept from going still lower by artificial means. It would be interesting to know what sort of "stuff" can be worse than this, and from what kind of bank note circulation your merchants and financiers have protected your enterprising city, whose citizens could give no stronger evidence of their patience and energy than the fact that they have continued to live and to prosper under the terrible inflictions of the Illinois system of banking.

Very respectfully,

J. McCULLOCH.

OBJECTIONS TO GOVERNMENT DEMAND NOTES.

By a New-York Bank Officer.

New-York, September 12th, 1861.

HON. S. P. CHASE, *Secretary of the Treasury :*

SIR,—When, in response to your earnest appeal, the banks in New-York, Boston and Philadelphia united in an effort to supply the means required to sustain the government, they were impelled to do so by the imminent peril which beset the nation, and by the fact that, with an exhausted treasury, large obligations already incurred, and still larger rapidly pressing, you had no practicable resource but the issue of paper money, *i. e.*, promises to pay on demand, without the power to redeem them.

To avert the evils of an irredeemable and constantly depreciating paper currency thus threatened, whose consequences were clearly seen to involve, not only the community, but themselves in eventual ruin, the banks at once adopted a plan of organization, for the purpose of drawing out the capital of the country, and loaning it to the government, to be paid by future revenues on the restoration of peace, enabling government to supply its necessities by obligations in the usual and legitimate form of debt, rather than by the creation of fictitious money.

To do this, the banks in the three cities have formed themselves into a confederation, practically corresponding to the constitution of the government, making together substantially one institution for the purposes of the national loan, with an aggregate capital of 120 millions of dollars, while each bank, as usual, conducts its special affairs. By means of this organization they have secured the power to take promptly the first fifty millions, and by their example have gained for the loan the confidence of the public, and, unless disturbed by apprehensions of danger from a large emission of paper money by government, they will endeavor to carry through the whole amount contemplated :

1. By offering the loan for sale to the public, at cost, for the common benefit; thus preventing depreciation by competition in sales among the various parties interested.

2. By holding the specie reserve in banks in each city as a common fund, subject to an average distribution on its receding below an agreed standard.

Fortunately, at this crisis the financial position and resources of the country are strong beyond all precedent in our history; and, as compared with other nations who have passed successfully through similar trials, they are fully equal to any probable exigencies. Specie, already greatly exceeding any former supply, is still flowing into the country. Our crops for two years have been so abundant as to leave still a large excess for export-

tation; and exchanges with Europe, yet in our favor, are only likely to turn against us by some fatal error in our financial policy.

With all these conditions favoring the movement, there is every reason to believe that the proposed plan will supply all the means the government will require. Why, then, should they resort to any other expedient?

When the proposed system of raising means by the banks was reported by a committee of ten, they were almost unanimously in favor of affixing to it a condition that government should not issue demand notes. That condition was only yielded from a reluctance to endanger or embarrass your appeal in so solemn a crisis, and because of your remonstrance against being compelled to give an official pledge against the use of a legal enactment; and still further, because of your assurance that it would only be resorted to when other means of raising money should fail.

The banks, therefore, feel the most implicit confidence that these issues will be confined to a very inconsiderable sum, and not be extended beyond a small amount, for which a specific specie fund will be pledged.

Allow me to express to you some of the reasons which present themselves against the issue of government demand notes.

1. It is evident that we can supply the means to carry the war successfully through, and without financial embarrassment, so long as exchanges can be kept generally in our favor, and large coin exportations from the country be prevented. This can be done only by maintaining in our banks and government the highest practicable specie standard, relatively to other nations, and thus compelling commerce to contribute to the expenditures of government, by purchase of our surplus productions, the profits of which will be absorbed by the national loan.

There are some mitigating circumstances even in a civil war. The expenditures are almost exclusively within our own States, and there are few materials which are not drawn from our own industry. It can be made substantially a family matter.

2. An expansion of currency is our greatest danger. By emitting paper money, the government are to that degree promoting the evils which we have organized to avert. Money is the measure of prices, and, whether in coin or paper, an addition to its volume tends to its depreciation as compared with all other material interests, or, what is the same thing, to an advance in prices. By enhancing prices of our surplus products, their exportation is to that extent prevented. By an increased price obtained for foreign goods is their importation stimulated. Thus are the exchanges turned against us, our gold currency is superseded by paper issues and sent abroad, and we awake to find the basis of credit, as well of government as of banks, taken away.

3. This result is especially probable with government paper, which is supposed to possess superior value, and will, therefore, be the more readily substituted for coin. Government's promises to pay are certainly no better, while it relies upon banks for means to redeem its promises, than are the notes of banks themselves secured by capital. They only the more readily promote expansion, because of the greater faith which the public have in them.

An expansion of paper money, therefore, inevitably tends, by the enhancement of prices, to the expulsion of coin from circulation and from the country, and the suspension of specie payments. Experience has proved that such issues of government are not less exempt from final loss than those issued by private corporations.

4. By an expansion of paper money and the consequent advance in prices, the cost of the war and the amount of the national debt are greatly increased.

5. There is, also, in the expansion of paper money, a tendency to stimulate private credit, which, in time of war, is especially dangerous. War is exhausting. It prevents large surplus production. Expansion of credit, under such circumstances, has, therefore, few modifying influences, but must sooner culminate in panic and disaster. The banks, by their organization, are merely restricting their ordinary loans, and diverting them to government use, until they can distribute the national debt among the people, and until industry shall resume its wonted channels.

6. Is not the creation of paper money a novel function of government in the present age? No leading nation now directly exercises it. England and France have confined this power to banks with special capitals and independent management, and under important legal restrictions. It certainly seems contrary to the spirit of our Constitution, and is a total reverse of the policy of the government for the last fifty years. Would it not place in the hands of an administration the power to govern the material interests of the nation, and to derange, if not regulate, prices at will; and, by an expansion or contraction of the volume of money in circulation, to change the value of contracts between citizens? Surely the exercise of a new power, involving such vast consequences, will not be entered upon without the gravest consideration.

7. The issue of paper money by government, engaged in war, is especially dangerous, because public confidence is liable to sudden change by every success or reverse of our army. At the very moment when the treasury may require additional resources for the renewal of operations, or to reinstate its position, it is certain to be the more embarrassed by a rapid return of its demand notes.

This effect was strikingly illustrated on the morning when the news of the disaster at Bull Run reached New-York. Before its receipt, the assistant treasurer was engaged in securing a subscription for treasury notes, under an authority to issue five millions. He could easily have trebled the amount—when suddenly, by a flash of the telegraph, the eager demand changed into a more intense desire to sell, at a depreciated rate, and was never renewed.

Government surely cannot afford to issue obligations liable to such results. The Treasury Department would be a bed of thorns, when a single casualty might involve it and the nation beyond the power of restitution. The banks who have undertaken the loan, and all others who have purchased it, are equally interested; since a destruction of government credit, based upon loans, would be equally and even more fatal to their investment, which is payable at a future day. All are, therefore, interested in avoiding a danger whose results are shared alike. Why

should government voluntarily incur a liability that might impair its power to place another dollar of its loan, cripple the banks by depreciating the value of that which they have assumed, and, after all, be driven to the issue of an irredeemable currency, under more unfavorable circumstances than at first?

8. An expansion of the currency is a popular measure, and especially seductive, because of its temporarily stimulating effect upon prices, and the apparent prosperity which it engenders. When the peril is greatest and nearest its culmination, there are no striking signs of warning. Government has no facility for meeting such contingencies. All its machinery implies deliberation and forecast, and is inconsistent with the necessities which arise in sudden financial emergencies. It is comparatively isolated in the exercise of its functions, and does not, like the banks, so pervade society as to feel those delicate indications of danger which financial experience only can comprehend.

9. Having commenced to raise the requisite means by loans through the medium of banks, it is for the interest of all that government should avoid any new financial expedients that will disturb the usual current of business. Banks, as now organized, are supplying the needful circulating medium, and will naturally increase it as far as practicable. Indeed, the danger is always in the direction of an over issue.

The government issues are not proposed as a substitute for, but an addition to, those of the banks; thus powerfully accelerating the speed with which the country tends towards danger, and all this during a feeble condition of business, which requires *less* rather than *more* of the medium of exchanges. So far as the proposed issues of government are a substitute for those of banks, it is depriving them of the means on which they rely to carry successfully through the government loan. It is unquestionably the true interest of the government to extend the maturity of its every financial engagement beyond the continuance of the war. Why, then, should they occupy the very position by which the banks expect to enable it to do so?

Besides this, as the banks must supply the coin basis for the government notes, it is substantially an increase of their circulation without their ability to control it. And as the banks must largely expand their credit to meet their engagements to government, they will necessarily require that the specie reserve should not remain locked up in the vaults of the treasury, but return to their own with the least possible delay. If government withdraw the coin as a basis for its issues, while the banks are thus also expanded, it is evident that both fabrics must rest on the same foundation, and cannot stand.

10. If an expansion of the circulating medium should become necessary, it is better that banks which invest in the loan should supply it, because they issue a paper of superior value, combining both their own capital and credit, and that of the government. And also, because the demand for the loan so created is of vastly greater service to the nation, by sustaining its credit and the price of its stock. They thus enable it to obtain money at the lowest rate, economizing the cost of the war, and give to the national loan a tone and character at home and abroad. During the twenty years of war in which England was engaged, from

1797 to 1817, when with a population considerably less than that of these free States, her national debt swelled to the enormous sum of four thousand three hundred millions of dollars, the burthen was doubly aggravated from the fact that the average price of Consols for the whole period was about 61 per cent.; and that payable in a paper currency depreciated from 10 to 20 per cent. below the gold standard.

Surely no considerations of fancied convenience should tempt us to incur the hazard of a similar state of things.

Should the government attempt to supply not only a credit fund for the investment of the national savings, but at the same time furnish a national paper currency, is it not plain that a suspension of specie redemptions by it would inflict a depreciating currency upon the community, which the banks would be compelled to receive in payment of debts, thus increasing the amount of government obligations in their hands, impairing the value of their previous investment in the three years loan, and forcing them also to suspend? In that case our government securities at once cease to attract capital from abroad, and our power of immediate national restoration is gone. Rather than this, it would be safer for the banks to suspend, and that the government be preserved superior to all its subjects, its character and credit maintained as a basis for reconstruction.

But bank paper is not liable to so great expansion as government. It is limited by law, by securities pledged for its redemption, by public vigilance and apprehension. Government, on the contrary, is all-controlling, has unbounded confidence of the people, moral power to compel its circulation, and no experience to govern its action.

The law has limited its first issue to fifty millions, which would be an addition of about one-third to the paper circulation of the loyal States. Should this experiment meet a temporary success, it would doubtless be increased at the December session. By that time all the fancied good and little of the real evil will have been developed. It is, therefore, all-important that correct public sentiment be previously aroused and distinctly expressed.

The plan so wisely adopted for supplying the treasury by distributing the loan through the medium of banks is meeting a success exceeding all reasonable expectations. Even before the notes are ready for delivery the public are flocking to the treasury with their money to purchase them. The banks have responded in coin without inconvenience to the drafts upon them. And they find, that with the large disbursements of government, the specie necessarily and rapidly returns to them, having stimulated the industry of the people in its passage. The capital of the nation is being absorbed in the loan, and there are the most encouraging signs that this will continue in accelerated ratio. All classes of society, from highest to lowest, are zealous in their praises of the stock, and the doubts and apprehensions respecting the stability of the nation, which before so generally prevailed, have, in a great measure, ceased.

All this is well enough; why not let well enough alone?

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A BANK OFFICER.

GOVERNMENT TREASURY NOTES FOR CIRCULATION.

Copy of a letter from a Merchant who resided in Rio Janeiro twenty-two years.

REFERRING to our conversation of this morning, in reference to the issue of treasury notes to circulate as currency, that is, notes of a denomination as low as \$5, bearing no interest, and which I considered might eventually injure the currency of the country by depreciating its value in relation to foreign standards, I will here briefly state facts which have come under my own observation, and which forcibly impress me with these views.

In Brazil, where I passed twenty-two years actively engaged in commercial pursuits, the system of issuing treasury notes to serve as a circulating medium was, for a series of years, adopted with such fatal results to the currency of the country, that, knowing certain causes produce certain results all the world over, I entertained a feeling almost of dread, when I learned the legislative measure of Congress which sanctioned the issue of these notes.

The currency of Brazil, in 1833, when I first went to that country, consisted entirely of paper, specie being an article of merchandise; the par of exchange was about 44, based upon the legal standard or law which fixed the value of gold at so many milreas per ounce. The actual rate of exchange was about 42½ per milrea. Exchange fluctuated from 40 @ 42, according to the balance of trade and necessities of commerce. The revenue was insufficient to meet the expenditure, and the legislative Chambers authorized the Minister of Finance to issue treasury notes to meet the deficit, of various denominations, ranging from one milrea up to five hundred milreas. Special duties were levied for the purpose of gradually cancelling and withdrawing these notes from circulation, and a certain portion of them were actually so cancelled and publicly burnt according to law. A few years later a rebellion occurred in the province of Rio Grande, which separated itself, *de facto*, from the monarchy, called itself a republic, elected a President, &c., and waged a war of many years against the imperial government. The consequent increased expenditure of the latter induced the Minister of Finance to ask permission of the Chambers to authorize a further issue of treasury notes as before, in default of negotiating a loan on favorable terms. After some opposition permission was granted, and from time to time repeated, according to the necessities of the case. These facilities for providing for the wants of the treasury were so tempting that nearly every Minister of Finance availed of them, and, in the course of years, an enormous increase to the circulating medium took place. At first, the healthy state of trade, particularly the productive powers of the country, yielding always large crops of coffee, sugar, &c., enabled it to bear the measure without any very great decline in the value of the milrea; the decline

however, was continual, and before 1840 the rate of exchange settled down to about 31d. per milrea. This discrepancy between the par of exchange and its actual rate made the legislature alter the standard, and they fixed the value of an ounce of gold in keeping with the current rates of exchange. Further issues of treasury notes took place, and the currency became thereby further depreciated, until the rate of exchange receded to 25. Again the legislature altered the standard, and made the par of exchange at about $26\frac{1}{2}$, at which it now stands, the actual rates of exchange varying from 25 @ $26\frac{1}{2}$. Thus, during the course of my residence there I witnessed a depreciation in the value of the milrea from 42 to 25, which necessitated an alteration of the standard or par value, depreciating it no less than 60 per cent., arising solely from the issue of notes which were intended to and actually did circulate as money.

In the republic of Buenos Ayres a similar issue of paper money was resorted to by the government, where, as the issue was greater in proportion to that of Brazil, and the resources of the country are less, exchange declined from 45 to $2\frac{1}{2}$, the latter being about the value of the dollar at present.

Whenever these measures were under debate the opposition to them always arose from those who were possessed of means, and who saw in this depreciation of currency a certain curtailment of their means. The advocates of the measure were too often those who had nothing to lose, and who were actually in debt; the capitalist invariably advocated a loan upon any terms rather than disable the currency.

It is this experience that made me view with alarm the same measures adopted in this country; and as it will be very simple at any time to declare these notes a legal tender, and such a step may be resorted to under pressure of difficulties, it would naturally at once put a premium on gold, and bring about a suspension of specie payments. Some of my friends in England who consign property to me in this country have evidently reasoned in the same way, for, without any reference to the subject having been made by me, one who had great experience in Brazil and the River Plate, writes to me as follows:

"In view of the Federal government being compelled to have recourse to the issue of treasury notes as authorized by law, and of the effect such a measure would infallibly have upon exchange, causing it to rise rapidly, we write to-day that we naturally feel anxious that remittances should be made at once to secure the current rate, and guard against the occurrence referred to. Should you yourself think such a measure probable, and its effect such as we anticipate, you will," &c., &c.

A NEW-YORK MERCHANT OF 1861.

New-York, October, 1861.

THE ARMIES OF EUROPE IN 1861.

IN the course of the season just concluded a lecture on "The Armed Forces of Europe" was delivered, at the United Service Institution, by Captain PETRIE, of Her Majesty's 14th Regiment, employed on the Topographical Staff.

The subject is one so full of interest, and so constantly discussed, that we willingly avail ourselves of Captain PETRIE's great carefulness and research for the means of supplying our readers with information which they would otherwise find it difficult to obtain at all, or, if it were obtained, it would fail to possess such a character of authenticity as obviously distinguishes the statements which we now reproduce:

Austria.—The war establishment of the Austrian army, according to the organization that came into force in April, 1860, is as follows:—309 battalions of infantry, 437,964 men; 41 regiments of cavalry, 60,110 men; 136 batteries of artillery, 27,176 men, 1,088 guns; two regiments of engineers, 7,460 men; six regiments pioneers, 6,858; 24 squadrons train, 18,204; 10 companies sanitary corps, 2,550; staff corps, corps of adjutants and general staff, 3,889; total, regular army, 564,211. Volunteer corps organized in 1859, 30,000; depots and reserves of all arms, 103,751; gendarmerie, police, veterans, &c., 40,382. Grand total of forces, 738,344 men, 1,088 guns. *

Prussia.—Infantry—Guard, nine regiments, 28,674 men; line, 72 regiments, 229,392; jäger, 10 battalions, 10,480; total, 268,546. Cavalry, 48 regiments, 36,768; field jäger and staff orderlies, 902; total, 37,670. Artillery, nine regiments, 41,292 men, 1,228 guns; pioneers, train, &c., 11,971 men; total field troops, 359,479. Depots and Ersatz troops, 98,487 men, 216 guns; Landwehr and garrison troops, &c., 261,126 men. Grand total of forces, 719,092 men, 1,444 guns.

Russia.—The army of Russia is so complicated in its organization that there would be considerable difficulty in making an exact analysis of it; but the numbers have been ascertained with sufficient accuracy to be, on the present reduced establishment, about 850,000 men. Of these the active army numbers 520,523 men, and 1,160 guns; the rest are composed of disciplined Cossacks and of irregular troops.

France.—The infantry consists of 103 regiments of the line, each having three active battalions and one depot battalion; 20 battalions of chasseurs, three regiments of zouaves, two regiments of foreign infantry, two battalions of African light infantry, three regiments of Turcos or Tirailleurs Algériens. The artillery includes four regiments of horse artillery, with 192 guns; 10 regiments of mounted artillery, with 600 guns; 10 batteries of foot artillery, with 60 guns; one regiment of pontooners, six squadrons train, giving a total of 38,767 men, 37,954 horses, 852 guns. This is in addition to 15,000 men, garrison artillery and the

depots, artificers, &c. The total number of guns that can be brought into the field, including the imperial guard, is 942, all of which are brass and rifled. The imperial guard forms a complete *corps d'armée* in itself. It is composed as follows: One regiment of gendarmerie, seven regiments of grenadiers and voltigeurs, one regiment of chasseurs, one squadron of gendarmerie-à-cheval, six regiments of cavalry, fifteen batteries of artillery, two companies of pontooners, two companies of engineers, four companies of train. Its total establishment is 38,060 men, 13,447 horses and 90 guns. The official returns on the 1st of January, 1860, gave the total number of available men as follows: Troops in France, 398,559; in Algeria, 83,782; in North Italy, 55,281; in Rome, 7,904; in China, 5,468. Total under arms, 550,994; men on *congé*, 64,471; reserve, 11,017; Grand total, 626,482.

Great Britain.—Regular troops of all arms, 218,971 men, 30,072 horses, 366 guns; British local and colonial troops, 18,249 men, 248 guns; foreign and colored troops, chiefly in India, 218,043 men, 58 guns; military police in India, 79,264 men. Grand total, 534,527 men, 30,072 horses, 672 guns. Of these, there are in the United Kingdom: Infantry, guards, seven battalions, 6,297 men; line, 35 battalions, 33,105 men; total, 39,402 men. Cavalry, life and horse guards, three regiments, 1,311 men; dragoons, &c., 16 regiments, 10,560 men; total, 11,871 men. Artillery, horse, six batteries, 1,200 men, 36 guns; field, 23 batteries, 5,000 men, 138 guns; garrison, 39 batteries, 4,680 men; total, 10,940 men, 174 guns. Engineers, 2,316; military train, 1,830; hospital corps, 609; commissariat staff corps, 300. Grand total of active forces, 67,268 men, 174 guns. Besides, there are the depot establishments: Infantry, line, 126 depots, 24,770; cavalry, 9 depots, 396; artillery, 2,975; total depots, 28,141 men. Reserves available for the defence of the kingdom in case of war: Pensioners, 14,768; militia, 45,000; yeomanry, 16,080; Irish constabulary, 12,392; volunteers, 140,000; total, 228,240 men.

RECAPITULATION OF THE ARMIES OF EUROPE IN 1861.

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>	<i>Others.</i>	<i>Total Men.</i>
Austria,.....	437,964 ..	60,110 ..	27,176 ..	20,961 ..	546,211
Prussia,.....	268,546 ..	37,670 ..	41,292 ..	471,584 ..	719,092
Russia,.....	850,000
France,.....	626,482
Great Britain,...	64,172 ..	12,267 ..	13,915 ..	444,273 ..	534,527

	<i>Total Population.</i>	<i>Total Army.</i>	<i>One man in every</i>
Austria,.....	40,000,000 ..	546,211 ..	73
Prussia,.....	17,750,000 ..	719,092 ..	24
Russia,.....	64,000,000 ..	850,000 ..	75
France,.....	36,750,000 ..	626,482 ..	58
Great Britain,.....	30,000,000 ..	534,527 ..	56

GOLD AND SILVER COIN AND BULLION.

- I. *On the National Dissemination of Gold.* II. *The Bullion Trade of the World.* III. *Small Coin in France.* IV. *Export of Gold from England to the East.* V. *Silver Mines of British Columbia.* VI. *New-York Assay Office.*

I. ON THE NATIONAL DISSEMINATION OF GOLD.

MR. ECKFELDT, the Principal Assayer of the United States Mint at Philadelphia, has lately made several interesting examinations tending to show the very wide distribution of gold. Passing over the evidence respecting its presence in various galenas, in metallic lead, copper, silver, antimony, &c., we cite the following, perhaps the most curious result of all:

Underneath the paved city of Philadelphia there lies a deposit of clay, whose area, by a probable estimate, would measure over three miles square, enabling us to figure out the convenient sum of ten square miles. The average depth is believed to be not less than fifteen feet. The inquiry was started whether gold was diffused in this earthy bed. From a central locality, which might afford a fair assay for the whole, the cellar of the new market house in Market-street, near Eleventh-street, we dug out some of the clay, at a depth of fourteen feet, where it could not have been an artificial deposit. The weight of 130 grammes was dried and duly treated, and yielded one-eighth of a milligramme of gold; a very decided quantity on a fine assay balance. (*American Journal of Science*, Second Series, Vol. XXXII., No. 95, Sept., 1861.)

It was afterwards ascertained that the clay in its natural moisture loses about fifteen per cent. by drying. So that as it lies on the ground, the clay contains one part gold in 1,224,000.

This experiment was repeated upon clay taken from a brick-yard in the suburbs of the city, with nearly the same result.

In order to calculate with some accuracy the value of this body of wealth, we cut out blocks of the clay, and found that, on an average, a cubic foot, as it lies in the ground, weighs 120 pounds, as near as may be; making the specific gravity 1.92. The assay gives seven-tenths of a grain, say three cents worth of gold to the cubic foot. Assuming the data already given, we get 4,180 millions of cubic feet of clay under our streets and houses, in which securely lies 126 millions of dollars. And if, as is pretty certain, the corporate limits of the city would afford eight times this bulk of clay, we have more gold than has yet been brought, according to the statistics, from California and Australia.

It is also apparent that every time a cart-load of clay is hauled out of a cellar, enough gold goes with it to pay for the carting. And if the bricks which front our houses could have brought to their surface, in the form of gold leaf, the amount of gold which they contain, we should have the glittering show of two square inches on every brick. (*American Philadelphia Society Proceedings*, VIII., 273.)

II. THE BULLION TRADE OF THE WORLD. EFFECT OF THE WAR IN AMERICA.

From the Bulletin of Paris, July 21.

During the monetary crisis which prevailed some three years ago, the Bank of France purchased all the silver it could obtain both in France and abroad. It was, indeed, at one moment so overstocked with silver as to have reason to fear the necessity of touching its reserve. It then made an arrangement with the Bank of England to deposit with it fifty millions of silver, to receive in return a similar sum in gold. That contract was scarcely concluded, when the news arrived that the war with China was ended, and the crisis in the United States took place. Gold was wanted for America and also for Italy, and the bank employed that which it had procured. Meanwhile China, instead of drawing silver from Europe as previously, sent us considerable quantities in payment of the war indemnity. On the other hand, the expedition to Syria was drawing to a close, so that at the same time the demand for silver ceased and the demand for gold became more active; and this occurred at the very moment when the Bank of France was taking back the silver it had deposited with the Bank of England. Thus the metallic crisis caused by the scarcity of silver money now threatens to recur through the scarcity of gold coin. But on this side the danger is less great, owing to the immense quantity of gold coined of late in all the mints of Europe. Gold will continue in circulation on account of its small volume and relatively high value. It is a certain fact that the very persons who but yesterday complained of the scarcity of silver coin are now greatly annoyed at having to receive a heavy bag of 1,000 francs in silver instead of a convenient roll of Napoleons. If LYCURGUS returned to this lower world, he would find people just as reluctant to use his cumbersome money as to live on his disagreeable black broth.

III. SMALL COIN IN FRANCE.

The following advice to travellers is contained in the Paris letter of a late British journal, and will be of service to such Americans as are able to travel abroad during the coming year:

"English people coming to France will do well to provide themselves with English gold, for the scarcity of small currency in this country is now so great as to be a serious inconvenience to those who set any value upon their time. When you present your draft or letter of credit to a Paris banker, he does not ask you, 'how will you have it?' but thrusts the amount into your hand 'short.' If you object that a 500 franc note is not handy money to pay cabs and make small purchases, the only alternative is to load yourself with a heap of five-franc silver pieces wrapped in a bit of coarse sacking. The banker is not only without Napoleons, but he has not so much as a supply of 100 franc notes. Tradesmen, if they can decently frame an excuse, will not give change even to their best customers. Of course you can always get a large note changed for the minimum notes of 100 francs by going to the Bank of France, but even

there you will find no metal but silver; a porter who sits in the exchange office proclaims to every comer that there is 'no gold.' The rapidity with which they change a note at the Bank of France is, however, some consolation for the loss of time and the cab hire which it costs you to get there. Bank of France paper is, in the strictest sense of the word, payable to 'bearer;' the clerks demand neither name nor address from the man who presents a note, and hand over the change in an instant, without waiting, as they do at the Bank of England, to peruse the list of stopped numbers."

IV. EXPORT OF GOLD TO THE EAST.

Export of gold from England to the East for the first eight months of 1861 and 1860, by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers, and from the Mediterranean ports for seven months, the shipments for August from the latter not having fully come to hand :

	1861.		1860.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
First 7 months from England,...	£559,489	£4,820,588	£885,807	£5,707,443
Month of August,.....	27,415	253,366	76,588	392,399
Total from England for 8 months,	586,904	5,073,954	962,495	6,099,842
7 mos. from Mediterranean ports,	180,220	1,229,497	257,140	1,781,262

V. SILVER MINES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA.

Some interest has been created regarding these recently discovered mines. The British *Colonist*, of a recent date, says :

Silver mining promises to become a leading feature in the industry of British Columbia. Already two companies are engaged in prospecting their claims. One is near Fort Hope; the other, "the British Columbia and Vancouver Island Silver Mining Company," is at work on the shores of Harrison Lake, about 20 miles below Port Douglas. So far as the latter company have advanced, the indications are of the most favorable character. The deeper they descend into the vein, the richer are the specimens found. An assay made by MARCHAND & Co., under the inspection of a committee appointed by the British Columbia and Vancouver Island Silver Mining Company, yielded at the rate of 355 ounces to the ton of 2,000 pounds. The assay was made in the fairest manner. When it is recollected that the assay of the Harrison Lake lead is only made from ore taken out at a few feet below the surface or outcroppings, it is fair to conclude that the farther down the vein is followed the richer will be the silver ore. Such is said to be an invariable rule in the Mexican and South American silver mines, and it is said to have been verified already by the company at work on Harrison Lake. Consequently in a few months we shall not be astonished if called to chronicle assays yielding \$1,000 or \$1,500 to the ton.

VI. NEW-YORK ASSAY OFFICE.

BULLION DEPOSITS, UNITED STATES ASSAY OFFICE, NEW-YORK.

	<i>Silver.</i>		<i>Gold.</i>		<i>Total.</i>
1860, 4th quarter,.....	\$ 216,472 ..		\$ 11,818,605 ..		\$ 12,035,077
1861, 1st "	452,118 ..		17,882,427 ..		18,334,545
" 2d "	792,647 ..		21,959,126 ..		22,751,773
" 3d "	1,019,000 ..		16,128,000 ..		17,147,000
<hr/>					
Total deposits from October 1, 1860, to September 30, 1861,	\$ 2,480,237 ..		\$ 67,788,158 ..		\$ 70,268,395

BULLION TRANSMITTED TO UNITED STATES MINT FOR COINAGE.

	<i>Silver.</i>		<i>Gold.</i>		<i>Total.</i>
1860, 4th quarter,.....	\$ 101,987 ..		\$ 8,772,811 ..		\$ 8,874,798
1861, 1st "	496,830 ..		19,484,603 ..		19,981,433
" 2d "	809,367 ..		19,505,400 ..		20,314,767
" 3d "	891,942 ..		17,092,718 ..		17,984,660
<hr/>					
	\$ 2,800,126 ..		\$ 63,855,532 ..		\$ 67,155,658

The estimated cost of transportation to and from the Mint—on gold, \$64,855; silver, \$6,900—is \$71,755. Add to this the loss of time, and the aggregate loss will appear to be about one hundred thousand dollars annually.

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE Secretary of the Treasury has prepared the following statement, showing the amount of the public debt of the United States on the 3d day of September, 1861, and the amount of Treasury Notes outstanding on the 7th day of September, 1861, together with the date of acts authorizing the same, rates of interest, time of maturity, &c. From this statement it appears that the public funded debt at that time was \$70,217,048 50, and the amount of Treasury Notes issued, \$55,950,500, making a total of \$126,167,548 50; subject to an annual interest, on loans, of \$3,900,467 25, and an annual interest on Treasury Notes of \$5,840,746 49. The following are the particulars:

<i>Interest.</i>		<i>Under what Act issued.</i>		<i>Loans, Amount.</i>		<i>When redeemable.</i>
6 per cent.	April 15, 1842	\$ 2,883,364	Dec. 31, 1856
6 "	Jan. 28, 1847	9,415,250	Jan. 1, 1868
6 "	March 15, 1848	8,908,342	July 1, 1868
5 "	June 14, 1858	20,000,000	Jan. 1, 1874
5 "	June 22, 1860	7,022,000	Jan. 1, 1871
6 "	Feb. 8, 1861	18,415,000	Jan. 1, 1881
5 "	Sept. 9, 1850	3,461,000	Jan. 1, 1865
5 "	Sept. 9, 1851	112,092	On demand.

Total funded debt,.... \$ 70,217,048

TREASURY NOTES.

<i>Under what Act issued.</i>	<i>Amount.</i>	<i>Maturity.</i>	<i>Rate.</i>
December 23, 1857,.....	\$ 20,000,000 ..	1 year after date,.....	3 to 6 per ct.
December 17, 1860,.....	10,060,000 ..	1 year after date,.....	6 to 12 “
June 22, '60, Feb. and Mar., '61,	46,000,000 ..	2 years after date,....	6 per cent.
Tariff Act, March 2, 1861,...	10,000,000 ..	60 days after date, ...	6 “
Act of July 17, 1861,.....	2,090,300 ..	60 days after date, ...	6 “
Act of July 17, 1861,.....	15,000,000 ..	3 years after date,....	7 3-10 per ct.
Act of July 17, 1861,.....	630,850 ..	3 years after date,....	7 3-10 “
	<i>Outstanding.</i>	<i>When due.</i>	<i>Annual interest.</i>
December 23, 1857,.....	\$ 1,445,300 ..	All past due,.....	\$ 97,506 74
December 17, 1860,.....	9,933,950 ..	Dec., '61, and Jan., '62,	1,116,534 00
June 22, '60, Feb. and Mar., '61,	16,850,100 ..	April to August, 1863,	1,085,909 00
Tariff Act, March 2, 1861,...	10,000,000 ..	September, 1861,.....	98,630 14
Act of July 17, 1861,.....	2,090,300 ..	Sept. and Oct., 1861,...	20,903 00
Act of July 17, 1861,.....	15,000,000 ..	July and August, 1864,	3,285,000 00
Act of July 17, 1861,.....	630,850 ..	July and August, 1864,	136,263 60
Total,.....	\$ 55,950,500 ..	Total,.....	\$ 5,840,746 49

THE TREASURY LOAN OF OCTOBER, 1861.

A CARD FROM BOSTON BANKERS.

FROM numerous inquiries addressed to individual members of the Treasury Note Committee, it is apparent that many of our fellow-citizens do not rightly apprehend the nature or conditions of the national loan of fifty millions; and that many who understand these points are not aware of the importance to the government that this loan should be thoroughly distributed among the people.

Some persons suppose that they must send their funds to Washington, in order that they may obtain treasury notes; others imagine that they must take their bag of gold to the Assistant Treasurer's office, and there patiently wait their turn before they can obtain any portion, however small, of the loan.

It should therefore be known, that any person may obtain any amount, from fifty dollars to five thousand, by paying the money to any bank in Boston, or through any bank in New-England which will remit the money to a bank in Boston and obtain the treasury notes, or by paying the money to the Assistant Treasurer in Boston. Interest at the rate of one cent per day for each fifty dollars, from the 19th August to the day of payment, is to be prepaid, and the treasury notes will bear interest from 19th August, thus securing interest to each depositor from the moment of his subscription. Receipts will be given by the Treasurer, or the banks till the treasury notes are forwarded, and these receipts will bear interest.

Thus much as to the conditions of the loan; but a far more important topic is that which relates to the thorough distribution of this loan among the people. After the lucid and forcible appeal of the Secretary of the Treasury, it would seem as if nothing additional could be needed; such, however, is not the fact. In order for the vigorous and successful prosecution of the war, it is admitted on all hands that the government must

be promptly and amply supplied with men and money. Nothing is more encouraging to those who have engaged in raising and equipping regiments, than to see that the funds are furnished and placed at the disposal of government.

And who are concerned in the results of this war? Better ask, who are not? What man or woman or child has not a direct interest at stake? What property, real or personal, is of value except as it is protected and fostered by government? And is not every interest, as well as every individual, dependent for security and prosperity, if not for actual existence, upon the maintaining, defending and upholding this government and these institutions, under which we have so long prospered?

When this loan was proposed to the public, the men of wealth in our large communities seemed to be ready to respond at once to the call, and expressed themselves ready to do their part in furnishing the money required by the government. But the exigency was pressing, and the Secretary of the Treasury felt the necessity of making immediate provision for the urgent wants of his department, and therefore made an arrangement with the banks, absolute so far as fifty millions are concerned, but conditional so far as the further sum of one hundred millions are concerned.

The banks are meeting their engagements, and furnishing the fifty millions with no practical inconvenience to themselves or the mercantile community; and if no more money was requisite, no difficulty would be experienced; on the contrary, the banks would be glad to hold a large portion of the loan at the present time, when commercial paper is very scarce, and the legitimate wants of the business community very limited.

But who is to furnish the next fifty millions?

Are the banks expected to do so? If they are, the men of means large and small must take and pay for the first fifty millions during the present month or early in October, otherwise it cannot be accomplished.

There is no lack of means. The money is on deposit and can be drawn at pleasure, or if invested, the investment can be changed, or money can be borrowed upon these notes readily at ninety cents on the dollar; and should we not be willing to use our credit that we may save our government, our country and our property?

The undersigned therefore appeal with confidence to the community to come forward at once, and, by assuming the fifty millions which the banks have taken, (only ten millions in this vicinity,) enable the banks at once to engage to furnish the next fifty millions to the government.

This is our appeal.

FRANKLIN HAVEN, President Merchants' Bank.

J. AMORY DAVIS,	"	Suffolk	"
ANDREW T. HALL,	"	Tremont	"
BENJAMIN E. BATES,	"	Commerce	"
THOMAS LAMB,	"	New-England,	"
ALMON D. HODGES,	"	Washington	"
WILLIAM THOMAS,	"	Webster	"
SAMUEL H. WALLEY,	"	Revere	"
JAMES H. BEAL,	"	Granite	"

Treasury Note Committee.

Boston, September 11, 1861.

The Mayor of the city of New-York addressed Secretary CHASE on the subject of advances by the city to the war expenses. His letter was as follows:

(Copy.)

MAYOR'S OFFICE, *New-York*, 16th Aug., 1861.

To HON. SALMON P. CHASE, *Secretary of the Treasury*:

Dear Sir,—On behalf of the Corporation of the city of New-York, I would call your attention, as the head of the fiscal department of the government, to a transaction of which you are doubtless cognizant through the usual channels of public information.

At the time of the assumption of their present hostile attitude by a portion of the States, I felt it incumbent to recommend to the corporate authorities of the city an advance of \$1,000,000 in aid of the general objects connected with the support of the government. This appropriation was promptly made, and I beg to transmit to you herewith copies of my message, and the ordinance passed by the Common Council in accordance with its recommendations.

Of the million thus appropriated, the sum of \$750,000 was applied to the purchase of arms, equipments and supplies for troops raised at the call of the President, and taken into the service of the United States; and the city now holds the vouchers, ready to be produced at your call, which will show such disposition of the funds in question.

I submit that the advances thus made by the Corporation of the city of New-York, at a most critical period, are the basis of a claim for reimbursement by the government. The meritorious nature of the claim is beyond dispute, and I am confident that the time and manner of repayment are the only questions you will consider. On these points I await the favor of your reply. I am, with great respect,

FERNANDO WOOD, *Mayor*.

The following is the reply of the Treasury Department:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Third Auditor's Office*, August 20, 1861.

Sir,—Your letter of the 16th inst., addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, has been by him referred to this office for reply.

You state, that in accordance with the recommendations contained in your message addressed to the corporate authorities of the city of New-York, on the 22d April, 1861, an appropriation of one million dollars in aid of the general objects connected with the support of the government was made by ordinance of the Common Council, of which ordinance you furnish a copy, and that of the sum thus appropriated, seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars was applied to the purchase of arms, equipments and supplies for the troops raised at the call of the President, and taken into the service of the United States, and the city now holds the vouchers, ready to be produced, which will show such a disposition of the funds in question. You submit, therefore, that the advances thus made are the basis of a claim for reimbursement by the government, and you request to be informed with regard to the time and manner of repayment. Accordingly, I have the honor to inform you that the only action

taken by Congress at the recent special session, with reference to the repayment of expenses incurred in equipping, subsisting, &c., troops called into the service of the United States, was an appropriation in the Army Appropriation act of July 17, 1861, for "amount required to the *States* expenses, incurred on account of volunteers called into the field," and an "Act to indemnify the States for expenses incurred by them in defence of the United States," approved July 27, 1861. In each of these statutes you will observe the repayment is limited to expenditures incurred by the "*States*." It is clear, that necessary and proper expenditures incurred by municipal authorities, under the circumstances you mention, commend themselves to the favorable consideration of Congress; and it is not doubted that when the matter is presented for the consideration of that body, such legislation will be had. But until such regulation is had, I am not aware of any provision that can be made by the executive for repayment of the expenditures referred to.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

R. J. STIMSON, *Auditor.*

HON. FERNANDO WOOD, *Mayor, New-York.*

THE ENGLISH MONEY MARKET.

OF the fluctuations indicated by the tabular statement of the English money market, the *Economist* says:

In the first week of September, 1851, the absolutist monarchs of Germany were studiously repressing all signs of popular life; the late king of Prussia, in particular, having destroyed the last vestige of the freedom of the press in his dominions. The Emperor of Austria had also officially announced his determination of in future reigning despotically. A severe earthquake had taken place in the Kingdom of Naples, causing great loss of life and destruction of property. The invasion of Cuba by General LOPEZ, with about 450 men, had occurred, but the invaders had been almost immediately defeated with great loss. The important discovery of the Australian gold fields had just been announced. The London money market continued easy, and the general rate of discount was below 3 per cent.

In the second week of September, 1851, the approaching period for the simultaneous cessation of office of the President of the French Republic and the dissolution of the French Assembly, was exciting some uneasiness; since, by the constitution, LOUIS NAPOLEON (the present emperor) was ineligible for re-election. No suspicion of a *coup d'état*, however, appeared to be entertained. The accounts from Germany and Italy continued to report arbitrary and despotic acts on the part of the reigning government.

From the Cape of Good Hope it was stated that the colony was suffering severely from the Caffre war, and that reinforcements were urgently required. Further accounts had been received of the gold discoveries in Australia.

In the third week of September, 1851, some further mercantile failures had taken place at Liverpool. The money market, however, remained easy, and the supply of capital was abundant. Abroad, the new session of the Dutch Chambers had just been opened. The accounts of the misgovernment in the Italian provinces, and especially in Naples, continued deplorable. From Austria, doubtful accounts were received of the success of the loan there in course of negotiation. A commercial treaty had been arranged between Prussia and Hanover, by which the latter kingdom and Brunswick, at the expiration of rather more than two years, would enter the Zollverein. Great excitement still prevailed in the United States with regard to the piratical invasion of Cuba by General LOPEZ. Further interesting accounts had been received from the Australian gold regions.

In the fourth week of September, 1851, the Great Exhibition continued to be thronged with visitors, the returns on one day having exceeded 60,000. From abroad, few events of importance were announced. Further confirmation had been received of the richness of the gold discoveries in Australia. The financial statement of Holland had just been presented to the Dutch Chambers, and was very favorable. Oldenburg had assented to the commercial treaty between Hanover and Prussia. The railway from St. Petersburg to Moscow had been inaugurated by the Emperor of Russia. Intelligence had arrived of a terrific hurricane in the West Indies, which had done much damage. The advices from the United States and Cuba were more reassuring, and affairs in the latter island had assumed a quiet appearance.

In the first week of October, 1851, attention was being directed to the forthcoming American cotton crop. Intelligence had been received of satisfactory landing, in complete order, of the submarine telegraph, at a point near Calais. KOSSUTH and his co-exiles had embarked at Marseilles, on board an American vessel, for England, the French government not allowing them to pass through France. A concordat had just been concluded by Spain with the Holy See. The terms had been definitely arranged for the continuance of the commercial treaty between Belgium and the Zollverein. The advices from Canada stated that gold seeking was being conducted in the colony, but without success. The great American novelist, J. FENIMORE COOPER, had just died. A Swedish four per cent. loan had been introduced on the London Stock Exchange.

1858. In the first week of September, 1858, the bullion movement continued remarkably favorable. The money market was extremely easy, although a payment of £350,000 had just been made on the Turkish loan of three millions, and the final instalment of the first Indian debenture loan was coming due. Numerous investments were being made in public securities, and Consols were at 97. The Atlantic Telegraph, after working a short time, was at fault, to the great disappointment of the public.

In the second week of September, 1858, the enormous accumulation of gold was causing the funds to rise. Money in Lombard-street was worth only $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. The second Indian debenture loan, issued at the reserved price of 97, was quoted $98\frac{1}{8}$. The first particulars respecting the proposed new concession of the Lombard Venetian Railway had been published.

In the third week of September, 1858, the treaty of peace with China had been published in the Paris *Moniteur*. The Bank of France had lowered their rate of discount from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent., but the Bank of England maintained their minimum at 3 per cent., although the bullion had reached £19,134,065, and the reserve £13,593,100.

In the fourth week of September, 1858, Sir HOPE GRANT and other generals were engaged in the pursuit of detached bodies of insurgents in Oude. A reduction in the bank rate to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. was looked for, but it did not take place until some months afterwards. Consols had reached 98 $\frac{1}{2}$, being the highest price known for years, and most other classes of securities were at the same time advancing, a considerable degree of speculative animation being observable on the Stock Exchange. The new Turkish loan, issued at 80, was at $\frac{1}{2}$ premium, and the Brazilian loan commanded 1 premium.

In the first week of October, 1858, French ships of war had been sent to make a demonstration in the Tagus. The Bank of Vienna was collecting large quantities of silver, with a view to the resumption of specie payments, and the rate of discount at Hamburg had consequently risen to 5 per cent. The Bank of England held 19 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions of bullion, and were expected to lower their rate of discount from 3 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The subscription list for the second issue of £2,000,000 of Messrs. DENT, PALMER & Co.'s Turkish loan of £5,000,000 closed on the 8th, when it transpired that £1,280,000 had been taken, making £4,280,000 in all. Notwithstanding this new issue, the Turkish 6 per cent. loan of 1854 was supported at 97 $\frac{1}{2}$. The official particulars of the new Lombardo-Venetian Railway concession had transpired. The new shares were quoted $4\frac{1}{2}$ premium, and the old 5 $\frac{1}{2}$. A great sensation had been excited in Scotland by the announcement of another call of £100 per share on the unfortunate proprietors of the Western Bank.

1859. In the first week of September, 1859, the rate for money was very low, the banks and money establishments not allowing more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. on deposits. £2,750,000 had been paid into the Indian treasury on account of the Indian loan, which had risen to 3 $\frac{5}{8}$ to 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ premium. The Indian Council were lending money on government securities at 2 per cent.

In the second week of September, 1859, news had been received from China of the disastrous repulse sustained by Admiral HOPE on the Peiho, and the certainty of a war with China in consequence. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the funds rose to 95 $\frac{1}{2}$. Owing to the abundance of money, the rate being $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in Lombard-street, a great proportion of the Indian loan, viz., £3,250,000 out of £5,000,000, had been paid to the Council of India, while in strictness the instalments actually due amounted to £1,000,000 only.

In the third week of September, 1859, the bank rate of discount was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., notwithstanding that the bullion and reserve were considerably lower than in the preceding year, being respectively £17,192,169 and £10,587,394, and the other securities had risen from £15,227,068 to £19,317,020. The instalments on the Indian and Russian loans were in course of payment.

In the fourth week of September, 1859, the bank rate of discount was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Large arrivals of bullion were announced, and the abundance of capital was demonstrated by the fact of three millions and a half of the new Indian loan of five millions being paid up before the second instalment fell due.

In the first week of October, 1859, money was very abundant. The bank rate was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and in the discount market the terms were generally a shade under. The bullion at the bank had increased within five weeks by £1,082,836. The rate for money in the Stock Exchange was 2 per cent., from day to day, and little more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. from account to account.

1860. In the first week of September, 1860, a ministerial crisis had taken place in Naples, and, after some vacillation, the King had determined on quitting his metropolis. The arrival of GARIBALDI was hourly expected. From America intelligence had arrived of another piratical attempt of WALKER on the Republic of Nicaragua. At home there was rather more confidence on account of the improvement in the weather, and the London money market remained easy. A serious collision had taken place on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, causing much loss of life.

In the second week of September, 1860, GARIBALDI had just entered Naples, amid great enthusiasm. Insurrectionary movements had broken out in the Papal provinces, and a deputation from the inhabitants of that part of Italy had been received by King VICTOR EMMANUEL. General CIALDINI had invaded and occupied the disturbed districts. In consequence of this resolution, the Emperor of the French had withdrawn his ambassadors from Turin. It was reported that measures were in progress for effecting a reconciliation between Austria and Russia. At home no event of importance had occurred. The Court of Bankruptcy was still occupied with the disclosures consequent on the great failures in the leather trade.

In the third week of September, 1860, General CIALDINI had just defeated General LAMORICIERE and the Papal army at Castelfidardo, with great loss, and the siege of Ancona had commenced. Various points in the Papal provinces were being occupied by the national troops. An attempt had been made to assassinate the Emperor NAPOLEON. In the London Bankruptcy Court, the examination of the partners in the great leather house of STREATFEILD, LAWRENCE & MORTIMER was exciting much interest.

In the fourth week of September, 1860, great sensation had been caused in England by the MACDONALD affair at Bonn. The national troops, under CIALDINI and GARIBALDI, were gaining further successes in the Papal provinces and Naples, although the latter had experienced a slight temporary check at Capua. A frightful catastrophe had taken place on Lake Michigan, by the foundering of a steamer, upwards of 300 lives being estimated to be lost. The great hide and leather house of MELLO & SOUZA had just failed at Rio, with liabilities for nearly half a million. Intelligence had arrived from China of the setting out of the allied forces for the Peiho.

In the first week of October, 1860, the official despatch had been re-

ceived of the capitulation of Ancona to the Sardinian troops, and of the surrender of General LAMORICIERE and his army as prisoners of war. The Pope had pronounced an allocution, protesting against the invasion of the Papal provinces by the Italian forces. A manifesto of MAZZINI had also been published. The accounts from Canada described great enthusiasm to be attending the progress of the Prince of Wales. The New-York press contained accounts of the execution of the filibuster WALKER. At home there were no events of importance, but great sensation had been caused by the mysterious child-murder at Rood.

Subjoined is a valuable statement from the London *Economist*, affording a comparative view of the Bank of England returns, the bank rate of discount, the price of Consols, the price of wheat and the Continental exchanges, during a period of four years, corresponding with the first week in October, 1861, as well as ten years back, viz., in 1851 :

	Oct., 1851.	Oct., 1853.	Oct., 1859.	Oct., 1860.	Oct., 1861.
BANK OF ENGLAND—					
Circulation,	£ 20,707,000	£ 21,635,000	£ 23,021,000	£ 22,756,000	£ 21,836,000
Public deposits,	9,655,000 ..	8,441,000 ..	8,523,000 ..	6,832,000 ..	4,909,000
Other deposits,	8,556,000 ..	11,914,000 ..	13,271,000 ..	12,006,000 ..	12,115,000
Government securities,	13,464,000 ..	11,131,000 ..	11,219,000 ..	9,663,000 ..	10,732,000
Other securities,	14,624,000 ..	15,122,000 ..	19,792,000 ..	19,945,000 ..	17,417,000
Reserve of notes and coin, ..	9,533,000 ..	13,173,000 ..	9,985,000 ..	8,391,000 ..	7,686,000
Coin and bullion,	14,991,000 ..	19,526,000 ..	17,623,000 ..	15,869,000 ..	14,124,000
Bank rate of discount,	3 per ct. ..	3 per ct. ..	2½ per ct. ..	4 per ct. ..	3½ per ct.
Price of Consols,	97½ ..	98¼ ..	95½ ..	93¼ ..	93
Average price of wheat,	35s. 7d. ..	43s. 2d. ..	42s. 1d. ..	56s. 11d. ..	56s. 9d.
Exchange on Paris, (short,) ...	25 22½ ..	25 12½ ..	25 10 ..	25 10 ..	25 37½
Amsterdam, (short,)	11 18¾ ..	11 15 ..	11 14¾ ..	11 14 ..	11 18
Hamburg, (3 mos.),	13 10 ..	13 8 ..	13 5¼ ..	13 5¼ ..	13 9¼

ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITAL.

The subjoined table exhibits the present prices of railway stocks compared with those current at the same period of last year, with the bank rate of discount. It likewise states the rate of dividend that would be yielded at present prices, assuming future distributions to be equal to those of the past twelve months :

RAILWAYS.	Capital of consolidated stock.	Total last two dividends.	Price Sept. 18, 1860.		Present price Sept. 18, 1861.		Present rate per ct. per an., at existing prices, taking last two dividends.
			Bank rate 4 per cent.	Bank rate 4 per cent.	Bank rate 4 per cent.	Bank rate 4 per cent.	
Caledonian,	£ 3,404,054 ..	5¼ ..	91½ @ 92	105	@ 105½	..	£ 4 19s. 6d.
Bristol and Exeter, ..	2,000,000 ..	4¾ ..	100 @ 102	92	@ 94	..	5 3 8
Great Northern, ...	4,808,433 ..	5 1-16 ..	115 @ 116	108	@ 109	..	4 12 10
Great Western,	8,201,460 ..	2¾ ..	72¾ @ 73¼	70	@ 70½	..	4 1 6
Lanc. & Yorkshire, ..	12,167,994 ..	5¾ ..	112¼ @ 112¾	108	@ 108½	..	5 5 11
Brighton,	4,618,554 ..	6 ..	110 @ 111	114	@ 116	..	5 3 5
North Western,	24,925,993 ..	4¾ ..	99¾ @ 100¼	98¾	@ 98¾	..	4 16 0
South Western,	7,156,087 ..	4¾ ..	91½ @ 92½	95	@ 96	..	4 16 4
Midland,	9,130,621 ..	6¾ ..	126½ @ 127	127½	@ 128¼	..	5 3 3
North British,	2,613,333 ..	3¾ ..	62¾ @ 63¼	62¾	@ 63¼	..	5 2 9
N. East.—Berwick, ..	5,149,917 ..	5½ ..	99 @ 99½	101½	@ 102¼	..	5 7 6
N. East.—York,	3,220,125 ..	4¾ ..	84¾ @ 84¾	91¾	@ 92¼	..	5 2 11
N. East.—Leeds, ...	1,398,300 ..	2 15-16 ..	56¾ @ 57	60	@ 60½	..	4 17 1
South Eastern,	7,433,700 ..	£ 5 1s. 8d. ..	86¾ @ 86¾	79	@ 80	..	6 7 0

THE CLEARING-HOUSE, NEW-YORK.

At the annual meeting of the members of the New-York Clearing-House, October 15th, the following gentlemen were elected :

Clearing-House Committee.

- *JACOB D. VERMILYE, Merchants' Bank.
- *GEORGE S. COE, American Exchange.
- JAMES M. MORRISON, Manhattan Company.
- *EPHRAIM D. BROWN, Mechanics and Traders' Bank.
- *JOSEPH M. PRICE, Oriental Bank.

Committee on Conference.

- JAMES GALLATIN, National Bank.
- *JACOB CAMPBELL, Jr., Pacific Bank.
- GEORGE W. DUER, Bank State of New-York.
- *ALFRED S. FRASER, Seventh Ward Bank.
- *ROBERT H. HAYDOCK, Fulton Bank.

Committee on Admissions.

- *D. RANDOLPH MARTIN, Ocean Bank.
- *CHARLES F. HUNTER, People's Bank.
- *HAMILTON BLYDENBURG, Nassau Bank.
- JOHN Q. JONES, Chemical Bank.
- R. W. R. FREEMAN, Atlantic Bank.

Committee on Arbitration.

- HENRY L. JAQUES, Metropolitan Bank.
- *JOHN THOMPSON, Irving Bank.
- *GEORGE W. DUER, Bank State of New-York.
- WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Bank of America.
- *FREDERICK A. PLATT, Corn Exchange Bank.

THOMAS TILESTON was re-elected Chairman and Mr. GEORGE D. LYMAN was re-appointed Manager of the Clearing-House for the year ending October, 1862.

Annexed is the statement of the business of the Clearing-House from its commencement, in 1853, to the 1st of the present month. The vast amount represented by the following figures has passed through the establishment without a loss or difference of a single cent in the accounts :

* Those marked with a star [*] were members of the same committees the previous year.

Clearing-House Transactions from October 11, 1853, to October 1, 1861.

	<i>Aggregate Exchanges.</i>	<i>Aggregate Balances</i>
1853-'54,	\$ 5,750,455,987 06	.. \$ 297,411,493 69
1854-'55,	5,362,912,098 38	.. 289,694,137 14
1855-'56,	6,906,213,328 47	.. 334,714,489 33
1856-'57,	8,333,226,718 06	.. 365,313,901 69
1857-'58,	4,756,664,386 09	.. 314,238,910 60
1858-'59,	6,448,005,956 01	.. 363,984,682 56
1859-'60,	7,231,143,056 69	.. 308,693,438 37
1860-'61,	5,915,742,758 05	.. 353,383,944 41
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 50,704,364,288 81	.. \$ 2,627,434,997 79
Amount of exchanges for eight years, ending Oct. 1st, 1861,	\$ 50,704,364,288 81	
" balances paid and received for 8 years, to "	2,627,434,997 79	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Aggregate transactions for eight years,	\$ 53,331,799,286 60	
All without loss or difference.		

OPERATIONS OF THE BANK OF FRANCE.

THE monthly account, published by the government of the Bank of France, for the month of September, which was anxiously expected, has not given general satisfaction. The most unfavorable item in the account is that of commercial bills discounted, which have fallen off from 547,000,000 francs to 506,000,000 francs in one month. This item demonstrates the apathy which exists among commercial men at the present moment, or their unwillingness to enter on any extensive operations until the political horizon becomes less clouded. It must be observed, on the other hand, that this diminution in the account of commercial bills discounted may be accounted for by the rate of discount charged by the Bank of France being higher than that demanded by private bankers, and likewise by the extreme prudence with which the directors accept the bills offered for discount. It must be remembered, likewise, that the commercial bills held by the Bank of France at this time last year amounted to 490,000,000 francs, being 16,000,000 francs less than at present. It is true that the cash in hand has diminished by 8,000,000 francs, but it amounts still to 387,000,000 francs. At this period last year it amounted to 531,000,000 francs. It fell, however, to 349,000,000 francs in January last, 38,000,000 francs less than at present. The bank, moreover, paid during the last month 16,000,000 francs to the Treasury, and 36,000,000 francs to persons having private accounts with it, so that its liabilities have diminished by so much. It may be asked, why the bank has paid its creditors with silver and not with bank notes, of which the circulation has diminished by 1,000,000 francs. The reason assigned is, that the cash withdrawn has been expended in paying for the foreign corn imported, and specie is required for that purpose. The item most interesting to holders of bank shares is a sum of 2,438,000 francs to the credit of profit and loss realized during the last month.—*London Times*.

THE CURRENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

THE returns of the circulation of the private and joint-stock banks in England and Wales, for the four weeks ending the 24th August, combined with the circulation of the Scotch and Irish banks for the same period, and the average circulation of the Bank of England for the four weeks ending January, 1861, and in 1845, 1854 and 1859, will give the following results of the circulation of notes in the United Kingdom, when compared with previous years :

	1845.	1854.	1859.	January, 1861.	Aug. 24, 1861.
Bank of England,....	£ 22,015,000 ..	£ 20,298,000 ..	£ 21,886,000 ..	£ 20,076,998 ..	£ 20,190,372
Private banks,.....	4,570,000 ..	3,849,000 ..	3,444,000 ..	3,320,794 ..	2,974,906
Joint-stock banks,...	3,222,000 ..	3,073,000 ..	3,018,000 ..	2,939,985 ..	2,704,611
Total in England,....	£ 29,807,000 ..	£ 27,220,000 ..	£ 28,348,000 ..	£ 26,337,777 ..	£ 25,869,889
Scotland,.....	3,804,000 ..	4,316,000 ..	4,591,000 ..	4,303,285 ..	4,053,808
Ireland,.....	7,716,000 ..	6,722,000 ..	7,404,000 ..	6,912,819 ..	5,519,428
United Kingdom,....	£ 41,327,000 ..	£ 38,258,000 ..	£ 40,343,000 ..	£ 37,553,882 ..	£ 35,443,125

Compared with the month ending the 25th of August, 1860, the above returns show a decrease of £2,085,098 in the circulation of notes in England, and a decrease of £2,813,766 in the circulation of the United Kingdom.

On comparing the above with the fixed issues of the several banks, the following is the state of the circulation :

The English private banks are below their fixed issue,.....	£ 1,373,002
The English joint-stock banks are below their fixed issue,.....	597,746
Total below fixed issue in England,.....	£ 1,970,748
The Scotch banks are above their fixed issue,.....	£ 1,304,537
The Irish banks are below their fixed issue,.....	835,066

The average stock of bullion held by the Bank of England in both departments, during the month ending the 21st of August, was £12,509,523, being an increase of £748,447 as compared with the previous month, and a decrease of £3,125,230 when compared with the same period last year.

The following are the amounts of specie held by the Scotch and Irish banks during the month ending the 24th of August :

Gold and silver held by the Scotch banks,.....	£ 2,470,235
Gold and silver held by the Irish banks,.....	2,126,454
	£ 4,596,689

being an increase of £52,311 as compared with the previous return, and a decrease of £147,463 when compared with the corresponding period last year ; yet, with this marked decline in their specie reserve, the bank reduced its rate of interest in September.

THE IMPERIAL CROWN OF ENGLAND.

In a recent pamphlet, prepared for private circulation only, Professor TENNANT thus describes the crown :

The Imperial State crown of Her Majesty Queen VICTORIA was made by Messrs. RUNDELL and BRIDGE, in the year 1838, with jewels taken from old crowns, and others furnished by command of Her Majesty. It consists of diamonds, pearls, rubies, sapphires and emeralds, set in silver and gold; it has a crimson velvet cap, with ermine border, and is lined with white silk. Its gross weight is 39oz. 5dwts. troy. The lower part of the band, above the ermine border, consists of a row of 129 pearls, and the upper part of the band, a row of 112 pearls, between which, in front of the crown, is a large sapphire (partly drilled) purchased for the crown by His Majesty King GEORGE IV. At the back is a sapphire of smaller size, and six other sapphires, (three on each side,) between which are eight emeralds. Above and below the seven sapphires are fourteen diamonds, and around the eight emeralds, 128 diamonds. Between the emeralds and sapphires are sixteen trefoil ornaments, containing 160 diamonds. Above the band are eight sapphires, surmounted by eight diamonds, between which are eight festoons, consisting of 148 diamonds.

In the front of the crown, and in the centre of a diamond Maltese cross, is the famous ruby said to have been given to EDWARD, Prince of Wales, son of EDWARD III., called the Black Prince, by Don PEDRO, King of Castile, after the battle of Najera, near Vittoria, A. D. 1367. This ruby was worn in the helmet of HENRY V., at the battle of Agincourt, A. D. 1415. It is pierced quite through after the Eastern custom, the upper part of the piercing being filled up by a small ruby. Around this ruby, to form the cross, are seventy-five brilliant diamonds.

Three other Maltese crosses, forming the two sides and back of the crown, have emerald centres, and contain respectively 132, 124 and 130 brilliant diamonds. Between the four Maltese crosses are four ornaments in the form of the French fleur-de-lis, with four rubies in the centres, and surrounded by rose diamonds, containing respectively 85, 86, 86 and 87 rose diamonds.

From the Maltese crosses issue four Imperial arches, composed of oak leaves and acorns, the leaves containing 728 rose, table and brilliant diamonds, 32 pearls forming the acorns, set cups containing 54 rose diamonds and one table diamond. The total number of diamonds in the arches and acorns is 108 brilliants, 116 table and 559 rose diamonds.

From the upper part of the arches are suspended four large pendant pear-shaped pearls, with rose diamond caps, containing twelve rose diamonds, and stems containing twenty-four very small rose diamonds. Above the arch stands the mound, containing in the lower hemisphere 304 brilliants, and in the upper 244 brilliants, the zone and arc being composed of thirty-three rose diamonds. The cross on the summit has a rose-cut sapphire in the centre, surrounded by four large brilliants, and

108 smaller brilliants. Summary of jewels comprised in the crown: one large ruby, irregularly polished, one large broad-spread sapphire, sixteen sapphires, eleven emeralds, four rubies, 1,363 brilliant diamonds, 1,273 rose diamonds, 147 table diamonds, four drop-shaped pearls, 273 pearls.

EVILS FROM EXTENDING CREDIT.

PREVIOUS to the year 1854 we had to call the attention of the trade to the evils produced by this system, and meetings were held in London and Manchester, when strong resolutions were passed condemning the practice, and expressing the opinion that it was injurious to commercial prosperity. However, it was found to be supported by the great merchants of London, and they would have it so; now it becomes our duty again to place before the trade facts, of which they have no cognizance, and let them judge of what is going on around them. By the office records, it appears that from January 1, 1842, to the present time, 280 wholesale houses in the city, whose returns ranged from £20,000 to £100,000 a year, have failed. During the years 1842, 1843, 1844, the average failures among the wholesale houses were seven or eight in each year; when we called attention to the subject of "dating forward" it had risen to twenty-five a year; and it has since reached thirty a year; the lowest number recorded was three in one year. To this number of 280 must be added seventy-four firms that went out of the trade altogether during the same period. Thus clearly showing, that during twenty years, 350 firms in the city of London have ceased to exist in the soft goods trade; their business has to some extent been absorbed by the large wholesale houses, who have considerable trade flourishing; but the real fact of the case is, that by far the larger portion of the trade that used to be done in London has gone to the manufacturing districts, and the houses in London are now taking illusive means to secure the trade. Travellers are sent in all directions, in July and August, to take orders for goods to be dated as October, and to be drawn for at three, if not four months, from the 1st of December; by such means the trade has become demoralized. The drapers openly avow the city houses have no terms; every account is generally squabbled over; and the party who has the responsibility of financing can scarcely tell, within several thousand pounds, how much he can rely upon to receive from his customers. The debtors are, by the system of "dating forward," allowed to accumulate large sums of money that does not properly belong to them; they are induced to incur large expenses in alterations and improvements in their shops more than they would otherwise do, and hence arises the great increase of the failures, principally through extravagance. It is because we firmly believe that a severe crisis is at hand that we offer these remarks, in the sincere desire that the wholesale houses will see the absolute necessity of reducing the terms of credit. Let not the large capitalists say, "this does not concern them;" it does, and very closely, for it is with them, and them alone, that the present system obtains.—*The Weekly Intelligencer*.

STATISTICS OF WAGES.

BEFORE the potato failure, Irish wages, according to the *Times*, were but 6d. a day, even for occasional hands; and such was the struggle for life that farmers sometimes had a difficulty to prevent their men murdering strange hands; laborers kept such a jealous watch over their crust, that any man from a distance, if set to work by a farmer, would be hurled headlong out of yard or field. Wages in Limerick county are now 6s. a week for a man the year round—extra hands in harvest getting 9s. to 12s.; women, girls and boys, 6d. a day each. Most laborers live in cottages upon the farms where they work, paying 30s. to 40s. a year rent, but many farmers give the cottages in; some allow, also, twenty perches of ground as a garden to each house, and one or two farmers give their men ale in harvest. Messrs. CHRISTY, of Odare, let out their steam-threshing machine at £2 per day, paying the engine driver and feeder just the usual wages of other men, but adding half a crown to each man for every sovereign earned over £6 (for three days) in a week. The cottages are greatly improved, but generally comprise one or two apartments on the ground floor only—such a thing as an Irish laborer going up stairs to bed being never heard of. The roofs are of slate quite as commonly as of thatch; but neat as many appear outside, there are few conveniences within, and in some cases the chimney is little better than an aperture for emitting a portion of the turf smoke. In a country ride of ten miles near Limerick, we saw five cabins without any windows, more than a score of houses with one, or sometimes two windows of four or six small panes each, and not a single opening casement or sash, ventilation being secured in the day time by setting open the door or half door. The pig, where there fortunately is one, has a sty, but makes very free with his master's keeping-room, and is, indeed, a playmate for the children.

In the neighborhood of Tipperary a man's wages are 6s. a week in winter, and up to 9s. in summer; otherwise, 7s. a week all the year round. Odd hands, in harvest time, 6s. or 7s., and their board. The laborer pays rent out of this, and is not allowed a plot of ground for potato growing, except on the estate of improving land-owners. In the northern part of Tipperary county wages are 1s. a day, and up to 2s. 6d., sometimes, for mowing corn; so that a farmer gets his corn cut and stooked for 5s., when in England we pay 8s. or 10s. Most men have potato plots; potatoes, in fact, form the main diet of the poor people, and, with the addition of a little Indian corn stirabout, perhaps a herring on Sundays, and a pipe of tobacco now and then, they seem lighthearted enough. The coming winter, however, is likely to witness much distress, owing to the virulence of the potato murrain, and the wet season that has, to a great extent, hindered the cutting and drying of peat in the bogs.

BOSTON BANK DIVIDENDS.

Compiled by JOSEPH G. MARTIN, Commission Stock Broker, No. 6 State-street.

THE following table presents the capital of each Boston bank, together with last semi-annual dividend, and the amount payable on Monday, October 7th:

NAMES OF BANKS.	CAPITAL STOCK.	DIVIDENDS.					AMOUNT. Oct., 1861.
		Oct., 1859.	April, 1860.	Oct., 1860.	April, 1861.	Oct., 1861.	
Atlantic,	\$ 500,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	—
Atlas,	1,000,000 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	3 ..	\$ 30,000
Blackstone,	750,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	22,500
Boston, (par \$50,)...	900,000 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	36,000
Boylston,	400,000 ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	3½ ..	14,000
Broadway,	150,000 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	4,500
City,	1,000,000 ..	3 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	30,000
Columbian,	1,000,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	30,000
Commerce,	2,000,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	60,000
Continental,	300,000 ..	— ..	— ..	new ..	2 ..	3 ..	9,000
Eagle,	1,000,000 ..	4 ..	4 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	30,000
Eliot,	600,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	18,000
Exchange,	1,000,000 ..	5 ..	5 ..	5 ..	5 ..	4 ..	40,000
Faneuil Hall,	500,000 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	20,000
Freeman's,	400,000 ..	4 ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4 ..	3 ..	12,000
Globe,	1,000,000 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	40,000
Granite,	900,000 ..	3 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	27,000
Hamilton,	500,000 ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4 ..	20,000
Hide and Leather, ..	1,000,000 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3½ ..	3 ..	30,000
Howard,	500,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	15,000
Market, (par \$70,)..	560,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	4 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	19,600
Mass'tts, (par \$250,)..	800,000 ..	\$8 ..	\$8 ..	\$25 ..	\$8 ..	\$8 ..	25,600
Maverick,	400,000 ..	3 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	14,000
Mechanics',	250,000 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	3½ ..	8,750
Merchants',	4,000,000 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	120,000
Metropolis,	200,000 ..	3 ..	4 ..	4 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	7,000
Mount Vernon,	200,000 ..	— ..	— ..	— ..	new ..	3 ..	6,000
Mutual Redemption, ..	561,700 ..	— ..	— ..	2 ..	2 ..	2 ..	11,234
National,	750,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	22,500
New-England,	1,000,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	35,000
North,	860,000 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	25,800
North America,	750,000 ..	3 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	22,500
Republic,	1,000,000 ..	new* ..	— ..	4 ..	3 ..	2 ..	20,000
Revere,	1,000,000 ..	2 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	2½ ..	25,000
Safety Fund,	1,000,000 ..	4 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	30,000
Shawmut,	750,000 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	22,500
Shoe and Leather, ..	1,000,000 ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	45,000
State, (par \$60,)...	1,800,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	63,000
Suffolk,	1,000,000 ..	4 ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	4½ ..	45,000
Traders',	600,000 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	18,000
Tremont,	1,500,000 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	3½ ..	52,500
Union,	1,000,000 ..	3½ ..	4 ..	4 ..	4 ..	3½ ..	35,000
Washington,	750,000 ..	4 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..	22,500
Webster,	1,500,000 ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3½ ..	3 ..	45,000
Total, Oct., 1861, ..	\$ 38,631,700						\$ 1,229,484
Total, April, 1861, ..	38,431,700						
Total, Oct., 1860, ..	36,981,700						
Total, April, 1860, ..	35,770,000						
Total, Oct., 1859, ..	34,360,000						
Total, April, 1859, ..	33,160,000						

The changes in dividends since April present an unusual feature in bank payments for the past ten or fifteen years; as during most of that time they have steadily gained, or at least held their own, while now we have quite a general reduction to note. No bank pays any more than in April.

Of the forty-four banks in the table, the dividends average 3.16 per cent. Two banks divide $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; five, 4; nine, $3\frac{1}{2}$; twenty-three, 3; one, $2\frac{1}{2}$; two, 2 per cent. Atlantic passes, and Massachusetts banks pays 3 1-5 per cent., or \$8 per share. Twenty-one banks pay the same as in April last, twenty-two reduce their dividends, and the Mount Vernon pays 3 per cent. for the first ten months of its operation. This is the first time any bank in Boston has passed its dividends since 1844.

Out of the forty-four banks, twenty-seven are at or below par, and only seventeen are above; while in April last forty were above, two were at par, and two below it.

PRODUCTION OF GOLD IN AUSTRALIA.

WE learn from the Australian and New-Zealand *Gazette*, that the labors of the Chinese diggers on the gold-fields in Victoria appear, from the quantity exported by them during the current year, to have been attended with less success than previously. To the present date 15,011 ounces is the amount of their exports, against 37,000 ounces during the same period of 1860. The exports of gold by the Chinese were 86,000 ounces in 1860, against 85,500 ounces in the previous year. It appears from the following, that the Celestials by no means deserve the treatment which they have received in New South Wales, which, if matters had been reversed at Canton, would have probably occasioned a war. Sir JOHN BOWRING had less provocation. No doubt they are regarded with jealousy, but so are newly-arrived Englishmen, thanks to the despotism of trades' unions; yet the most reliable accounts speak of them as hard-working patient emigrants, despite their not very cleanly habits; but of their aptitude for trade and business there can be no doubt, for they live and flourish where the most boisterous and wasteful Anglo-Saxon would starve. We are told that the Chinese have lately made a handsome contribution to a number of the public buildings of Melbourne. In Little Bourk-street, and the alleys leading from it, that peculiar people have made a city for themselves and their British-born spouses, whose numbers (according to the *Argus*) are gradually increasing, and few tradesmen seem to flourish but those who hang over their doors the mysterious characters which only Chinamen understand. In a central position in that street KONG MENG & Co. have lately erected a court-house, where disputes among Chinamen will be disposed of after their own manner and according to their own laws; it is of brick, with a front of white stone, the columns of the one story Ionic and of the other composite. The floors are of black and white marble. There are no fire-places, the Chinese having some superstition on that point; and to obviate another prejudice, the windows are not placed one above another.

NEW-YORK BANK STOCKS, 1859, 1860, 1861.

BANKS.	Oct. 19, 1859.		Oct. 19, 1860.		Oct. 19, 1861.		Profits June 18, '61.
	Offer.	Ask'd.	Offer.	Ask'd.	Offer.	Ask'd.	
Bank of New-York,.....	103½	104½	103	103½	82½	92	\$ 240,860
Manhattan Bank,.....	136	140	140	145	116	..	662,220
Merchants' Bank,.....	107	108	107½	108	92	93	158,878
Mechanics' Bank,.....	112	114	114	116	96	99	343,936
Union Bank,.....	99½	99½	105½	106	89	90	127,471
Bank of America,.....	110	111	114	114	97½	99	427,568
City Bank,.....	124	..	130	135	107	..	199,143
Phenix Bank,.....	108	109	110	115	88	90	254,813
Tradesmen's Bank,.....	106	107	109	110	97	97	88,786
Chemical Bank,.....	400	..	400	..	720,373
Fulton Bank,.....	134	..	135	140	115	140	217,151
Butchers and Drovers' B'k, 120	123	..	125	130	103	103	118,696
Mechanics & Traders' B'k, 110	118	..	110	112	106	112	62,299
National Bank,.....	100	101	100	103	88	90	73,645
Merchants' Exchange Bk., 96	98	..	98	99	78	80	120,396
Leather Manufac. Bank, ..	150	..	140	..	112	..	244,197
Seventh Ward Bank,....	125	140	130	..	111½	125	145,881
State of New-York Bank, 101	103	..	102	..	83	85	169,588
Bank of Commerce,.....	99	99½	101	..	83	84	585,291
Broadway Bank,.....	132	..	130	155	115	120	514,421
Ocean Bank,.....	92½	93	98	99½	70	72	63,744
Mercantile Bank,.....	119	125	100	112	144,268
American Exchange Bank, 103½	104	..	103½	104	85	86	215,294
Bank of the Republic,....	125	126	126	127	88	91	419,908
Bank of North America, ..	107	..	109	110	86	92	154,722
Hanover Bank,.....	85½	88	93	94	70	71	87,578
Irving Bank,.....	..	98	96	97	70	75	37,599
Metropolitan Bank,.....	110	110½	111½	113	93	95	567,334
East River Bank,.....	90	..	98	100	79	82	30,080
Nassau Bank,.....	99½	102	103	104	83	..	44,584
Shoe and Leather Bank, ..	111	..	108	109	86	90	180,565
Corn Exchange Bank,....	99	101	95	98	85½	..	93,800
Continental Bank,.....	100½	102	103½	105	73½	75	108,951
St. Nicholas Bank,.....	94	95	89	90	66	70	48,087
Marine Bank,.....	82½	84	84	86	60	..	25,850
Commonweath Bank,....	96½	97	94	95	70	75	54,435
Importers & Traders' B'k, 108½	109	..	113½	114	86	..	202,496
Park Bank,.....	105	106	113	113	93	95	298,891

Bank stocks in New-York, at this time, are ten to twenty per cent. below those prevailing a year ago. We give the quotations at the New-York Stock Exchange for the shares of the leading banks in the city of New-York as they were on the 19th of October, for three years past. It will be seen that the range of present prices is, on an average, fully 20 per cent. below that for 1860 and 1859. The real value of the bank stocks in this city cannot, we are very confident, be much less than it was in 1859, nor more than 10 per cent. less than in 1860. It is the opinion of those having the best opportunities for knowing, that 10 per cent. is an ample guarantee for all the losses sustained by the recent crisis. If so, the prices of shares are excessively depreciated. The banks are now in a very prosperous condition, and in the government loan have all

the paper they need at a very high rate of interest. The aid they have extended to government is calculated to greatly strengthen their customers and the public generally. Attention has only to be turned toward these institutions to cause a large advance in their shares.

FRENCH BANK LAW.

A CAUSE of some commercial interest was decided recently by the Imperial Court of Donai. A joint-stock bank was formed at Lille, in the year 1846, under the title of "Caisse Commerciale du Nord," and M. DECROIX was named as the manager. He called the shareholders together in 1859, and announced to them that it had become necessary to wind up the company, as it had experienced a loss of the enormous sum of 3,000,000 francs by the failure of a person named DUHANT. It appeared, when the matter had been investigated, that the manager had permitted DUHANT to overdraw his account, without having required any security. The affairs of the bank were wound up, and the consequence was, that the shareholders experienced a very heavy loss. Subsequently they brought an action against DECROIX, the manager, before the Tribunal of Commerce of Lille, and against the Council of Surveillance, as being accountable for the manager for a sum of 889,000 francs. Their ground of action was, that the Council had been guilty of great imprudence in permitting the manager to make so large an advance to DUHANT. The tribunal nevertheless decided, that as DUHANT was an extensive merchant, enjoying the reputation of being wealthy, and had moreover, been a good customer to the bank, no legal imprudence had been committed in making him the advances, and judgment was pronounced for the defendants. The shareholders appealed to the Imperial Court of Donai, and the court, taking a different view of the facts, adjudged that DECROIX should pay them 100 francs a share, but released the Council of Surveillance from all responsibility.

THE BANK OF FRANCE.—It appears that the arrangement effected on Monday by the Bank of France, has been made with Messrs. ROTHSCHILD and five other Paris banking houses, and it is to the effect that the banks are to have, through these firms, the power to draw bills upon London to the amount of £2,000,000, of which £1,000,000 will be on Messrs. ROTHSCHILD and £1,000,000 on Messrs. BARING. The knowledge of this circumstance has produced a slight decline—about an $\frac{1}{8}$ per cent. in the rate of exchange; and when the drawing of the bills commences, a further downward movement must be expected, but it is not considered likely that the reaction will be a point that will attract gold from London. The measure will probably not do more than check, for the present, the drain of specie from Paris to this side. At the maturity of the bills, which will be drawn at three months' date, the amount will have to be repaid, unless a renewal be obtained, and the rate of exchange at that period will be proportionably influenced in our favor. On the other hand, the difficulty in France, if affairs should not meanwhile take a better course, will then return, and, perhaps, with increased force from the present postponement. It may be hoped, however, that the result of the excellent vintage and other circumstances, will operate to bring about some restoration of trade and commerce.—*London Times, October 10th.*

	YEAR 1860.		MARCH, 1861.		APRIL, 1861.		MAY, 1861.		JUNE, 1861.		JULY, 1861.		AUG., 1861.		SEPT., 1861.		YEAR 1861.	
	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.
BONDS AND STOCKS.																		
United States six per cents, 1863,...	95	100½	95	95½	89	95	80	80	75	79½	89	90	81½	89½	98	90	80	100
United States six per cents, 1871,...	86½	89½
U. S. Treasury Notes, six per cents,	95½	98	97½	99
U. S. five per cents, 1874, coupon,...	85	104½	85	85	75	89½	76	76	75	78½	76	82	78½	81	79½	81½	75	97
Indiana State five per cents,.....	88	98	85	87½	88	93	80	80	78	80	75	77½	75	75½	77½	79	75	93
Virginia six per cent. bonds,.....	78	95	74	91	26	76½	43½	39	39	48	44	50	50	56½	51½	55	36	81
Tennessee six per cent. bonds,.....	64	98	72	77	41	75½	40½	47½	34½	41½	37	45½	42	46½	41½	44½	34½	77
Georgia six per cent. bonds,.....	102	105	60	60½	53	60	57	70	65	77	63½	67	53	77
North Carolina six per cent. bonds,	76	100	78	82	45	81	58	62	44	53	48	62	54	70	60	63½	44	82½
California seven per cent. bonds, ..	82	95	87½	88	78½	87½	71½	75	76½	78	74½	78½	75	77	76	81½	71½	88
Missouri six per cent. bonds,.....	61	84½	63½	69½	87½	66	35	42	36	40½	37½	46½	41	45	41½	44½	35	72½
Canton Company shares,.....	14	23½	14	15	8	14½	8½	10	8½	9	9	9½	9	10	10	..	8	15
Cumberland Coal Co., preferred,...	8	17½	7	7½	6	7½	4	5½	4½	4½	4½	5½	4½	5	4	9½
Pacific Mail Steamship Company,...	70	107½	82	88½	50	56	60½	71	59	69	69	77	70	78½	75½	89½	50	94
New-York Central Rail-Road,.....	70	92½	75½	80	68	78½	71½	79½	71½	73½	73½	79½	72½	77	72½	74½	68	89½
Erie Rail-Road shares,.....	86	66	43	47	33	45½	34	37½	31½	31½	32	38	32½	34½	32½	34	31½	40½
Hudson River Rail-Road,.....	8	24	15½	16½	11½	16½	10½	12½	8½	10½	9½	12½	10½	11	10½	10½	8½	16½
Harlem Rail-Road shares,.....	27	55	38	41½	28	41½	25½	31½	20½	25½	22½	29½	24½	26½	25	25½	20½	48
Harlem Rail-Road, preferred,.....	30	49½	39	46	29½	44½	30½	33½	30½	38½	33	39½	35	37½	34½	36½	29½	45½
Reading Rail-Road shares,.....	84½	78½	54	60	40	58½	40	46	30½	44½	41	47½	40½	43	41½	43½	39½	61½
Michigan Central Rail-Road,.....	5	25	14½	18½	12½	17½	10½	13½	10½	12½	12	15½	14	18½	14½	14½	10½	18½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana R.R.,...	12½	50½	38	39½	26	39½	24½	29½	23½	27½	26½	33½	27½	30	28½	31½	22½	39½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana, guar.,...	106	146½	115	117½	97½	116½	99	107	104	109	105	111½	104½	108	106	115	97½	117½
Panama Rail-Road shares,.....	51½	89½	75½	83	55½	81½	57	71	62	69	62	69½	68	65	64½	68½	55½	88½
Illinois Central Rail-Road shares, ..	55	82½	68½	74	55	73½	55½	61	56	61½	60½	66½	62½	66½	66½	69½	55	74½
Galena and Chicago Rail-Road,...	18½	49½	83	87	27	22½	20½	25½	20½	21½	23½	38	27½	30½	29	30½	20½	38
Cleveland and Toledo Rail-Road,...	42½	54½	56	61	34	58	30½	39	32½	36½	34	45	37½	41½	41½	45½	30½	62
Chicago & Rock Island Rail-Road,...	81	100½	97	102½	85	98	89	92½	89	92	89	92	89½	90	91½	93½	85	102½
Illinois Central Construction bonds,	73½	87	76	80½	72	81	75	77	76	77½	73	79	75	80	76	..	72	80½
Pennsylvania Coal Company,.....	80	101½	85	90	82	90	80	84	79	88½	80	86½	82½	85½	82½	86	79	92
Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.,...

THE STOCK EXCHANGE.

THERE was an animated discussion, on the 22d October, on the report of a committee of the Board of Brokers. The resolutions passed by a large majority, 86 to 32 :

NEW-YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, *October 7th, 1861.*

The committee appointed by the board to report upon a plan for uniform and regular commissions, this day presented the following resolutions :

Resolved, That no member of this board shall execute any order, either to buy or sell, for a less commission than one-quarter of one per cent. on the par value, except for bankers or brokers, when the commission shall not be less than one-eighth of one per cent. on the par value.

Resolved, That any return of commission by a member, or any arrangement whatever, whereby the commission paid, or to be paid, shall be less than that called for in the foregoing resolution, shall be considered a violation of the same.

Resolved, That any sitting member may, during his absence from the board, employ any other member to execute any order without charge ; but in this case the member so doing shall call out the name of the party employing him every time he offers to buy or sell.

Resolved, That a standing committee of three be appointed by the chair, whose duty it shall be to report to this board any violation of the foregoing resolutions which may come to their knowledge, and that any member so reported shall, upon conviction, be suspended not less than sixty days nor more than twelve months, at the pleasure of the board ; and upon a repetition and conviction, the party shall be declared no longer a member of the board, and ever after be ineligible.

Resolved, That all articles regarding commissions, other than the foregoing, be and are hereby repealed.

Resolved, That the Secretary be ordered to have one thousand copies of the revised constitution and by-laws printed for the use of the members without delay.

DAVID GROESBECK, }
H. G. STEBBINS, } *Committee.*
W. R. VERMILYE, }

The New-York Board of Brokers voted, October 23d, to open their room at 10 A. M., and keep it open until 4 P. M., holding the sessions at the usual hours. It was also recommended that members should transact business, usually done in the street, at the board room. The change in the rate of commissions creates a great deal of discussion, and does not work well. The rate adopted, $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., is evidently considered too high by parties who have business with the board, and they will seek the services of outside brokers, or do their business through banking houses. The rule will probably not remain long in force. If not repealed, it will tend to concentrate business in the hands of such brokers as will not be bound by it, to the loss of such as stand honestly by their agreement.

BANK STATISTICS.

INDIANA.

THE free banks of Indiana made their exhibit on the 1st September, showing the following facts. The banks which continue under the law are as follow:

Bank of Goshen.	Prairie City Bank.
Bank of Salem, at Salem.	Salem Bank.
Bank of Corydon.	Exchange Bank.
Bank of Mt. Vernon.	Parke County Bank.
Bank of Elkhart.	Exchange Bank, Greencastle.
Indiana Farmers' Bank,	Cambridge City Bank.
Bank of Salem, New-Albany.	Bank of Paoli.
Southern Bank of Indiana.	Lagrange Bank.
Indiana Bank.	

These have a circulation of \$879,164. Secured stocks and gold as follow: \$890,536 Indiana Stocks; \$114,500 Louisiana; \$21,000 Tennessee; \$230,000 Missouri; \$60,500 California; \$11,000 North Carolina; \$2,000 Georgia; \$2,500 Kentucky; \$3,000 Michigan; \$5,000 Virginia; \$30,000 United States; \$20,000 gold; \$1,856 in exchange.

The banks which have withdrawn their securities and filed their bonds are the

Brookville Bank.	Farmers' Bank.
Merchants and Mechanics' Bank.	Hoosier Bank.
Indian Reserve Bank.	Fayette County Bank.
Bank of Indiana, (Michigan City.)	Bank of Syracuse.
Bank of Monticello.	

These have a total outstanding circulation of \$23,181.

The following named banks are retiring their circulation:

Bank of Rockville.	Canal Bank.
Huntington County Bank.	Indiana Stock Bank.
Crescent City Bank.	Kentucky Stock Bank.

Their circulation amounts to \$52,925. The aggregate outstanding of all is \$955,270.

The following shows the rates at which the suspended banks are redeemed by the auditor of Indiana:

Bank of Albany,.....at 90 cts.	Central Bank,.....at par.
Bank of Albion,.....at par.	Farmers' Bank, Jasper,.....at 91 cts.
Bank of Connersville,.....at 87 cts.	Kalamazoo Bank,.....at 90 cts.
Bank of Gosport,.....at par.	Northern Indiana Bank,.....at 83 cts.
Bank of Perrysville,.....at par.	N. Y. and V. S. Stock Bank,....at par.
Bank of South Bend,.....at par.	Orange Bank,.....at par.
Bloomington Bank,.....at 85 cts.	State Stock, Marion,.....at 90 cts.
Boone County Bank,.....at par.	Savings Bank of Indiana,.....at 69 cts.
Bank of T. Wadsworth,.....at 91 cts.	Traders' Bank, Nashville,.....at 92 cts.
Bank of Rockport,.....at par.	Wayne Bank, Logansport,.....at par.

No other suspended bank notes are redeemed at this office.

BANKS OF OHIO.

The quarterly bank statement exhibits the condition of the banks of Ohio, on the first Monday of August, 1861. The following is a summary of the statement :

RESOURCES.

	<i>Independent Banks.</i>	<i>Free Banks.</i>	<i>Branches of State Bank.</i>	<i>Totals.</i>
Specie,.....	\$ 139,670 ..	\$ 123,558 ..	\$ 1,936,617 ..	\$ 2,199,845
Eastern deposits,...	165,806 ..	509,795 ..	1,437,616 ..	2,113,217
Bank notes,.....	142,697 ..	266,415 ..	508,034 ..	917,146
Due from banks,...	61,840 ..	401,715 ..	755,239 ..	1,218,794
Discounts,.....	1,327,328 ..	1,252,247 ..	7,779,375 ..	10,358,960
State bonds,.....	686,155 ..	846,205 ..	794,809 ..	2,327,169
Real and personal property,.....	93,840 ..	54,498 ..	543,502 ..	691,840
Cash items,.....	6,139 ..	83,323 ..	56,599 ..	146,061
Other resources,...	378,741 ..	38,593 ..	978,238 ..	1,395,572
Total,.....	\$ 3,002,220 ..	\$ 3,576,352 ..	\$ 14,790,032 ..	\$ 21,368,604

LIABILITIES.

	<i>Independent Banks.</i>	<i>Free Banks.</i>	<i>Branches of State Bank.</i>	<i>Totals.</i>
Capital,.....	\$ 575,000 ..	\$ 1,010,950 ..	\$ 4,004,500 ..	\$ 5,590,450
Safety fund,.....	718,551 ..	265,625 ..	704,940 ..	1,689,116
Circulation,.....	601,765 ..	619,257 ..	7,579,058 ..	8,800,080
Due to banks,.....	42,832 ..	451,667 ..	148,326 ..	642,825
Deposits,.....	846,761 ..	1,068,447 ..	2,005,722 ..	3,920,930
Unpaid dividends..	217 ..	825 ..	2,810 ..	3,852
Conting't fund, &c.,	147,784 ..	82,127 ..	164,948 ..	394,859
Discount,.....	31,738 ..	57,647 ..	154,259 ..	243,644
Bills payable,.....	2,400 ..	17,000 ..	19,400 ..	38,800
Other liabilities,....	35,168 ..	2,805 ..	25,476 ..	63,449
Total,.....	\$ 3,002,220 ..	\$ 3,576,352 ..	\$ 14,790,032 ..	\$ 21,388,005

The total leading items compare with the report for the last quarter and corresponding quarter last year as follow :

	<i>Aug., 1861.</i>	<i>May, 1861.</i>	<i>Aug., 1860.</i>
Loans,	\$ 10,358,951 ..	\$ 11,163,111 ..	\$ 11,431,440
Specie,.....	2,199,845 ..	2,185,671 ..	1,909,630
Eastern deposits,....	2,113,219 ..	1,341,631 ..	2,008,582
Circulation,.....	8,800,081 ..	8,136,280 ..	8,381,122
Deposits,.....	3,920,932 ..	4,388,703 ..	4,670,811
Bonds, &c.,.....	2,327,169 ..	2,095,164 ..	2,214,115

PHILADELPHIA.—19 Banks—Capital, September, 1861, \$11,811,485.

<i>1861.</i>	<i>Loans.</i>	<i>Specie.</i>	<i>Circulation.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Due Banks.</i>
Jan. 5,....	\$ 26,891,280 ..	\$ 4,020,266 ..	\$ 2,689,512 ..	\$ 15,261,925 ..	\$ 3,598,785
Jan. 12,....	26,555,986 ..	4,151,824 ..	2,694,217 ..	15,001,591 ..	3,464,167
Jan. 19,....	26,172,478 ..	4,268,105 ..	2,754,315 ..	14,750,882 ..	3,416,292
Jan. 26,....	25,892,265 ..	4,448,781 ..	2,737,638 ..	14,891,200 ..	3,143,795
Feb. 2,....	25,801,981 ..	4,588,054 ..	2,778,318 ..	15,295,453 ..	2,699,627
Feb. 16,....	25,344,076 ..	4,881,426 ..	2,809,865 ..	14,904,783 ..	2,864,874
Feb. 23,....	25,146,864 ..	4,901,704 ..	2,795,113 ..	14,835,806 ..	2,878,996

PHILADELPHIA.—(Continued.)

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due Banks.
Mch. 2,....	25,085,810 ..	5,006,938 ..	2,811,491 ..	14,868,736 ..	2,811,491
Mch. 9,....	24,626,583 ..	5,295,814 ..	2,396,492 ..	14,501,214 ..	2,788,978
Mch. 16,....	24,627,504 ..	5,538,320 ..	2,802,414 ..	15,018,566 ..	2,597,500
Mch. 23,....	24,608,908 ..	6,059,320 ..	2,764,090 ..	15,464,754 ..	2,776,645
Mch. 30,....	24,978,496 ..	5,200,063 ..	2,811,263 ..	15,800,147 ..	3,010,776
Apl. 6,....	25,413,186 ..	6,452,093 ..	3,070,220 ..	16,006,115 ..	3,135,784
Apl. 13,....	25,415,442 ..	6,675,122 ..	2,820,813 ..	16,458,833 ..	3,543,158
Apl. 20,....	25,809,955 ..	6,796,011 ..	2,641,055 ..	16,633,231 ..	3,332,073
Apl. 27,....	25,296,942 ..	6,250,187 ..	2,546,305 ..	15,749,282 ..	3,273,704
May 4,....	25,488,065 ..	5,898,802 ..	2,716,602 ..	15,671,997 ..	3,107,598
May 11,....	25,715,818 ..	5,738,048 ..	2,607,421 ..	15,523,151 ..	3,017,655
May 18,....	25,496,580 ..	5,558,551 ..	2,485,552 ..	15,549,797 ..	2,798,670
May 25,....	25,091,226 ..	5,648,220 ..	2,408,518 ..	15,410,522 ..	2,554,885
June 1,....	24,671,294 ..	5,718,826 ..	2,317,067 ..	15,306,666 ..	2,491,024
June 8,....	24,585,244 ..	5,767,994 ..	2,294,862 ..	15,267,675 ..	2,543,406
June 15,....	24,282,443 ..	5,927,466 ..	2,198,087 ..	15,379,569 ..	2,477,029
June 22,....	24,240,988 ..	6,836,744 ..	2,147,212 ..	15,740,672 ..	2,460,557
June 29,....	23,967,200 ..	6,688,893 ..	2,101,312 ..	15,997,943 ..	2,412,962
July 6,....	24,127,173 ..	6,956,112 ..	2,190,085 ..	15,851,924 ..	2,610,189
July 13,....	23,996,828 ..	7,255,798 ..	2,154,812 ..	16,129,765 ..	2,739,490
July 20,....	23,942,341 ..	7,477,298 ..	2,128,922 ..	19,190,876 ..	2,881,735
July 27,....	23,927,483 ..	7,159,969 ..	2,091,770 ..	16,026,267 ..	2,783,565
Aug. 3,....	24,211,527 ..	6,748,321 ..	2,088,574 ..	15,941,861 ..	2,719,439
Aug. 10,....	24,064,070 ..	6,796,140 ..	2,074,009 ..	15,568,024 ..	2,767,679
Aug. 17,....	24,011,084 ..	6,765,120 ..	2,076,857 ..	15,835,838 ..	2,886,426
Aug. 24,....	27,457,117 ..	6,467,537 ..	2,046,614 ..	18,217,914 ..	2,988,213
Aug. 31,....	28,537,264 ..	6,179,432 ..	2,074,048 ..	19,030,712 ..	3,132,796
Sept. 7,....	28,328,496 ..	5,617,370 ..	2,111,439 ..	18,826,837 ..	3,064,097
Sept. 14,....	27,871,497 ..	5,046,536 ..	2,148,865 ..	16,976,017 ..	2,981,495
Sept. 21,....	27,469,472 ..	4,697,284 ..	2,202,773 ..	16,498,788 ..	3,060,448
Sept. 28,....	26,713,917 ..	5,222,672 ..	2,194,491 ..	16,844,113 ..	3,105,779
Oct. 5,....	30,499,119 ..	5,383,287 ..	2,238,739 ..	20,331,970 ..	3,104,160
Oct. 12,....	30,281,157 ..	5,943,503 ..	2,249,731 ..	20,929,931 ..	2,900,474
Oct. 19,....	29,705,244 ..	6,375,750 ..	2,250,365 ..	21,100,095 ..	2,587,838

NEW-YORK.—54 Banks—Capital, August, 1861, \$69,907,000.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Weekly Clearings.	Sub-Treasury.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 129,625,465 ..	\$ 24,839,475 ..	\$ 8,698,288 ..	\$ 86,454,430 ..	\$ 95,994,868 ..	\$ 3,645,500
Jan. 12,....	129,125,515 ..	26,460,988 ..	8,357,198 ..	88,148,883 ..	123,308,183 ..	2,584,400
Jan. 19,....	126,034,520 ..	29,598,783 ..	8,067,570 ..	89,638,696 ..	121,218,782 ..	2,166,000
Jan. 26,....	123,935,153 ..	28,968,941 ..	7,920,298 ..	87,886,046 ..	123,070,934 ..	5,751,300
Feb. 2,....	121,907,024 ..	31,054,509 ..	8,099,376 ..	87,879,743 ..	122,138,525 ..	4,328,000
Feb. 9,....	120,368,050 ..	34,655,645 ..	8,361,305 ..	88,988,681 ..	121,525,631 ..	3,664,900
Feb. 16,....	119,880,371 ..	37,119,000 ..	8,273,840 ..	91,547,158 ..	111,837,663 ..	3,356,000
Feb. 23,....	119,286,290 ..	38,044,229 ..	8,128,792 ..	91,628,626 ..	118,142,167 ..	3,386,700
Mch. 2,....	121,893,963 ..	34,480,407 ..	8,290,755 ..	89,635,298 ..	126,728,832 ..	9,166,030
Mch. 9,....	122,705,094 ..	33,892,768 ..	8,585,783 ..	88,711,448 ..	129,303,550 ..	7,524,000
Mch. 16,....	122,609,925 ..	36,219,676 ..	8,892,347 ..	90,520,779 ..	119,500,578 ..	6,720,000
Mch. 23,....	120,750,455 ..	39,480,784 ..	8,845,011 ..	91,940,228 ..	120,188,015 ..	6,240,510
Mch. 30,....	120,958,165 ..	41,408,308 ..	8,434,344 ..	93,611,893 ..	119,040,819 ..	6,092,841
Apl. 6,....	122,118,496 ..	41,705,558 ..	8,930,141 ..	94,859,510 ..	128,277,671 ..	8,486,494
Apl. 13,....	123,108,885 ..	41,764,748 ..	8,801,429 ..	96,626,078 ..	134,284,307 ..	10,441,278
Apl. 20,....	124,701,259 ..	40,620,720 ..	8,825,057 ..	97,304,762 ..	124,020,087 ..	11,058,653
Apl. 27,....	124,817,154 ..	38,991,658 ..	8,840,476 ..	96,788,759 ..	106,948,819 ..	10,773,106
May 4,....	134,610,166 ..	38,054,254 ..	9,296,399 ..	94,977,881 ..	106,413,316 ..	9,761,752

NEW-YORK—(Continued.)

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits	Weekly Clearings.	Sub-Treasury.
May 11,....	128,182,298 ..	88,801,545 ..	9,304,241 ..	94,879,967 ..	104,163,420 ..	8,588,902
May 18,....	120,007,806 ..	89,557,980 ..	9,061,181 ..	93,179,526 ..	98,102,519 ..	7,867,542
May 25,....	118,141,856 ..	39,622,791 ..	8,793,882 ..	91,384,877 ..	94,155,277 ..	6,886,008
June 1,....	118,290,181 ..	87,502,402 ..	8,688,780 ..	90,197,459 ..	88,847,249 ..	11,468,789
June 8,....	117,509,075 ..	86,887,025 ..	8,963,007 ..	87,656,760 ..	95,465,614 ..	10,753,608
June 15,....	115,494,821 ..	88,280,211 ..	8,707,818 ..	87,992,791 ..	86,467,176 ..	9,488,884
June 22,....	118,667,640 ..	39,480,189 ..	8,444,880 ..	87,602,343 ..	88,183,062 ..	8,004,656
June 29,....	112,404,012 ..	42,078,011 ..	8,388,559 ..	88,721,752 ..	83,279,416 ..	6,094,288
July 6,....	112,184,668 ..	45,630,025 ..	8,862,799 ..	90,579,758 ..	88,818,280 ..	4,616,620
July 13,....	112,445,542 ..	45,016,836 ..	8,499,699 ..	91,805,987 ..	86,393,087 ..	7,055,548
July 20,....	112,086,103 ..	46,602,295 ..	8,354,192 ..	93,298,195 ..	96,566,821 ..	6,573,198
July 27,....	112,311,832 ..	46,900,721 ..	8,324,368 ..	93,687,988 ..	85,965,067 ..	7,859,273
Aug. 3,....	111,719,111 ..	46,226,181 ..	8,585,574 ..	92,229,384 ..	81,415,525 ..	6,738,059
Aug. 10,....	109,983,942 ..	48,680,116 ..	8,730,452 ..	92,016,057 ..	80,417,832 ..	5,629,641
Aug. 17,....	108,717,434 ..	49,788,990 ..	8,521,426 ..	92,046,308 ..	80,172,670 ..	4,380,239
Aug. 24,....	137,663,938 ..	47,119,481 ..	8,489,714 ..	118,456,307 ..	82,946,028 ..	6,993,296
Aug. 31,....	141,081,474 ..	45,098,113 ..	8,440,155 ..	120,436,010 ..	83,446,771 ..	8,851,608
Sept. 7,....	139,158,230 ..	41,887,230 ..	8,890,581 ..	114,091,061 ..	89,058,896 ..	13,094,909
Sept. 14,....	136,565,624 ..	87,529,412 ..	8,792,620 ..	106,760,876 ..	95,611,078 ..	14,293,222
Sept. 21,....	130,192,258 ..	86,805,177 ..	8,707,698 ..	99,316,831 ..	97,104,420 ..	15,541,307
Sept. 28,....	126,128,326 ..	88,128,552 ..	8,638,780 ..	96,551,898 ..	85,635,514 ..	13,103,444
Oct. 5,....	148,545,483 ..	89,809,901 ..	8,884,056 ..	120,607,549 ..	110,687,377 ..	10,629,098
Oct. 12,....	156,318,914 ..	41,132,606 ..	8,783,090 ..	129,188,487 ..	113,981,352 ..	10,802,808
Oct. 19,....	151,828,438 ..	42,282,584 ..	8,583,673 ..	126,433,063 ..	122,808,544 ..	9,503,649

* BOSTON. — 42 Banks—Capital, January, 1859, \$35,125,483; June, 1861, \$38,281,700.

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due to Banks.	Due from Banks.
Jan. 5,....	\$ 62,025,734 ..	\$ 4,204,610 ..	\$ 7,082,018 ..	\$ 18,719,190 ..	\$ 7,668,862 ..	\$ 8,371,804
Jan. 12,....	62,720,067 ..	4,199,155 ..	6,825,325 ..	18,422,650 ..	8,082,942 ..	7,605,680
Jan. 19,....	63,275,167 ..	4,425,256 ..	6,706,045 ..	18,366,511 ..	8,346,141 ..	7,094,483
Jan. 26,....	63,237,796 ..	4,532,019 ..	6,374,476 ..	18,185,123 ..	8,477,840 ..	6,714,029
Feb. 2,....	63,264,318 ..	4,629,068 ..	6,247,643 ..	18,134,009 ..	8,485,630 ..	6,563,176
Feb. 9,....	63,434,332 ..	4,573,614 ..	6,837,552 ..	18,074,898 ..	8,318,692 ..	6,299,117
Feb. 16,....	63,118,532 ..	4,651,803 ..	6,216,299 ..	17,795,444 ..	8,312,101 ..	6,791,101
Feb. 23,....	62,765,083 ..	4,788,981 ..	6,334,383 ..	17,833,065 ..	8,451,939 ..	6,522,815
Mch. 2,....	62,725,101 ..	4,751,291 ..	6,872,201 ..	17,981,201 ..	8,111,201 ..	6,921,107
Mch. 9,....	62,649,600 ..	4,836,600 ..	6,345,600 ..	18,132,000 ..	7,978,000 ..	7,082,600
Mch. 16,....	62,511,727 ..	5,367,722 ..	6,166,253 ..	18,126,034 ..	8,269,601 ..	6,550,262
Mch. 23,....	62,359,922 ..	5,601,871 ..	6,059,548 ..	17,811,827 ..	8,611,882 ..	6,450,362
Mch. 30,....	62,666,800 ..	5,605,400 ..	6,108,600 ..	18,629,000 ..	8,845,500 ..	7,269,900
Apl. 6,....	62,861,820 ..	5,809,425 ..	6,996,996 ..	19,913,855 ..	9,193,022 ..	8,596,667
Apl. 13,....	62,734,600 ..	5,875,600 ..	6,900,500 ..	19,697,500 ..	9,888,000 ..	8,167,000
Apl. 20,....	62,396,500 ..	5,780,700 ..	6,738,000 ..	19,440,700 ..	9,482,000 ..	8,210,500
Apl. 27,....	61,807,897 ..	5,633,790 ..	6,610,860 ..	18,571,856 ..	9,640,246 ..	8,131,220
May 4,....	61,884,400 ..	5,832,000 ..	6,875,000 ..	18,846,700 ..	9,223,000 ..	8,163,400
May 11,....	61,156,500 ..	5,997,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,809,600 ..	8,660,000 ..	7,625,600
May 18,....	61,206,000 ..	6,172,800 ..	6,746,000 ..	18,646,600 ..	8,331,000 ..	7,299,500
May 25,....	60,525,000 ..	6,402,700 ..	6,280,800 ..	18,536,000 ..	8,300,800 ..	7,144,500
June 1,....	60,213,500 ..	6,461,800 ..	6,139,700 ..	18,536,800 ..	8,206,000 ..	7,135,500
June 8,....	60,625,800 ..	6,018,800 ..	6,460,800 ..	18,204,500 ..	8,093,000 ..	7,193,000
June 15,....	60,074,100 ..	5,458,700 ..	6,452,500 ..	18,293,000 ..	8,000,000 ..	7,208,000
June 22,....	60,180,500 ..	5,831,000 ..	6,322,800 ..	18,240,800 ..	7,758,600 ..	7,428,000
June 29,....	60,095,675 ..	5,874,353 ..	6,106,524 ..	18,264,875 ..	7,609,614 ..	7,093,610
July 6,....	60,251,122 ..	6,090,012 ..	6,831,142 ..	18,521,267 ..	7,965,908 ..	8,178,059
July 13,....	60,324,993 ..	6,395,797 ..	6,607,102 ..	18,267,317 ..	8,178,718 ..	7,627,456

BOSTON.—(Continued.)

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Deposits.	Due to Banks.	Due from Banks.
July 20,....	60,252,940 ..	6,662,661 ..	6,735,628 ..	18,541,111 ..	8,580,619 ..	8,071,750
July 27, ...	60,276,822 ..	6,528,420 ..	6,804,533 ..	17,968,853 ..	8,324,698 ..	7,018,454
Aug. 3,....	61,268,745 ..	6,199,104 ..	6,831,199 ..	18,111,086 ..	8,423,709 ..	6,553,756
Aug. 10,....	61,188,851 ..	6,412,156 ..	6,450,374 ..	18,044,728 ..	8,558,647 ..	6,606,025
Aug. 17,....	60,898,110 ..	6,665,929 ..	6,366,466 ..	18,235,061 ..	8,523,538 ..	6,801,296
Aug. 24,....	61,775,707 ..	6,734,426 ..	6,153,273 ..	19,505,417 ..	8,376,735 ..	6,870,252
Aug. 31,....	64,530,296 ..	6,434,053 ..	6,160,153 ..	22,896,635 ..	8,459,272 ..	7,497,482
Sept. 7,....	64,341,908 ..	7,078,145 ..	6,500,354 ..	22,661,619 ..	7,916,574 ..	7,369,914
Sept. 14,....	64,292,297 ..	6,670,849 ..	6,445,849 ..	22,161,256 ..	8,011,214 ..	7,171,901
Sept. 23,....	62,262,723 ..	5,719,294 ..	6,338,929 ..	20,042,678 ..	7,543,290 ..	7,634,684
Oct. 5,....	63,684,238 ..	6,415,856 ..	6,707,701 ..	23,171,040 ..	7,991,759 ..	8,594,042
Oct. 12,....	65,568,464 ..	7,153,836 ..	6,749,511 ..	25,460,093 ..	8,300,750 ..	8,600,928
Oct. 19,....	65,058,662 ..	7,002,868 ..	6,558,701 ..	25,541,241 ..	7,896,697 ..	8,432,453

THE POET AND THE BANKER.

CHARLES SPRAGUE attained his seventieth year on the 26th day of October; born in the town of Boston, October 26th, 1791; he has reached the threescore years and ten that are allotted to few, and has survived many who, like himself, are known to fame. PERCIVAL was four years his junior, GRIFFIN and DAWES thirteen years. POE was twenty years his junior, and long since buried his hopes and himself too. Mr. SPRAGUE has followed a vocation that does not ordinarily tend to long life, but he acquired fame at the age of thirty-years, when his "Curiosity" was made known to the world; and, at the age of thirty-three, he became the first cashier of the Globe Bank at Boston, chartered in the year 1824. He is its cashier now, after thirty-seven years of "cash" and "credits" and "notes" and other "bank items," and has, within a few days past, paid to its stockholders their seventy-fourth dividend! Not a single dividend has been passed in this long series of thirty-seven years by the bank.

If "Curiosity" had never been spread over the *Globe*, Mr. SPRAGUE's fame would have been world-wide by the publication of

"I see thee still!"

his ode to Shakespeare, his centennial ode, &c.

We have alluded to some of the poet contemporaries whom the author of "Curiosity" has survived. There are many others who have fallen before the "banker and poet" finds his home. Among these were Dr. FROTHINGHAM, (born 1793;) WILCOX, (1794;) HENRY WARE, Jr., (1794;) DRAKE, (1795;) GOODRICH, (1796;) CLASON, New-York, (1796;) BRAINARD, (1796;) WALTER COLTON, (1797;) SANDS, (1799;) W. B. O. PEABODY, MELLEN and BISHOP DOANE, also 1799; JAMES G. BROOKS, WILLIAM LEGGETT, and also EDWARD C. PINKNEY, whose

"I fill this cup"

will render his name precious to after years; FAIRFIELD, DAWES, (whose *Spirit of Beauty* is everywhere,) CURRY, CROSWELL, LAWRENCE, ROCKWELL, FLINT, WILLIS GAYLORD CLARK, &c., have all gone to their long homes.

Long may it be before the journalist shall say of the banker and poet,

"Thou to a fairer land art gone;
There let me hope, my journey done,
To see thee still."

BANK ITEMS.

Notice.—The publisher of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE has in preparation, for publication in December next, the *Merchants and Bankers' Almanac* for 1862, containing the usual list of banks, bank officers, private bankers, &c. The publisher will be glad to receive information as to any changes of bank presidents and cashiers and banking firms, since the publication of the volume for 1861.

Cards of private bankers will be inserted in the new volume at fifteen dollars each. The revulsion in trade throughout the country during the present year points to the advantage to bankers in the insertion of their cards. The circulation of this volume in the several States, and in England, France, &c., makes it a valuable medium for advertisements.

RATES FOR ADVERTISING.

Bankers' Cards, in Bankers' Magazine, one-fifth of a page, one year, (including subscription),.....	\$20 00
“ “ Almanac, one-fifth of a page, one year,.....	15 00
“ “ Magazine and Almanac, “	25 00
Bankers' Magazine, subscription, one year,.....	5 00
Bankers' Almanac, (including postage),.....	1 25

NEW-YORK.—The Bank of Commerce in New-York, having only \$1,795 outstanding of its own circulation, has recently paid out, over the counter, \$50,000 of the United States Treasury Notes, payable on demand.

WILLIAM H. COX, Esq., who for many years has been book-keeper and transfer clerk of the Mechanics' Bank of this city, was unanimously elected Cashier, October 23d, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of GIDEON DE ANGELIS, the late Cashier.

ROBERT BAYLES, Esq., for two years past Assistant Cashier of the American Exchange Bank, New-York, has accepted the cashiership of the Market Bank, New-York.

Lowville.—The Bank of Lowville, Lewis County, New-York, on the 13th October, was robbed. The amount taken was six thousand dollars—one-half in specie. The lock of the outside door, that of the outer door of the vault and the inner door of the vault were all picked, and the money taken from an iron safe in the vault, by cutting a hole through the door some four inches in diameter. The lining of the safe door was cut through by chisels, a hammer and mallet, taken from the wagon-shop of Mr. HIRAM PORTER, and the tools were left in the vault, and the vault doors and outside door re-locked. Upon trying to open the vault the next morning, it was found that the principal lock, (a combination lock, costing \$300) would not work, and a mason was employed to dig through the masonry of the vault. An entrance was effected and the loss discovered. The hole through the safe was, from appearances, cut by some instrument, it being circular, and the edge of the outer part nearly smooth. Some \$6,000 in bonds and stocks were also taken. About \$60 of treasury notes, mostly in fives, were taken. No clue is known to the perpetrators. They were evidently old hands, and one at least a skilful locksmith. The burglars also obtained five bonds of \$1,000 each of the Sacketts Harbor and Saratoga R. R. Co., of 1857, with coupons attached, numbered 182, 196, 197, 564 and 565. The burglars were experienced hands, and will doubtless make good their escape.

NEW-HAMPSHIRE.—SAMUEL LORD, Esq., Cashier of the Piscataqua Exchange Bank, has recently paid the seventy-first dividend of that bank, the preceding ones having been made during his cashiership.

RHODE ISLAND.—JOHN S. COGGESHALL, Esq., was, on 1st October, elected Cashier of the Rhode Island Union Bank, at Newport, in place of ROBERT P. LEE, deceased.

CONNECTICUT.—NATHANIEL F. THOMPSON has been elected President of the Mechanics' Bank, of New-Haven, Connecticut, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the late JOHN W. FITCH.

NORTH CAROLINA.—A letter from a member of a New-Jersey regiment, now at Fort Hatteras, sends two North Carolina notes left behind by the soldiers, one for \$2 and the other for 25 cents, the former payable one year after date. They are printed with green ink, on manilla paper, and are very rudely executed. In the 25 cent note the word Carolina is spelt "Carolina." The style and execution of the notes indicate an alarming scarcity of money in that State. Mr. STILES deems it fortunate that only a small force was landed at first, as had the entire command reached shore and attacked the fort as contemplated, they must have lost many lives.

VIRGINIA.—A letter in the *Washington Star*, from Alexandria, Virginia, says of the rebel currency:

"A Fairfax farmer came to town to-day to buy some flour and salt, with the following currency: Corporation of Warrenton, Virginia, \$1 and 50 cent notes; Town of Leesburg, 12½ cent notes; Manassas Gap Rail-Road Company, 50 cent notes; J. C. GUNNELL, of Fairfax, 25 cents; City of Richmond, \$2, \$1 and 50 cents; Bank of the State of South Carolina, \$1; Manufacturers' Bank, Richmond, C. W. PURCEL, \$1; Bank of Winchester, \$1; City Bank of Augusta, Georgia, \$1; Bank of Richmond, \$1; Corporation of Charleston, 50 cents; Corporation of Winchester, 50 cents. Salt and flour could not be had for the most of it. This is but a small sample of the issues of every bank, village, city or town now in the Confederacy. When resumption day comes there will be awful times."

ILLINOIS.—The following sales of stocks were made at auction October 5th, by ADRIAN H. MULLER, New-York, by order of JESSE K. DUBOIS, Esq., Auditor of the State of Illinois:

\$1,000 United States 5's, 1871,.....	82½	\$22,000 Virginia 6's, 1887, coupons, ..	45½
1,000 Kentucky 6's,.....	75½	4,000 Virginia 6's, 1888, coupons, ..	46
1,000 Illinois 6's, 1870,.....	83½	4 000 Virginia 6's, 1894, coupons, ..	46
2,000 Illinois 6's, 1877,.....	83½	13,000 North Carolina 6's, 1871,....	57½
5,000 Tennessee 6's, 1898, coupons, ..	42½	2,000 North Carolina 6's, 1885,....	59½
22,000 Tennessee 6's, 1898, coupons, ..	42½	1,000 North Carolina 6's, 1885,....	59
20,000 Missouri 6's, 1886, coupons, ..	42½	2,000 North Carolina 6's, 1889,....	59½
11,000 Mo. 6's, 1874, and St. Jo. R. R. 46½		3,500 Ill. and Mich. Canal Bonds, ..	80½
4,000 Virginia 6's, 1886, coupons, ..	45½	96 Ill. Internal Improvement, ..	82

These stocks were on account of the following Illinois banks, now in liquidation:

Bank of the Commonwealth, Robinson; Humboldt Bank, Napierville; Kaskaskia Bank, Kaskaskia; Merchants and Drovers' Bank, Joliet; Southern Bank of Illinois, Grayville.

By order of the Auditor the securities have been sold at New-York on account of the following banks of Illinois, now in liquidation:—Garden State Bank, Hutsonville; Plowman's Bank, Taylorville; New-Market Bank, New-Market; Bank of Benton, Benton; Bank of Quincy, Quincy; Citizens' Bank, Mount Carmel; Commercial Bank, New-Haven; Corn Planters' Bank, Marshall; Shawanese Bank, Elizabethtown.

Mr. J. BUNN, banker, Springfield, Illinois, gives notice that the Auditor is redeeming the notes of the following banks at the rates opposite each:

Alisana Bank,.....	55½ cents.	Hampden Bank,.....	58 cents.
American Exchange Bank,....	51 "	Humboldt Bank,.....	56 "
Bank of Chester,.....	54½ "	Kaskaskia Bank,.....	62 "
Bank of Commonwealth,.....	53 "	Merchants and Drovers' Bank, ..	61 "
Bank of Elgin,.....	66 "	Morgan County Bank,.....	52 "
Belvidere Bank,.....	52½ "	Rail-Road Bank,.....	55 "
Commercial Bank of Palestine, 56	"	Rock Island Bank,.....	50 "
Farmers' Bank, New-Canton, ..	64½ "	South. Bank of Ill., Grayville, ..	56 "
Farmers and Traders' Bank, ..	50 "		

Mr. BUNN offers to remit exchange on New-York, or coin, by express, at the above rates, less ¼ per cent. of proceeds.

The securities of the following will be sold soon, unless already sold:

Bank of Aurora,	Continental Bank,	Jersey County Bank,
Bank of Benton,	Corn Exchange Bank,	Lafayette Bank,
Bank of Napierville,	Corn Planters' Bank,	National Bank,
Bank of Pike County,	Douglas Bank,	New-Market Bank,
Bank of Quincy,	Far. B'k of Ill., Metropolis,	Plowman's Bank,
Bank of Raleigh,	Frontier Bank,	Reed's Bank,
Canal Bank,	Garden State Bank,	Shawanese Bank,
Citizens' Bank,	Grand Prairie Bank,	Union County Bank.
Com'l Bank, New-Haven,	Grayville Bank,	

KENTUCKY.—The legislature, on the 4th of October, took a recess till November 27th, directing the committee on banks in the mean time to inquire into the management of the Bank of Louisville. The Bank of Kentucky has promised its quota of \$600,000 for the defence of Kentucky. The Bank of Louisville, whose quota was nearly \$100,000, has promised \$200,000. The Northern Bank has promised \$25,000 more than its quota, and the Farmers' Bank has promptly responded to its quota of the \$2,000,000 required.

In discussing this question, Senator SPEED said, that a majority of the Louisville Bank directors would gladly welcome BUCKNER, and open the vaults freely to him, and, therefore, he wished the management exposed.

Senator GOODLOE said the Commercial Bank would promptly respond to any demand in this emergency.

Mr. SPEED's resolution of inquiry into the condition and management of the Bank of Louisville passed both houses.

Farmers' Bank of Kentucky.—Mr. J. B. TEMPLE, Cashier of this bank, on the 12th of October issued the following special notice as to collections:

"Until further notice, collection paper will be received by this bank and branches only on conditions as follow: The bank will not be responsible for any irregularity occasioned by the existence of war and disturbed state of the country. Due diligence will be used to secure the presentation of paper and payment thereof, or protest for non-payment and notice thereof. All collection paper now on hand will be held subject to these conditions, unless withdrawn."

LOUISIANA.—The following notice has been issued by the Citizens' Bank at New-Orleans:

Notice.—Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, New-Orleans, September 16th, 1861. Parties having paper on collection in this bank are hereby notified and required, unless they consent to receive Treasury Notes of the Confederate States, or local bank notes, in payment of said paper, to withdraw the same. And no paper shall hereafter be received on collection where the owners require other than Treasury Notes or local bank notes in payment thereof.

By order of E. ROUSSEAU, *Cashier.*

The banks of New-Orleans suspended specie payment at the request of the Governor of Louisiana, who issued a proclamation on the subject, stating the step was necessary to maintain the credit of the \$100,000,000 of Treasury Notes issued by the Confederate government, in order to supply the means for carrying on the war. The banks are to receive and pay out these notes at par. The New-Orleans banks were the last to take this step, into which they have been driven by the rebel government. This action of the banks at once created a scarcity of small change.

The New-Orleans *Crescent*, of October 2d, represents the market "on a war footing." The weekly statement of the city banks shows, in the aggregate, for the week ending 28th of September, a decrease in specie of \$150,000; increase in circulation of \$142,087; increase in deposits, \$299,393; increase in short loans, \$409,952; advance in exchange of \$28,586; and an increase in distant balances of \$93,923. The banks held \$1,148,700 in Confederate Treasury Notes, and \$3,336,589 in exchange. Some of the banks were buying sterling at 108½ @ 108½ @ 109. The selling rates were 111 @ 112½. Francs, 3f. 25c. @ 3f. 10c. at retail. Inland exchange was confined to transactions chiefly on Virginia. The Bank of New-Orleans was buying and selling regularly on Richmond. Checks on that point were sold, payable in Confederate notes.

WISCONSIN.—The bankers throughout the State had a convention at Milwaukee, September 18th. The result of the convention was a resolve to commence the redemption of Wisconsin currency, at that city and at Madison, on the 15th of October, thus anticipating somewhat the action contemplated by the legislature in fixing the 1st of December as the day upon which redemption is to be resumed. The following resolutions were adopted:

Resolved, That the interests of the people and of the banks of the State imperatively require that the banks shall resume the redemption of their circulating notes before the 1st of December next, and as soon as arrangements can be made for the purpose.

Resolved, That the banks of this State should redeem their notes from the 15th of October next, at Milwaukee or Madison, in New-York exchange, at 1 per cent. discount, and should appoint their agents respectively for that purpose, and notify the secretary of the Bankers' Association of such appointment by the 10th day of October next.

Resolved, That no new banks should be put in operation, nor any increase of circulation be made by the banks now in existence, except by the consent of the directors of the Bankers' Association, and that no more of the discredited banks be reinstated.

S. W. MOORE, *Secretary*.

Exchange took another downward step this morning, landing at 2 per cent., with plenty to sell at that. The banks are not anxious to buy at over 1 per cent. Gold is in fair supply at 3 per cent., with parties outside of the banks offering freely. The supply of currency is getting to be a little short, though no stringency is actually felt as yet. We learn that the Monroe County Bank has put up the securities required by law, and that its bills are being received at par, the same as other current money.—*Milwaukee Press*, September 19th.

OHIO.—JOSEPH C. CULBERTSON, Esq., was, on the 1st January last, appointed Cashier of the Miami County Branch of the State Bank of Ohio, in place of R. GIBBS, Esq., resigned.

MISSOURI.—Two of the city banks have been, perhaps, permanently discredited, viz., the Union Bank and the St. Louis Bank. The other four banks which have been operating on the bankable-fund system, and in a state of legalized suspension, have come to an understanding, we are told, and hereafter the Mechanics', Merchants', Southern and State Banks, and their branches, will constitute the "bankable-fund" list, and take and exchange each others' notes as formerly. The Exchange Bank is doing an independent business, on a strictly specie basis, it never having suspended. This agreement by the banks will probably enhance the price of their money, and probably exchange will be furnished ere long at a trifling premium. We are glad to know that it is the intention of the Mechanics' Bank to resume specie payment at the earliest practicable moment, and the same is said of the Merchants' Bank, but of this we cannot speak so positively.

Of the Farmers' and Western Banks, the *St. Louis Republican* says: An arrangement is in progress, we understand, which will probably result in at once placing these two banks on an equal footing with the other banks—a position they should have all the time occupied. They are owned and managed by the most wealthy and respectable gentlemen in the most commercial part of the State, and are as sound, we are assured, as any of our banks.

A letter from the Cashier of the Farmers' Bank, dated at Lexington, Mo., on the 17th inst., states that the bank has burned of its circulation in that place \$912,680. This is in addition to what has been consumed at the branches and at the office of the bank commissioners in St. Louis.

The Boatmen's Savings Institution are receiving and paying out only State and Merchants' Bank notes. The Building and Savings Associations receive none on deposit. So we are informed it is with some of the other institutions. The bankers generally are receiving on deposit the notes of the four banks first named above, some of them making a special account in the case of each kind of note.

The rate of exchange for gold closed at par, and may be quoted for bankable funds at 10 per cent. premium. Bankable funds are the notes of the State, Southern, Merchants' and Mechanics' banks.

The Farmers' Bank.—Mr. AULL, the President of the Farmers' Bank of Lexington, states that the institution is as sound as ever; that it has met with no loss except the trifling sum stolen and carried to Chicago by several soldiers, the greater portion of which has been recovered. He confirms the statement that \$830,000 of the circulation of the bank was burned by the directors, and adds that the Farmers' Bank has coin and other assets sufficient to redeem every one of its notes, to pay all depositors, and to return to stockholders \$100 for every share of stock held by them. From this statement it will be seen, by persons holding notes of the Farmers' Bank, that that institution is quite as sound and solvent as banks that refuse to receive its paper on deposit.

Washington.—The *National Intelligencer*, correcting the story that Messrs. Riggs & Co., of that city, have been buying up Treasury Notes at a discount, and drawing the specie for them from the Treasury, says:

"Riggs & Co., on the contrary are the only bankers here who receive Treasury Notes on deposit as specie. They have never taken or bought one at less than the value in gold on its face. They have been advancing to army contractors, and now have at least a half million of dollars of their means so employed in aiding the government's military operations, for it does amount to most important aid. They now have on hand, perhaps, a larger amount of Treasury Notes, every one received at par, than any other banking house in the country."

CANADA.—The Bank of Montreal has now established a regular agency at Chicago with E. W. WILLARD as manager, and deposits will be received and exchange sold as at the other banks of the city.

LONDON.—The directors of the Ionian Bank have declared a half-yearly dividend at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum.

A half-yearly court of the Bank of England was held September 12, when it was stated that the profit in the six months ending the 31st August was £750,589, making the rest on that day £3,751, 654. A dividend of 5 per cent. for the half year, free of income tax, was proposed by the directors, and approved by the court, leaving the rest (surplus) at £3,024,004.

Confederate Government Notes.—These "promises to pay" are of all denominations—ones, fives, twenties, hundreds—it is just as easy to pay the last as the first—and all read, "Two years after date, the Confederate States of America promise to pay to the bearer ——— dollars on demand, at the capital of the same. These notes may be exchanged at pleasure for eight per cent. Confederate bonds." Imagine the perplexities of a confiding innocent, who, with a batch of these in his hands, should enter upon a search for the "capital of the Confederate States!"

Like all the late issues of Southern paper currency, the Confederate notes are roughly printed, not from finely engraved steel plates like the bank bills civilized people are accustomed to see—they cannot now send to Philadelphia or New-York to have such plates engraved—but from movable type, and, by way of ornament, in blue ink.

The annual election of the Boston Stock and Exchange Board took place Monday, September 30, and the following named gentlemen were chosen:

For President—A. W. SPENCER.

For Vice-President—GILBERT ATTWOOD.

For Secretary—JOHN H. SOLEY.

For Treasurer—NATHANIEL TRACY.

For Standing Committee—CHARLES L. HAYWARD, JOHN E. M. GILLEY, EDWARD B. GRANT.

It was voted to invest the funds (\$2,500) in 7 3-10 United States Treasury Notes.

THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE.—The following is a copy of a letter from a Maine Cashier, who has a just appreciation of the importance of the magazine to banking institutions:

"I always feel interested in your work, from the fact that it gave me my start in the business. I try to make my clerks study it; some of them say it is dry, and I take the liberty to say to you, that from personal experience I have felt the want of

sound practical papers to clerks—something in the style of "SABINE'S Suggestions," &c., to Cashiers.

"They have their faults, which a Cashier cannot correct, and which they could improve upon were they to read it and feel interested and ambitious. Too many feel their situation something on the machine order, and it needs some vigorous piece, which they will be interested in, to wake them up. Excuse the hint, but I have long thought of it."

To SUBSCRIBERS.—One or more of the following Nos. of "THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE AND STATISTICAL REGISTER" are wanted by the publisher to complete other volumes. Subscription price will be paid, or a copy of the Comparative Tariff will be given for either of the following Nos.:

August,	1846	April,	1848	May,	1851
September,	1846	June,	1848	August,	1851
October,	1846	July,	1848	January,	1852
December,	1846	August,	1848	February,	1852
January,	1847	October,	1848	July,	1852
March,	1847	January,	1849	September,	1852
April,	1847	June,	1849	January,	1853
July,	1847	September,	1849	July,	1853
September,	1847	October,	1849	January,	1856
January,	1848	February,	1851	March,	1856
February,	1848	April,	1851		

TURKEY.—The report of the Ottoman Bank states that the net profit in the past half year was £20,104, and that the available balance on the present occasion is £25,690. It is proposed to add £3,000 to the reserve, which will then amount to £71,196, and to declare a dividend at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum, free of income tax, leaving £1,894 to be carried forward. The directors observe:

The shareholders will have been prepared to learn that the general business of the bank has, during the past half-year, been of a restricted character. In the Danubian Principalities, however, it has considerably extended itself, under the able management of Mr. A. I. POWELL, the local director, with good profit and promise for the future. The negotiations in which the directors have been engaged for the settlement of the bank's claims upon the Turkish government have not, hitherto, resulted in any definite arrangement, but the financial reforms which have attended the accession of the Sultan lead to the hope that no considerable time can elapse without an adjustment in accordance with the distinct pledges of the government.

Errata.—Page 311, October No., for *State Bank of Ohio*, read, *State Bank of Iowa*.

PRIVATE BANKERS.

OHIO.—Mr. JOSEPH C. BUTLER has purchased the interest of Mr. SAMUEL WIGGINS in the Lafayette Banking Company, of Cincinnati, and becomes an active manager in the firm.

We call attention to the changes in the following named banking firms, and to their cards in our advertising sheet, where these changes are again noted:

ILLINOIS.—*Carlinville*.—The firm formerly styled CHESNUT, BLACKBURN & DUBOIS is now CHESNUT & DUBOIS. See their card on the cover of this work.

Jerseyville.—The firm of A. M. BLACKBURN & Co. is succeeded by D'ARCY & CHEENEY, who will transact the business of the late firm.

INDIANA.—The card of Messrs. MORRISON, BLANCHARD & Co., at Richmond, is also referred to as showing some changes.

IOWA.—The firm of MACKLOT & CORBIN, Davenport, has been dissolved, and L. A. MACKLOT succeeds to the business.

Notes on the Money Market.

NEW-YORK, OCTOBER 24, 1861.

Exchange on London, at sixty days' sight, 107½ @ 107¾.

THE market rates for money have ruled quite low during the month of October, when good securities were offered. Business paper, of a good stamp, is in limited supply, and is readily passed at seven per cent. The leading topic of discussion during the month has been the Treasury loan, for which individual subscriptions have been taken freely at the numerous points indicated in our last No., pp. 308—310. The total subscriptions at New-York, independently of the city banks, to the new loan, have been \$18,500,000. At Philadelphia the subscriptions, up to the 19th inst., were \$2,917,378. The following is a statement of the subscriptions to the national loan received at Philadelphia:

For the week ending 18th September,.....	\$821,699 36
“ “ 28th September,.....	856,185 15
“ “ 5th October,.....	409,298 01
“ “ 12th October,.....	218,981 27
“ “ 19th October,.....	616,214 78
Total,.....	\$2,917,378 52

The banks of New-York are paying into the Sub-Treasury this week \$3,500,000, being the final instalment on the first fifty millions of the national loan. The Assistant Treasurer reimburses them in a further sum of \$560,000 on account of sales. According to the agreement of August 19th with the Secretary of the Treasury, the banks are now absolute owners of that portion of the first branch of the loan unsold; but they, of course, prefer, for the present, that the government continue to distribute the notes among the people at its own expense and trouble, especially as its facilities for the work are abundant and far-reaching.

The banks in convention, at the close of September, agreed to take the second portion of the loan to the government, amounting to fifty millions of dollars, apportioned as before, viz.:

To the New-York City banks,.....	\$35,000,000
To the banks of Boston,.....	10,000,000
To the banks of Philadelphia,.....	5,000,000

This amount was passed to the credit of the Treasury Department on the first day of October, from which time the loan bears interest. No portion of this loan has been yet paid to the government.

The banks in convention have informally agreed to take the third portion of the Treasury loan, making, with the previous issues, one hundred and fifty millions of dollars; but the terms for the third portion are not finally agreed upon, except that the rate of interest is the same, and the rate to be at par; but it is not yet decided whether the interest shall commence on the first of November or at a prior date.

At Providence, we are glad to learn that the new loan to the government is commanding the attention of our wealthy men. We are informed that the amount now provided by the citizens of Rhode Island is about one and a half million dollars. Some very large subscriptions have recently been made on the books in the hands of the agent, and we hope the interest in the loan will continue so long as the government wants money. Messrs. BROWN & IVES subscribed for \$100,000; ALEXANDER DUNCAN, \$100,000; A. D. & J. Y. SMITH, \$40,000; the trustees of estate of THOS. L. HALSEY, \$20,000.

At the October bank meeting a committee of six was appointed, consisting of Messrs. STEVENS, of the Bank of Commerce; GALLATIN, of the National; COE, of the American Exchange; TAYLOR, of the City; HOWES, of the Park; and LEVERICH, of the New-York; whose duty it is to confer

with the banks of Boston and Philadelphia and the Secretary of the Treasury, and to consider and report at a subsequent meeting upon the expediency of taking the third instalment of fifty millions of the 7 3-10 per cent. Treasury Notes before the time named in the original agreement, which is in December next.

The committee were also instructed to confer with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Boston and Philadelphia banks on the subject of all stocks remaining unsold, authorized to be issued under the national loan act, approved on the 17th of July, 1861. The interpretation given to this action is a desire to control the issue of the twenty years bonds authorized by this act. This can hardly be, however, as the act requires that the bonds shall only be awarded after the reception of proposals at fifteen days' notice.

The act only authorizes the borrowing of two hundred and fifty millions, of which one hundred and fifty will be exhausted if the banks avail themselves of the privilege of taking the December offering; and it is probable that the Secretary may avail himself of the privilege of issuing the fifty millions of demand notes permitted by the bill; so that there will only be authority to issue \$50,000,000 of permanent loan, even in the contingency of no issue of the 8 65-100 per cent. notes, also permitted by the bill.

The Secretary of the Treasury has advanced to the following States 40 per centum on account of their expenditures, made up to about one month ago, for troops called into the service. New-York has as yet made no demand:

Indiana,.....	\$ 450,000	..	Illinois,.....	\$ 400,000	..	Maine,.....	\$ 200,000
Ohio,.....	900,000	..	Michigan,.....	92,000	..	Wisconsin,.....	205,000
New-Hampshire,...	74,000	..	Vermont,.....	128,000	..	Pennsylvania,....	606,000
Massachusetts,....	775,000	..	Iowa,.....	80,000	..	New-Hampshire,...	200,000
Total,.....							\$ 4,105,000

Inquiries have recently been made whether the large denominations of 7.30 Treasury Notes can be converted by holders into small denominations. For instance, an original subscriber to a note of \$1,000 may at some time wish to divide it into 500's, 100's or 50's. This, we understand, the Treasury Department have taken measures to provide for, as well as for replacing any that may become destroyed, lost or much defaced.

The American Bank Note Company have recently been striking off 50's and 100's from the plate of August 19th, and have received an order to print 500's. This done, a full supply of the small denominations will be at the command of the Treasury Department at Washington, to meet any necessities in the way of exchange or re-issue that may occur. The company, after completing this work, will, we presume, proceed to alter the date of the plate to October 1st, preparatory to printing the second fifty millions that are to be dated October 1st, the day on which that branch of the loan was placed to the credit of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The statements of the banks of the three principal cities of the Union, for the last week, compare with the previous one, and the corresponding time in 1860, as follow:

	<i>Loans.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Specie.</i>	<i>Circulation.</i>
New-York, October 19,.....	\$ 151,828,498	.. \$ 126,483,068	.. \$ 42,282,884	.. \$ 8,583,673
Boston, October 21,.....	65,058,662	.. 25,541,241	.. 7,002,863	.. 6,553,701
Philadelphia, October 21,.....	29,705,244	.. 21,100,095	.. 6,875,750	.. 2,255,865
Total,.....	\$ 246,592,344	.. \$ 173,074,399	.. \$ 55,661,497	.. \$ 17,392,739
Last week,.....	252,168,535	.. 175,573,511	.. 54,236,945	.. 17,732,838
Last year,.....	214,350,316	.. 114,080,163	.. 31,879,356	.. 20,117,056

The brokers report a diminished business in commercial paper. The banks are prepared to take all that offers of a good character. We hear of offers by private capitalists, at 4½ @ 5½ per cent. "on call," for large sums, but the bulk of business in temporary loans is at seven per cent., at which rate there is a lively demand. We annex the ruling rates for business paper at this date, compared with the last week in July, August and September:

	<i>July 24.</i>	<i>Aug. 24.</i>	<i>Sept. 24.</i>	<i>Oct. 24.</i>
	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Loans on call, State Stock securities,.....	5 @ 6	.. 4 @ 5	.. 5½ @ 6	.. 6 @ 7
" other good securities,.....	6 @ 7	.. 6 @ 7	.. 6 @ 7	.. 7 @ ..
Prime endorsed bills, 60 days,.....	5 @ 6	.. 6 @ 7	.. 6 @ 6½	.. 6½ @ 7
First class single signatures, 4 to 6 months,.	7 @ 9	.. 7 @ 10	.. 6½ @ 7	.. 8 @ 12
Other good bills,.....	9 @ 9 @ 12	.. 10 @ 12	.. 12 @ 15
Names less known,.....	no sale.	.. no sale.	.. 12 @ 15	.. 24 @ 36

The operations in State loans have been large during the month. Mr. DUBOIS, Auditor of the State of Illinois, has sold at public auction, in this city, large amounts of Missouri, Tennessee and other State bonds, in behalf of numerous Illinois banks that are now going into liquidation. Among the latest were sales for account of the following in that State: Bank of Aurora, Aurora; Corn Exchange Bank, Fairfield; Frontier Bank, Benton; Grayville Bank, Grayville; Bank of Raleigh, Raleigh, and the Lancaster Bank at Lancaster. Virginia sixes have declined from 51, in August, to $45\frac{1}{4}$ @ 46 at this date. We hear of no sales of Kentucky bonds. Tennessee sixes have ranged from 43 @ 44; North Carolina, 59 @ 60 $\frac{1}{2}$. The Government six per cents of 1851 are taken readily this week at 93 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 95; the five per cent. coupons at 84 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 85.

We annex highest cash prices, at the dates named, of the Government and leading State securities in this market:

	Aug. 27th.	Sept. 3d.	10th.	21st.	28th.	Oct. 5th.	12th.	23d.
U. S. 6 per cents, 1867-8,....	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	*89 $\frac{1}{2}$	*90 $\frac{1}{2}$	*91	*91 $\frac{1}{2}$	*92	*93 $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$
U. S. 5 per cents, 1874,.....	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	81	82	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	84
Ohio 6 per cents, 1886,.....	98	98	92	93	89	90	91	90
Kentucky 6 per cents,.....	77	77	76	79	76	76	76	76
Indiana 5 per cents,.....	76	76	77	78	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	78	79
Pennsylvania 5 per cents,....	81	80	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	79	78	78	80
Virginia 6 per cents,.....	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	54	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	52	48 $\frac{1}{2}$	45 $\frac{1}{2}$	47	46
Georgia 6 per cents,.....	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	67	66	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	64	65	65	64 $\frac{1}{2}$
California 7 per cents, 1877,...	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	76	77	79	81	82	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	81
North Carolina 6 per cents,....	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	59	59	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	59 $\frac{1}{2}$
Missouri 6 per cents,.....	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	42	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$
Louisiana 6 per cents,.....	53	53	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	55	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	56	56
Tennessee 6 per cents,.....	43	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	43	43	42	42	42 $\frac{1}{2}$

The specie movements are entirely one way for some months past. The foreign export for the nine months of 1861 were \$3,280,000, against \$39,351,000, of 1860. The reduced quantities of foreign goods imported are shown, in the custom-house revenues for the nine months of 1861, in the sum of \$15,856,128, against \$30,428,788 for the same period in 1860. The imports of foreign goods, the custom-house revenue and the specie export for each month of the year 1861, have been as follow:

	Foreign Imports, N. Y.		Custom-House Receipts, N. Y.		Specie Export, N. Y.	
	1860.	1861.	1860.	1861.	1860.	1861.
January,...	\$21,528,000	\$19,565,000	\$3,599,166	\$2,059,202	\$854,000	\$59,000
February,...	19,166,000	14,068,000	3,378,043	2,528,786	977,000	1,108,000
March,.....	23,495,000	12,658,000	3,477,545	2,489,926	2,382,000	302,000
April,.....	16,922,000	12,938,000	2,444,267	1,648,261	2,996,000	1,418,000
May,.....	16,797,000	11,462,000	2,466,462	979,145	5,530,000	129,000
June,.....	19,123,000	7,263,000	2,724,193	885,062	8,842,000	244,000
July,.....	24,817,000	7,942,000	4,504,066	2,069,590	6,564,000	11,000
August,....	25,798,000	7,836,000	4,496,243	1,558,824	7,455,000	3,000
September,.	16,005,000	6,074,000	3,088,908	1,642,382	3,751,000	16,000
Total,....	\$183,651,000	\$89,801,000	\$30,428,788	\$15,856,128	\$39,351,000	\$3,280,000

The exchange market has been without any marked changes during the month. Bankers' signatures on London have ranged from 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 108, at sixty days. The large amounts of produce shipping to Europe create an abundant supply of exchange, ranging from 105 @ 106.

The annexed summary will show the changes at the close of each month since July last:

	July 24.	Aug. 24.	Sept. 24.	Oct. 24.
London, bankers' bills,.....	107 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 107 $\frac{1}{2}$	107 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 107 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 @ 108 $\frac{1}{2}$	107 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 108
Do. mercantile bills,.....	105 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 106 $\frac{1}{2}$	106 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 107 $\frac{1}{2}$	107 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 108	107 @ 107 $\frac{1}{2}$
Do. with bills of lading,.	104 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 105 $\frac{1}{2}$	105 @ 106	106 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 107	105 @ 106
Paris, bankers' bills,.....	5.30 @ 5.27 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.40 @ 5.30	5.37 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 5.30	5.38 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 5.35
Amsterdam, per guilder,....	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 41	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 40 $\frac{1}{2}$	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 40	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 40 $\frac{1}{2}$
Bremen, per rix dollar,.....	77 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 78	75 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 77	76 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 77 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 77 $\frac{1}{2}$
Hamburg, per marc banco,...	35 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 36	35 @ 35	35 @ 35 $\frac{1}{2}$	35 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Frankfort, per florin,.....	@	@	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 40 $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 40 $\frac{1}{2}$

* Loan due in 1851.

Of the London market, it was reported on the 10th that at the bank there was a moderate demand for discount, but the supply in the open market was still good at about $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. In the stock exchange it is difficult to find employment for the floating balances, and the abundance of money is expected to be still more strongly felt on the payment of the approaching dividends, as there are on this occasion no heavy loans to be repaid to the bank.

The Bank of France have concluded an arrangement with Messrs. ROTHSCHILD and some other banking establishment, by which the bank will have power to draw for £2,000,000 sterling on London. Of this sum, £1,000,000 will be on Messrs. ROTHSCHILD, and £1,000,000 on Messrs. BAKING BROTHERS. The temporary effect of this measure, according to the *Economist*, will be to check, temporarily, the export of specie from Paris to London, and possibly to cause some slight efflux of gold from England. It is, however, considered merely a postponement of the difficulties of the Bank of France, as in three months the bills will mature and, if not renewed, will have to be repaid. If accompanied by a further rise in the rate of discount, it might possibly be of service in averting panic, *but otherwise there seems little likelihood of the measure producing any permanently good effect.*

The continued pressure in Paris is due partly to the foreign and heavy purchases of grain for consumption in France, but also in a great degree to the heavy investments in the new Italian loan, of which the instalments will have to be paid in specie. There has likewise been much over-speculation in building. The last return of the Bank of France gives the following very unfavorable results: Decrease in the bullion, £3,240,000; in the treasury balance, of £2,490,000, and in the advances, of £80,000. On the other hand, an increase has taken place in the bills discounted, of £2,936,000; in the issue of notes, of £370,000, and in the current accounts, of £56,000.

On the whole, we look upon the condition of the French money market as somewhat critical, although the rate of discount at the Bank of France had been increased to $5\frac{1}{2}$, and afterwards to 6 per cent. The reduction by the Bank of England we consider as an unfortunate move, in the present aspect of the cotton and breadstuffs trades in this country and in Western Europe. England is not in a condition to offer inducements to money borrowers to extend their business. A rigid curtailment of liabilities should be the order of the day.

Up to this date the Treasury Department has received about \$26,500,000 from individual subscriptions to the first instalment of the new loan, or about fifty-three per cent. The banks have been reimbursed this amount.

DEATHS.

At St. Louis, Mo., on Wednesday, October 9th, JOHN A. BROWNLEE, Esq., aged forty-three years, son of the late Rev. Dr. W. C. BROWNLEE, of New-York City, and President of the Merchants' Bank of St. Louis in 1859-1861.

* At BROOKLYN, N. Y., Monday, October 14th, E. RUDOLPHUS COOPER, recently Cashier of the Market Bank, N. Y., and formerly Paying Teller of the Mechanics' Banking Association.

NAMES OF PRIVATE BANKERS

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Whose Cards (with their references) may be found on the cover of "The Bankers' Magazine," or "The Merchants and Bankers' Almanac" for 1861.

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
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
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DECEMBER, 1861.—CONTENTS.

	Page
ART. I. GOVERNMENT TREASURY NOTES AND BANK PAPER. "Some Objections to Government Demand Notes" Considered—Provisions of the Constitution as to Bills of Credit—Effects of Inflation of Paper Currency—Revolutions of 1837 and 1857—Bank Capital of 1834—1837—Is the Creation of Paper Money a new function of Government?—Bank Circulation of Great Britain less now than in 1844—Paper Money should not be Created for Individual Profit—Discordant Banking Policy of the several States—"Confederation" of Banks—Failures of Western Banks in 1861—Views of Eminent Statesmen and Writers—Superiority of a Government Circulation over Bank Paper—Conflict between Government Credit and Private Credit.	401
II. Modern Alchemy. By HON. AMASA WALKER, of Massachusetts.	407
III. State Bills of Credit—Are they Violations of the Constitution?	416
IV. Financial Policy of the Government.—1. Considerations on a Special National Loan, in connection with a National Circulating Medium. 2. Investigation and Exposition of the qualifications which constitute Money, and of the true principle which ought to be the basis of Paper Money. By L. BONNEFOUX.	417
V. The Early Mines and Coinage of the American Colonies.	454
VI. Capital, Circulation, Profits, Deposits, Bank Balances, Loans, Real Estate and Value of Stock of each Bank in the City of New-York, with Date of Commencement of Operations.	462
VII. Review of the New-York Stock Market for October, with the lowest and highest prices of thirty various State Loans, Rail-Road Securities, &c., each month, 1860, 1861.	463
VIII. Private Bankers—Changes in New-York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Indiana, &c.	475
IX. BANK ITEMS—New Banks—Bank Failures—Bank Dividends—Foreign Banks.	470
X. Notes on the Money Market and Stock Market of New-York, for November, 1861.	477

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- II.—A List of Private Bankers in Three Hundred and Fifty Cities and Towns of the U. S.
- III.—Alphabetical List of Sixteen Hundred Cashiers in the United States.
- IV.—A List of the Banks in Canada, New-Brunswick and Nova Scotia—their Cashiers, Managers and Foreign Agents.
- V.—Governor, Directors and Officers of the Bank of England, 1861.
- VI.—List of Banks and Bankers in London, December, 1861.
- VII.—List of Bankers in Europe, Asia, South America, Australia, West Indies, &c.
- VIII.—Lowest and Highest Quotations of Stocks at New-York, each Month, 1861.
- IX.—Annual Report on Breadstuffs of the U. S., 1861.
- X.—Quotations of Foreign Exchange at New-York, each Month, 1861.
- XI.—The Usury Laws and Laws of Damages on Bills, of each State in the U. S.
- XII.—The Banks of New-York—Names of President, Vice-President, Cashier and Notary.
- XIII.—Marine Losses of each Month, January to December, 1861.
- XIV.—Journal of Financial and Commercial Events, year 1861.
- XV.—Comparative Tariffs of the U. S., 1842-1861.
- XVI.—The Cotton Crop of each year, and Foreign Exports, 1858-1861.
- XVII.—Table of the Values of all Foreign Gold and Silver Coins in U. S.

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No. 6.

GOVERNMENT TREASURY NOTES AND BANK PAPER.

- I. *"Some Objections to Government Demand Notes" Considered.* II. *Provisions of the Constitution as to Bills of Credit.* III. *Effects of Inflation of Paper Currency.* IV. *Revolutions of 1837 and 1857.* V. *Bank Capital of 1834—1837.* VI. *Is the Creation of Paper Money a new function of Government?* VII. *Bank Circulation of Great Britain less now than in 1844.* VIII. *Paper Money should not be created for Individual Profit.* IX. *Discordant Banking Policy of the several States.* X. *"Confederation" of Banks.* XI. *Failures of Western Banks in 1861.* XII. *Views of Eminent Statesmen and Writers.* XIII. *Superiority of a Government Circulation over Bank Paper.* XIV. *Conflict between Government Credit and Private Credit.*

WE took occasion in our last number (pp. 353—357) to republish a pamphlet, by a bank officer of this city, entitled "Some Objections to Government Demand Notes." This is a subject which eminently deserves the consideration of the general government, the State governments, and of bankers and capitalists; indeed, we may properly say it is one of the most important questions that claim the attention of legislative bodies and of the community at large.

From the first, the connection, agency and influence of the general government with the paper circulation of the country have been long discussed by the authorities of the general and the State governments.

It would appear that the framers of the constitution, in view of the ill-effects of excessive paper circulation, were jealous of any use of credit by the States; for the constitution provides that "*no State shall emit bills of credit,*" and that Congress only shall "*coin money and regulate the value*

thereof;" and although the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States determine that the bills of State banks (even where the capital is owned by the State) are not *bills of credit*, yet the assumption of such control of the paper currency, and our whole experience as to the result of such control, demonstrate that such paper currency is pernicious, liable to excessive abuse, and fraught with evil to the community.

It will do no good, at this late day, to discuss *the law* of the subject. The Supreme Court having decided that the paper circulation of the State banks, whether owned wholly or in part, or not at all, by the State, is legal, it now remains for us to compare the advantages and disadvantages of such circulation with that issued by the general government.

The author of the pamphlet before us handles ably the subject of the paper circulating medium, and demonstrates its dangers and its results. The points he lays down mainly are:

1st. An expansion of paper money inevitably tends, by the enhancement of prices, to the expulsion of coin from circulation and from the country, and to the suspension of specie payments.

2d. By an expansion of paper money, and the consequent advance in prices, the cost of the war and the amount of the national debt are greatly increased.

3d. There is in the expansion of paper money a tendency to stimulate private credit, which in time of war is especially dangerous.

4th. An expansion of the currency is a popular measure and especially seductive, because of its temporarily stimulating effect upon prices, and the apparent prosperity which it engenders. When the peril is greatest and nearest its culmination, there are no striking signs of warning.

Our whole history confirms these positions. Those who have outlived the lamentable revulsions of the year 1837 and 1857, bear evidence that the commercial expansion of the former period was clearly traceable to the increased volume of paper money between the years 1834 and 1837; while the more recent revulsion of 1857 may be clearly attributed to bank expansion and subsequent contraction.

It is only necessary to recur to the official statistics* of the currency of the year 1834, before the Bank of the United States was extinguished, and of the year 1836-7, after the State bank system was so unwisely inaugurated by President JACKSON, to demonstrate the contrast, viz.:

	Jan., 1834.	Jan., 1835.	Jan., 1836.	Jan., 1837.
Bank capital, . . .	\$200,000,000 ..	\$231,000,000 ..	\$251,000,000 ..	\$290,000,000
" circulation, ..	94,000,000 ..	103,000,000 ..	140,000,000 ..	149,000,000
" loans,	324,000,000 ..	365,000,000 ..	457,000,000 ..	525,000,000

This sudden and unwise expansion was the sole cause of the wide distress which accompanied and followed the suspension of March—May, 1837. The enormous increase of foreign imports in those years (\$108,000,000 in 1833 and \$182,000,000 in 1836) would never have taken place but for the expansion of the currency in the shape of bank circulation and deposits.

The same results are recorded for the years 1856—1857, which were

* For details see *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, April, 1860, p. 792.

preceded by a rapid enlargement, "especially seductive," in the banking movement of the whole country.

Assuming that an expanded currency (in which we now include, by general consent, the banking deposits) of the banks is both a remote and a late cause of commercial distress, it is now a grave question to examine, 1st. Whether there are more or less legal restraints upon such expansion now than there were in 1837 and 1857; and, 2d. Whether the partial use by the general government of its constitutional privilege in the creation of a currency has a favorable or an unfavorable effect upon the finances and commerce of the country.

"Is not the creation of paper money a novel function of government in the present age? No leading nation now directly exercises it. England and France have confined this power to banks with special capitals, and independent management, and under important legal restrictions. It certainly seems contrary to the spirit of our constitution, and is a total reverse of the policy of the government for the last fifty years."

Here is a grave error which should be shown in the outset. The British government, in view of commercial and financial distress very similar to our own, and arising from similar circumstances, in the sudden creation of bank paper, has assumed the *whole control* of the banking movement of that country. The commercial distress of 1824-5, and of later periods in England, was generally attributed to the perpetual changes and fluctuations of their banking policy; and, in consequence, the bank charter of 1844 produced a radical change in the banking movements of that country. By that act the creation of additional banking institutions was prohibited outside of London, and the then existing ones were disqualified from increasing their issues. Thus, the maximum of the circulation became fixed; affected only, as to the Bank of England, by a greater or less volume of coin and bullion in its vaults; and the provincial circulation gradually thereafter became reduced by the occasional liquidation of the country banks.

This state of things is shown in the annexed summary of bank circulation in Great Britain, which we reproduce from our last No. (October, 1861,) p. 376 :

CIRCULATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1845—1861.

	1845.	1854.	1859.	January, 1861.	Aug. 24, 1861.
Bank of England,....	£ 22,015,000 ..	£ 20,298,000 ..	£ 21,886,000 ..	£ 20,076,998 ..	£ 20,190,372
Private banks,.....	4,570,000 ..	3,849,000 ..	3,444,000 ..	3,320,794 ..	2,974,906
Joint-stock banks,...	3,222,000 ..	3,073,000 ..	3,018,000 ..	2,939,985 ..	2,704,611
Total in England,....	£ 29,807,000 ..	£ 27,220,000 ..	£ 28,348,000 ..	£ 26,337,777 ..	£ 25,869,889
Scotland,	3,804,000 ..	4,316,000 ..	4,591,000 ..	4,303,285 ..	4,053,808
Ireland,.....	7,716,000 ..	6,722,000 ..	7,404,000 ..	6,912,819 ..	5,519,428
United Kingdom,....	£ 41,327,000 ..	£ 38,258,000 ..	£ 40,343,000 ..	£ 37,553,882 ..	£ 35,443,125

Here we see how wise was the foresight of the British government in 1844, in assuming the sole control of the currency, and thus limiting the volume of bank circulation. It is, therefore; no "novel function" of the British government to "create paper money." On the contrary, this function was largely assumed during the first forty years of this century ;

and it was finally and wholly assumed in 1844, when the government, through its creation, the Bank of England, wisely said, "no larger volume of paper money shall hereafter be created." It is true that the bank is owned by private capitalists and its profits enure to their benefit; but their capital in the bank is wholly loaned to the government, which, in turn, thereby becomes a guarantor of the solvency or the conservative management of the bank. The government can then safely, as it does, constitute the present issue of the bank a *legal tender*, thus creating confidence in a national paper; but at the same time it says that no increase shall take place unless represented by coin or bullion in the vaults of the bank.

The course of the Bank of France is also virtually controlled by the government; and its issues have thus become national, and fully possessing the confidence of the people.

How different is it with the currency of this country. An unfortunate construction of the constitution has fostered the policy of independent action by the State governments in reference to the currency. The spurious doctrine of "State rights" has wormed itself among the people, and one of the true functions of the general government, viz., the sole control of the currency for the people, has been wrested from it, and placed with the authorities of thirty or more States; each one aiming, at the instigation of its own capitalists, to create as large a volume of bank paper as can possibly be sustained. Thus leaving to the promptings of cupidity or individual profit *that which should be established and maintained only on the broad grounds of national and public welfare.*

The inevitable results of such a mongrel, diversified and discordant series of legislative movements must, as the "Bank Officer" most clearly demonstrates, end in "a suspension of specie payments." It was so in 1819, in 1837, in 1840 and in 1857; and it will be so FOR ALL TIME TO COME, unless the general government properly assume its legitimate and clearly-defined functions to control the currency, and thus afford a national circulation equivalent to a legal tender; or, unless the banks of the whole country unite in the adoption of a sound policy, as has been done recently by the banks of this city, by insisting on a liberal basis of coin against their cash liabilities.

"The banks in the three cities have formed themselves into a confederation, *practically corresponding to the constitution of the government, making together substantially one institution* for the purpose of the national loan, with an aggregate capital of one hundred and twenty millions of dollars; while each bank, as usual, conducts its special affairs."

Now if this policy of the banks of this metropolis be a sound one, *in practically constituting themselves ONE INSTITUTION*, by making common cause of their specie reserve, why not apply the same sound rule to the banks of the whole State, and merge the whole three hundred moneyed institutions, practically, into one, so as to prevent unnecessary inflation on the part of one or more?

And if this rule, thus enlarged, be sound, why not make the fourteen hundred banks of the country practically one institution, thus forbidding unwise expansion of its circulating notes and credits, and making the

specie reserve of the whole country one basis of action? the issues to be contracted *pro rata* with the contraction of the reserve.

This is practically the doctrine of the New-York Board of Currency, whose policy is now so vigorously and so effectually applied to the fifty-four banks of the city, but which policy was so pertinaciously opposed by the *Importers and Traders' Bank*, the *Greenwich Bank* and some few others in New-York, and by the four Albany banks which failed this year, holding \$41,000 in specie against \$2,600,000 (!) of cash liabilities.*

Our "Bank Officer" perhaps concedes more than he at first intended, when he says that the combination of New-York city banks "practically correspond to the constitution of the government," and that the paper issued by the government "is all-controlling, has unbounded confidence of the people, and the moral power to compel its circulation."

It is this very idea of safety which renders the government notes legitimate and acceptable at all points of the Union, while the local bank paper has not, frequently, the quality of soundness or reliability to recommend it.

On the other hand, the proposition that "bank paper is not liable to so great expansion as government; and is limited by law, by securities pledged for its redemption, by public vigilance and apprehension," is not substantially sustained. Our own experience in the State of New-York establishes the fact, that there are frequent and severe fluctuations of the circulation, and occasional losses from the failure of banks of issue, which are not limited by law, but, on the contrary, are too eager for large profits. The adoption of mortgages as a basis of issues is full of danger, tending to undue expansion and to loss. But New-York is among the best of the free banking States, and her worst features have been adopted elsewhere. Within the current year, 1861, there have been numerous failures among the free banks of Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri and Minnesota, and the holders of their bills have been compelled to submit to a loss of ten to fifty per cent. The Auditor of the State of Illinois now gives notice of his readiness to redeem the bills of certain suspended banks in that State, at rates ranging from FIFTY TO SIXTY cents per dollar; the holder sustaining a heavy loss thereby, although the bills were supposed to be secured according to law.

While we thus record the annual and the monthly suspensions of banking institutions which, without adequate restraints, entail heavy losses upon the community, we are admonished by the fathers of the republic, as well as by more modern minds, of the dangers of bank paper. These dangers are not confined to the community, but exist also for the stockholders.

Mr. VAN BUREN comments upon the severe revulsions during his own administration, as induced "by excessive issues of bank paper."

Mr. NATHAN APPLETON says, "it is a tremendous power, that of increasing or diminishing the circulating medium of the whole country."

Mr. ALEXANDER HAMILTON said, (before the Supreme Court decisions, sustaining local bank paper,) "the emitting of paper money is wisely prohibited to the State governments."

* See BANKERS' MAGAZINE, July, 1861, for official returns to this effect.

Mr. JEFFERSON has said, "paper money, * * by breaking up the measures of value, makes a lottery of private property."

Mr. MADISON said, in 1815, just prior to the resumption of specie payments, "it is essential to every modification of the finances that the benefits of a uniform *national* currency should be restored to the community."

Mr. TOOKE, an eminent English writer, has said, "in every civilized country, supplying and regulating the circulating medium is a function of the sovereign prerogative."

Mr. WILSON G. HUNT expressed volumes when he said, "what has been, may be expected to occur again; and as long as the present system be in existence, we shall be subject to calamities similar to those of 1837 and 1857."

We think it can be demonstrated that the stability of commerce and the safety of private capital in banks can be secured only by depriving individuals, and associations of individuals, of the power of creating, enlarging or contracting the currency. 2. That the benefits, if any, arising from a paper circulation, should enure to the government and not to individuals. 3. That the power delegated by the constitution to Congress only, "to coin money and regulate the value thereof," embraces the power to control exclusively *all representations of money, whether in the shape of paper or of coin*. 4. That the paper circulation of the whole country can never be placed upon a reliable basis by individual State legislation; but to secure uniformity, reliability, confidence and redemption beyond contingency, must emanate only from the general government, become a legal tender, and be issued upon sound principles of finance.

Finally, that unless such a radical reform be produced, we shall never be free from the liability to a recurrence of commercial and financial revulsions and losses. That to the people only, through their representatives at the seat of the general government, belongs constitutionally the power to create a circulating medium for the country, and that the welfare and the fame of the whole people, *as one nation*, cannot be secured without keeping this power in the hands of the people or their representatives.

In coming to correct conclusions on this great national question, we must abstract ourselves from our private and special interests as "bank officers" or bank stockholders, and place ourselves upon the broad basis of national credit. We must lose sight of the temptation to individual profit, and deny to favored classes those rights which cannot be delegated to all. Conceding that the right to create paper money is unsafe in unwise hands, and liable to abuse, we must acknowledge that the power should remain with the people in their representative capacity.

The largest moneyed institution in the country has wisely relinquished a right to issue paper money, and has liquidated its liabilities in this shape: concluding that eventual profit is better secured without using a power pronounced by wise men as unsafe—and we hope to see the day when the general government only will be entitled to the exercise of this privilege.

MODERN ALCHEMY.

By AMASA WALKER.

ALCHEMY at one time occupied a high place among the occult sciences, and the most learned and ingenious men made it the study of their lives. Observing that the composition of different metals produced masses of a color unlike either of the ingredients, as, for example, that a mixture like gold results from melting together copper and zinc, they very naturally arrived at the conclusion that one metal could be changed into another; that the baser metals could be transformed into gold and silver. To do this, the ancient alchemists thought it only necessary to find a substance which, containing the original principle of all matter, should possess the power of dissolving all its elements. This was their great ideal; for this they sought with most unwearying assiduity and persistency for centuries. The opinion they had adopted was so plausible, the object they sought so desirable, and the apparent advances made, from time to time, toward its attainment were so great, that though a thousand times baffled, they could never relinquish their golden dreams. For more than thirteen centuries, from the third to the sixteenth at least, alchemy maintained its position in the schools of learning, and only gave way to sound science as the real truths of chemistry were discovered. And even then, it may be said, so far as the great desideratum of transmitting the baser into the more precious is concerned, only to appear in another form, adapted to the altered condition of a more advanced civilization.

There is a modern alchemy which secures as strong a faith, as earnest and persevering efforts as did the ancient, and the alchemist of to-day is as sure of the truthfulness of his idea, and the final success of his experiments, as his prototype of five or fifteen centuries ago. That paper may, by some marvellous solvent, some *menstruum universale*, be made into gold, or that which in fact is better, is as earnestly believed now as was the existence of the philosopher's stone among the early adepts of the hermetic art.

Our modern manipulators are as skillful as ever were those of past times, and, we may add, as successful, too. They come *just as near* changing paper into money as ever the old alchemists did to transmuting copper and zinc into a more valuable metal, and we are as much bound to believe in the truth of their alleged achievements now as we are to believe that the famous Pope, JOHN XXII., "changed 50,000 pounds of quicksilver into pure gold for King EDWARD I."

It seems quite surprising to us that a theory so absurd as the one referred to should have commanded the assent of the learned world for so long a period; but it is not more strange than that a perfectly cognate idea should possess the public mind at the present time. The problem that alchemy proposed to solve was of the deepest interest to the individual who should accomplish it, and was, doubtless, supposed to be of the greatest interest to mankind. Political economy, or the laws of wealth, were then unknown, and the ancients were not aware that when-

ever gold, by any contrivance, could be created at a trifling expense, it would of necessity have so little value as to be useless as money. So, at the present time, our alchemists, who would supply the world with paper money *ad libitum*, fail to see that just in proportion as the amount of what is adopted as money is increased, its power is decreased, until at last even paper might prove too bulky and ponderous.

The ancients failed to discover the fact that gold was one of the original elements of nature, and that no possible operation of the crucible could produce it. So, in modern times, those who fancy they can by some ingenious expedient substitute an article *without* value for one that *has* it, and cause it to perform the same functions, are in pursuit of an object that can never, by any possibility, be attained. Gold may be dug out of the earth by labor, and then it will have value, and will form a proper material by which to measure the value of any and every other object that also costs labor. It is the large value contained in a small quantity of gold that so wonderfully adapts it to use as money. A single ounce of it will ordinarily purchase or command in exchange fifteen or twenty bushels of wheat on the plains of Illinois. Paper can never do this, except by promising to pay gold. Paper never pays for anything. When A. has sold his wheat for paper money, what has he got? His pay? certainly not. He has got, to be sure, what he accepts as pay, but that it is not itself his pay would very clearly appear should the bank fail before he was rid of its notes. What he really receives is the promise of the bank; and such promises to pay are merely evidence of an unfinished contract. All credit is of this sort; notes or obligations to pay a value, whether given by a bank or by an individual, are merely the evidence that certain contracts have been made but are *not fulfilled*. These evidences may pass from hand to hand in exchange for commodities, or in discharge of debts, but they are never paid until a value has been given for them by the promisor. The more these promises are issued, the more actual money will sooner or later be required to discharge them. These promises perform perfectly well *one* function of money, viz., that of a medium of exchange; that function by which property is conveyed from one person to another. But the remaining equally important function, viz., that of measuring value, or acting as a standard or measure of value, they cannot perform at all, for the very obvious reason that they possess no value themselves. They may be very good promises; they may be based on the best of securities, but what of all that? They lack the element of value, and, of course, cannot measure or truly determine the value of any commodity whatever.

This may be seen if we will suppose a community, with a specie currency of \$100,000, and that this is just adequate to their wants. Now issue a million of dollars in paper money, and put it into circulation with this specie at par. What would follow? As there is now ten times more money than before, and only the same amount of commodities to be exchanged or measured, the prices of all commodities must rise. How else could the million of new money be used? Money is good for nothing except for purchasing commodities or paying debts, and these items of demand remaining the same in amount, and the money being increased tenfold, a corresponding rise of prices is inevitable.

This would seem to be plain, yet it is not understood. Men are so excited by the anxious desire and the seeming possibility of getting a substitute for specie, that, like the old alchemists, of whom it may be said, in language once applied to a very different subject, that—

“What ardently they wished they long believed,
And disappointed still, were still deceived,”

these, too, persevere with their experiments, and, notwithstanding all the disasters and monetary convulsions which the attempt to substitute promise for performance has caused, we find them still in hot pursuit of the philosopher's stone of the nineteenth century.

A new professor of this modern alchemy has just made his appearance before the public, and challenged its attention in a pamphlet of some 120 pages, entitled “A New System of Paper Currency,” by LYSANDER SPOONER, published at Boston.

MR. SPOONER belongs to the legal profession, and is quite well known by his writings on constitutional law. His opinions on questions connected with his profession, we believe, are regarded as entitled to much respect. He now enters a new field, and presents a very complete, and, we may add, a very elaborate plan for establishing a currency which, he is sure, will meet the wants of the public, and may be issued in any quantity desired, however large.

The character of this currency is clearly set forth in the first two sentences of the work, which we here quote :

“The principle of the system is, that the currency shall represent an *invested* dollar instead of a specie dollar.”

“The currency will, therefore, be redeemable by an invested dollar, unless the bankers choose to redeem it with specie.”

The bare description of this system of currency in detail, and its expected results, cover sixty pages of the work.

We cannot, of course, give even an abstract of it, but will endeavor to present, and we hope correctly, the leading idea of the system.

The capital is \$100,000, in shares of one dollar each. The stockholders give their several notes according to the amount of the stock they wish to hold, which notes are secured by mortgage on reliable property. These notes are to bear interest at the rate of seven per cent., and are made payable at the term of twenty years. The notes thus given are the property of the banking company, and constitute what the projector calls the Productive Stock ; and this stock forms the basis of security on which the circulation, called Circulating Stock, rests, and which consists of certificates in the sum of one dollar and upwards. These certificates read as follow :

“Be it known, that the bearer is proprietor of five shares in the Circulating Stock of the Boston Banking Company, which shares are of the nominal value of five dollars, and are entitled to be received at that value in payment of any debts due to said company, and also, to be redeemed by the transfer of Productive Stock, or otherwise, according to the provisions of the articles of association of said company, which bear date January 1st, 1860.”

Signed by Trustees.

Countersigned by President and Secretary.

The notes or certificates thus created are to be issued by discounting notes, bills of exchange, &c., as done by other banks. By this operation, the borrower is to get the use of these notes by paying six per cent., or the current rate of interest, and the stockholders, that is, those who hold the so-called Productive Stock, will get the profits arising from the interest paid in upon the loans of the bank, *minus* the expenses of the institution. Whatever this amount may be will be clear gain to the aforesaid stockholders, as what they nominally pay as interest on their Productive Stock will also come back to them in dividends.

This statement, we think, presents a general idea of the objects of the proposed "New System of Currency," and the manner in which it is to be issued and used. It will be seen that it is intended to be wholly a credit currency; no specie is contemplated at all. The great desideratum is supposed to be attained by the security given for the ultimate payment of the notes, as they are made lawful tender for all payments made *to the bank*, and also for *the purchase of its stock*. This last consideration makes it certain that, *for the specific purposes named*, they will always be equal to par.

The projector, having given a full outline of his project, very naively remarks, "The system is plainly practicable, *provided the currency will pass*. The only question, then, is, whether the currency will pass?"

Very good; that is the question. Will the public wish to borrow this currency at the usual rate of interest, and then accept it at par in payment of all values transferred? How shall we more readily decide that question, than by getting a view of what would be the natural operation of such a currency so far as we can reasonably anticipate? Let us suppose a case:

A bank on this principle is established and now ready to commence operations: Farmer BROWN goes to the bank and offers his note for \$1,000, on twelve months, secured by mortgage on his farm, well worth twice the money. The bank discounts one year's interest, \$60, and lets him have \$940 of the "new currency." What will Farmer BROWN do with it? He proposes to pay his neighbor, SMITH, a note he owes him, for \$300. Mr. SMITH, on seeing the money, hesitates, and asks whether the Cocklefield Bank will receive it, as he has a note to pay at that institution in a few days? Mr. BROWN does not know how that is, but will ascertain. He inquires, and is told that such currency will be of no use to that bank, because it will not be received in redemption of their own notes or bills; nor will their customers accept such money as loans, inasmuch as they all want money that will be acceptable everywhere, and which, if needful, will command the specie at once. No other bank, for the same reason, will accept this kind of money.

Farmer BROWN thus finds, that to pay debts at bank this *currency* will not *pass*. But perhaps he can pay a note for \$200 which he owes Widow PERKINS, because, as she will at once put the amount in the savings bank, it may make no difference to her. He proposes to pay the widow, but she demurs until the savings bank has been consulted. Will the treasurer of the bank accept this currency? No. And why not? Because the bank receives money only to loan out again, and such currency will not be accepted by those who borrow. Farmer

BROWN recollects now that he owes the grocer of the village \$100 for sundries had and received, and offers to make him a payment on account. The grocer, a kind, obliging man, hesitates a little, says he would be glad to accommodate, but he don't know whether his creditors in Boston will accept this money in payment. He will not absolutely refuse, but will take it on condition that the dealers in Boston will receive it. This is agreed to, and the money is at once forwarded to the city. By return of mail the grocer receives an answer, from which we make the following extract :

"The \$100, 'new currency,' you sent us, we cannot accept on your account. The banks will not receive it, and all our notes are payable in bank. Nor could we remit to the West Indies, or any other foreign country, in payment for our imports. However current it may be in this country, and however safe it may be, it can never be received at par, if at all, in a city whose trade is foreign as well as domestic, for domestic bills are paid through the bank, and foreign balances are, and always must be, discharged by specie, which this currency does not even promise to pay."

FARMER BROWN is informed that the \$100 has been returned, and is subject to his order.

What use can the good farmer make of his money ? It was easily obtained ; it does not seem to be so easily got rid of. But perhaps he can buy farm stock with it. He will try. He visits one of his neighbors and proposes to give \$80 for a yoke of steers. The neighbor is quite satisfied with the price, but cannot take the new currency unless the wheelwright, whom he owes for an ox-wagon, will accept it. He goes, accordingly, to the wagon-maker, puts the question, and receives for answer, "Yes, if Mr. GRANT, the grocer, will take it from me." This spoils the trade, for it is already ascertained that Mr. GRANT can do nothing with it. This is truly discouraging ; cannot Mr. BROWN purchase land with it ? The experiment is made. Mr. SIMPSON, near by, is a rich, hard-faced man, but has a great deal of land he would like very well to part with, at a good price. Mr. B. makes the proposition ; tells Mr. S. that the money he offers him is unquestionably good ; that it is perfectly secured by the best of mortgages, and, being receivable for all sums due the bank, will certainly be wanted, as there is no more money of this kind issued than what is due the bank. Mr. SIMPSON looks into the matter. He sees, that taking this money will really be selling his land on credit ; but he can wait, and besides, if he gets a round price for the land, he can afford to make a discount on the money if necessary. He is shrewd enough to know that he will probably have to do the latter, because, though there is no more of the "new currency" in circulation than the amount due the bank, yet, as every one who holds this kind of money will be desirous to turn it at once into cash funds, and as all the debts due the bank are payable at different periods for a long time to come, there will always be more sellers than buyers of this kind of money, and, consequently, it will always be at a discount as compared with specie. Mr. SIMPSON, however, fixes a price upon his land which Mr. BROWN thinks quite too high. Mr. BROWN, now in rather a pensive mode, begins to soliloquize, "Will this 'new currency' be of any advan-

tage to me? I have paid \$60 for the use of \$940 for a year; can I make any disposition of it that will be equivalent to the interest paid? I cannot pay a debt with it, or purchase any good property which I may want; and to buy land which I don't really need, and pay a good deal more for it than it is worth, does not seem to be very judicious. What can I do with it? If I keep it on hand it will pay my note when due, with the aid of \$60 of good money; that is certain; but I shall lose the year's interest. I might also purchase the stock of the bank with it at par, but that don't seem to be an object; if the 'new currency' is so difficult to get rid of, the stock of the bank will not be very profitable. On the whole, I think it will be most advantageous to keep the money till I am called on to pay my note at the bank." Farmer BROWN, at least, is now able to answer the question proposed by Mr. SPOONER, "Will the currency pass?" He has tried it and found out just *how* it will pass, and *what* it is good for. He has found that it is not entirely worthless; he could exchange it for unsaleable property; he could, in fact, trade it off, like any other article of barter; but as money, as that which was equivalent to the specie, as that for the use of which he could afford to pay interest, he has found it altogether deficient. And has not the experience of Farmer BROWN, which we submit as a fair and unexaggerated statement of the character and results of such a currency, clearly and conclusively shown that it can be of no advantage to the public to be furnished with a circulating medium of this description; that there can be, in fact, no possible utility in it?

But perhaps the learned projector may say in reply, "But, if such a currency were universal through the country, if it were made as plenty as I have estimated it might be, and if all banks dealt in the same kind of currency, then it would pay all debts and purchase all kinds of property at a fair value." Let us see how far that proposition is true.

Mr. SPOONER says, (page 17,) that "the system admits of competition limited only by the real property of the country." That is to say, that this currency may be extended just so far as there is *real property* to form the basis. Now, of such property, there is in the United States at least \$10,000,000,000, and, of course, we might have just so much of the "new currency." Our present mixed currency, circulation and deposits amounts to about \$450,000,000. So that of the new currency we might have more than twenty times as much as of the present. What would follow if ten thousand millions, or half that sum, of such currency were issued? Would it be at par with specie, or any currency redeemable on demand by specie? Certainly not; not even one million, or one hundred thousand dollars of such money could be issued without being soon at a discount. But if it could be kept in circulation at par, what would become of the specie of the country? Would not all prices be correspondingly raised, our exports diminished, our imports increased enormously; and then with what should we pay our foreign balances? But we need not contemplate any such contingency, because it is impossible that a purely credit currency should be kept at par, even with a mixed currency. It would decline in relation to specie just in proportion to the amount issued. It would be, in truth, useless as money, and the whole project, however plausible, would be found utterly impracticable.

Why, then, it may be asked, take any notice of such currency? Because, absurd and preposterous as it may be, the great mass of the people in this country, as well as in Europe, have a vague but very strong belief that such a currency is practicable, nay more, it is their *beau idéal* of a currency; a currency that *costs nothing*, and is *perfectly secure*, and can be had in *any quantity*. We speak deliberately when we say that there is a general feeling of this nature pervading all communities in which any kind of paper money is used. Mr. SPOONER, on this question, is really a representative man, and truly expresses a class of ideas very prevalent among people of great respectability, and who are on other subjects highly intelligent.

When we say that Mr. SPOONER's project is preposterous, we do not regard it as saying anything peculiarly derogatory to him. He is an able jurist, but has no practical acquaintance, we conclude, with business affairs, nor any knowledge of the real nature of money. We say this, because it seems to us that if he had either he would never present a system so utterly impracticable and unphilosophical.

One thing we cheerfully accord to Mr. SPOONER's system—it is an *honest one*. Here is no fraud, no deception. It makes no promises that it cannot fulfil. It does not profess to be convertible into specie. It is the best transmutation project we have seen. Mr. SPOONER, however, can, we think, make no claim to originality, so far as the general principle is concerned. The famous bank of JOHN LAW, in France, was essentially of the same character. The Land Bank, projected in the Colony of Massachusetts, in 1740, but defeated by the opposition of Governor BELCHER, was founded on the same principle. This bank is alluded to in an "Historical Account of the Massachusetts Currency, by JOSEPH B. FELT, Boston, 1839," which may be found in the Massachusetts State Library, and is described at length in a small volume, which, according to the recollection of the writer, may also be found in the same collection. And the Socialists have full faith in a currency of this description, and believe they shall be able to supply the world with money at an interest of one per cent., or the mere expense of issuing it. They boast that they "can annihilate interest."

A disciple of PROUDHON, and one of his ardent admirers, introduced a petition into the legislature of Massachusetts, a few years since, for a bank very similar to that of Mr. SPOONER, that is, it was a bank relying wholly on the *security* of its currency, because it was based on *land mortgages*, and the notes were not to be redeemable in coin, but receivable for all sums due the bank. Every farmer who wished could, by this project, mortgage his estate and get a supply of the currency. The measure was very properly rejected by the legislature, for, though such a scheme could never have succeeded, the experiment would have been attended with great hazard and loss to all concerned in it.

An additional evidence of the universality of the idea that by some legislative alchemy paper may be made as good as gold is found in the fact, that no sooner had the new Confederacy of the Southern States been formed, than a project was brought forward in the *Memphis Appeal* for a "national mint to coin paper money." The general features of this scheme are, that the government shall coin \$120,000,000 to take the place of an equal amount of bank notes and gold, which the writer

supposes to form at present the currency of the Confederacy, and the government paper is to be limited to this amount at the commencement; but, as the writer has satisfied himself that the currency of those States naturally increases in volume at the rate of \$11,000,000 per annum, he proposes that the government shall issue that amount and no more; and then, he thinks, there will be no greater quantity of money than under the present system, and, of course, it will retain its par value. This sum of \$11,000,000, which the government is to create each year, the projector supposes will be sufficient to meet all the expenses of the Confederate States "if there is no war," and that they will be able to support government without taxation, and at once realize their beautiful vision of free trade. The projector of this scheme seems to anticipate that there may be some practical difficulty if other States and nations should not recognise this "paper coin" of the Confederacy, but he puts that matter to rest as follows: "It may be urged that the world will not recognise your currency. If you initiate it the European powers will not only recognise it, but they will adopt it very soon. It is a manifestation of your power not forbidden by international law, and no nation has a right to question it. Besides, you can *compel* a recognition of it. Remember, you *control the world*, and control it without armies and navies."

So we see what Europe and the rest of mankind have got to do. They must accept the "paper coin" of the Confederacy at once.

This currency, like Mr. SPOONER'S, is an honest one; that is, there is no deception about it. The government stamps a piece of paper \$50, but it does nothing more. It does not promise to redeem it with anything whatever. It is to go with circulation by the *fiat* of government, and the world must accept it. It is much like the forced paper circulation which has, at different times, been issued by the despotic governments of Russia and Austria.

Many schemes of the same kind have at different times been presented to the attention of the world, but none of them have been more complete in detail, or more systematically arranged than that of Mr. SPOONER, yet his currency will not "PASS." And what is still more, it would do great mischief if it did. Fortunately for man, at no time and in no place can the great laws of nature be changed or successfully contravened or evaded. They are all "very good," and the wisdom of man consists in ascertaining what those laws are, and in conforming his own legislation to them. When he does this he is in the right path, that which promotes his highest well-being. When he runs counter to these immutable laws of the Creator he is sure, in the end, to do himself harm.

The mixed currency of the present day is a most ingenious attempt to secure a cheaper kind of money than that which has the element of value full and perfect. With what success we have abundant evidence. The constant fluctuations, the occasional revulsions, the terrific periodical explosions of all credit, show most strikingly how impotent is the attempt to counteract the great law of value.

The alchemy of a mixed currency is, in truth, more delusive and detrimental to the public than that of purely credit money, for the reason that the latter will at once depreciate to its just value unless sustained by despotic power compelling its circulation, while the latter will be accepted as money at par until the banks suspend their specie payments,

and then a great loss falls upon the community in the shape of exchange. Yet this is the smallest of the evils of a mixed currency. The chief difficulty is, that the issue of this kind of currency inevitably expands the credit of a country so enormously, and so deranges its trade, that revolution and bankruptcy follow as certain and necessary consequences, and it must be withdrawn from circulation at the very moment when most needed, leaving business men to pay their debts without the means of doing so.

The experience of last November and December was very instructive on this point. Louisiana, with 40 per cent. of specie, went through the immediate crisis without suspension, or any great contraction of facilities to the business community, while Illinois, with only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of coin, succumbed without a struggle. How could she do otherwise? Her banks had promised forty dollars to every dollar they possessed, and when called on to convert their currency into specie, they stopped payment. The universal derangement and stagnation of business throughout the whole country, which the mere threat of secession occasioned, in November last, was a terrible illustration of the danger to which a currency consisting, on the average, of four-fifths of mere credit, must always be exposed when any great emergency occurs, impairing general confidence. And now, when war has actually taken place, how great are the disadvantages of having so unreliable a currency, how ruinous are the exchanges with the suspended States, whether at the South or West, and how greatly is the strength of those States impaired in a military point of view, which, at the commencement of the struggle, had but a small proportion of specie in their circulating medium.

Nothing can be more demonstrable than that all attempt at "transmutation," every departure from a sound currency (one that has full value in itself) is an injury done to the great body of the people, without a corresponding advantage to the parties who issue it. Yet so powerful is habit, so accustomed have we become to the use of promises instead of value, so completely do we identify paper with specie, that we receive with the greatest incredulity the idea that the former is not just as good as the latter.

Such is indisputably the condition of the people of this country. How long it will be so no one can determine, yet that a change for the better is before us we may be certain. The frequent recurrence of those sudden and violent contractions which have taken place within a few years, is doing much to arrest attention and excite inquiry. Men begin somewhat to understand that a mixed currency, having a large proportion of specie as its basis, is more reliable than one that has a smaller support of value, and they have only to follow out that idea to its legitimate conclusion, and they will be satisfied that it is perfectly impracticable to transmute paper into gold to any extent or degree whatever, and that all attempts to do so (beneficially to the trade and commerce of the world) are as absurd and futile as the efforts of the old alchemists to change the baser metals into the more precious. Gold and silver exist in amply sufficient quantities to answer all the natural demand there is, or ever can be, for money, and no transmutation of them, either by the chemist or the mixed currency banker, can possibly add to their value or utility.

But while we should use the precious metals only as money, we may,

and, for convenience, should substitute paper for the circulation of them; but such paper should always be the representative of an equal quantity of the actual specie in the bank from which it is issued. No man of practical sense expects that so thorough a reform can be effected at once. It must be approached by degrees. A gradual but constant increase of the proportion of specie to currency is what should everywhere be insisted upon.

The more that point is secured the safer will be the monetary system, and the greater the prosperity of trade; and the final result cannot fail to be the establishment of a perfectly reliable and satisfactory currency

STATE BILLS OF CREDIT.

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN reference to "bills of credit" the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that the paper issued by a State must, to *violate* the constitutional clause, be intended for circulation on the credit of the State, for ordinary purposes, as money, and be redeemable by the State at a future day. (4 *Peters' S. C. Reports*, 410, 431. 11 *Id.* 257. 10 *Howard*, 190, 205.)

Loan-office certificates, issued in pursuance of a statute of Missouri, receivable at the State Treasury for taxes or debts due to the State, and for the redemption of which the faith and funds of the State were pledged, are bills of credit. (4 *Peters' S. C. Reports*, 410, 432, *CRAIG vs. THE STATE OF MISSOURI*. JOHNSON, THOMPSON and McLEAN, dissenting. 8 *Peters*, p. 40.) The dissenting judges thought that as they were issued to borrow money, were promises to receive and not to pay, were not made a legal tender, bore interest, and that a fund had been provided to redeem them, they were not bills of credit.

The bills issued by the banks of the Commonwealth of Kentucky are not bills of credit. (11 *Peters*, 257, *BRISCOE vs. THE BANK OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY*. STORY and THOMPSON, J., dissented.

Nor are the bills of the Bank of the State of Arkansas, to which the State furnished all the capital, received all the profits, and the notes of which were receivable in payment of the debts of the State. (10 *Howard*, 190, 205, *WOODRUFF vs. TAPNALL*. 15 *Howard*, 304, 317, 318.)

A bill of credit emanates from the sovereignty of the State, and its currency rests on the faith of the State, and on which the State cannot be sued. (13 *Howard*, 17.)

The State Bank of Alabama was founded on capital raised by sale of the State bonds; the State owned all the capital, was to receive all the profits; half the capital was deposited in specie for redemption of its notes; it was managed by directors selected by the legislature, and liable for over-issues; it had power to issue notes, to discount, and do other corporate banking duties, the credit of the State was pledged for the ultimate redemption of its bills, which were promises to pay by the bank, and were signed by the president and cashier. It was held to be no violation of the clause of the constitution. 13 *Howard's S. C. Reports*, 12, *DARRINGTON vs. THE BANK OF ALABAMA*. GRIER, J., dissented.

FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

- I. *Considerations on a Special National Loan, in connection with a National Circulating Medium.* II. *Investigation and Exposition of the qualifications which constitute Money, and of the true principle which ought to be the basis of Paper Money.*

By L. BONNEFOUX,

Originator of the New-York State Stock Security Bank in 1838.

INTRODUCTION.

THE aspirations of the colonists, refugees and exiles, scattered in the various colonies of Great Britain, on the North American continent, were, long before the Declaration of Independence, united in the feeling of forming only ONE PEOPLE—that is, ONE NATION. In 1754, delegates from the various parts of the country assembled at Albany in convention on that subject; the bases of a Union were debated, and a paper drawn up by B. FRANKLIN embodied the views of the convention.

The spirit of freedom which the persecuted of the Old World brought with them contributed much to create the general aspirations just alluded to—other causes combined to do it. It was intuitively felt that this vast continent, on account of its scanty population and its unlimited resources when developed by civilization, was destined to be the boundless field where free institutions would quietly and progressively expand, sheltered from the re-action and anarchy which the privileged classes of Europe have so often succeeded in creating, whenever and wherever the people have made attempts to vindicate their rights, and to secure for themselves the boon of self-government. Moreover, natural causes seemed to indicate that North America was providentially adapted for being the site of a homogeneous and great Nation; its peculiar configurations connecting, as it were, its extreme points by means of mighty rivers and immense inland seas, is most happily fitted for the full and for the most beneficial development of the great discoveries and inventions of the nineteenth century. Steam and the electric telegraph were discovered at the very time when they began to be needed to bind more closely the various parts of this extensive country.

Under the various charters granted by the English crown to each separate colony, municipal corporations and governments had been established, which prepared the people thereof to the habits of a representative government, hence, the determination of the British ministry to tax the people of the colonies, without allowing them to be represented in Parliament—naturally produced discussion and created discontent, remonstrance, opposition, and finally armed resistance. The people rose up throughout the country, and on the 4th of July, 1776, the Declaration of Independence took place. This memorable Declaration was a solemn appeal to mankind in favor of the natural and inalienable rights of man. It was warmly responded to in the Old World, and this response formed

a bond of sympathy and union between the host of the vindicators of free government in the Old as well as the New World, which binds them yet to this day. The people of North America, as a whole, felt the want of being united, so as to assume "among the powers of the earth" their stand as an equal and separate NATION. The Declaration embodied their feelings and aspirations; they stood ready to support it by pledging to each other "their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor." The Declaration was signed by fifty-seven delegates from the "United Colonies." Had these patriotic delegates been intrusted to frame a constitution for the whole people, under one form of government, no doubt but what they would have proved equal to the task. But the officials who ruled the corporations and administrations of the various colonies, wanted to grasp at power and wield it for themselves. They showed, at that early period, the same spirit which has been so prevalent among that class of men in our own times. They took the ground at once, that each colony was a State which they were exclusively to rule; they acknowledged in mere words that "the people were the origin of all power," but they took good care that said power should be lodged exclusively in their own hands; they pretended that each State was a sovereign power, and proceeded, November 15th, 1777, to agree on "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union," subject to the ratification of the *Legislatures* of the several States. It took eight months before these articles were ratified, (on the 9th of July, 1778,) and then, by only eight States; it took over three years before they were ratified by all. These facts show the jarring views of these Legislatures and the clashing interests existing among these self-created constituents. The people were not consulted, either in the organization of a confederacy nor in the ratification of the "Articles of Confederation." This was done, as stated above, by the "Legislatures," and not, as it ought to have been done, by a convention of the people.

It is obvious, from the facts above stated, that the "Articles of Confederation" were at variance with, and belied completely, the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence.

The absolute necessity of constituting an executive power to carry on the war, forced the framers of the "Articles of Confederation" to provide for a congress of delegates from each State, which was intended to act as a general government; but the action of that congress was trammelled by absurd and conflicting restrictions, which plainly indicated the narrow and selfish views of the officials, who had taken upon themselves to assume a constituting sovereign power. They evidently attempted to take back with one hand what, for form sake, they grudgingly granted with the other. One of the "articles" was the following: "In determining questions, each State shall have one vote." The officials of each State controlled, thereby, the votes of their own delegates by means of private instructions, intended to be binding to them; hence resulted the conflicting action of two powers within the confederation, the one ostensible, and the other secret and kept out of view, but ready, at all times, to assume the control and to repudiate the acts of the other, as it did, virtually, repudiate the public debt incurred by the war of independence.

The inevitable consequences which followed the usurpation of sove-

reign power by the officials of each State government can easily be conjectured. The aspirations of the people for union being thus frustrated, their patriotic enthusiasm soon subsided; drafting for the army became necessary. Intrigues took place in Congress and among some of the generals, to supersede WASHINGTON at the time he was cooped up at Valley Forge, while Congress was at Yorktown, after their flight from Philadelphia. It may be asserted, that the confederation would have proved a miserable failure if the treaty of alliance with LOUIS XVI., which was secretly effected, about that time, by the personal exertions of FRANKLIN and DEANE, had not taken place. It was the powerful assistance of the army and navy of France which enabled the people of the United States, notwithstanding the wranglings of the confederation with their Congress, to achieve American independence.

The confederation survived only a few years the crowning feats of a seven years' war. It had been found incompetent for war—it was found still more so in peace time. A popular outcry arose against its inefficiency and misrule. The exertions of the friends of liberty, of the people's rights and of the Union, in and out of Congress, for a more powerful government, were stubbornly resisted by the officials of the various State governments, who were tenacious of their own individual power and importance. This struggle disclosed completely the inefficacy of the confederation to provide for the credit and the wants of the country, and to fulfill the duties and obligations of a general government. It became manifest that a radical change in the system was absolutely necessary. This wide-spread conviction was shared alike by the true patriots and by the wise and honest men congregated in the country at that eventful period. Public opinion at last became too strong to be any longer resisted. The Confederacy was doomed—its Congress turned against it—the general aspirations of the people were gratified by the call for a convention of the people of all the States. The delegates of that convention adopted unanimously the actual constitution on the 17th of September, 1787; it was ratified in June, 1788, by the conventions of the requisite number of States, to make it binding for the States so ratifying. Under its operations, the meeting of the first Congress took place on the 30th of April, 1789, when President WASHINGTON, in his inaugural speech, congratulated his "fellow-citizens" on "the important Revolution just accomplished on the system of their united government." The avowed object of the framers of the Constitution had been to sink the pretended sovereignty assumed by the State governments of the various States, and to constitute a National government for the whole people. This object was acknowledged to have been accomplished. The people of the United States, by ordaining the Constitution ratified by them in 1788, have understood and agreed upon, simultaneously to form ONE PEOPLE, and to constitute ONE NATION.

The purport of this discursive introduction, in touching thus rapidly the prominent causes and events which have preceded and led to the adoption of a Constitution avowedly enacted for perfecting the Union and constituting a National government has been—First, to contrast the inefficiency of the Confederacy of 1778, and its abortion, after a few years of a distracted wrangling existence, with the vigor, steadiness and elasticity

displayed by the general government of the Union in maintaining its integrity for upwards of seventy years; this "contrast" originates in this case, in the fact, that the "Confederacy" was *dictated* by a few aristocrats, while the "Union" has been *ordained* by, and for, the people.

This "introduction" has further in view, to indicate thereby the result of the desperate struggle now existing between the "Confederacy" of ten slave States against the "Union" of the twenty-four, nearly all free States, which maintain their stand for freedom and the Constitution.

The calm and intelligent observer who studies carefully causes and effects, has no misgivings as to the final issue; the Great Fact is now exhibited before the world, that the people of this extensive country, North, East and West, cling more and more to each other in proportion as danger to their Union seems to increase, the feeling that they, one and all, constitute one great Nation, prevails more and more among all classes and parties; they are confident in their strength, unity and resources to sustain their position and crush rebellion, notwithstanding occasional disasters; on the other hand, the slave confederacy is based on fraud and deception; its very violence and recklessness will produce its natural result—anarchy—and, positively, insure its destruction.

Finally, the conviction having gradually gained possession of the popular mind that the Nation is abundantly able to bear burthens, which the people will patriotically bear for the purpose of sustaining Public Credit, the position of the country,* as to its monetary affairs, has thereby become, upon the whole, stronger than it has ever been; that "position" is, it must strike political as well as financial observers, one particularly fit to enable Congress to bind safely and closely the financial interests of the whole country; no measure will be so conducive to secure that end, and to cement firmly the bond of union between all the States, as that of creating a SOUND NATIONAL CIRCULATING MEDIUM.

I. CONSIDERATIONS ON A SPECIAL NATIONAL LOAN, IN CONNECTION WITH A NATIONAL CIRCULATING MEDIUM.

It has been laid down in the preceding pages, as the result of the facts I have therein exposed and rapidly commented upon, that a sound national circulating medium would, in the actual juncture of our monetary affairs, cement firmly the bond of the Union existing between the 24 States which feel strong in the confidence they have that their national unity cannot be impaired. It becomes now, therefore, proper to investigate the principles which would secure and constitute a sound basis to said "National Circulating Medium." A summary review and selected extracts, of various articles published on the system of issuing a currency based on the pledge of public stocks, &c., which originated in the State of New-York twenty-three years ago, will, I am fully convinced, lead to determine unerring principles, which will, if acted upon faithfully and

* The "country," in the sense it is used above, is understood to include only the twenty-four States which are now united to preserve and maintain the Union.

rigorously, ensure a national currency, *commanding* specie at all times and under all possible circumstances, beyond the nominal amount of its issues.*

SUMMARY REVIEW, SELECT EXTRACTS.

In the fall of the year 1838 I wrote a series of articles in the New-York *Evening Post*, (Nos. 1 to 4, signed L. B.,) on banking in general, but particularly in reference to a law entitled "An act to authorize the business of banking," passed April 18, 1838, by the Legislature of the State of New-York; the four articles just referred to took the ground:

First.—That sections 2d and 3d of the above mentioned law embody a most ingenious conception, which, being faithfully carried out by sound and provident legislation, might be made to be the basis of the safest and best system of banking existing.

Second.—That the law was enacted under the influence of lobby speculators, who succeeded to ingraft therein a system of kite-flying, so that two systems of banking were thereby dovetailed under the same act, and their confused intermixture has altogether misled the public mind, even to this day, *as to the true bearing of the second and third sections of said law.*

Lastly.—I pointed out, that bonds and mortgages would prove to be a delusive pledge, and that no public debt of any State, except that of New-York, on account of its *peculiar soundness*, and of the fact that it was the bounden duty of the Legislature to keep it so, ought to be allowed to be deposited as pledge for the issue of circulating notes. The Comptroller of the State, Mr. A. C. FLAGG, had just published, at that time, a tabular statement of the public debts of the various States of the Union. It stated their origin, their object, amount, the ratio of increase from year to year; no provisions whatever being made therein to pay the accruing interest except by borrowing each year, in some cases, double the amount borrowed the year before, I concluded, from a critical examination of that tabular statement, that about half a dozen of the States would not be able to borrow much longer, and that, in consequence, they would stop paying their interest and repudiate their debts. I clearly intimated the conclusion I had come at in one of the articles above mentioned; but the Comptroller continued to receive in pledge public stocks of the Western States, notwithstanding the evidence of the danger, which I had thus publicly indicated.

The blindness of the Legislature, of the Comptroller and of the bankers in general, in not perceiving the signs of the times, excited my self-confidence as to the correctness of my views and prognostications, I resolved to stake my sagacity and test my anticipations, by originating the system of issuing circulating notes, as an individual banker, by pledging *exclusively* stocks of the State of New-York; and in November 1838, I started the New-York State Stock Security Bank; the "extracts" which follow of various pamphlets and newspaper articles published in consequence from time to time, will show the end I had in view thereby, and

* This may be easily effected by requiring the *pledge* of stocks to be 10 or 15 per cent. above the *circulating notes* delivered, as will be further explained.

will, I trust, clearly demonstrate the unerring accuracy of the principles therein investigated.

After nine years of practical experience as an individual banker, I published a pamphlet with the following title: "Draft of a new System of Banking, based exclusively on New-York State Stock." Underneath follow extracts thereof:

"Nine years ago, in 1837, a general suspension of the banks took place, and the false and pernicious principles of banking adopted and practiced by our corporate institutions became so glaring, that a general outcry arose against banking *monopolies*; at last the Legislature of this State, in obedience to public sentiment, enacted, on the 18th of April, 1838, a General Banking Law, entitling every *person*, or association of persons, who would legally transfer to the Comptroller of this State any portion of the public debt, &c., to receive, by virtue of this transfer, an equal amount of circulating notes, which such *person*, or association of persons, are thereby authorized to *loan* and circulate as money, &c.

"This General Banking Law was a great step towards establishing a sound system of banking, and the ingenious principle it contains, namely, that of enabling the original issuers of the circulating notes to receive an interest on their circulation, *in addition to the one received on the stock deposited by transfer*, may be managed so as to form a basis for the very perfection of paper money. But the law, when first enacted, allowed the public debt of any of the States of the Union to be deposited, &c. This unwise and improvident provision was the cause of great injury, and broke down most of the new banks. One of the institutions which were first started had, however, been got up on a solid basis, and by taking the name of 'The New-York State Stock Security Bank,' the owner thereof implied that the circulating notes issued by him were to be *wholly* secured by New-York State stock. The individual who thus voluntarily took the initiative of depositing New-York State Stock exclusively, pointed out, thereby, the beacon of the sound principle which was to retrieve our banking system; and it may be assumed, as a matter of certainty, that the new system would have worked well from the start, if the law had made it binding on the Comptroller to receive *only* New-York State Stocks. This salutary restriction has been at last enacted, and now, although the mortgage clause still exists—although the law (by reason of having been subjected to legislative cobbling, eight times in eight years) contains many absurd and conflicting provisions, yet the fact that the fundamental principle is sound, redeems *altogether* the defects of the law; and it must be acknowledged that the new system had secured to this State the best currency in the Union. There is, moreover, an important feature in the working of the new system, which has been, as yet, overlooked, and which may be so managed as to confer general benefit to the community, and be, at the same time, a source of great profit to the capitalists who will first make that important feature the fundamental principle of their operations. This important feature proceeds from the fact, that the *circulating notes* of an institution got up on the same principle as 'The New-York State Stock Security Bank,' are, strictly speaking, *the representatives in small sums of the public*

debt of this State. These circulating notes are actually registered and *authentic fractional parts of the public debt of the State of New-York, payable on demand.* An institution of that description might be managed so as to become what might be appropriately denominated an Omnibus Bank, as it would enable all and anybody to receive an interest on almost any small amount of idle money, and get for the same, in his own hands, New-York State Stock Security; which security (being, besides, circulating notes, payable on demand) he may, at any time, if needed, use and issue for his own benefit, either in part or wholly.

"I will now proceed to show how this operation may be accomplished, and how it may be profitably combined with the loaning of money to individuals, and with the transmission of funds to and from foreign countries. The system which I mean to develop is based on the above operations; it comprehends and combines, therefore, the following three branches of business:

"1st. The paying of a low interest on funds left in deposit.

"2d. The loaning of money to individuals.

"3d. The transmission of funds to and from foreign countries.

"The rules and measures to be adopted for managing those three branches of business are laid out underneath, under their proper heads; the *rules* have been drafted with a view of their being peculiarly suitable for the *use of three or four capitalists, managing their own funds and their own affairs*; *SIMPLICITY*, therefore, has been aimed at throughout."

Further extracts from this pamphlet would not, in a direct manner, apply to the subject in view; I will merely give the following, because, what is stated therein, as applicable to show the true character of circulating notes *wholly* secured by the pledge of New-York State Stock, would apply, equally, to a *national currency* that would be secured *wholly* by the pledge of the stock of a *special loan*, created for the purpose of being the basis and security thereof. The circulating notes of such "national currency" would not only be *fractional parts* of said privileged national debt, but, moreover, would be vouchers of said debt, *payable on demand.*

"Section second of the General Banking Law, as amended in 1840, provides as follows: 'It shall not be lawful for the Comptroller to take such stock (New-York State Stock) at a rate above its par value, nor above its current market price.' Moreover, no circulating notes are to be delivered by the Comptroller until ample securities have been deposited in his hands for their ultimate redemption, if need be; on the other hand, the circulating notes of the New-York State Stock Security Bank bear evidence on their face, when registered at the Comptroller's office, that they are 'secured *wholly* by New-York State Stocks.' It follows, from those three points, that the holder of a circulating note, wholly secured by New-York State Stocks, will, whatever may happen, receive the full amount thereof, because the Comptroller is bound by law, in case the market price of the stock lowers, to demand more security, or to retain in his hands the quarterly interest accruing on the securities transferred to him, &c. It is a fact, therefore, that a circulating note,

wholly secured by New-York State Stock, is better than a certificate of the same amount issued by the State, under this point of view, that the holder of a certificate, if he chooses to sell when the stock happens to be under par, must, of course, bear the loss, while the holder of a circulating note of 'The New-York State Security Stock Bank' will always receive the full value thereof; these circulating notes are, therefore, not only fractional parts of the public debt of the State of New-York, but they are, moreover, *vouchers of said debt, payable on demand.*"

At the time I published the system of banking, whereof the above "extracts" are taken, I had, practically, become competent to determine the nature and the benefits derived from circulating notes, secured wholly as money, by the exclusive pledge of New-York State Stock; when these circulating notes were first issued, most of the city banks refused to take them in deposit. The officers thereof thought, as some of them plainly told me, that this measure would induce the public to refuse taking them. The very reverse took place. People had found out, at that time, that the value of a bank bill does not consist in the *promise to pay specie*,* inserted therein, nor in the amount of the capital of the bank, however large it may be declared, nor in the splendor of the buildings wherein the issuers are located; they began to be aware that the positive value of a circulating note is determined by the nature of the pledge upon which it is allowed to be issued, *expressed in the note itself*. My circulating notes had, in the blank space usually left for the signature of the cashier, engraved in large type, "secured wholly by the pledge of New-York State Stock;" this pledge was registered and authenticated by the signature of the Register of the Bank Department; it was obvious, thereby, that the State of New-York was virtually my cashier, as these circulating notes were actually fractional parts of the public debt of the State; on the faith of that fact, they circulated all over the United States, in preference to the bank notes of this State.

From constant practice and close attention, I had ascertained the general laws which govern the average relative amount of circulation and redemption of circulating notes within a fixed period, with a degree of accuracy and certainty which cannot be obtained except by the peculiar process I had adopted; this had been done both in the most favorable and the most critical times. In times of panic, such as took place in 1841 and 1842, when a number of Western States repudiated their debts, and when bank breaking was a daily occurrence, I kept perfectly safe, going on loaning money as usual, and *commanding* all the time *specie* beyond the total amount of my circulation. I became thereby convinced that such a result was owing to the principles I had originated, and I felt confident that these principles, by being explained, would occasion, in course of time, a beneficial Revolution not only in banking but in *political and social economy*. I undertook, in consequence, to throw out suggestions and researches on the subject, by means of the press, and in the year 1847 I published an article in the *New-York Evening Post*, which will be found underneath. My object was to agitate the question

* People recollected too vividly that these *promises* had all been violated in 1837.

and provoke controversy, so that any error said article might contain could be pointed out and therefore rectified. Said article was reproduced in the New-York *Mirror*, in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, of the month of August, 1848. The *Democratic Review*, of June, 1848, contained a short approbative notice thereof; no controversy, however, took place at that time.

INVESTIGATION OF THE TRUE PRINCIPLES THAT PAPER MONEY OUGHT
TO BE BASED UPON.

I.

Men who have made it their study to investigate the peculiarities of the human mind, have found out that it is prone, in its eagerness after knowledge, to be over-ingenious in its attempts at discoveries, and that the proper application of *simple* principles is generally lost sight of by the most talented men existing; those principles wherewith they are familiar from their infancy appear to be *below their mental* vision; they are all the time stretching upwards the powers of their minds to discover something *new*.

Numberless instances might be given, confirming the strict truth of the above observation. The following one is striking:

The Greeks and the Romans were well aware of the principle which was the cause that their wheeled chariots rolled faster on a *smooth* surface than on a *rough* one; they were well aware, moreover, of the great advantages of rapid communication and quick travelling; they had the materials and the capacity to make *rails*, and yet they never thought of making the proper application of the simple principles they were familiar with to the construction of *rail-roads*; thousands of years have elapsed since, carrying away innumerable generations of ingenious and scientific men, and it is only within less than half a century that the proper application of said simple principle has been made.

The propriety of the above remarks, as an introduction to the subject that it is intended to treat herein, will soon be perceived by the intelligent reader.

The general suspension of the banks, which took place in 1837, led the writer of this article to investigate the general system of our currency, and he became convinced, not only that the system of said currency was erroneous, but that the system of *Paper Money* itself was based upon a radical error. The broad truth flashed to his mind, that the true principle that paper money ought to be based upon, had been disregarded and overleaped, on account, no doubt, of its *simplicity*; but in order that the result of his investigations may be easily understood, a few condensed, preliminary remarks, as to the origin and progress of banking, will be found necessary.

II.

Money, in its comprehensive sense, is understood to be the *material* which has been and is used by common consent or by law, as the representative of *property*; and "property," also, in its comprehensive

sense, is understood to comprehend every thing and all things existing worth to be possessed; "money" is, therefore, the token or the measure of value agreed upon, by general consent, to represent integrally "property," so that the relative value of each article existing, of whatever possible description, may be measured or determined by and from a common standard.

The "material" used as constituting "*money*" has varied according as the civilization of mankind has advanced; shells, beads of various kinds, have been and are still used by tribes and nations whose articles of barter are limited. In Carthage, an ancient and great commercial city, stamped leather was money. In China and Russia, paper, stamped or engraved by authority of the government, was and is money. Metals, such as iron, copper, &c., moulded or cut into determined and prescribed sizes and shapes, was and is money among some nations where the precious metals are scarce.

III.

Gold and silver have particularly been used by nearly all ancient and modern nations as a means of exchange and barter for all articles of first necessity, raw materials, manufactured goods, and generally all kinds of property whatsoever. The comparative scarcity of those precious metals, and the convenient form and weight of the fractional parts thereof, have, no doubt, been the principal reasons which have induced nations, generally, to adopt gold and silver as *the representatives of property*.

Paper Money is an invention of modern times. The persecution against the Jews, in the Middle Ages, led them to contrive means which might enable them to remove the value of their gold and silver from one country to another, without transporting with them the precious metals, which excited the cupidity of their oppressors; bills of exchange and promissory notes were then devised.

Banks issuing certificates on deposits of gold and silver were first established in Venice, Genoa and Amsterdam. The depositors of the precious metals received these certificates or checks, and used them in their mercantile transactions as representatives of their gold and silver, saving thereby (by paying the bank a small commission) labor, transportation and risk of robbery. Thus far banking was based on a safe principle. (The certificates issued never exceeded in amount the total of the gold and silver deposited.) In the mean time the discovery of America increased greatly the foreign commerce of Europe; Cadiz, Lisbon, London, came to be great marts of trade. At last banks were chartered, with the exclusive privilege of issuing their own promises to pay, and the bills containing those promises were called *Paper Money*.

IV.

Paper Money became, in a short time, an instrument of immense power for extending commerce, manufactures and civilization. It actually invaded, revolutionized and controlled the mercantile transactions and the political relations of the whole world; the extent of its effects will appear incredible, if we compare, with proper discrimination, what has taken place since the last one hundred years, to what would have been

the probable situation of things if gold and silver had continued to be the only token of value, that is, the only means for effecting purchases, exchanges and barter generally. But there is a great drawback to the important results that have been obtained; immense national debts and periodical revulsions in prices, producing bankruptcy, ruin and misery on a great scale, are the concomitants of paper money, such as it has been regulated to this day. All the plans that have been tried to give it stability have failed, and the reason why, is, that the system is based upon a *radical error*. Said *radical error* consists in having made paper money the *representative of gold and silver*. This is a *fiction*, that has the effect of reality only so long as confidence exists. The moment that a demand for specie is sustained for a few millions, panic and ruin are the inevitable result, and the reason is obvious. We have, for instance, in the United States, about \$80,000,000 of gold and silver coin; out of that amount the banks have about \$30,000,000, and the amount of paper currency issued thereupon is very likely as high as \$150,000,000, and there is, besides, an immense amount of floating capital, in the shape of deposits and vouchers, payable on demand, so that the aggregate total thereof cannot be much less than five dollars of paper, payable on demand, for every one dollar of specie in the country. The consequences of having an established monetary system, composed of such elements, are the following: First, that an attempt to return to a pure metallic currency is obviously impossible. Second, that so long as paper money is made to promise to be the representative of gold and silver, so long we will be exposed to the evils above described; that is, that a demand of six or seven millions of specie, to settle balances in our foreign commerce, will invariably unsettle and paralyze the immense interior trade and the extensive transactions of this wealthy country.

V.

The aggregate amount of the products of a country constitutes its real wealth. According to this uncontrovertible definition of wealth, there is no country on the face of the earth as rich as the United States, and yet the sudden exportation of a few millions of dollars in gold and silver coin will disorder the currency, create panic and revulsions, which will be felt all over the various States of the Union. When we take into consideration that the amount of coin exported is insignificant, as compared with the immense *available* wealth of the country, the fact of such a ruinous result will strike the investigating mind with a conviction that there is something *wrong* in our monetary system—that it is not in harmony with the state of society as it now exists.

Well, the purport of the preceding remarks and explanations has been to ascertain what it was *that is wrong*, and the *drift* of the argumentative part thereof has been intended, moreover, not only to show that paper money has been to this day a *mere fiction*, based upon a *radically erroneous principle*, but also to prepare and enable the reader to conceive how paper money can be made a substantial truth. Make *paper money* the direct representative of *property*, and this true and sound principle will give the means of establishing a monetary system, whereof the basis will never fail. Let that system be established by *law*, with such plain and

easily understood restrictions that will command the confidence of the community as to the scrupulous fulfillment of the fundamental rule, which ought to be the basis thereof, viz., that the property hypothecated be ample security to the bill-holder, and that it be of such a description as to be divisible in fractional parts, so as to be made readily *available*, whenever necessary—and the important question is solved; gold and silver become merely merchandise, and any quantity thereof might be exported without disturbing in the least the currency of the country. We would thereby become truly independent, and our immense inland commercial transactions would be no longer under the influence of the fluctuations which are inseparable from mercantile operations with foreign countries.

VI.

A certain class of *paper money* has been issued for the last nine years by some banks in this State, which might, by *law*, be made a *direct* representative of *property*, and yet no one appears to suspect the immense advantages that would accrue to the whole community by making such kind of paper money the *legal currency* of this State. The second and third sections of an "Act to authorize the business of banking," (passed April 18, 1838,) contain, actually, the inception of the system of *paper money*, which has been ascertained from the above disquisition to be based upon the *true* principle. That system cannot, however, be legalized in all its bearings by our Legislature, because the Constitution of the United States prohibits the States from coining money, and from making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. But our Legislature could carry the obvious intent of the second and third sections, by a few clear and provident provisions that would secure the religious fulfillment of the fundamental rule above laid down, namely: "That the property hypothecated be ample security to the bill-holder, and that it be of such a description as to be divisible in fractional parts, and made readily available whenever wanted;" and, if the Free Banking Law was amended, according to the draft that is alluded to, pages 17 and 18, the advantages that would accrue therefrom to this State, and to the community at large, would soon become apparent; for, although the bills of the free banks would continue to be exigible to be paid in specie, yet the fact of their being wholly secured (with ample margin) by New-York State Stock would greatly diminish the want of specie for banking purposes, and its exportation to settle foreign balances would not be felt, by any means, to the extent that it is now; and, in proportion as the number of existing Safety Fund banks would decrease, the advantage of this Free Banking system would become still more manifest, so that other States would probably enact free banking laws under the same system; and if a great majority of the States were to do so, there would be no difficulty in obtaining an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to the effect of allowing the States to issue paper money, by making it a direct representative of property, according to the fundamental rule above explained. The various sovereign States of this Confederacy would then have a legal right to coin money out of paper, and this application of inherent right of sovereignty, which they ought not to

have given up, would, altogether, shelter their currency from the fluctuations consequent to the issue of paper money which promises to be a representative of gold and silver. On the other hand, the general government would continue to receive and pay out its dues in gold and silver coin, which fact would have a tendency to keep in the country a large amount of specie; said specie would be used mainly for paying government dues and for small change; it would be, therefore, a mere mercantile commodity, and it might increase or diminish without any material inconvenience.*

VII.

The system of paper money, restricted as herein advocated, might be introduced in France, England, &c., with great advantage; there would be, however, considerable danger that the central government power of those countries would, in times of financial embarrassment, increase the amount of issues, or else, that the public debt might be repudiated, &c.; and the feature pointed out in the last paragraph, as to the complete independence of our General Government, in regard to finances, renders the system of coining money out of paper one of peculiar fitness to constitute the monetary system of this confederacy of sovereign States, as the action of our General Government would be limited to that of a wholesome FINANCIAL REGULATOR.

VIII.

In conclusion, the writer of this "Essay" is well aware of the difficulties that the adoption of the true system of paper money will have to contend with; nothing is more difficult to eradicate than ERROR, when it has got rooted in the habits of nations; he believes, nevertheless, that the community would soon understand the great advantage of this system, and that it would soon appreciate its safety and have full confidence therein, if the Legislature would regulate it, once for all, understandingly. This is, indeed, the greatest difficulty to overcome, as a majority of our Legislators appear to be bent upon making laws that *require revising once or twice every year*. The hopes of the undersigned are not, therefore, very sanguine as regards the overcoming of said *main difficulty*; but being firmly convinced that the system herein advocated is based upon substantial *truth*, he considers it his duty to the community to give it publicity.

All the "extracts" given in this publication have been reproduced *verbatim*; the only exception to be found is in the above article, wherein some slight alterations have been made, in order to harmonize more completely the obvious intent of two paragraphs with the views expressed more at length on the same subject in one of the "extracts"

* At the time this "article" was written, I was under the impression that the States were Sovereign Powers. This fallacy has been so insidiously circulated by the press, that people do not think of looking into the Constitution to ascertain the fact. I did so, subsequently. See Appendix.

which are to follow. It has been divided into eight parts, so as to facilitate reference to any of them in comments that will follow.

For the space of ten years, that is, from 1838, when the General Banking Law was enacted, to the year 1848, an organized opposition had been kept up by the corporate banks of this State against the free banking system; influential individuals, interested in the re-charter of Safety Fund banks, had been toiling incessantly at every session of the Legislature, in introducing, *insidiously*, injurious, absurd and conflicting amendatory acts, so as to discredit and hamper the free banking system, and of preventing thereby capitalists and moneyed men generally from organizing individual banks and joint-stock associations under its provisions; on the other hand, these influential men endeavored to set aside the verdict that public opinion had pronounced against them in 1837 and 1838. The charter of one of the corporate bodies which had suspended specie payments, the NORTH RIVER BANK, came to expire in 1842, and the influential body of men, above alluded to, joined their efforts to those of the officers of the banks, and the bribed lobby members under their *influence*, in order to get a re-charter of said *corporate body*; they would no doubt have succeeded had not my friend, SOLOMON TOWNSEND,* as Chairman of the Committee on Banks and Insurance Companies, in the Assembly, made an able and strong *Report* against the re-charter. Public sentiment against moneyed corporations was known to be deeply rooted, and the majority of our Legislators at Albany, however inclined they were to re-charter the bank, dared not vote against the "report." Three years afterwards, in 1845, a new constitution was adopted, wherein public opinion was at last vindicated. It was therein *prohibited to the Legislature* to charter, and of course re-charter, any banking corporation; but the Safety Fund men were not easily rebuked; they changed their tactics, and exerted themselves to get a majority of the Legislature under their influence, in order to enact *another general* banking law; it is unnecessary, here, to expose the shallowness of the artifice; it is sufficient to say that they had secured the majority they wanted, notwithstanding the impudence of the scheme; said scheme passed the Senate without hardly any debate, as the Safety Fund men did not want any on the subject. Some premonitory symptoms of the plot had reached me, and I hastily compiled a pamphlet, from articles I had formerly published, and forwarded it to all the members of the Legislature, and to all the State officers; this pamphlet was entitled "Vindication of the Free Banking System," &c.

It exposed, thoroughly, the fallacious statements made by the Chairman of the Senate Committee. I will quote one passage, to show how the scheme was commented upon in the pamphlet:

"These men (the Safety Fund men) have succeeded to control the

* This is the same gentleman who succeeded, by parliamentary tactics, in introducing a clause in a bill intended to hamper the free banks, providing that henceforth NEW-YORK STATE STOCKS only should be received as pledge for delivering circulating notes; this was done on the 14th of May, 1846, ten minutes only before the adjournment of the House. Mr. TOWNSEND, by so doing, conferred a public benefit. This *simple* requirement has been found to be more effective to give us a *sound currency*, than all the confused trash of Amendatory Acts that now encumber the General Banking Law.

action of the bank committees in both Houses, and the chairmen of both committees have respectively introduced bills to accomplish said general re-charter. The passage of either one or the other of these bills appears to have been the principal point the *interested* parties have in view; their influence, speeches, lobby talk and secret movements have all been directed to secure said point. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banks, Mr. AYRAULT, is President of a Safety Fund bank. One would suppose, therefore, that he ought to be rather sensitive not to expose himself to the suspicion of advocating his own selfish views, contrary to his duty to the State at large, as a Senator. Mr. AYRAULT, it appears, places himself above such suspicion; he uses openly the utmost of his influence and powers of reasoning to promote his own interest, by a re-charter of his own bank, under the cover of advocating the creation of a wholesale batch of Safety Fund banks. In order that the public may be able to form a proper estimate of the confidence which ought to be placed on the assertions and arguments of the Safety Fund bank President aforesaid, the following samples of the general tenor of his statements are extracted from the *Atlas* edition of the Debates in Convention, 1846."

The "above extract" shows the nature of the charges brought against the conspirators. Further particulars will be found below. The bill on another General Banking Law was withdrawn. I have entered into the above particulars, not only because it is proper, when an opportunity occurs, to expose the corruptions of our Legislators, &c., but because the publication of the above-mentioned pamphlet brought the subject of a "NATIONAL CURRENCY" into public notice.

I had inserted in my "Vindication of Free Banking" the "Article" given above, under the head of INVESTIGATION OF THE TRUE PRINCIPLES THAT PAPER MONEY OUGHT TO BE BASED UPON: the Comptroller of the State, Mr. FILLMORE, in his Annual Report to the Legislature, had adopted the views exposed in the Pamphlet I had forwarded to him, as to the advantages of establishing a "National Currency" based on the principles therein explained and advocated. The suggestions of Mr. FILLMORE, who had, in the mean time, been elected Vice-President of the United States, created general attention, and a controversy among the newspapers of the day took place. I was residing at Washington when Mr. FILLMORE came there to take his seat in the Senate, and in conversation with him I stated that I would take up and refute all the cavilling and objections that were then made to the system that we advocated. Six articles on the subject were published in the *New-York Mirror*. Part of the first Article is given underneath; it was published on January 20th, 1849:

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK.

Washington City, January 16, 1849.

To the Editor of the New-York Mirror:

SIR,—Four Comptrollers have been in office since the General Banking Law of the State of New-York has been enacted, but none of the predecessors of the present incumbent have thought proper to furnish the public with a *fair* statement of its beneficial effects, and MILLARD FILLMORE,

in his first annual report as Comptroller, is entitled to the credit of having examined with impartiality the working of the two systems of banking existing in his State, and of recording, in conclusion, his deliberate opinion in favor of free banking.

This is an important move on many accounts, and my intention, if you allow me the use of your columns, is to develop its practical bearing, and to review, at length, the suggestions of the Comptroller, in a series of articles.

The Comptroller states "both of these (the *Safety Fund* and the *Free Banking* systems) have been in operation long enough to test their merits. It is presumed that no one would advise the continuance of both. Two rival systems cannot exist without creating *jealousies* among those interested. *The time has come when the Legislature must choose between them.*"

The *jealousies* above alluded to have been the cause of the various injurious provisions and amendments which have been enacted at various times for the purpose of hampering the sound *fundamental* principle of the Free Banking Law. The Safety Fund interest has always had a powerful influence in the Legislature; that interest received a serious check when the new constitution, which prohibits all *special charters*, was adopted; but, the Safety Fund bank men, with that dexterity and cunning which characterizes those who cling to exclusive privileges, devised to get round the stumbling block, by concocting, in the summer session of 1847, a bill having in view the general re-charter of their banks, by providing that any five persons in the State might establish a bank, by paying *eight* per cent. on its *declared* capital, as a safety fund for the redemption of all its circulating notes. If that bill had passed, two general banking laws would have been in operation. Under *that* of the Free Banking system, the bill-holders may be made to be *amply secured*, but under *that* of the re-vamped Safety Fund Bank Law, the security of the bill-holder would have been only *eight cents* for each dollar.

When I heard that a bill of the above import was under the consideration of the Committee on Banks, I denounced the contemplated bubble in a series of four articles, which were published in the New-York *Mirror*. The Bank Committee reported unfavorably; but in the winter session of 1847 and 1848, the influence of the Safety Fund bank men secured in their favor both bank committees. Mr. AYRAULT, a Safety Fund bank president, was elected chairman of *that* of the Senate, and one SCHERMERHORN, notorious, as I then understood, for his Kite Banking schemes, presided over *that* of the Assembly; and, in order not to lose time, two bills, almost alike, were framed, so as to agitate the question at once in both Houses. The security to be given to the bill-holder was increased *two cents*—it was provided to be *ten cents for each dollar*. All attentive observers of lobbying machinery foresaw that a desperate attempt was being made to get one of the bills through. It was in view of this danger that I published a pamphlet, entitled "Vindication of Free Banking," &c., wherein I exposed, through the means of faithful quotations, &c., the misrepresentations and untrue statements issued and circulated by the abettors of the State Fund Bank system, particularly those made by Mr. AYRAULT, in the triple capacity of Senator, Safety Fund bank Presi-

dent and member of the Convention which drafted the new Constitution of the State of New-York. Neither of the bills passed; but, in one instance, *that* of Mr. AYRAULT was defeated only by the casting vote of the Lieutenant-Governor. No doubt but renewed efforts were intended to be made this session, and it is gratifying to expect that the stand taken by the Comptroller will frustrate the contemplated movement.

Mr. FILLMORE gives a brief exposition of the Free Banking Law, but the important points he had to treat did not allow him to explain the intricacies wherewith conflicting legislation has shrouded the subject, and many of his remarks, which will be pointed out at the proper place, will, in consequence, appear obscure to the reader; and as it is important that said subject should be clearly understood, this seems to be a suitable time, preparatory to further comments, to republish such articles as give the origin, the history and the analysis of the Free Banking System. (*These are omitted, as part of them would be repetitions of what has already been stated herein.*)

On the 24th January, 1849, the New-York *Mirror* published another article on the subject of Mr. FILLMORE's annual Report; the following is a short extract:

"WASHINGTON, January 20, 1849.

"*To the Editor of the New-York Mirror:*

"The organist of Mr. POLK comes out in full blast this morning against the Report of Comptroller FILLMORE, denouncing his suggestions on banking as embodying an insidious and mischievous movement against the currency, &c. The two leading columns of the *Union* are taken up by comments, and moreover, by extracts from two other papers, blowing up-sky-high (so says Mr. RITCHIE) the Whig Bank Scheme of 'citizen' FILLMORE.

"The whole of this outpouring is a mere salmagundi of ranting misrepresentations and of absurd assertions, which betray the most complete ignorance of financial subjects.

"The suggestions of the Vice-President elect ought to be controverted by argument, and not denounced by idle and abusive declamation. The extracts I have enclosed in my former letters have been forwarded for the purpose of preparing the minds of your readers for a full and impartial investigation of these suggestions. You have underneath the article referred to in my last, and I will be able next week to take up the subject."

This extract is given merely to show that the controversy on a "National Currency" had assumed a political complexion. Three other "articles" were published, but no further extracts are needed at this place, as the *Appendix*, concluding this publication, contains strictures on the subject.

On the 29th of March the New-York *Mirror* published another article, reproduced in full underneath. The Report of Mr. FILLMORE had three paragraphs on the subject of a "National Currency;" the underneath article quotes one of them, and the other two are as follows:

"The National Government might be made amply secure. The law might provide that all bills secured by United States Stock should

be registered and countersigned in the Treasury Department, as the notes circulated by the banks in this State are now registered and countersigned in this office. This would enable every collector, postmaster or other receiver of public moneys, to know that they were receivable for public dues.

"The stock of the United States, by which their redemption was secured, might be so transferred to the State officer holding the same, that it could not be sold or transferred by him without the assent of the Secretary of the Treasury; and in case of the failure of the bank to redeem its notes, it might be optional with the Secretary of the Treasury to exchange the notes held by the government for an equal amount of United States stock held for their redemption, or let it be sold and receive the government's share of the dividends. In this way the national government would always be secure against loss."

A SOUND NATIONAL PAPER CURRENCY.

Annual Report of the Comptroller of the State of New-York.—(Continued.)

WASHINGTON CITY, March 23, 1849.

To the Editor of the New-York Mirror :

The principal object I had in view in the preceding articles on the annual Report of MILLARD FILLMORE has been, principally, to bring out in its genuine simplicity the luminous idea which started the Free Banking system, and to divest therefrom all the intricacies wherewith conflicting and injurious legislation has obscured and shrouded the subject; it was necessary that the simplicity, soundness and efficiency of the fundamental principle of said system should be vindicated, and made clearly apparent to the public, in order that the merits and importance of the suggestions of the Comptroller might be appreciated correctly. Those suggestions have been transcribed in full in the last article published in the *Mirror*, on the 9th ult., for the purpose of showing their homogeneity and connection with the system of Free Banking I have developed; and then, for demonstrating their direct bearing, through this connection, to establish a *sound national paper currency*.

I proceed, now, to lay down various definitions relative to elementary principles on social and political economy, illustrated by an explanatory disquisition and statement on the characteristics of *money*, and of monetary paper; connecting the whole with an argumentative reasoning, which will clearly demonstrate that the happy conception which originated the Free Banking system may be carried out so as to confer and impart to the currency issued under its simple and efficient provisions, all the attributes and characteristics which truly constitute *money*. It will follow, therefore, as a matter of incontrovertible consequence, that the ingenious principle of said system, as defined in the article published in the *Mirror* on the 22d of January last, would be actually *the proper basis* to establish the *national paper currency*, suggested by Comptroller FILLMORE.

The word *money* is commonly understood to mean *metal*, coined with a legal stamp or impression, for the purpose of barter, &c. But this de-

definition is neither accurate nor correct. The careless use of words, without proper regard being paid to their strict definite sense, creates vagueness in the mind, and a confusion of ideas which originate much evil, as will be perceived in the course of the following explanations:

Whenever *money* is meant to apply particularly to pieces of *metal*, the term of *hard money*, or that of *metallic money*, are the appropriate expressions: but before I explain further, it is proper to define, in precise terms, the meaning given in the course of this exposition to the word *property*. Property is understood to comprehend, in a general and comprehensive sense, every thing, and all things existing, worth being possessed.

As to the word *money*, it means, in its definite and proper sense, the token or the measure of value agreed upon by general consent to represent integrally, *property*; so that the relative value of each article existing, of whatever possible description, may be measured or determined by and from a common standard; according to this comprehensive sense, any other substance or material than metal may be agreed upon to constitute *money*. In Russia, for instance, *paper*, stamped or engraved, by authority of government, is *money*; in Carthage, according to old traditions, *stamped leather* was *money*; shells and beads of peculiar kinds are to this day used as money by tribes and nations whose articles of barter are very limited; but the bank notes issued by corporate banks in the United States, in England, in France, &c., although commonly called *paper money*, are not *money*; because these bank notes, except those of the Bank of England since the year 1844, (see Appendix, remark first,) are not invested with the peculiar feature which is requisite to constitute the token or the measure of value; these bank notes *do not represent property integrally*; they contain, it is true, the *promise* to pay or represent specie on demand; it is admitted, on the other hand, that *specie* is *property*, according to the comprehensive sense of that word; but the bank-note holder has no special guarantee that said *promise* will be made good; and these *promises* cannot, with any propriety, be called *paper money*, unless there be a guarantee that the amount of specie in the bank be kept equal, at all times, to the amount of the paper issued. The appellation of *paper money* given to the notes of banks which are authorized to issue them to a larger amount than they have specie to pay them with, is a *deceiving misnomer*; and I will, in the course of this article, show that the *fiction* contained in the *promise* of the bank note has been the direct cause of all the evil which has been occasioned by the sham substitute which has been misnamed *paper money*.

But the bank note which is made *to represent property integrally*, becomes through this means a token or a measure of value; it is, in fact, *money*, and therefore constitutes *real paper money*. The circulating notes, secured by New-York State Stocks, under the provisions of the Free Banking Law of that State, *represent property integrally*; (see Appendix, remark second;) they are, therefore, *money*, and form the very best basis to establish a *sound paper currency*.

Until the time of the invention of the art of printing and of the discovery of America—events which both took place in the fifteenth century—the commercial transactions of nations were very limited, if compared to the immense increase which has been progressing ever since.

Copper, brass, silver, gold, &c., had been successively used by most nations as *tokens*, to measure and determine thereby the relative value of the various articles which constituted *property*. These tokens consisted, at first, in unsightly lumps and irregular fragments; in a more advanced state of society the metals were wrought or melted in the shape of bars, with a stamp, &c.; and as arts and sciences progressed, these metals were coined, under government control, into circular uniform pieces, of various weight and sizes, whereof the relative value was determined and regulated by and from a common standard; they became thereby convenient tokens to represent *money*, and to circulate as such. This *metallic money* was generally found to be adequate to effect the barter and exchange of produce, of merchandise—that is to say, of *property* as it then existed—but the discovery of the New World following closely the invention of printing, opened at once a new era in the history of nations; new inventions and wonderful improvements in machinery were the natural consequences of the progressive amount of knowledge obtained and diffused by the art of printing; on the other hand, the wide field of an extended and almost an unlimited commerce with the new continent gave mankind new productions, started manufactures on the most extensive scale, and subjected commercial nations to new wants and new luxuries.

This powerful combination of causes brought forth a prodigious increase in the endless variety and in the endless quantity of articles constituting *property*; it produced CAPITAL, and capital, by devising ways of making it useful, and render *property* available, became the *prolific* element which has increased it to an unbounded magnitude. It was soon found that *metallic money* was no longer adequate to effect, to settle and to regulate the gigantic mercantile operations which sprang up from a new state of society, in the general barter of *property*, and in the multifarious transactions of commercial and manufacturing nations. The new art of printing, and its auxiliary, copper and steel plate engraving, presented means which might be devised to create a token, or a measure of value, for all existing *property*, commensurate to the increasing wants of a progressing state of civilization, more convenient to obtain that object than *metallic money*; more readily obtained to the requisite extent, although more easily regulated and *restricted* to the necessary amount; and various expedients were contrived to use *engraved pieces of paper*, devised in the form of vouchers, as substitutes and instead of the precious metals. This was effected by virtue of some peculiar guaranty constituting these vouchers representatives of *property*, in a direct or indirect manner.

The following *principal* contrivances were adopted:

1. Bills of exchange and drafts.
2. Promissory notes payable on time.
3. Bonds and mortgages.
4. Shares of stock, in corporate and joint-stock companies, and in loans of corporate municipalities and sovereign States.
5. Bank notes; that is, *promises* from the banks to pay the amount stated on their face, in specie, on demand. (See Appendix, remark third.)

These five distinct contrivances of paper vouchers have the common

feature of being, in full or in part, representatives of *property*. They may be considered as *five different classes of money*, to the extent which is defined and determined to each class respectively, by the qualifications annexed to each in the underneath statement, which has been arranged according to the order each class has been above laid down.

CLASS 1. *BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND DRAFTS* can with propriety be designated *prospective money*, because they are understood to be direct representatives of *property integrally*—which property is appropriated and delivered over in time to fulfil the contract. (See Appendix, remark fourth.) “Almost the entire business of any commercial country may be said to be transacted through the operations of bills of exchange, each one of which represents a specific commodity, the delivery of which fulfils the obligation of the bill, and completes the transaction without the use of *metallic money*.” Considering the magnitude of these transactions, the losses attending the use of this class of money are trifling, although the fulfilment of the obligation rests solely on the honor of the issuer. This proceeds from the fact that the principle upon which *this class of money* is issued is actually the true and efficient one I have defined. It is understood, as above stated, to represent *property integrally* to its full amount, and the issuer thereof is held by law strictly and absolutely responsible to that extent.

CLASS 2. *PROMISSORY NOTES*, payable on time, may be classed, with propriety, as *CREDIT MONEY*, inasmuch that the value of the “property” upon which it is predicated is to be realized by granting “credit.” Properly managed, “credit money” is the “main spring” of mercantile business; it enables those who have large stocks of produce, merchandise, &c., to trade them to others, facilitating, thereby, the means of being retailed out profitably. This class of money is based on the mutual confidence that the “property” delivered over to the maker of the promissory note will realize to his benefit, by the time said note becomes due, a larger sum than the amount of said promissory note. “Credit money” is, therefore, based on “property” delivered to represent or realize an amount at an agreed upon time; it is issued, in fact, on the assumption and trust that the “property” delivered will yield, as above stated, a larger sum than the amount stipulated for. The confidence, which is the basis of “credit money,” may not be fulfilled, either because of the dishonesty of the maker of the promissory note, or else on account of a sustained fall on the prices of the property delivered; but the losses incurred by this class of money are, on the whole, amply made up by the large profits resulting from its use. Self-interest is the watchful regulator of “credit money.” It cannot be denied, however, but that avidity of gain will often tempt the wholesale dealers to grant credit injudiciously.

CLASS 3. *BONDS AND MORTGAGES*.—A bond and mortgage is a paper instrument, authenticated and binding by law, entitling the holder thereof, that is, the mortgagee, to receive within the term of a certain number of years, therein specified, the *principal* of a sum of money stipulated therein; the *yearly* interest thereof is to be paid at stated times, and in case of default in the payment of either, the property mortgaged becomes forfeited, and is sold to the benefit of the mortgagee, so that the sum of

money stipulated for may be paid in full, expenses included. A bond and mortgage is, therefore, the direct representative of *property*, integrally, as said property is understood, in all cases, to be worth more than the amount stipulated for; it may be, therefore, considered as "prospective money;" but in order to distinguish this class of money from that already defined under the head of *BILLS OF EXCHANGE*, it will be more properly qualified from a peculiar feature attending it. The bond and mortgage cannot fail to procure to the holder thereof either the amount of money stipulated for, or else the property mortgaged; and it may, not inaptly, be designated "personal money," available surely at a future period; because the mortgage itself is an authentic "personal property," publicly recorded and registered, &c., which cannot, like Bills of Exchange, be paid or transferred to order.

The following is another feature of the mortgage: The mortgagee who, for instance, mortgages the house he lives in, receives by so doing the amount stipulated for; in the mean time, he keeps possession and enjoyment of his own house, so that, by paying a certain rate of interest, the ingenious contrivance of that "paper voucher," called "mortgage," enables the mortgagor to use, at the same time, both the house and the money received.

CLASS 4. SHARES OF STOCK, &c.—This class of money must be qualified according to the nature and conditions of the stock which constitutes them.

SHARES in the stock of corporate companies which have the management of their own capital, will be set down under the class of "credit money;" but this "credit money" is liable to greater loss than the "credit money" obtained from promissory notes, inasmuch that the *irresponsible* directors of a corporation are more easily led into speculation than individuals, upon whom the loss from said speculation is direct and *personal*. The nick term of "fancy stocks" is applied to those stocks which are based on speculation; the **SHARES** of such stocks may be called with propriety *speculative money*.

SHARES in the stock of companies whereof the capital is *permanently* invested, yielding yearly interest, &c.—such as trust or insurance companies, &c.—may be classed as *credit money*, or *prospective money*, according to the nature of the capital and the mode of investment.

SHARES in the stocks issued by corporate municipalities and sovereign States, which have either ample revenue, or else provide a suitable sinking fund to pay the capital and interest of their debts, may be classed as *prospective money*, or *personal money*, according to the terms and stipulations of the loans which created the stock. The ingenious conception which originated the Free Banking Law, will, even, enable the *shares* of certain stocks of being made *available money*. Under the provisions of that law, shares of certificates of New-York State stocks, by being deposited in trust into the hands of the Comptroller, entitled the depositor to receive *per contra* registered *circulating notes*, which are thus made, at once, *available money*—that is, **READY MONEY**.

CLASS 5. BANK NOTES.—Bank promises are commonly known and designated under the name of *paper money*. I have shown, however, in the first part of this article, that this appellation is not correct—that bank

promises are not *paper money*—that the qualification of paper money, when applied to bank promises, is a deceiving misnomer. By taking into consideration the various evils resulting from the use and pretence of that class of paper voucher, its proper qualification is that of *fictitious money*, as it will be further shown.

The object I had in view in drafting the above classification is to establish a fact which, had it been barely asserted, would have been dissented from or disregarded by most readers. The fact is, that nine-tenths, at least of the general barter of *property*—that is, of the moneyed, commercial, mercantile and business transactions of the world—are actually effected, managed, settled and regulated *by means of monetary paper*, and that the total amount of *metallic money* in circulation is insignificant, compared to the aggregate amount of the five classes of *paper contrivances* (viz., money vouchers) above described. The above explanatory statement has, no doubt, prepared the minds of the readers to perceive that this is no exaggeration; moreover, there are several important deductions to be drawn from said statement. I proceed to point out the following one:—It consists in the fact, that four out of these five paper contrivances answer admirably the purposes for which they have been devised. This is not the case with the fifth class, viz., that of Bank Promises. I have qualified that class as being *fictitious money*, because it is to the *fiction* contained in the bank note promise that is to be attributed most of the fluctuations which produce disorder in business, by interrupting the regular course of industry; this fifth class, although, so far as amount goes, is unimportant as compared to each one of the other classes, is actually a direct and *permanent* cause of periodical revulsions in monetary and financial affairs, as will soon be made apparent.

As a passing remark, it will be here stated, that I have demonstrated in a former publication, by developing further the views herein expressed, that *metallic money* might be advantageously almost dispensed with for all inland mercantile transactions, if *REAL* paper money was to be created and substituted for corporate bank promises; but the truth of this assertion is not material to the purport of this article, and it would be branching off too far from the special points I want particularly to investigate, namely: The public injury resulting from the confusion of ideas produced by giving the name of “paper money” to “bank promises,” and the evil consequences inevitably ensuing from the *fiction* contained in the promise of the bank note. I proceed, therefore, with the elucidation of these *special points*.

The expressions of gold money, silver money, copper money, &c., are easily understood; they mean *money*, represented respectively by gold, silver, copper, &c. According to this clear, unmistakable definition, “paper money” must mean *money* represented by “paper.” Any paper, therefore, that does not represent *money*, cannot, with any propriety or truth, be called “paper money.” Well, it is evident, from various definitions given in the course of this article, that bank notes, which are promises to pay, do not represent *money* in its proper and comprehensive sense, and the logical inference of the above reasoning corroborates irrefutably what I maintained when defining the word *money*, namely: that corporate “bank promises are not money,” and that the appellation of

"paper money," applied to these "promises," is a downright misnomer. Notwithstanding this undeniable truth, the common parlance of men will have it, that corporate bank notes constitute actually "paper money." This is a popular error of long standing; I will explain the great evil resulting therefrom: It proceeds from the fact that the losses, the abuses, the impositions, the monetary revulsions, the bankruptcies and the ruin which are concomitant with the existence of corporate bank promises, are invariably laid to the charge of "paper money." Whenever these evils take place to a considerable extent, the outcry against the cursed paper money becomes general. There is not a scribbler in the land but what launches out, at random, denunciations against it. The consequences of this misconception of terms are—that the "proper remedy" is not even thought of—that all kinds of impracticable schemes are devised, and ineffectual or injurious Legislative restrictions are proposed or enacted; that, in the mean time, *the cause of all the evil continues to exist*; and lastly, that men to this day do not generally apprehend or understand what constitutes *REAL* paper money. (See Appendix, remark fifth.)

The investigation I have undertaken will be completed by describing particularly the bearing and influence of the peculiar feature of the bank note promise, which is the permanent and *inherent* cause of disorder and revulsion in monetary affairs; this peculiar feature is, that the "promise" contained in the corporate bank note, that of paying the amount on its face in specie on demand, is a fiction, inasmuch that those corporate banks are authorized to issue an amount of "promises," payable on demand, larger considerably than the amount of "specie" in their vaults; moreover, those banks have generally a large amount of floating capital, in the shape of deposits and other vouchers, payable on demand, so that the aggregate total of these items cannot be much less than three to five dollars of paper, payable "on demand," for every one dollar of specie. It is the peculiar feature just described which causes banks to be so sensitive whenever any material amount of specie is demanded. The consequence of having a monetary system composed of such elements is as follows: The moment that a demand for specie is sustained for a few millions, banks curtail their discounts; this will seriously affect the "credit system," healthy mercantile business is at once checked and embarrassed, revulsion in prices follow, and, according to the extent and duration of the demand, stagnation of business, bankruptcies and wide-spread ruin will take place, not only at the place the "specie" has been withdrawn, but if that point be the centre of business, it will extend all over the country with an increased effect; the reason of this result will be palpably understood by the following practical illustration:

Suppose that five millions of dollars in specie are rapidly withdrawn from the banks of New-York to settle foreign demands, &c., the banks will have to curtail their discounts to an amount nearly equal to the aggregate total of the bank promises and other vouchers predicated on these five millions; this will be from fifteen to twenty-five millions. New-York being the centre of business of the whole Union, this curtailment of fifteen to twenty-five millions will embarrass the mercantile paper of the immediate customers of the banks to an amount at least of forty to fifty millions; these customers, and the banks themselves, have extensive

relations for the general barter of produce and "property" all over the United States; it follows, that an embarrassment of mercantile paper and business transactions, to an amount that cannot be short of hundreds of millions of dollars, will be the ultimate consequence. No wonder, then, that stagnation of business, revulsions of monetary affairs, bankruptcies and ruin should be, at periodical intervals, the inevitable result of the mixed currency now existing. The five millions of dollars withdrawn from the banks have a rebounding effect on fifteen to twenty-five millions of bank promises; these have another *rebounding* effect on immediate customers, and the evil increases, in a geometrical ratio, "as the rebounding effect extends." (See Appendix, remark sixth.)

Some people may think that the evils I have described might be prevented if the total quantity of specie in the country was increased, and, on the whole, greater. In a general point of view this is a mistake; whenever the amount of specie is greater there is a proportionate increase of bank promises. It is the sensitiveness of banks, under the influence of the fictitious features I have described, which causes perturbation whenever the relative proportion between specie and paper payable on demand is altered by any material drain of specie.

It has been urged, on the other hand, that an exclusive *metallic currency* would set every thing right. The attempt to establish an *exclusive* metallic currency, intended to do away with the five *principal* classes of *monetary paper*, classified in the above explanatory statement thereof, is an obvious impossibility; it has been made apparent that such a currency is not commensurate to the wants and transactions of civilized commercial nations, that it is incompatible with the actual state of society. I have shown, I trust forcibly, in another publication, (see Appendix, remark seventh,) that the proper way "to set every thing right" would be "to create *real* paper money representing *property*;" that such a circulating medium might be made to be, *in every country*, the proper basis for a distinct "SOUND NATIONAL PAPER CURRENCY," creating thereby a *philosophical money*, in harmony in each country with the existing general intelligence of the commercial world. But, suppose that *metallic money* would exclude merely the *bank promises*, viz., the fifth class of monetary paper as above enumerated, even this is hardly possible, as *credit money*, which is the *main spring* of commercial transactions, is rendered vigorous and effective mainly by means of the circulating medium furnished by banks in their operations of loaning and discounting promissory notes, &c. Let us see, however, what would be the effect of an *exclusive metallic* circulating medium if it was attempted and realized. The circulation of corporate bank promises in the Union is estimated to be about \$100,000,000. The total amount of specie in the Union, is, say 90 millions, out of which the banks and the United States Treasury hold about 50 millions; the excess of specie, in actual circulation, is, therefore, 40 millions, which, being added to the 100 millions of bank promises, makes, altogether, 140 millions of circulating medium; this circulating medium, when properly combined with classes Nos. 1 to 4 of monetary paper above defined, is simply sufficient to meet all the wants of trade. Well, suppose that the 100 millions of bank promises should be altogether suppressed, and that 50 millions of specie should be added to the actual

stock, it would give us a circulating medium of 140 millions all in specie. The question then arises, what effect would result from this exclusive metallic currency? I maintain that a great falling off of business would be the consequence, and that the amount of prospective money and of credit money would very materially decrease. The reason is obvious: loans and discounts from banks give action to "credit money," viz., to the main spring of commercial transactions. Banks are led to supply the means which give the impetus to that "main spring" on account, principally, of the extra profits they derive from their paper circulation. If "bank promises" were no longer allowed to be issued, and "specie" substituted in their place as a circulating medium, BANKING would of course be nearly broken up, as it is very evident that but few persons would hoard up specie in reserve, and associate together for the purpose of discounting individual bills, promissory notes, credit money generally, on the reserved strength of metallic capital. A metallic circulating medium yields no interest, and the principal stimulus to active business would not exist. The "main spring" of commercial transactions would not receive sufficient momentum, and the four classes of monetary paper above mentioned, (Nos. 1 to 4,) would materially diminish, capital would become inert and inactive. The country, it is true, would be rid of speculation, of revulsions in monetary affairs, of extended bankruptcies and occasional ruin; but it is very doubtful, after all, that the change would be beneficial. I have exposed, without gloss, the evils resulting from the issue of bank promises; but, on the other hand, it must be admitted that it is an instrument of wonderful power for extending commerce, manufactures, arts, sciences, increasing, thereby, property to an unbounded magnitude; so that the general welfare of mankind, of civilized nations particularly, is ultimately greatly benefited. Well, then, if it be a matter of doubt whether an exclusive metallic currency would be preferable, on the whole, to a mixed currency of bank promises and specie, with all its evils; but there cannot be any as to the immense superiority of a real paper money currency over an exclusive metallic one. It would give the needed impetus to business, without the injurious *rebounding* effect resulting from the effect of bank *promises*; the main and direct cause of the superlative superiority of "paper money" is, that it is *prolific* in its nature, while "metallic money" is *inert* and unproductive.* It exemplifies the superiority of *mind* over *matter*.

Urged by the desire of enabling the public to discriminate between *real* paper money and the sham substitute (the "Bank promises") which has so long usurped its place; wishing, moreover, to expose fully *the fact* that "monetary paper" had proved to be the mightiest instrument existing for extending commerce, arts, sciences, and promoting the general improvement and welfare of mankind, I have been led thereby into digressions necessary to develop the importance of a subject which does not appear to be sufficiently understood and appreciated. It is time, however, to sum up, and to remind the reader that the point I intended to establish in the second paragraph of this article has been fairly demonstrated. The point intended to establish was, that the circulating notes issued in pursuance of the happy conception which originated the Free Banking Law of the State of New-York, "have all the attributes and

characteristics of *money*." (See for summary of this point the paragraph which concludes the definition of the word *money*.)

It follows, from the above conclusion, and from the definitions and reasoning which have led to it, that circulating notes secured and issued in any other STATE, or in any other COUNTRY, in accordance with provisions embodying the principle of the second and third sections of the law, would constitute, emphatically, *real* paper money; and that it might be made to be "the proper basis" to establish a distinct "SOUND NATIONAL PAPER CURRENCY" for each and all civilized commercial nations in the world: and thus the wisdom of the underneath "suggestion" of Comptroller FILLMORE, now Vice-President of the United States, has been fully justified by this careful exposition and logical development of sound principles of political economy. This is the suggestion:

"If, then, in addition to this, CONGRESS would authorize such notes as were secured by stocks of the United States to be received for public dues to the NATIONAL TREASURY, this would give to such notes a universal credit co-extensive with the United States, and leave nothing further to be desired in the shape of a NATIONAL PAPER CURRENCY."

In a former article (published in the *Mirror*, Jan. 24th) I have taken notice of a long tirade of absurdity and ranting comments from the Washington *Union* of Jan. 20th, on the above suggestion, which the *acute* editor denounces as "A new Whig Bank Scheme;" and another article, published Feb. 9th, contains, on that point, the following paragraph:

"The Administration paper, the *Union*, pretends that the issue of a currency in pursuance of this last suggestion would be a violation of the Constitution. There is no provision whatever in the Constitution prohibiting the government from giving or receiving in payment *the evidence of its own debt*. Art. 1, Sec. 10, prohibits *the States* 'to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts.' This was an urgent and wise provision at the time it was enacted; but the Constitution contains no such prohibition applicable to the *General Government*, and such a prohibition cannot be even implied, for it would have been absurd that the General Government should have been bound not to do what circumstances might have imperiously required, in case of a protracted defensive war."

The plan above suggested not only does not violate the Constitution, but there is nothing in it infringing its spirit, even by implication. The *soundness* of the basis of said plan has been, I trust, demonstrated in this article; in another, I intend to vindicate the urgent *policy* of its adoption, by pointing out its various and important advantages, particularly that of acting harmoniously with the independent Treasury, by preventing an injurious accumulation of "metallic money;" and in order that the objections which will be started may be removed, I will, at the next session of Congress, submit a draft of such provisions as will satisfy all clear-headed men that the plan may be made to work with the utmost simplicity, order and efficiency. The NATIONAL PAPER CURRENCY provided by this plan will greatly mitigate the monetary revulsions occasioned by the issue of bank "promises," and it will altogether ensure the most beneficial results to the whole Union, with or without California gold.

New-York, October 11th, 1861.

The above letter to the editor of the *Mirror* gives a development of the suggestions contained in the "Article" inserted herein, pages 425 to 429; those two "Articles," in connection with the *seven explanatory remarks*, inserted in the Appendix, will enable all impartial and clear-headed readers to form an opinion as to the sterling and superior advantages of the system of banking, thoroughly explained therein; "the seven explanatory remarks" are altogether important, as giving *practical illustrations** of the working of the two systems, that of issuing circulating notes, secured *wholly* on the pledge of Public Stocks, and that of bank bills issued by Corporate Banks, based on *promises to pay*, &c. No unprejudiced man can deny the evidence, that the Banking System of the State of New-York, although it is not as perfect as it would be under the system herein advocated, has altogether worked out a salutary change in banking that has been felt, in fact, all over the whole country; the bill-holder, who has New-York State Stocks pledged for the due payment thereof, feels no apprehension whatever. It may be asserted that a suspension of specie payment would not have extended to the city of New-York in 1857, if *all* the banks of that city had been in operation under the new system; but there were yet many Corporate Banks, issuing *promises to pay*, that prevented harmony of action; as it was, the bill-holder did not lose anything. With this IMPORTANT result before them, the next Congress cannot hesitate to take up in earnest the questions of creating a "NATIONAL CURRENCY." Public opinion demands it.

APPENDIX.

EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

First.

THE principle of securing bank issues by a pledge of "Property," giving ample security to the bill-holder, was first acted upon, *partially*, in 1838, by the enactment of the Free Banking Law of the State of New-York. It met, as I have shown in preceding articles, with persevering and insidious hostility from the Safety Fund Bank interest and from the issuers of corporate bank "promises," and was, in consequence, much hampered by injurious and conflicting legislation. Eight years afterwards Sir ROBERT PEEL brought about his reform of the statute of the Bank of England, by adopting the *same principle*—that of securing paper issues by the pledge of "Property"—to as great an extent as the financial situation of Great Britain could admit. The bank is allowed to issue circulating notes to an amount equal to fourteen millions sterling which she holds of Government stocks, and her issues, over that amount, must be secured by an equal amount of *specie*, pound for pound, that is,

* In reading those bearing on the amount of *specie* in the country, &c., it must be borne in mind, that they were written before the influx of gold from California.

as would be said in this country, dollar for dollar. Strictly speaking, the notes of the Bank of England now represent "Property," and the true principle which ought to be the basis of *real* paper money is thereby acknowledged; the *kind* of "Property" held in reserve—I allude to the government securities—is not conditioned nor guaranteed according to the *exigencies* I have defined, as those securities form part of an immense debt of eight hundred millions of pounds sterling, *which a revolution might repudiate*. However, by taking into consideration that the prodigious amount of *capital* in England, as well as its enormous debt, are alike due to the issue of "bank promises," it must be admitted that the reform brought about by Sir ROBERT PEEL is the greatest effort yet made *to establish a paper currency on a sound principle*; it is an explicit acknowledgment that the *fiction* of the "bank promise" is repudiated by the statesmen of a nation whose immense resources have been so long under its potential influence, either for good or for evil.

Second.

The State of New-York derives from her canals a yearly income of over two millions of dollars. The Constitution of the State provides that \$1,300,000 therefrom shall be set apart each fiscal year as a sinking fund, which shall be sacredly applied to pay the interest and redeem the principal of that part of the State debt called the *canal debt*, whereof the total amount is now under \$17,000,000. It is, therefore, evident that the stocks of that debt are guaranteed by a *positive revenue* amply sufficient to pay the interest and redeem the principal thereof. These stocks, therefore, *emphatically* represent "Property," integrally, and, as such, are easily convertible, and command *ready money* at all times.

Third.

If bank notes, instead of being issued as "bank promises," had been made to be *real* paper money, that "paper contrivance" would have been the proper instrument to give and to regulate the "needed impetus" to business, and that *fifth class* of "monetary paper" might have been qualified with perfect truth *ready money*; the harmonious action of that "fifth class" on the four other classes already enumerated would be the *completion* of a *system* of "monetary paper" commensurate, altogether, to the most extensive wants of commercial nations, although more easily regulated and restricted to the necessary amount than "metallic money."

According to the classification I have made of the first four classes, we have seen that

BILLS OF EXCHANGE produce "Prospective Money."

PROMISSORY NOTES, "Credit Money."

BONDS AND MORTGAGES, "Personal Money."

SHARES OF STOCK, according to the conditions constituting the nature and guaranties of the stock, supply the community with "Credit Money," "Speculative Money," "Prospective Money" and "Available Money."

Well, if the *fifth class* was made to be "*real* paper money," it would supply the "*ready money*" necessary to give the needed momentum to the above classes of monetary paper, and the amount requisite for that purpose can easily be ascertained. It is estimated that the *circulating me-*

dium in the United States is made up of about one hundred millions of "bank promises," and of forty millions of *specie* in the hands of the people at large; total, one hundred and forty millions. If the one hundred millions of "bank promises" were to be altogether suppressed, eighty millions of *real* paper money would be sufficient to give healthy activity to the other classes of "monetary paper," as twenty millions, at least, of the fifty millions of *specie* now held dormant by corporate banks and the Independent Treasury, would be released from their vaults, and get into general circulation. The "circulating medium," that is, the *ready money* of the country, would thus be made up of sixty millions of *specie* and eighty millions of *real* paper money. It is estimated that thirty to thirty-five millions therefrom might be made, according to the suggestion of Vice-President FILLMORE, a *legal tender* to the United States Treasury from California to Maine; there would remain to be provided by the various States from forty-five to fifty millions under the provision of Free Banking Laws, as herein explained. The various incontestable advantages of this system for establishing a "national paper currency" will be distinctly enumerated in a separate article; I will now merely point out, that *coin* would continue to be the *standard*, whence the relative value of all articles constituting "Property" is established. Although the bank notes of this *real* paper money would be a *legal tender* to the Treasury of the United States, and to the treasuries of the various States that would authorize their issues respectively, they would, nevertheless, at all times, be redeemable in *specie* by the issuers thereof, *on demand of the bill-holders*. It will be perceived, at one glance, that with a "circulating medium" made up of such *sound elements* as above indicated, five or six, or even ten millions of *metallic money* might be exported on an emergency, without disturbing or affecting materially the discounts and loans of banks and bankers issuing *real* paper money. The "rebounding" effect resulting from the *fiction* which characterizes "bank promises" would not exist.

It follows, from the above exposition, that the aggregate total of the kind of "property" *suitable* to be pledged as a security for the issue of *real* paper money, should be of such a description as not to exceed a determined amount, so that "ready money" should be maintained and restricted within the appropriate limit. This fact is here recorded for the purpose of establishing two important points: 1st. That *real estate* or *landed property*, besides other objections, is not a proper kind of "property" to be taken as the basis of a *real* paper currency, because of the magnitude of its amount; 2d. That the proper kind of "property" to be used is, emphatically, State Stocks, representing the wealth of the State, predicated on positive revenue set apart by law to pay the interest and principal thereof. Such stocks can be provided for or created to suit *exactly* the amount of "ready money" required for circulation.

This is the place to notice an objection that has been made by many persons who admit the soundness and efficiency of the proposed plan. What will you do when the stocks are paid off? Answer—you admit that my plan secures a sound circulating medium, that it obviates the evils resulting from the *rebounding effect* produced by the *fiction* of the "bank promises," at the same time that it supplies the needed impetus to the other classes of monetary paper. Well, let us, at all events, take

advantage of, and use the public debt while it exists, and when it decreases under the *necessary* amount, I propose a *provision* which would secure all the important advantages above enumerated; which "provision," it would be wise and proper, in view of said advantages, for a Republican Government to enact. It consists in giving one year's time to tax-payers generally, and to anticipate the revenue, thus put off, by the issue of Treasury notes redeemable one year from date. The proceeds of these Treasury notes would be used to pay the expenditures of the Government, and the purchasers thereof could use them *exactly* in the same way as it is now proposed to use United States stocks, viz., as a basis for "a sound national paper currency." Thirty to thirty-five millions of such an ingenious "paper contrivance" would be sufficient, as to the proper *quantum* to be furnished by the General Government; it is thus that the mere anticipation of the *annual revenue* of a commercial country would prove to be a most safe basis to establish A REAL PAPER MONEY CURRENCY. It would, by this process, become an *important element* of steady and progressive national prosperity.

Fourth.

The *Democratic Review* of last June contains an article on "bank circulation," (pages 499 to 510,) giving interesting details tending to prove that "money of itself, whether it be gold and silver, or their substitute, bank paper, is instrumental in the transaction of a *very small proportion* of the whole business of a nation." The quotation just given precedes that of a few lines quoted from the same article in the paragraph concerning BILLS OF EXCHANGE, at the place that I refer to, *Note No. 4*. These lines express very nearly my own view of the subject, and I have transcribed them *verbatim* accordingly; those readers who may feel interested in the classification I have given of "monetary paper" will be well pleased to see how that point has been treated by the able Reviewer I have been quoting. The *proportion* which BILLS OF EXCHANGE bear to "ready money" (see remark *third*, above) may be gathered (says said Reviewer) "from a return made by Mr. LEATHAM, an English banker, who discovered from the stamps issued by the Stamp Office that there was circulated in one year £523,493,342 of private bills of exchange; that the amount standing at one time was £132,123,460, while the gross bank circulation of paper money was £27,272,000, or 20 per cent. only."

Out of 30 millions of gold estimated to be in England, the bank has in its vault an average of 10 to 15 millions. Suppose the circulation to be 18 millions, the total aggregate amount of bank notes and specie united would be 39 millions sterling; that is, less than 30 per cent. of the amount of "Bills of Exchange" existing at one time. If to the items of "Bills of Exchange" we unite those of PROMISSORY NOTES, BONDS AND MORTGAGES, SHARES OF STOCK, it will be easily perceived that the aggregate total of those four classes of "monetary paper" is immense, as compared to the total amount of bank notes and specie *in circulation*. I have stated "that nine-tenths, at least, of the moneyed, commercial and business transactions of the world are actually effected, managed, settled and regulated by means of "*monetary paper*." The statistics above

quoted indicate clearly that my statement is far from being an exaggeration; it would follow, therefore, by taking on one side the *five* classes of "monetary paper," and on the other, "metallic money" only, that *specie* in circulation is *less* than the *twenty-fourth part* of the "monetary paper" afloat. It is calculated that "Promissory Notes," "Bonds and Mortgages," "Shares of Stock," &c., average each, one in the other, as much "monetary paper" as *BILLS OF EXCHANGE*; the proportion between these four classes of paper and "ready money" would, therefore, be as 12 to 1; but the *specie* in circulation is certainly less in amount than the total of the bank notes; this would establish a proportion considerably more than 24 to 1 of "monetary paper" as compared to "metallic money."

But besides the five *principal* classes of "Monetary Paper" above enumerated, there are others, such as Treasury Notes, Government Scrips, Certificates of Deposit, Transferable Policies of Insurance, Bills of Lading to order, &c., &c., which increase still higher the proportions of "Monetary Paper" as compared to "Metallic Money." On the other hand, it is well to bear in mind what is stated at the head of my classification of "Monetary Paper," viz.: that each class is understood to be a *voucher* constituting the same—a representative of property—so that the "Monetary Paper System," as a whole, ought to be understood as being an ingenious and well-digested plan to represent the *existing wealth* of commercial nations, in order to afford means of facilitating its availability.

It follows, from the above definition of what constitutes "Monetary Paper," that Stock Certificates of National Debts, beyond the amount of the annual revenue (viz., the yearly interest paid on said debt) are not included in the above estimate of "Monetary Paper." This is, besides, obvious at one glance, by comparing, separately, the amount of the public debt of England to the total of the *specie* in that country, *which is as 26 to 1*. The national debt of England is 800 millions sterling—about four billions of dollars; the whole metallic money in Europe is estimated to be about one billion, so that the national debt of Great Britain is *four times* the amount of "metallic money" in the whole of Europe!

Fifth.

There appears to be in the nature of men a certain reluctance to retrace their steps when once they have advanced considerably on the wrong track; this peculiarity of the human mind accounts for the difficulty universally experienced in uprooting old errors, by those who, either by chance or well-directed investigation, have found out the *true* application of a principle *wrongly understood* when first discovered. When the issue of "bank promises" was first devised, it suited the abettors of that device to call them "paper money;" and although any one possessed of an investigating mind may easily prove that said application is not applicable, the popular error on this point continues to this day, and is, as I have shown, the *direct* and *positive* cause of constant revulsions in monetary affairs.

Sixth.

The relative proportion existing between paper payable *on demand* and *specie*, laid down in the practical illustrations I have given of the

effect produced by a drain of "metallic money," may possibly be disputed. I have taken no particular pains to ascertain the precise correctness of statistics in the various statements I have made; they have no material influence on the inferences which I draw; these proceed from close attention, during many years of practical banking operations, to account for effects, to study and discover first causes, and to analyze with care their bearing and connection with each other; I feel confident that the general appreciation of facts I have made cannot be controverted; and I am well satisfied that the causes and the extent of the "rebounding effect" described in the paragraph which is the subject of this remark, will be admitted to be correct by all persons conversant in monetary affairs, who have read attentively the developments which have led thereto.

Seventh.

The publication alluded to in the paragraph which refers to note No. 7, is entitled "Investigation of the principle which ought to be the basis of paper money."* It detects and explains the *radical error* upon which "paper money" (so called) has been issued; it develops a system of banking in perfect harmony with the state of civilization now existing, by suppressing "bank promises," and creating in their place *real* paper money, that is, *paper* representing "property," according to *exigencies*, such as I have defined in this article. Said system indicates how every commercial nation may establish a distinct "national paper currency" having the three following characteristic features, out of which the second, as will be seen, ensures the certainty that the system can be successfully carried into execution.

The first feature is, that of securing ample security to the bill-holder.

The second, that of enabling banks and bankers to realize two interests on the same capital, although the borrower never pays but one; this proceeds from the fact, that the insurers of the circulating notes receive an interest on the stock deposited, in addition to the one they receive from the borrower. This *prolific* property of "monetary paper" constitutes an incontestable superiority over "metallic money," and will enable those who engage their capital under the provisions of that system to realize handsome profits by legitimate means.

The third characteristic feature is, that of supplying the community with a sound circulating medium, sufficiently active to give the needed impetus to the other classes of "monetary paper," and withal, regulating properly their issues; not liable, like that supplied by "bank promises," to occasion inevitable periodical revulsions and losses in monetary affairs.

According to the system developed in the above-mentioned publication, *coin* would continue to be the standard acknowledged as regulating the relative value of all articles constituting "property." "Metallic money" would continue to be the *token* agreed upon between commercial nations, to regulate their exchanges and transactions, at the same time that each nation would have a distinct "national *real* money currency" of its own.

* See pages 425 to 429.

The following paragraph alludes particularly to the effect that the adoption of the system would have in the United States:

"Let that system be established by *law*, with such plain and easily-understood restrictions that will command the confidence of the community as to the scrupulous fulfilment of the fundamental rule, which ought to be the basis thereof, and the important question is solved."

The fact that this *real* paper money would be a *legal tender* to the General Government and to the State governments, to the extent, respectively, of the distinct issues authorized by each, would cause gold and silver to become, nearly, mere merchandise, and any quantity thereof might be exported without disturbing in the least the currency of the country. We would thereby become truly independent, and our immense inland commercial transactions would be no longer under the influence of the fluctuations which are inseparable from mercantile operations with foreign countries.

L. B.

ILLINOIS CURRENCY. WHAT IS IT?

THE United States Circuit Court, in Chicago, is engaged in framing an answer to this interesting question, in a case involving the issue of currency. Judge DRUMMOND, of the United States Circuit Court, is now engaged in hearing what may be called a test case for the series of suits now pending against banks and bankers, which have grown out of the late currency troubles. It is that of WILLARD M. NEWELL, and others, against the Chicago Marine and Fire Insurance Company, and is the first case which has reached the United States Court. The action is based on a certificate of deposit, issued by defendants, bearing date February 25, 1861, for the sum of \$533, Illinois currency, payable in like funds. Demand was made for payment on the first day of June last, and the defendants tendered notes of the Bank of Benton, and the Garden State and Alisana Banks, all of them, at that date, selling for about fifty-five cents on the dollar. These were declined, and the suit was commenced. The defence make the following points:

First.—That Illinois currency does not mean par funds, but any Illinois bank notes.

Second.—That the word "currency" has this meaning, by force of custom and usage, in this city; and, therefore,

Third.—That upon presentment of certificates, and demand for payment, the tender of notes of the Bank of Benton, and Garden State and Alisana Banks, was a compliance with their contract.

The plaintiffs deny the truth of all points, and insist that Illinois currency means funds current in the State, and no other; that is, gold and silver, or bank notes, at par. The evidence is all in, and EMORY A. STORRS commenced his opening argument for the plaintiff yesterday afternoon, pending which the court adjourned until to-day.

OPERATIONS OF THE BANK OF FRANCE, 1847—1861.

VIEWS OF THE "JOURNAL DES DÉBATS."

From the London Times.

THE position of the Bank of France is discussed by the *Débats* in an article of considerable length. Although the deficiency of the harvest is not considered by the writer as the sole cause of the drain of specie which has been going on for some time, and has forced the bank to raise its interest and have recourse to other exceptional measures, yet a necessity exists to pay in gold or silver for the 12,000,000 or 15,000,000 hectolitres of wheat which are required for the year's food. The *Débats* is of opinion that means may be devised to lessen the force of the outward current, and cites the precedent of 1847, when the Russian government, it may be remembered, purchased from the Bank of France fifty millions of *rente*, and by so doing relieved that establishment rapidly from its temporary embarrassment.

"Among the economic crises of the last thirty years," says the writer, "it is that which presents the greatest resemblance to the present one. It was then, as now, to the purchasers of corn, necessitated by an insufficient harvest, that the drain of specie was specially ascribed. Of 205,000,000 francs, of which the metallic reserve of the Bank of France consisted on the 1st of October, 1846, there only remained, on the 14th of January, 1847, 86,000,000 francs, of which 28,000,000 francs were in the branch banks. At London, 25,000,000 francs of gold were purchased at a sacrifice of 800,209 francs, for exchange, interest and expenses. With some difference in the manner of proceeding, the operation was the same which the Bank of France made a few days back, through some large banking firms of Paris. In 1847 the operation produced a good effect, the metallic reserve on the 16th of March having risen to 110,000,000 francs. It was at that moment that the Court of Russia proposed to the Bank of France to purchase from it, at the rate of the day, 50,000,000 francs of its five and three per cents. The proposition, after a little hesitation, was accepted. The bank gave to the Imperial Treasury of Russia 2,000,000 francs of five per cents, at 115f. 75c., and 142,000 francs of threes, at 77f. 65c., forming together a capital of about 50,000,000 francs. The operation, while permitting the saving of the greater part of the specie which would have had to be sent into Russia to pay for the purchase of wheat, had an excellent effect on the metallic reserve of the bank. The latter was slowly recomposed, and attained in August the sum of 149,000,000 francs, and on the 25th of December, 1857, it was 171,000,000 francs, a sum considered perfectly sufficient at that epoch, when the operations of the bank were far from having acquired the immense development which they owe to the increase of business for the last ten years. The alienation of 50,000,000 francs of public funds deprived the shareholders at one blow of an assured income

of 2,142,000 francs. The bank, nevertheless, was able to distribute to them a dividend of 177 francs, which was the largest up to that time. Moreover, before the end of the same year, 1847, the bank had reconstituted the greater part of its *rentes* on more advantageous terms (three per cents at 75f. 25c. and 73f. 81c.) than those on which it sold them.

"The moment could not be better chosen. With the fall in silver, probably only temporary, the Russian government would obtain ingots on better conditions than those which it had to accept at the beginning of the year, but which are not likely soon to be made to it again; moreover, it would not have to pay in gold this lower price, as it did for the 31,000,000 francs of which the coining is now being brought to a close; it could give France, in return for her silver, merchandise, which is at this moment much more necessary than gold—it could pay in wheat. The last harvest in Russia was more than satisfactory, in spite of the perturbation which the emancipation of the serfs must have temporarily caused in agriculture. Of the 12,000,000 to 15,000,000 hectolitres of wheat which France will have to demand abroad, Russia can supply the third, perhaps even the half. So much the better for her and for France. But here is the reverse of the medal. In purchasing wheat from Russian producers, France must pay for it in cash, in great part, even before having received it; and that is the cause of the severe and sudden drain of specie from France. On the other hand, the 100,000,000 francs, for example, which France would send to Russia in good pieces of five francs or in ingots, would disappear from the country in the same way and for the same reasons, as for some years past. The operation would result in a great embarrassment for French circulation, without any appreciable advantage for Russian circulation. The government of St. Petersburg may, however, remedy that inconvenience with facility and safety. The 100,000,000 francs in specie, (to continue to speak in round figures,) which the insufficiency of the French harvest requires to be sent to Russia, are for her, (on account of her serious need of money,) so to speak, a happy accident."

But a similar operation could not be repeated at present, the writer declares; the financial situation of Russia, which has become greatly deteriorated since 1847, not permitting her to sink a large capital in foreign funds. But a different arrangement could be entered on, the *Débats* thinks, and with advantage to both parties. At the beginning of the present year the Bank of France, after having effected a similar operation in London, asked the Russian government to cede to it about thirty-one millions of gold for so much silver, and the government of St. Petersburg at once consented, silver then appearing of more value. But the bank soon after discovered that the comparative value of the two metals had changed, and that there was no longer any good reason for refusing silver coin to the public, all premium on it having ceased to exist. The bank then discontinued paying five-franc pieces to Russia, and simply sent silver ingots. But, although the operation was sterile for the bank, it turned out of great utility to Russia, who had the whole mass of silver delivered to the mints of Paris and Strasbourg, and there transformed into Russian pieces, with an intrinsic value of 15 per cent. below the nominal one, the object being to prevent, in that manner, the practices of exporta-

tion or of melting down, which had previously drawn away from Russia, as from Austria, all her silver money. The whole sum will amount, nominally, to somewhat over thirty-three millions; but that sum is totally inadequate for a population of 62,000,000 inhabitants, and having a paper currency of 700,000,000 roubles. Why should not Russia, the *Débats* asks, continue that operation on a still larger scale? Its argument runs thus:

"The government of St. Petersburg might come to an understanding with the producers of Russian wheat, to substitute itself to them as the creditor of France; it might demand from them credits spread over a year, or pay them in notes of the State Bank, or in new four per cent. bills. In their place it might receive from the Bank of France the 100,000,000 francs in specie which France owes for Russian wheat; but it would give to that silver the same destination as the 31,000,000 francs of silver which it recently exchanged for gold. By making efforts, which, however, they considered somewhat excessive, the mints of Paris and Strasbourg were able, from July to October, to deliver per month 8,000,000 francs in Russian small coin; the coining of the new 100,000,000 francs would, therefore, require a year. The new money would thus arrive by degrees at its destination, to replace, in the centre of the empire, that which, little by little, would spread towards the circumference, so that the circulation of all European Russia would, in a year from this time, be provided with the specie of which it is now in complete want. On its part, the Bank of France, which would supply ingots to the French mints, in proportion to their progress in the manufacture, would not be inconvenienced by an issue of 100,000,000 francs, spread over an entire year. The issue would also be insensible if it were made in six months only, supposing that the coinage could and should be forced so as to supply monthly double the quantity of specie produced in the coining of the first 31,000,000 francs. The operation proposed would, it seems to us, sensibly lighten for France the burden of the crisis, while producing great advantages for Russia. Will that suffice to recommend it to the attention of those whom it may concern?"

LONDON BANK OF DEPOSIT.—In consequence of the pressure of depositors, the directors of the Bank of Deposit and National Assurance and Investment Association have submitted to an investigation of its affairs. The liabilities are estimated at about £300,000. The directors affirm that the assets show rather more than twenty shillings in the pound, but that a forced realization would entail great loss. Mr. HARDING, the accountant, who has been called in, has reduced this estimate by one-third. Perhaps a dividend of ten shillings in the pound may ultimately be realized. The depositors are spread all over the country, and belong chiefly to the poorer classes. The bank was established in 1844.

THE EARLY MINES AND COINAGE OF AMERICA.

A History of American Manufactures from 1608 to 1860, exhibiting the origin and growth of the principal mechanic arts and manufactures, from the earliest colonial period to the adoption of the Constitution, and comprising annals of the industry of the United States in machinery, manufactures and the useful arts, with a notice of the important inventions, tariffs and the results of each decennial census. By J. LEANDER BISHOP, M. D., to which are added, notes on the principal manufacturing centres and remarkable manufactories at the present time. Two volumes, 8vo. EDWARD YOUNG & Co., Philadelphia, 1861.

THE first volume only of this work has been issued. It is a production of rare value, for which the community is largely indebted to Dr. BISHOP for his researches and labors in the investigation of the numerous subjects treated of. It contains matters of great interest to millers, brewers, ship-builders, paper-makers, printers, type-founders, brick-makers, wine manufacturers, salt manufacturers, manufacturers of cotton and woollen goods, tanners and boot-makers, iron manufacturers, and all interested in metals. We propose to introduce here some few extracts relating to the early coinage, gold and silver mines, &c., of the American Colonies.

I. *Early Colonial Coinage of Massachusetts.* II. *Early Coinage of Connecticut.* III. *Gold, Silver and Copper Mines.* IV. *The Mines of Antiquity.* V. *Mineral Resources of Carolina and Georgia.* VI. *Metals of Pennsylvania.* VII. *Mint in Maryland.* VIII. *Early use of Silver.*

I. COLONIAL COINAGE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In October, 1652, when Massachusetts undertook to supply the deficiency of specie by a silver coinage, Mr. JENKS was employed to make the dies, which he executed at the iron-works. The issue consisted of shillings, sixpences and threepences, to which was added, in 1662, an emission of twopences. Of the shillings there were at least sixteen different dies, and several of each of the others, all bearing the same date, and stamped with the name of the colony and a pine tree in the centre, "as an apt symbol of its progressive vigor."

These coins, which were of the fineness of sterling silver, but by weight "two pence in the shilling of less valew than the English coyne," are now extremely rare, and, from the device on the larger ones, are known to the curious as the "pine-tree coinage," although no such tree is designated by the law. The act creating this first colonial mint was much complained of, as an invasion of the royal prerogative, but the emission of money nevertheless continued for over thirty years, and some of the coin circulated in England. The wrath of CHARLES II. is said to have been adroitly turned aside by Sir THOMAS TEMPLE, (brother of Sir WILLIAM,) who, having shown the king some of the coins, after his return from New-England, was asked what tree that was upon them, to which he replied, that it was the royal oak which saved his majesty's life.

Pleased or amused by the supposed compliment, he called them "*a parcel of honest dogs*," and listened complacently to TEMPLE's defence of his colonial subjects.

The money was coined by JOHN HULL, a gold and silversmith, on whose land the "Mint Howse" stood, and ROBERT SANDERSON, of Boston.

Previous to this, business had been done largely by barter, and taxes were paid and exchanges made chiefly in beaver skins, cattle, corn or other produce, at fixed rates, and in leaden bullets and Indian wampum—the importations, and recently the stoppage of emigration, having drained off the English coin. In New Netherlands, also, where Director STUYVESANT the same year recommended a coinage in imitation of New-England, and also raised the value of specie 20 to 25 per cent., to prevent its exportation, beaver skins and Zeawant, or Indian shell-money, were the principal currency. The manufacture of the latter was a considerable business with the Indians, "curious minters of wampumpeag," and by many of the white people, who counterfeited it. Maryland issued silver and copper coins in 1662, the only other silver coins made before the Revolution. Carolina, in 1694, struck a halfpenny coin, and penny and twopenny pieces in 1723, and another penny in 1733. Coppers were coined from native metal in Connecticut in 1737 and 1739. Virginia issued halfpence in 1773. Several silver and copper coins were minted by the different States and by individuals after the war, and previous to the act of April 2d, 1792, establishing the national mint under the authority conferred by the constitution of 1787.

II. EARLY COINAGE OF CONNECTICUT.

In the years 1737 and 1739, copper coins were struck on copper from the Simsbury mines, by JOSEPH HIGBY, an ingenious blacksmith of the town of Granby. They were current for many years, and were known as the "Granby coppers." They were "stamped on planchets of the purest copper, and, in consequence, were in demand by gold-beaters for alloy." They are said to have been well executed for the times. The designs upon some of the pieces represented a sledge-hammer surmounted by crowns, in deference, probably, to the royal prerogative, and with due regard to the conditions symbolized.

Like the handiwork of JENKS, of Lynn, an elder member of the same craft, in the parent colony of Massachusetts Bay, few coins now remain to attest the artistic skill of HIGBY, as the impressions were soon effaced from the unalloyed metal. Good specimens of the Granby copper now command \$15 to \$25 each. There were several issues, with different devices, some having a broad-axe, with the motto, "I cut my way through." His coinage was considered a boon to the community, but not so a later, unauthorized imitation of the coinage of other minters. On the subject of this coinage, and of the Simsbury and Wallingford mines, see a late publication, "*The Newgate of Connecticut*," by R. H. PHELPS, 1860, and "*TRUMBULL'S History of Connecticut*," vol. ii., chap. 2.

The people of Connecticut have from early colonial times manifested

a proneness to invention, and to those finer branches of manufacture and "notions" for which the State is famous. Many of these originated among her people.

ABEL BUELL, an ingenious gold and silversmith of Killingworth, Conn., about 1766, constructed probably the first lapidary machine used in this country, and represented to the court that his "method of grinding and polishing crystals and other stones of great value, all the growth of this colony," was likely to be a great saving and advantage to the colony against the importation of such stones from abroad. In 1769 he presented a memorial, impressed with types of his own manufacture, for aid in erecting a type-foundry, which was granted, and the business commenced in New-Haven. About the same time he made a survey of the coast of Florida, for ROMAN'S Map of North America, published during the war, and was associated with AMOS DOOLITTLE, an engraver of New-Haven, who sketched and engraved four views of the battles of Lexington and Concord, the first series of historical prints, it is thought, made in America, and afterwards maps for MORSE'S Geography, etc. BUELL was also employed, with others, in coining copper money for the State, for which he constructed all the apparatus, capable of making 120 per minute. A few years later, while in England, he is said to have been consulted respecting the construction of iron bridges.

III. GOLD, SILVER AND COPPER MINES.

About the beginning of the last century the prevalent zeal for the discovery of precious ores, which it is probable had prompted the researches of WINTHROP, was rewarded by the discovery in Connecticut of two deposits of copper ore, which it was confidently hoped would yield constituents of a richer metal. One of these was found at Wallingford, and a more abundant mine at Simsbury, now Granby. The mines were opened, and an act of the legislature, exempting the miners from military duty, and giving them power to manage their operations, was obtained from the proprietors, who represented the business as one of great public advantage. As early as 1707 a company, composed of a greater part of the landholders of Simsbury, was formed to work the mine at that place, paying the town ten shillings for each ton of copper produced, the proceeds of which went to the support of "an able schoolmaster in Simsbury" and to Yale College. A contract was made with three brothers, clergymen, JOHN DUDLEY and TIMOTHY WOODBRIDGE, belonging respectively to Springfield, Simsbury and Hartford, to smelt the ores. Their scholastic attainments, as divines, were supposed to confer the requisite scientific and metallurgic knowledge, but they failed to give satisfaction. An act, obtained in 1709, conferred several privileges, and authorized the settlement, in a summary way, of disputes, which were frequent, and under it the business was managed upwards of sixty years. In 1714, JONATHAN BELCHER, (afterwards governor,) of Boston, WILLIAM PARTIDGE, of Newbury, and TIMOTHY WOODBRIDGE, Jr., became the principal operators until 1721, when ANDREW FREEMAN and CHARLES CORNELIA, of New-York, were associated in the business. The Boston company was then expending £70 per month, and the law, having expired, was

renewed at their request by the Assembly, which extended all the legal encouragement in its power, and authorized the division of the mines among the several lessees. In 1735, Governor BELCHER stated that he had expended about £15,000, or about \$75,000, in the business. He erected a smelting-furnace in Boston.

During the excitement, about this time, on the subject of mining, JOSEPH WHITING, of New-Haven, petitioned the General Court (October, 1733) for a loan of £1,000 for ten years, to aid him in further search for mines and minerals, in which he claimed to have made greater discoveries than any other man. But neither prospecting nor mining proved of much profit to individuals or the State.

The mine at Simsbury continued to be worked with various success until the year 1773. Shafts were sunk, one to the depth of eighty and another thirty-five feet, and vast caverns were excavated in the hill. But the imperfect state of mining knowledge and machinery, the insufficiency of drains or *levels* to carry off the water, and the cost of pumping, which had to be carried on day and night, by the aid of the neighboring farmers, absorbed much of the profits. The copper mines of England, which now yield over 20,000 tons of copper annually, at that time produced only 600 or 700 tons, and much was imported from the continent. The discovery, previous to 1722, of a deposit of rich cupreous ore in New-York, induced Parliament in that year, by the statute 8 GEORGE I., c. 18, to place copper ore from the plantations on the list of enumerated articles, with a view to obtaining a future supply from its own dominions. The quality of the Simsbury ore was tolerably good, yielding 3 to 5 per cent., and some masses 50 per cent. of metal, and, the price being high abroad, there was a prospect of a profitable business. Several cargoes were sent to Europe from Hartford. But the limitation of the market, and the cost of exporting it in ore, as required by a law prohibiting the smelting of it in the colonies, the expense of mining, as then conducted, and the loss of two ship-loads at sea, one of which was captured by the French during the wars, proved discouraging to the operators. Works for smelting and refining the ore were, notwithstanding prohibitions and discouragements, erected at Simsbury, at a village named Hanover, by the German workmen, where the operations were quietly conducted. By the original proprietors, and different companies of lessees, including one British company, the work was thus conducted for about seventy years, when there appeared to be a failure of the ore.

The vast subterranean vaults in Copper Hill, now included in East Granby, were, in 1773, converted into a prison for felons, who were employed in the mines. The mine, as Dr. TRUMBULL observes, was thus rendered "of much greater value to the State than all the copper dug out of it." This place, the famous "Newgate" of Connecticut, was, during the Revolution, the place of confinement for tories, and afterwards a general prison.

After having been used for that purpose about fifty years, the whole mine was, in 1830, purchased of the State for \$1,200, by RICHARD BACON, of Simsbury, and gentlemen from New-York, who, as the "Phoenix Mining Company," obtained a charter and laid out several thousand dollars upon it. They abandoned it after five or six years, during the

financial crisis. In 1855, mining was once more undertaken by the "Connecticut Copper Company," which took out a large quantity of ore, yielding about 5 per cent., and some nodules 50 per cent. of metal, and increasing in richness as they descended. Ten of BRADFORD'S separators, two steam-engines and other machinery were erected at much expense. But notwithstanding the greater command of capital, superior machinery, science and skill, to that possessed by the original proprietors, the work was again suspended in about two years, chiefly, it is said, from failure in the processes of extracting and refining the metal. The ore is of the vitreous kind, and not easily reduced, but it is hoped will yet be worked to advantage.

IV. THE MINES OF ANTIQUITY.

According to the ancient fiscal privileges of royalty, mines containing gold or silver belonged to the king. In the grants to many of the colonies, one-fifth of the product of such mines was reserved as a royalty, and the London company reserved another fifth of gold and silver mines in Virginia to itself. By the statutes 1 and 5 W. & M., this prerogative was so modified that mines of copper, tin, iron and lead could be no longer claimed, but the precious ores of other mines belonged to the crown, on the payment of the price of the base metal of the mine. A discouragement to the discovery and working of metals was thus withdrawn.

V. NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA.

Although many of the earlier adventurers doubtless kept a vigilant watch for traditional treasures in the soil, it was not until a comparatively recent date that Carolina and neighboring States were found to hold gold and silver in appreciable amount. Gold is first mentioned in Mr. JEFFERSON'S Notes, as a known constituent of the porphyritic structure of the Appalachian Chain. It is confined in the United States to the newer metamorphic series, and where the "Appalachian gold-field" crosses the western part of North Carolina, it occurs in auriferous quartz, pyrites and other crystalline forms, associated with silver, copper, lead, iron, barytes, etc., some of them also in useful proportions. It is not known how early it was found in this State, but a large lump was discovered in 1799, which, when melted at the mint, is said to have yielded twenty-five pounds of gold twenty-three carats fine. It was first obtained in any considerable quantity in this State.

Of the gold coinage of 1804, about eleven thousand dollars were the produce of virgin gold from Cabarrus County, N. C. From that time to 1827, all the gold in this country was obtained in this State, amounting in all to \$110,000. The Gold Hill mines, in Rowan County, are the richest in the Atlantic States, and now yield about \$200,000 worth annually. It is extracted from iron pyrites, contained in talcose slate, quartz and other rock, which is worth usually from one to three dollars per bushel, and occasionally \$1,000. The "Washington Silver Mine," in Davidson County, furnishes gold, silver, lead and iron. A bar of silver from one of these mines, in the New-York Exhibition in 1853-54, is said to have been the first smelted from the ores in the United States.

Several counties of this State produce gold in various association with other metals. The copious yield of gold by the mines of the Southern States induced Congress, in 1838, to establish three branch mints, one at Charlotte, North Carolina, one at Dahlonega, Georgia, and one at New-Orleans—the first two for gold coin only.

The mineral resources of the State of Georgia, in iron, gold and coal, are very ample. They lie in the northern mountainous districts of the State, among the terminal and outlying ridges of the Alleghany Chain. The furnaces, which occupy the head streams of the Chattahoochee and Alabama rivers, at present chiefly use brown hematite. This ore, and the specular and magnetic oxyds, exist in great richness and abundance. The primary ore belts of Carolina are, on the one hand, prolonged into Georgia, through Hebersham, Lumpkin and other counties, in the north-east, and the Ducktown Tennessee veins on the other, through the north-western counties into Alabama. The hematite beds are often in close proximity to the gold-bearing metamorphic slate and quartz. Two or three of the northern tiers of counties are well supplied with ore from them. In Cass County, particularly north and west of the Allatoona Hills; on both sides of the Etowa River, and extending, on either hand, into Cherokee and Paulding counties, the distance of forty miles, are very extensive beds of superior hematitic ore. It much resembles the ore of West Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and that which produces the Salisbury and Juniata iron. It is easily smelted, and yields an excellent iron either for heavy castings or bar iron. Very pure specular peroxyde, like that of the Iron Mountain of Missouri, and frequent veins of magnetic ore, abound in that vicinity.

The gold mines of the State, until the richer placers of California withdrew attention from them, were among the most productive in the country, and occasioned the establishment of a branch mint for gold coin at Dahlonega, Lumpkin County, in 1838, at which time 6,000 or 7,000 persons were engaged in washing for gold in the State.

VI. METALS IN PENNSYLVANIA.

CASPER WISTAR was a brass button and buckle manufacturer in Philadelphia previous to 1750, when one of his apprentices set up the business in New-York. The first of the name in this country established a glass factory in New-Jersey, and in 1769 RICHARD WISTAR united the two branches at his house in High-street, above Third, where he made glass lamps and bottles and brass buttons.

BENJAMIN RANDOLPH, at the Golden Eagle, Chestnut-street, in 1770, manufactured wooden buttons “of apple, holly and laurel wood, hard and clear.” There were two button factories in the city in 1797.

The establishment of a tin-plate manufactory was proposed by a convention assembled from the several counties at Philadelphia, in January, 1774, to consider the state of manufactures and trade. But it was not then found practicable. Tin could not be had in 1776 sufficient to make canteens and kettles for the army.

A sheet-iron manufactory was established in 1776, on Water-street, at the corner of Arch, by MURRAY, GRIFFIN & BULLARD, who made camp-kettles, blaze-pans, teakettles and other wares. Camp-kettles were also

made for the army by THOMAS BALES, out of sheet-iron made at Mount Holly by THOMAS MAYBERRY.

Pewter dishes, spoons and other household wares, of pewter and block tin, then in general use, were made many years earlier, by CORNELIUS BRADFORD and others.

Gold and silversmiths, whitesmiths, and manufacturers of buttons, shoe-buckles and such small wares were numerous. In 1767, the silversmiths of Philadelphia petitioned for the establishment of an assay office to regulate, assay and stamp gold and silver.

Among the tradesmen admitted to the freedom of the city in 1717 and 1718, were GEORGE PLUMLY, JOSEPH TROTTER and RICHARD GOSLING, cutlers; JAMES EVERET and SIMON EDGELL, pewterers; PETER STEEL and JAMES WINSTANLY, braziers; FRANCIS RICHARDSON, WILLIAM ENGLAND and EDWARD HUNT, goldsmiths; EDMUND BILLINGTON, whitesmith, and fourteen blacksmiths. In June, 1718, in consequence of a petition "from several tradesmen and manufacturers," complaining that notwithstanding their having taken out their freedoms, many strangers daily came in and settled, who were not entitled to carry on business, the Common Council gave permission to such trades as desired to frame and bring in an ordinance whereby they could be incorporated.—*Minutes of Common Council.*

In the federal procession in 1788, a carriage drawn by nine horses contained the federal blacksmiths, whitesmiths and nailers, in full employ. The blacksmiths completed during the procession a full set of plow-irons out of old swords, worked a sword into a sickle, turned several horse-shoes, and did other jobs on demand. Mr. I. GOODMAN, whitesmith, finished a complete pair of plyers, a knife and some machinery. The nailers finished and sold spikes, nails and broad tacks. They were followed by two hundred others of their trades, with the device—"By hammer and hand all arts do stand." The goldsmiths, silversmiths and jewellers followed their senior member, WILLIAM BALL, to the number of thirty-five.

How different the spectacle we witness at this hour, when that *Union*, which was everywhere hailed as the greatest blessing to the productive classes, after having fulfilled its high promise, is rashly threatened with destruction, and the plowshare and sickle are being once more beaten into swords for fratricidal conflict!

VII. MINT IN MARYLAND.

As early as 1652, for the promotion of trade, a mint was established in Maryland for the coinage of sixpences; and about the same time a curious tonnage duty was established for the support of the government. Every vessel having a flush-deck fore and aft, coming to trade in the province, was compelled to pay one-half pound of powder and three pounds of shot for every ton of burden.

VIII. EARLY USE OF SILVER.

Ancient histories, paintings and cabinets of ancient relics abundantly show that gold, silver and copper, hardened by combination with tin, constituting bronze or brass, formed the principal weapons, tools and metallic manu-

factures of the early ages, and of the half-civilized nations of modern times. Whatever may have been the original significance of the ancient poetic idea of a succession of ages of gold, silver, brass and iron, it appears to have had a real as well as an allegorical foundation in the world's history. We appear, in the literal sense at least, to have fallen emphatically upon the iron times, when the arts of life have rendered that metal more valuable than even gold, and susceptible of becoming, in the hands of the artificer, many hundredfold more precious, weight for weight, than the finest gold.

At the time of the discovery and first settlement of America, the natives had, in a very few instances, advanced beyond that primitive stage of civilization in which the use of metals was confined to trinkets of gold, silver and copper, worn upon the person of the savage. Their most effective tools and weapons were sharpened flint stones and shells, and they possessed no other means of felling a tree, or scooping a canoe from its trunk, than by the application of fire. Some tribes more advanced, possessed, in addition to these rude ornaments and implements, the art of casting images and other figures in gold and silver, many of which are still found in the *huacas* or graves of the races. Chisels, hatchets and a few other tools and weapons of copper, alloyed with tin, so as to cut wood with facility, were also made by the Peruvians and Mexicans, who thus appear to have reached the brazen era of civilization. Lead was also known to some extent. Although knives of iron, supposed to have been of meteoric origin, are mentioned as having been found at a later period among the Esquimaux and savages of the Northwest Coast, there is some room to doubt; and most of the fossil treasures of the continent, those of iron especially, lay for the most part unvexed in the womb of earth until after the date of English colonization.

THE DIAMOND MARKET.—The diamond mines are well guarded everywhere, but sometimes thefts take place undiscovered; and sometimes even the most cunning hiding places are found out; as when a negro stole a diamond weighing two carats and hid it in the corner of his eye, but was detected. If any one is suspected of theft, he is taken to a solitary room, locked up, and given powerful emetics; for the most common place of concealment is the stomach, and the management only does what the negro himself would do a few hours later to obtain re-possession of the gem. But, notwithstanding all these precautions, and notwithstanding that all stones weighing more than two carats belong to royalty, (referring, at least, to the mines of Golconda, the most celebrated and the richest in the world,) yet several gems of ten, and even twenty carats, make their way into the market, and find purchasers in spite of risk and law. If a slave finds a stone weighing $17\frac{1}{2}$ carats, he is a free man on the spot. The mines are scientifically worked, and gems are no longer got by flinging beefsteaks down inaccessible precipices, for vulture and eagles to bring up again, with a fringe of diamonds adhering to them, which was the manner in which they were secured in mythic times, according to the assertions of philosophers and SINBAD the sailor. Diamonds and gold have always had a strange connection together, and in Brazil are found in close union. In some parts of the country gold can be picked up in the streets after a shower of rain, and diamonds have been found entangled in the roots of vegetables, and in the crops of chickens. Diamonds are supposed to grow and ripen in the mines; thus rock crystal, which is found in the same kind of matrix, is called the "unripe" diamond, the "ripe" gem; and MADAME DE BARRERA tells a curious story, quoted from Mr. MAWE, of a negro who found a magnificent bit of "unripe diamond," weighing near a pound, and which, for its lustre and purity, was taken for the real thing.—*Temple Bar*.

BANKS OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK.

Liabilities and Resources of the Banks of the City of New-York, according to their Official Quarterly Statement, September 21st, 1861, with the date of Commencement of Business of each Bank, and the Value of Stock according to the Net Profits on hand.

LIABILITIES.	Capital.	Net Profits.	Circulation.	Due Banks.	Depositors.	Due all others.	Total.	Value of Shares.	Commenced Business.
1. Bank of Commerce.....	\$9,148,480 ..	\$439,178 ..	\$1,975 ..	\$2,239,510 ..	\$6,357,474 ..	\$18,645 ..	\$18,235,262 ..	\$104.80 ..	Jan. 1, 1839.
2. American Exchange Bank,	5,000,000 ..	299,360 ..	191,560 ..	1,682,056 ..	3,946,661 ..	875,408 ..	11,995,045 ..	106 ..	July 17, 1838.
3. Metropolitan Bank,	4,000,000 ..	417,009 ..	234,701 ..	2,614,051 ..	2,793,829 ..	738,870 ..	10,795,460 ..	110.42 ..	April 17, 1851.
4. Merchants' Bank,	2,776,400 ..	192,665 ..	227,473 ..	1,085,922 ..	2,296,805 ..	565,407 ..	7,094,672 ..	106.98 ..	June 7, 1805.
5. Bank of America,	3,000,000 ..	338,765 ..	129,761 ..	2,319,401 ..	4,900,257 ..	68,440 ..	10,751,624 ..	111.29 ..	June 1, 1812.
6. Bank of New-York,	3,000,000 ..	157,072 ..	355,804 ..	219,471 ..	3,769,170	7,501,017 ..	105.23 ..	June 9, 1784.
7. MANHATTAN COMPANY,*	2,050,000 ..	552,179 ..	257,557 ..	652,056 ..	3,627,567 ..	438,578 ..	7,577,937 ..	126.93 ..	April 2, 1799.
8. Bank of the Republic,	2,000,000 ..	359,495 ..	220,016 ..	580,326 ..	2,170,451 ..	355,578 ..	5,635,866 ..	117.97 ..	Jan. 20, 1851.
9. BK. OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK,*	2,000,000 ..	189,725 ..	236,478 ..	996,405 ..	2,440,391 ..	354,646 ..	6,217,645 ..	109.48 ..	May 18, 1836.
10. Continental Bank,	2,000,000 ..	117,559 ..	204,568 ..	479,354 ..	1,651,281 ..	997 ..	4,453,759 ..	105.57 ..	Jan. 18, 1853.
11. Mechanics' Bank,	2,000,000 ..	135,034 ..	224,175 ..	445,261 ..	2,981,102 ..	24,080 ..	5,569,602 ..	109.75 ..	March 23, 1810.
12. Park Bank,	2,000,000 ..	217,622 ..	226,170 ..	3,121,440 ..	2,324,657 ..	39,884 ..	7,929,703 ..	110.87 ..	March 31, 1856.
13. Phenix Bank,	1,500,000 ..	160,819 ..	126,125 ..	1,141,734 ..	2,435,207 ..	318,109 ..	5,981,984 ..	108.98 ..	June 15, 1812.
14. Importers and Traders' Bank,	1,500,000 ..	159,637 ..	194,978 ..	145,627 ..	1,483,706 ..	264,546 ..	8,745,494 ..	110.64 ..	Dec. 10, 1855.
15. National Bank,	1,500,000 ..	98,886 ..	110,497 ..	48,343 ..	1,512,489 ..	739 ..	3,270,954 ..	106.59 ..	April 30, 1829.
16. Shoe and Leather Bank,	1,500,000 ..	206,270 ..	216,564 ..	229,223 ..	1,376,790 ..	21,325 ..	3,550,175 ..	113.75 ..	Nov. 23, 1852.
17. Union Bank,	1,500,000 ..	154,849 ..	172,614 ..	260,927 ..	2,361,698 ..	263,880 ..	4,713,468 ..	110.33 ..	March 1, 1811.
18. Merchants' Exchange Bank,	1,235,000 ..	71,086 ..	103,627 ..	311,464 ..	1,634,302 ..	8,636 ..	2,764,075 ..	105.75 ..	June 1, 1828.
19. Bank of North America,	1,000,000 ..	126,152 ..	98,294 ..	386,079 ..	1,582,669 ..	1,432 ..	3,194,656 ..	112.61 ..	Feb. 25, 1851.
20. Broadway Bank,	1,000,000 ..	421,852 ..	341,257 ..	194,613 ..	2,108,466 ..	175,998 ..	4,242,246 ..	142.18 ..	Aug. 9, 1849.
21. City Bank,	1,000,000 ..	225,146	108,091 ..	2,598,135 ..	10,720 ..	3,983,092 ..	122.51 ..	June 6, 1812.
22. Corn Exchange Bank,	1,000,000 ..	48,625 ..	150,649 ..	268,388 ..	1,539,973 ..	1,495 ..	3,009,925 ..	104.85 ..	Feb. 1, 1853.
23. Hanover Bank,	1,000,000 ..	62,835 ..	85,874 ..	137,722 ..	880,402 ..	1,067 ..	2,167,980 ..	106.23 ..	March 24, 1851.
24. Market Bank,	1,000,000 ..	51,216 ..	175,328 ..	84,509 ..	975,228 ..	175,875 ..	2,462,156 ..	105.12 ..	Nov. 1, 1852.
25. Mercantile Bank,	1,000,000 ..	109,637 ..	24,888 ..	1,049,773 ..	1,032,344 ..	184,994 ..	3,401,636 ..	110.96 ..	Dec. 25, 1849.
26. Ocean Bank,	1,000,000 ..	88,639 ..	89,083 ..	510,303 ..	640,259 ..	178,822 ..	2,466,106 ..	103.86 ..	Dec. 10, 1849.
27. Nassau Bank,	1,000,000 ..	56,913 ..	143,100 ..	420,143 ..	948,615 ..	529 ..	2,569,300 ..	105.69 ..	Aug. 1, 1852.
28. Tradesmen's Bank,	1,000,000 ..	73,226 ..	308,385 ..	38,965 ..	795,075 ..	268,926 ..	2,475,127 ..	107.32 ..	— 1828.
29. Butchers and Drivers' Bank,	800,000 ..	98,848 ..	291,254 ..	91,586 ..	1,277,419 ..	9,414 ..	2,568,521 ..	112.35 ..	April 8, 1830.

30. Bank of the Commonwealth,.....	750,000 ..	44,391 ..	261,984 ..	212,545 ..	978,484 ..	138,589 ..	2,375,998 ..	105.92 ..	May 5, 1853.
31. St. Nicholas Bank,.....	750,000 ..	49,256 ..	84,848 ..	52,136 ..	626,138 ..	267,084 ..	1,898,912 ..	106.56 ..	Nov. 22, 1852.
32. Mechanics and Traders' Bank,....	600,000 ..	71,194 ..	162,783 ..	615 ..	1,010,871 ..	702 ..	1,846,165 ..	111.86 ..	April 15, 1850.
33. Artisans' Bank,.....	600,000 ..	16,454 ..	3,000	5,230 ..	27,887 ..	632,021 ..	102.74 ..	Sept. 2, 1856.
34. Fulton Bank,.....	600,000 ..	226,957 ..	184,860 ..	4,072 ..	1,616,495 ..	104,873 ..	2,737,257 ..	137.82 ..	March 1, 1854.
35. LEATHER MANUFACTURERS' BK.,*	600,000 ..	224,371 ..	279,922 ..	199,677 ..	1,006,332 ..	106,380 ..	2,416,632 ..	137.89 ..	April 23, 1852.
36. Irving Bank,.....	500,000 ..	13,730 ..	121,080 ..	25,939 ..	683,706 ..	515 ..	1,354,970 ..	102.74 ..	April 4, 1851.
37. SEVENTH WARD BANK,.....	500,000 ..	119,737 ..	173,233 ..	9,751 ..	926,432 ..	748 ..	1,729,901 ..	123.94 ..	April, — 1853.
38. Mechanics' Banking Association, ..	500,000 ..	33,073 ..	86,973 ..	7,655 ..	806,450 ..	1,462 ..	1,435,618 ..	106.61 ..	Aug. 1, 1853.
39. Manufac. and Merchants' Bank,....	500,000 ..	23,741 ..	121,992 ..	61,360 ..	532,654 ..	210 ..	1,239,957 ..	104.74 ..	Dec. 1, 1859.
40. Chatham Bank,.....	450,000 ..	12,322 ..	105,018 ..	36 ..	550,720 ..	1,941 ..	1,120,237 ..	102.78 ..	Feb. 20, 1851.
41. Pacific Bank,.....	422,700 ..	100,634 ..	151,164 ..	36,225 ..	939,716 ..	905 ..	1,671,844 ..	123.81 ..	Oct. 17, 1850.
42. People's Bank,.....	412,500 ..	12,986 ..	87,831 ..	30,622 ..	476,277 ..	72,114 ..	1,092,330 ..	103.15 ..	April 1, 1851.
43. Atlantic Bank,.....	400,000 ..	29,409 ..	99,191 ..	49,757 ..	803,433 ..	90,720 ..	972,540 ..	107.35 ..	May 25, 1853.
44. Citizen's Bank,.....	400,000 ..	33,255 ..	146,364	704,758 ..	19,551 ..	1,308,958 ..	109.56 ..	May 20, 1851.
45. Marine Bank,.....	399,000 ..	25,581 ..	154,479 ..	79,066 ..	771,827 ..	2,075 ..	1,432,028 ..	106.41 ..	May 5, 1853.
46. North River Bank,.....	400,000 ..	7,845 ..	65,684 ..	24,373 ..	523,328 ..	540 ..	1,021,770 ..	101.96 ..	July 2, 1852.
47. Chemical Bank,.....	300,000 ..	726,493 ..	397,540 ..	130,113 ..	4,215,993 ..	52,860 ..	5,825,499 ..	341.62 ..	April 1, 1854.
48. Oriental Bank,.....	300,000 ..	22,672 ..	99,649	419,147 ..	1,200 ..	842,668 ..	107.56 ..	July 11, 1853.
49. Grocers' Bank,.....	300,000 ..	32,810 ..	48,476 ..	11,567 ..	423,241 ..	409 ..	816,803 ..	110.94 ..	Aug. 1, 1851.
50. East River Bank,.....	206,325 ..	23,729 ..	103,660 ..	2 ..	235,492 ..	82,003 ..	652,011 ..	111.49 ..	Sept. 8, 1852.
51. Greenwich Bank,.....	200,000 ..	46,644 ..	147,600 ..	853 ..	521,129 ..	5,188 ..	921,414 ..	123.82 ..	April 17, 1850.
52. New-York County Bank,.....	200,000 ..	14,854 ..	64,047 ..	49 ..	288,098 ..	159 ..	567,207 ..	107.42 ..	Aug. 1, 1855.
53. N. Y. DRY DOCK COMPANY,*,.....	200,000 ..	5,099 ..	121,491 ..	11 ..	192,931 ..	142,326 ..	631,858 ..	102.54 ..	April 14, 1855.
54. Bull's Head Bank,.....	200,000 ..	26,531 ..	136,510	377,492 ..	151 ..	740,684 ..	113.26 ..	Sept. 1, 1854.
55. New-York Exchange Bank,.....	150,000 ..	14,432 ..	83,276 ..	30,630 ..	211,520 ..	16,726 ..	506,584 ..	109.62 ..	April 21, 1851.
Totals, September 21, 1861,.....	\$ 69,650,605 ..	\$ 7,608,579 ..	\$ 8,634,895 ..	\$ 22,725,112 ..	\$ 83,252,466 ..	\$ 6,483,341 ..	\$ 198,349,998		
" June 30, 1860,.....	69,738,777 ..	8,647,293 ..	8,731,894 ..	26,243,064 ..	79,716,004 ..	1,392,651 ..	194,459,688		
" March 31, 1860,.....	69,420,057 ..	7,675,947 ..	8,467,922 ..	29,089,360 ..	79,526,028 ..	861,379 ..	194,991,293		
" September 24, 1859,.....	68,983,632 ..	7,517,247 ..	8,211,126 ..	18,779,680 ..	76,265,092	179,706,777		
" December, 1858,.....	68,019,585 ..	6,862,144 ..	7,701,336 ..	28,469,904 ..	81,605,963 ..	1,011,465 ..	193,670,397		
" December, 1857,.....	65,024,112 ..	7,265,716 ..	6,279,802 ..	17,152,207 ..	59,377,089 ..	1,366,520 ..	156,465,426		
" March, 1857,.....	59,703,583 ..	6,611,258 ..	8,538,954 ..	22,888,578 ..	70,760,939 ..	717,793 ..	169,221,102		

* The five banks in small capitals are chartered banks, the others were established under the general banking law. The decrease of bank capital since June, 1860, is owing to the reduction of the Marine Bank capital from \$661,700, to \$399,000.

BANKS OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK.—CONTINUED.

Liabilities and Resources of the Banks of the City of New-York according to their Official Quarterly Report, September 21st, 1861.

	RESOURCES.	Loans.	Stocks.	Bonds and Mortgages.	Real Estate.	Due from Banks.	Cash Items		Specie.	Over-drafts.	Totals.
							and	Bank Notes.			
1.	Bank of Commerce,.....	\$ 10,610,621 ..	\$ 2,608,968	\$ 393,109 ..	\$ 1,357,259 ..	\$ 685,319 ..	\$ 2,579,956	\$ 18,285,262
2.	American Exchange Bank,.....	5,073,995 ..	3,160,867 ..	\$ 212,817 ..	865,239 ..	146,980 ..	643,400 ..	2,989,455 ..	\$ 3,192	11,995,045
8.	Metropolitan Bank,.....	7,837,696 ..	300,000 ..	51,032 ..	272,000 ..	369,675 ..	930,373 ..	1,585,435 ..	2,229	10,798,460
4.	Merchants' Bank,.....	4,479,165 ..	261,273	186,000 ..	94,235 ..	642,358 ..	1,431,252 ..	359	7,094,672
5.	Bank of America,.....	5,626,615 ..	666,298	210,000 ..	60,998 ..	637,384 ..	3,550,047 ..	832	10,751,624
6.	Bank of New-York,.....	3,030,739 ..	2,000,432	400,000 ..	43,231 ..	435,852 ..	1,540,544 ..	219	7,501,017
7.	Manhattan Company,.....	4,606,485	61,868 ..	355,784 ..	88,166 ..	577,310 ..	1,588,024 ..	805	7,577,937
8.	Bank of the Republic,.....	3,607,623 ..	865,225 ..	82,000 ..	150,000 ..	121,292 ..	550,756 ..	758,965	5,635,866
9.	Bank of the State of New-York,.....	2,973,723 ..	850,750	204,572 ..	274,559 ..	851,560 ..	1,060,321 ..	2,160	6,217,645
10.	Continental Bank,.....	2,753,995 ..	432,561	270,046 ..	45,132 ..	437,404 ..	488,067 ..	1,554	4,453,759
11.	Mechanics' Bank,.....	3,776,469 ..	449,509 ..	7,000 ..	250,000 ..	73,979 ..	390,214 ..	890,706 ..	1,725	5,869,602
12.	Park Bank,.....	5,123,037 ..	400,000	135,284 ..	196,541 ..	422,659 ..	1,043,430 ..	8,752	7,929,703
13.	Phenix Bank,.....	3,310,403 ..	690,120	175,000 ..	17,862 ..	377,897 ..	1,410,318 ..	384	5,981,984
14.	Importers and Traders' Bank,.....	1,881,026 ..	875,440 ..	10,888 ..	200,000 ..	66,918 ..	241,816 ..	469,801 ..	2,605	3,748,494
15.	National Bank,.....	2,097,098 ..	195,318	85,500 ..	7,364 ..	100,446 ..	785,097 ..	251	3,270,954
16.	Shoe and Leather Bank,.....	2,566,149 ..	363,000	100,863 ..	52,262 ..	154,518 ..	313,393	3,550,175
17.	Union Bank,.....	2,458,490 ..	698,042 ..	55,469 ..	209,346 ..	19,591 ..	520,983 ..	751,513 ..	34	4,713,468
18.	Merchants' Exchange Bank,.....	1,922,390 ..	148,785 ..	6,000 ..	62,798 ..	77,380 ..	172,593 ..	372,900 ..	1,229	2,764,075
19.	Bank of North America,.....	2,048,633 ..	118,000	110,250 ..	74,461 ..	395,570 ..	443,669 ..	4,023	3,194,656
20.	Broadway Bank,.....	2,336,799 ..	676,300	175,000 ..	43,697 ..	354,128 ..	435,758 ..	564	4,242,246
21.	City Bank,.....	2,404,610 ..	10,000	80,000 ..	64,304 ..	493,079 ..	878,290 ..	1,809	3,932,092
22.	Corn Exchange Bank,.....	1,764,617 ..	241,519	117,554 ..	18,479 ..	446,930 ..	419,833 ..	93	3,008,025
23.	Hanover Bank,.....	1,601,801 ..	145,005	91,881 ..	24,987 ..	111,297 ..	190,707 ..	2,802	2,167,980
24.	Market Bank,.....	1,632,832 ..	237,970	75,000 ..	35,719 ..	99,250 ..	360,280 ..	1,105	2,462,156
25.	Mercantile Bank,.....	2,474,738 ..	71,000	27,944 ..	203,646 ..	622,077 ..	231	3,401,636
26.	Ocean Bank,.....	1,695,211 ..	145,375 ..	18,240 ..	141,186 ..	86,679 ..	144,797 ..	233,200 ..	1,418	2,466,106
27.	Nassau Bank,.....	1,512,264 ..	243,066	177,606 ..	38,529 ..	80,960 ..	514,740 ..	2,045	2,566,800

[December,

28. Tradersmen's Bank,.....	1,012,809 ..	988,378	241,961 ..	30,787 ..	78,278 ..	179,964	2,475,197
29. Butchers and Drivers' Bank,.....	1,791,109 ..	330,000	59,511 ..	14,984 ..	94,248 ..	278,465 ..	254 ..	2,568,521
30. Bank of the Commonwealth,.....	1,253,905 ..	394,198	188,100 ..	65,211 ..	805,572 ..	167,241 ..	1,771 ..	2,375,998
31. St. Nicholas Bank,.....	1,148,091 ..	173,865 ..	26,500 ..	104,258 ..	13,968 ..	102,809 ..	258,775 ..	1,146 ..	1,828,912
32. Mechanics and Traders' Bank,.....	1,027,407 ..	316,680	44,120 ..	60,100 ..	116,738 ..	278,293 ..	2,827 ..	1,846,165
33. Artisans' Bank,.....	595,880 ..	8,615	40,688	468	425 ..	652,021
34. Fulton Bank,.....	1,374,331 ..	310,858	65,000 ..	39,511 ..	108,751 ..	843,776	2,737,257
35. Leather Manufacturers' Bank,.....	1,222,249 ..	558,129	49,890 ..	190,044 ..	396,310 ..	60 ..	2,416,682
36. Irving Bank,.....	885,022 ..	170,325 ..	2,900 ..	43,000 ..	38,808 ..	105,951 ..	107,186 ..	2,488 ..	1,854,970
37. Seventh Ward Bank,.....	955,278 ..	120,706	83,375 ..	17,920 ..	84,544 ..	518,002 ..	76 ..	1,729,901
38. Mechanics' Banking Association,.....	966,675 ..	215,671 ..	2,750 ..	3,623 ..	13,318 ..	49,941 ..	183,615	1,435,618
39. Manufacturers and Merchants' Bank,.....	825,766 ..	168,000	12,653 ..	6,729 ..	53,214 ..	173,368 ..	227 ..	1,239,957
40. Chatham Bank,.....	811,110 ..	126,559	5,417 ..	14,858 ..	66,767 ..	98,860 ..	1,866 ..	1,120,237
41. Pacific Bank,.....	1,044,432 ..	200,116	48,554 ..	7,965 ..	111,507 ..	238,470	1,671,344
42. People's Bank,.....	708,493 ..	87,000 ..	81,620 ..	88,019 ..	13,038 ..	53,890 ..	115,573 ..	197 ..	1,092,890
43. Atlantic Bank,.....	489,698 ..	288,890	7,244 ..	116,842 ..	67,266 ..	3,100 ..	972,540
44. Citizens' Bank,.....	796,268 ..	183,250	69,075 ..	7,578 ..	63,677 ..	189,110	1,308,958
45. Marine Bank,.....	781,315 ..	191,000 ..	15,000 ..	54,500 ..	13,020 ..	197,457 ..	179,706	1,432,028
46. North River Bank,.....	608,555 ..	109,418 ..	748 ..	86,149 ..	84,785 ..	69,466 ..	111,003 ..	1,646 ..	1,021,770
47. Chemical Bank,.....	1,748,844 ..	681,555 ..	33,500 ..	55,428 ..	146,457 ..	256,174 ..	2,902,319 ..	1,167 ..	5,825,499
48. Oriental Bank,.....	536,156 ..	127,969	54,379 ..	5,543 ..	22,838 ..	95,578 ..	10 ..	842,668
49. Grocers' Bank,.....	440,471 ..	189,240	30,000 ..	21,409 ..	35,104 ..	99,156 ..	1,423 ..	816,808
50. East River Bank,.....	856,902 ..	115,000	90,447 ..	4,420 ..	68,411 ..	21,731 ..	100 ..	652,011
51. Greenwich Bank,.....	264,256 ..	218,379	15,554 ..	708 ..	11,033 ..	416,875 ..	89 ..	921,414
52. New-York County Bank,.....	211,608 ..	192,762	14,638 ..	3,404 ..	144,750	567,207
53. New-York Dry Dock Company,.....	388,580 ..	124,477	11,620 ..	61,427 ..	16,700 ..	55,481 ..	3,563 ..	661,858
54. Bull's Head Bank,.....	351,949 ..	164,189	30,500 ..	53,225 ..	98,556 ..	42,177 ..	58 ..	740,654
55. New-York Exchange Bank,.....	302,663 ..	103,700	13,864 ..	66,447 ..	20,387 ..	21 ..	506,954

Totals, September 21, 1861,.....	\$ 113,810,543 ..	\$ 23,195,577 ..	\$ 617,677 ..	\$ 6,501,524 ..	\$ 4,299,098 ..	\$ 13,742,440 ..	\$ 36,118,215 ..	\$ 61,929 ..	\$ 198,349,998
“ June 30, 1860,.....	125,139,007 ..	13,267,842	6,314,456 ..	7,013,755 ..	19,037,997 ..	28,054,622 ..	69,946 ..	194,489,653
“ March 31, 1860,.....	125,949,817 ..	12,975,447	6,254,715 ..	5,078,902 ..	20,871,287 ..	28,172,656 ..	53,088 ..	194,991,293
“ September 24, 1859,.....	115,708,233 ..	11,911,174 ..	505,027 ..	6,316,469 ..	4,714,259 ..	19,499,987 ..	20,556,277 ..	55,128 ..	179,706,777
“ December, 1858,.....	124,967,547 ..	11,231,779 ..	509,963 ..	5,986,464 ..	5,899,674 ..	18,695,241 ..	26,326,983 ..	52,791 ..	193,670,397
“ December, 1857,.....	97,783,308 ..	8,191,419 ..	866,558 ..	5,424,647 ..	4,088,850 ..	13,912,456 ..	26,660,183 ..	93,112 ..	156,465,426
“ March, 1857,.....	118,813,017 ..	8,977,507	5,254,501 ..	5,419,824 ..	24,559,248 ..	10,756,375 ..	74,842 ..	169,221,102

New-York City Banks.—An examination of the last quarterly statement of the banks of this city, for the 21st of September last, shows that the average capital of the fifty-five banks is about \$1,280,000. Of the whole, their capital is distributed as follow :

1 over \$9,000,000 ..	1 of \$1,800,000 ..	4 of \$600,000
1 of 5,000,000 ..	4 of 1,500,000 ..	4 of 500,000
1 of 4,000,000 ..	1 of 1,235,000 ..	7 of 400,000 or over.
3 of 3,000,000 ..	10 of 1,000,000 ..	3 of 300,000
1 of 2,050,000 ..	1 of 800,000 ..	5 of 200,000 or over.
5 of 2,000,000 ..	2 of 750,000 ..	1 of 150,000

Seven banks show surplus profits over twenty per cent. The largest amount of circulation is that of the Chemical Bank, \$397,000 ; only four having over \$300,000. The largest amount due to country banks is by the Park Bank, \$3,121,000 ; three above \$2,000,000 ; four above \$1,000,000. The largest amount of individual deposits is held by the Bank of Commerce, \$6,387,000 ; two have over \$4,000,000. The fifty-five banks of New-York City commenced business at the following periods :

Year.	Year.	Year.	Year.
1 in 1784.	2 in 1824.	1 in 1836.	7 in 1852.
1 in 1799.	1 in 1825.	2 in 1838.	6 in 1853.
1 in 1805.	2 in 1828.	1 in 1839.	1 in 1854.
1 in 1810.	1 in 1829.	3 in 1849.	2 in 1855.
1 in 1811.	3 in 1830.	1 in 1850.	2 in 1856.
3 in 1812.	1 in 1833.	10 in 1851.	1 in 1859.

Fifty of these are organized under the general banking law of the State. Of the five chartered banks, two are unlimited, viz., the Manhattan and the New-York Dry Dock. The other charters will expire, the Leather Manufacturers' Bank in 1862 ; the Seventh Ward Bank in 1863, and the Bank of the State of New-York in the year 1866.

The following table illustrates the increase of banking capital, deposits, loans and specie, since the year 1849, at New-York. The most marked increase was in the number of banks and amount of capital during the years 1852—1853, and from September, 1855, to March, 1857 :

Date.	Capital.	Due other Banks.	Deposits.	Loans.	Specie.	No. of Banks.
September, 1849,....	\$25,065,000 ..	\$12,392,000 ..	\$28,482,000 ..	\$51,079,000 ..	\$8,022,000 ..	25
September, 1850,....	27,440,000 ..	16,412,000 ..	37,018,000 ..	62,886,000 ..	9,056,000 ..	28
September, 1851,....	34,603,000 ..	10,777,000 ..	36,957,000 ..	70,516,000 ..	6,082,000 ..	37
September, 1852,....	36,791,000 ..	22,434,000 ..	46,608,000 ..	94,355,000 ..	8,702,000 ..	41
June, 1853,....	44,196,000 ..	24,961,000 ..	59,078,000 ..	102,714,000 ..	12,174,000 ..	52
September, 1855,....	48,688,000 ..	18,525,000 ..	58,657,000 ..	103,924,000 ..	9,747,000 ..	52
March, 1857,....	59,703,000 ..	22,888,000 ..	70,760,000 ..	122,790,000 ..	10,786,000 ..	56
June, 1858,....	67,041,000 ..	28,275,000 ..	74,806,000 ..	127,662,000 ..	31,704,000 ..	58
September, 1859,....	68,933,000 ..	18,379,000 ..	75,497,000 ..	115,708,000 ..	20,556,000 ..	54
March, 1860,....	69,420,000 ..	29,039,000 ..	79,526,000 ..	125,949,000 ..	23,172,000 ..	55
June, 1860,....	69,758,000 ..	26,243,000 ..	80,536,000 ..	125,189,000 ..	23,054,000 ..	55
September, 1860,....	69,290,000 ..	21,271,000 ..	81,283,000 ..	120,271,000 ..	20,116,000 ..	54
December, 1860,....	69,907,000 ..	22,792,000 ..	84,828,000 ..	131,351,000 ..	24,597,000 ..	55
March, 1861,....	69,914,000 ..	28,219,000 ..	83,512,000 ..	117,069,000 ..	37,458,000 ..	55
June, 1861,....	69,650,000 ..	25,006,000 ..	77,158,000 ..	105,822,000 ..	39,972,000 ..	55
September, 1861,....	69,650,000 ..	22,725,000 ..	83,252,000 ..	118,810,000 ..	36,118,000 ..	55

*Comparative Table of the Banks of the State of New-York, 1859—1861,
from the quarterly reports.*

RESOURCES.	Sept., 1859.	Sept., 1860.	March, 1861.	June, 1861.	Sept., 1861.
Loans,.....	\$ 182,420,134	\$ 200,113,834	\$ 186,130,600	\$ 163,477,371	\$ 176,055,848
Overdrafts,.....	386,317	423,392	362,211	373,279	383,023
Due from banks,.....	12,218,983	17,167,040	14,611,956	13,324,077	14,196,276
Real Estate,.....	8,647,508	8,865,800	8,967,823	8,938,312	9,107,851
Specie on hand,.....	22,026,137	21,710,828	39,229,285	41,824,079	38,089,727
Cash items,.....	19,716,121	22,913,841	18,114,340	13,636,864	14,200,499
Stocks, bonds and mortgages,.....	34,742,237	36,609,787	37,775,737	41,527,496	47,405,222
Bills of other banks,.....	1,965,325	2,509,601	1,955,477	2,066,843	1,817,949
Loss and expense account,.....	1,124,173	981,432	1,058,219	1,221,482	800,811
Miscellaneous,.....	980	968	949
Total resources,.....	\$ 283,246,930	\$ 311,245,555	\$ 308,207,128	\$ 291,390,271	\$ 302,058,155
LIABILITIES.	Sept., 1859.	Sept., 1860.	March, 1861.	June, 1861.	Sept., 1861.
Capital,.....	\$ 110,997,040	\$ 111,834,347	\$ 111,755,491	\$ 109,912,209	\$ 109,982,324
Circulation,.....	27,970,968	31,759,127	27,827,965	25,617,151	28,015,748
Profits undivided,.....	12,514,593	13,816,463	12,929,192	14,597,241	13,007,927
Due banks,.....	23,992,116	29,706,606	34,007,310	30,013,723	28,211,772
Due other than banks,.....	943,505	2,252,961	1,214,942	1,045,466	1,525,222
Treasurer of the State,.....	1,873,226	3,569,907	2,609,426	2,171,120	2,764,416
Due depositors,.....	103,106,666	116,190,466	116,183,469	106,315,092	111,895,016
Miscellaneous,.....	1,843,811	2,615,673	1,679,333	1,718,269	6,655,730
Total liabilities,.....	\$ 283,246,930	\$ 311,245,555	\$ 308,207,128	\$ 291,390,271	\$ 302,058,155

List of twenty-nine Chartered Banks in the State of New-York, showing the date of incorporation, the expiration of charter, the amount of capital and the amount of circulation.

NAME OF BANK.	Date of Charter.	Charter will expire.	Capital authorized.	Circulation, Dec., 1850.
Steuben County Bank,.....	1832, March.	1862, Jan. 1.	\$ 150,000	\$ 175,000
Schenectady Bank,.....	" April.	" "	150,000	175,000
Essex County Bank,.....	" "	" "	100,000	150,000
Bank of Rome,.....	" "	" "	100,000	150,000
Bank of Orange County,.....	1832, April.	1862, Jan. 1.	105,600	150,000
Bank of Salina,.....	" "	" "	150,000	174,000
Leather Manufacturers' Bank,.....	" "	" June 1.	600,000	449,000
Westchester County Bank,.....	1833, March.	1863, Jan. 1.	200,000	200,000
Troy City Bank,.....	" April.	" "	300,000	250,000
Seventh Ward Bank, New-York,.....	" "	" "	500,000	350,000
Seneca County Bank,.....	" March.	" "	200,000	200,000
Lewis County Bank, <i>failed</i> ,.....	" April.	" "	100,000	150,000
Herkimer County Bank,.....	" March.	" "	200,000	200,000
Chemung Canal Bank,.....	" April.	" "	200,000	197,000
Cayuga County Bank,.....	" March.	" "	272,400	274,000
Albany City Bank,.....	1834, April.	1864, "	500,000	340,000
Bank of Orleans, Albion, <i>failed</i> ,.....	" "	" "	200,000	200,000
Farmers' and Man. Bank, Poughkeepsie,.....	" "	" "	300,000	250,000
Highland Bank, Newburgh,.....	" "	" "	200,000	200,000
Sackett's Harbor Bank, <i>failed</i> ,.....	" "	1865, "	200,000	200,000
Atlantic Bank, Brooklyn,.....	1836, May.	1866, "	500,000	330,000
Bank of Owego,.....	" "	" "	200,000	200,000
Bank of State of New-York,.....	" "	" "	2,000,000	806,000
Kingston Bank,.....	" "	" "	200,000	200,000
Onelda Bank,.....	" "	" "	400,000	300,000
Rochester City Bank,.....	" "	" "	400,000	300,000
Tompkins County Bank,.....	" March.	" "	250,000	224,000
Manhattan Company, New-York,.....	1799, April.	Unlimited.	2,050,000	1,063,000
New-York Dry Dock Company,.....	1825, "	Unlimited.	200,000	136,000

LOWEST AND HIGHEST SALES FOR CASH, FOR YEARS 1860 AND 1861.

BONDS AND STOCKS.	YEAR 1860.		APRIL, 1861.		MAY, 1861.		JUNE, 1861.		JULY, 1861.		AUG., 1861.		SEPT., 1861.		OCT., 1861.		YEAR 1861.	
	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.	Low- est.	High- est.
United States six per cent. 1863....	95	109½	89	95	80	95	75	79½	89	90	81½	90	88	90	90	90	80	100
United States six per cent. 1861....	85	104½	75	89½	76	79½	75	78½	76	82	78½	81	79½	81½	81½	86	75	97
U. S. Treasury Notes, six per cent.,	88	98	88	93	80	80	78	80	75	77½	75	75½	77½	79	79	79	75	93
U. S. five per cent. 1874, coupon,...	78	95	86	76½	43½	43½	39	48	44	50	50	56½	51½	55	45	48	36	81
Indiana State five per cent.,.....	64	98	41	75½	40½	47½	34½	41½	37	45½	42	46½	41½	44½	41	43½	34½	77
Virginia six per cent. bonds,.....	102	105	60	60½	53	60	57	70	65	77	68½	67	63	66	58	77
Tennessee six per cent. bonds,.....	76	100	45	81	53	62	44	53	48	62	54	70	60	63½	55½	60½	44	82½
Georgia six per cent. bonds,.....	82	95	78½	87½	71½	75	76½	78	74½	78½	73	77	76	81½	81	83	71½	88
North Carolina six per cent. bonds,	61	84½	37½	66	35	42	36	40½	37½	46½	41	45	41½	44½	40½	46½	35	72½
California seven per cent. bonds,...	14	28½	8	14½	8½	10	8½	9	9	9½	9	10	10	..	9½	..	8	15
Missouri six per cent. bonds,.....	8	17½	6	7½	4	5½	4½	4½	4½	5½	4½	5	4½	5½	4	9½
Canton Company shares,.....	70	107½	50	66	60½	71	59	69	69	77	70	79½	75½	89½	88½	96½	50	96½
Cumberland Coal Co., preferred,...	8½	43	17	32½	19½	23½	21½	23½	22½	29	24	26½	24½	26½	25½	28½	17	40½
Pacific Mail Steamship Company,...	86	66	33	45½	34	37½	31½	34½	32	38	32½	34½	32½	34	33½	38½	31½	49½
New-York Central Rail-Road,.....	8	24	11½	16½	10½	12½	8½	10½	9½	12½	10½	11	10½	10½	10½	14	8½	16½
Hudson River Rail-Road,.....	27	55	28	41½	25½	31½	20½	25½	22½	29½	24½	26½	25	25½	25½	35	20½	43
Harlem Rail-Road shares,.....	80	49½	29½	44½	30½	32½	30½	38½	38	39½	35	37½	34½	36½	34½	37	29½	45½
Reading Rail-Road shares,.....	84½	73½	40	58½	40	46	39½	44½	41	47½	40½	43	41½	43½	41	52	39½	61½
Michigan Central Rail-Road,.....	5	25	12½	19½	10½	13½	10½	12½	12	15½	12½	14	13½	14½	13½	19½	10½	19½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana R.R.,...	12½	50½	26	39½	24½	29½	22½	27½	26½	38½	27½	30	28½	31½	31	40½	22½	40½
Michigan S. & N. Indiana, guar.,...	106	146½	97½	116½	99	107	104	109	105	111½	104½	103	106	115	115	119	97½	119
Panama Rail-Road shares,.....	51½	89½	55½	81½	57	71	62	69	62	69½	63	65	61½	68½	64½	69½	55½	88½
Illinois Central Rail-Road shares,...	55	82½	55	73½	55½	61	56	61½	60½	66½	62½	66½	66½	69½	69	71½	55	74½
Galena and Chicago Rail-Road,...	18½	49½	22½	36½	20½	25½	20½	21½	23½	33	27½	30½	29	30½	29½	35½	20½	38½
Cleveland and Toledo Rail-Road,...	42½	84½	84	58	30½	39	32½	36½	34	45	37½	41½	41½	45½	45½	53	30½	62
Chicago & Rock Island Rail-Road,...	81	100½	85	98	89	92½	89	92	89	92	89½	90	91½	93½	87½	90	85	102½
Illinois Central Construction bonds,	73½	67	72	81	75	77	70	77½	73	79	75	80	76	76	76	76	72	80½
Pennsylvania Coal Company,.....	80	101½	82	90	80	84	79	83½	80	86½	82½	85½	82½	86	83½	86	79	92
Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.,...																		

The transactions at the New-York Stock Board, during the month of October, were unusually heavy, especially in government and State loans. The general result at the close of the month was a decided improvement upon the prices prevailing on the first day. The government new six per cents have been sold as high as $95\frac{3}{4}$ in the month; the five per cents reached 86, and the demand for the new 7.30 bonds, among the people, shows that it has become a truly popular loan among both small and large capitalists. The bonds of the loyal States are held at firm prices, and holders are more sanguine as to future values in the market. The range for Virginia sixes has been 45 @ 48; Tennessee, 41 @ $43\frac{1}{4}$; Missouri, $40\frac{1}{2}$ @ $46\frac{3}{4}$; North Carolina and Georgia, having a much smaller debt, their securities are less dealt in, the former ranging from $58\frac{1}{4}$ @ $60\frac{3}{4}$, and the latter from 63 @ 66. California bonds are getting into better hands, and find buyers for investment at 81 @ 83, which is about equal to nine per cent. per annum. A better appreciation of rail-road shares and bonds prevails. The leading roads have more business on their hands than they will execute, and at remunerative prices. New-York Central shares have sold during the month $5\frac{1}{4}$ higher than in September; Erie Rail-Road shares, $8\frac{1}{4}$; Hudson River, $4\frac{1}{2}$; Harlem, $3\frac{1}{8}$; Harlem preferred, $9\frac{3}{8}$; Michigan Central, $8\frac{1}{2}$; Michigan Southern, $5\frac{1}{8}$; guaranteed, $9\frac{1}{4}$; Panama, 4; Cleveland and Toledo, $7\frac{1}{2}$; Chicago and Rock Island, $7\frac{1}{2}$.

A decided improvement is also visible in rail-road bonds. Erie first, second and third mortgages are held above par. The company gives notice that holders of New-York and Erie second mortgage bonds, not yet extended for twenty years, are requested to present their bonds without delay at the office of the company, at the foot of Duane-street, for extension. Those willing to extend will receive par and interest for their bonds, from parties who are willing to extend them, on presenting them at said office on Tuesday and Thursday of each week, at from 10 to 12 o'clock, until the first day of December.

The banks of the three cities, New-York, Philadelphia and Boston, have agreed to pay to the United States government \$50,000,000, taking for this sum the six per cent. stocks of the government, redeemable in twenty years, at such a rate as will yield to the banks a rate of interest exactly 7 per cent., payable semi-annually. The problem, more concisely stated, then is, at what rate should the six per cent. stock, interest payable semi-annually, and redeemable in twenty years, be taken, in order to yield seven per cent. interest, also payable semi-annually. The problem was referred to Mr. JOSEPH M. PRICE, President of the Oriental Bank, and author of several valuable tables, to the actuaries of the "Mutual," "New-York Life and Trust" and the "United States" Life Insurance Companies respectively, and it is gratifying to find that these results, by at least four independent processes, were in all cases precisely the same, and were also proved by a regular *debit* and *credit* account, made by the manager of the New-York Clearing-House.

The value, then, at which \$100,000,000 of the six per cent. stock should be taken, is \$89,322,463 83; or, the value in this six per cent. stock of the \$50,000,000 to be placed at the credit of the Secretary of the Treasury, is \$44,661,231 91. It should be borne in mind that this sum is independent of any accrued interest on the above stock, which, of course, is subsequently taken into account.

BANK ITEMS.

Notice.—The publisher of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE has in preparation, for publication in December, 1861, the *Merchants and Bankers' Almanac* for 1862, containing the usual list of banks, bank officers, private bankers, &c. The publisher will be glad to receive information as to any changes of bank presidents and cashiers and banking firms, since the publication of the volume for 1861.

Cards of private bankers will be inserted in the new volume at fifteen dollars each. The revulsion in trade throughout the country during the present year points to the advantage to bankers in the insertion of their cards. The circulation of this volume in the several States, and in England, France, &c., makes it a valuable medium for advertisements.

RATES FOR ADVERTISING.

Bankers' Cards, in Bankers' Magazine, one-fifth of a page, one year, (including subscription,).....	\$20 00
“ “ Almanac, one-fifth of a page, one year,.....	15 00
“ “ Magazine and Almanac,.....	25 00
Bankers' Magazine, subscription, one year,.....	5 00
Bankers' Almanac, (including postage,).....	1 25

NEW-YORK.—The charters of six banks of this State will expire on 1st January, 1862, viz.: 1. Bank of Orange County, Goshen. 2. Bank of Rome, (Oneida County.) 3. Bank of Salina, Syracuse. 4. Essex County Bank, Keeseville. 5. Schenectady Bank. 6. Steuben County Bank, Bath. In June, 1862, the charter of the Leather Manufacturers' Bank, New-York City, will expire.

The Essex County Bank, at Keeseville, will not be re-organized under the general banking law. The old bank will be wound up, and its capital returned to the shareholders.

Extraordinary Counterfeit.—The one hundred dollar bills of the Shoe and Leather Bank, of New-York City, have been so perfectly counterfeited as to elude the vigilance of the banks and of various brokers, and of other bank tellers. The *Albany Journal*, in reference to this very dangerous counterfeit on the Shoe and Leather Bank, says: “The most dangerous and successful counterfeit ever put afloat on the banks in this State, was this morning discovered in the Assorting house in this city. They are one hundred dollar bills, purporting to have been issued by the ‘Shoe and Leather Bank, New-York,’ so admirably executed as apparently to have passed through several banking houses before reaching this city. The vignette, running from the centre to the right hand, represents a horseman in the pursuit of two cattle, and he in the act of lassoing one of them. On the right upper corner is a female head, decked with flowers, and on the lower right end the coat of arms of the State. The latter is not well executed, and appears to be the only deficiency in the bill. The fact that the signatures of the register, cashier and president are all engraved and well executed, makes it so dangerous a counterfeit. They are pronounced by good judges to be the best counterfeit ever seen in this country.” The president of the bank states, that so successful is the imitation of his one hundred dollar bills, that about \$1,500 were taken, through the Clearing-House exchanges, at his own bank, before the fraud was detected. The entire genuine issue of one hundred dollar bills will now be called in at once, and the plate, in all respects, changed. The present genuine plate was engraved by the American Bank Note Company, whose work appears, in the present instance, to have been most successfully imitated.

Mr. G. L. HAIGHT, hitherto Receiving Teller of the American Exchange Bank, was, on first November, appointed Assistant Cashier, in place of Mr. R. BAYLES, now of the Market Bank.

Albany.—Mr. VAN ALLEN, Receiver of the Bank of Albany, gives notice that he is prepared to pay a dividend of 46½ per cent. upon all demands against the bank that have been proved and acknowledged. The dividend is payable at the Merchants' Bank, of Albany. The bank suspended June 11th, 1861.

MASSACHUSETTS.—The annual meeting of the stockholders of the Bank of Mutual Redemption for the choice of directors for the ensuing year was held in October, when the following gentlemen were chosen:

FRANKLIN NICHOLS, President, Thames Bank, Norwich, Conn.
HENRY P. HICKOK, President, Merchants' Bank, Burlington, Vt.
STEPHEN N. MASON, Director, Globe Bank, Woonsocket, R. I.
A. W. THAXTER, President, Traders' Bank, Boston, Mass.
FRANCIS M. JOHNSON, President, Mount Wollaston Bank, Quincy, Mass.
THOMAS W. PEIRCE, Director, Bank of Commerce, Boston, Mass.
EZRA FARNSWORTH, Director, National Bank, of Boston, Mass.
CHESTER W. CHAPIN, Director, Agawam Bank, Springfield, Mass.
FRANCIS H. DEWEY, Director, Mechanics' Bank, Worcester, Mass.
ELIJAH W. UPTON, Director, Warren Bank, Danvers, Mass.
JACOB H. LOUD, President, Old Colony Bank, Plymouth, Mass.
GEORGE W. THAYER, President, Exchange Bank, Boston, Mass.
JAMES G. CARNEY, Stockholder, Lowell Bank, Lowell, Mass.

At a meeting of the directors, held subsequently, JAMES G. CARNEY was re-elected President.

New Plates.—The Prescott Bank, of Lowell, whose fives and tens were recently extensively counterfeited, are issuing new bills of those denominations. The new plates are engraved by the National Bank Note Company, of New-York; and the result is one of the finest specimens of bank note engraving now in circulation. The large amount of delicate and intricate combination of works, both on the face and back of the new bills, must be a great security against counterfeits. The old issues of fives and tens will be withdrawn from circulation.

Law Case.—As long ago as 1858 the Cashier of the Bank of Brighton, Mr. WOODWORTH, was detected in embezzling the funds of the bank, but, for some reason or other, proceedings against him were stopped. Subsequently to the detection of the embezzlement, it was ascertained that Mr. WOODWORTH had caused to be discounted at the Faneuil Hall Bank, in Boston, some \$20,000 in drafts on this city, in the name of the Bank of Brighton. The then President of the Bank of Brighton, Mr. STEPHEN BENNETT, refused to acknowledge the responsibility of the bank, and took shelter under the defalcation of the Cashier. The Faneuil Hall Bank had discounted the drafts in good faith, and contended that the Bank of Brighton was responsible. We propose to publish the case in full in the January number of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

NEW-HAMPSHIRE.—At a corporate meeting of the Mechanics and Traders' Bank, Portsmouth, N. H., on the 25th October, it was voted that the capital of the bank be reduced to \$98,300, and the balance be divided among the stockholders on the first Monday of January next.

RHODE ISLAND.—The officers of the Woonsocket Falls Bank having recently, on several occasions, missed small sums of money, and discovered marks of tools upon the safe, evidently made in attempting to force it open, for several nights have had a watch in the bank, detaining two of the clerks for the purpose. Monday night, about half-past eleven, they heard the outer door open and shut. They seized the person who came in and secured him. He had with him a bunch of false keys and several burglar's tools. The person was a resident of Woonsocket, respectably connected, and has heretofore enjoyed the confidence of the public, and has been employed in that and other banks.—*Providence Journal.*

CONNECTICUT.—Between Saturday and Monday, the 11th November, a daring and most successful robbery was perpetrated upon the Bank of West Winsted, Connecticut, the burglars succeeding in carrying off about \$50,000, \$8,000 of which was in specie, and the balance in bills, mostly of their own bank. Among other

valuables taken were four United States Treasury 6 per cent. notes, two of \$100 and two of \$50 each. The thieves had evidently studied the localities with great care, and undertook their work with a degree of circumspection and skill seldom exhibited by the profession. They entered through a lawyer's office, which was directly over the vault of the bank. Boards in the floor, of unequal length, were neatly sawed through, and after proceeding with the work in the vault, they were carefully replaced, screwed down, puttied over, and then sanded, so as not to attract observation. The inclosure of the vault was of granite, the top slab being over six inches thick. Through this they chiselled their way, splitting it in two, raising off one-half of it, and thus affording room through which to descend into the vault. On retiring with their booty they replaced the stone, screwed down the floor, and left everything in such apple-pie order that it took the bank officers some time to discover the mysterious hole through which their treasure had departed.

A reward of \$1,000 has been offered for the detection of the thieves and recovery of the money. In order to keep a sure safeguard against robberies of this kind, our banks should have the steel burglar-proof safe, manufactured by W. W. BACON, New-Haven, Connecticut. (*See his card on the cover of this work.*)

NEW-JERSEY.—A meeting of the commissioners appointed to organize the Merchants' Bank of Trenton, met November 21st, pursuant to notice, and the amount of stock required by law being represented, the stockholders proceeded to elect thirteen directors, who subsequently elected ROBERT COFFIN, Esq., President, and J. M. HYDE, Esq., Cashier. The first instalment of \$30,000 is now in hands of the commissioners.

Applications to the Legislature.—The next session of the New-Jersey legislature promises to be a very busy one, judging from the large number of applications to be made from the various counties of the State: For an act to incorporate a bank, to be located at Harrison, with a capital of \$100,000, and the privilege of increasing the capital to \$500,000; also, to charter a bank at East Newark, with \$100,000 capital, and the privilege of \$500,000. At the present time there are located in Hudson County four banks, as follow: The Mechanics and Traders' Bank, of Jersey City, Bank of Jersey City and Hudson County Bank, in Jersey City, and the Hoboken City Bank, of Hoboken.

PENNSYLVANIA.—Several of the banks are expected to pass their semi-annual dividends. The Girard Bank has suffered a loss upon Southern rail-road bonds estimated at two hundred thousand dollars, and, consequently and wisely, makes no dividend. Others of the banks have large amounts of business paper secured by collateral in the shape of notes given by Southern merchants. While the war lasts the collateral is worthless, and the makers of the notes having failed, the funds of the banks are to such an extent locked up until the war is ended. Meanwhile, the stockholders must wait for dividends.—*Philadelphia Press.*

MARYLAND.—J. WESLEY GUEST, Esq., was, on 2d of September last, elected Cashier of the Citizens' Bank, Baltimore, in place of WILLIAM L. RICHARDSON, Esq., who resigned.

Currency in the South.—Gold and silver are now selling in the Southern States at from ten to fifteen per cent. premium for current bank bills. A sound and uniform currency is as essential to the health and vigor of the Confederacy and the government as healthy red blood is to the power and endurance of the body. *This thing of a depreciated currency is just now more to be feared than all of LINCOLN's legions.* It is what it ought not to be, and cannot be submitted to by the Southern people. It is intolerable that the banks should be exempt by law from the obligation to redeem their currency in specie, and, at the same time, sell the very gold and silver with which it ought to be redeemed for ten to fifteen per cent. in exchange for their own bills. It is all the same whether they do this at their own counter directly, or indirectly through the agency of brokers. True to their soulless character and sordid instincts, the banks are ready, for a few vile dollars, to crush the government and the people together. Are these institutions really the friends of LINCOLN? Just so soon as it appears that the banks are to be allowed to prey upon the people at this time, when they are loyally and patriotically pouring into the public treasury every dollar they can spare, and bravely looking debt and taxation in the face, we shall find an abatement of zeal and a discontent perilous to our great cause. Whatever

circulates as money now must circulate at par, and if the bills of the suspended banks are really declining in value, and are in fact worth ten to fifteen per cent. less than gold, it is time to crush them out. *If this evil should be allowed to progress, we shall soon have universal bankruptcy.* We are willing to give our last dollar and last drop of blood to support the existing war and expel the invaders of our soil. We have solemnly consecrated our lives to this holy work, but we are not willing to be taxed ten per cent., even on the whole currency, for the benefit of selfish and unpatriotic money-mongers. Cast the money-changers out of our holy temple. Scourge them away from our patriotic altars. Congress is now in session. I propose a scheme for its consideration. It is as follows:

1. Let Congress declare, by solemn act, that whoever shall ask or receive a per cent., in consideration of the exchange of one sort of money for another, whether it shall be specie for paper money, or one sort of money for another, shall be guilty of treason, and punished with death.

2. Let it be instantly provided that each State shall receive at its own treasury at par any paper money which may be lawfully issued by any bank, corporation or individual within its jurisdiction.

3. Let it be provided that any such money shall be received at par in payment of all taxes and dues to the Confederate States Treasury.

4. Authorize the Treasury Department to use the public funds and securities for the redemption of any paper money in the Confederate States.

5. Require each bank in the Confederacy to redeem the bills of any other bank. Let Congress be warned and woke up to the financial perils which beset us. The banks are the allies of LINCOLN.—*Correspondence of the Richmond Enquirer.*

KENTUCKY.—W. C. HITE, Esq., has been appointed Cashier, *pro tem.*, of the Commercial Bank of Kentucky, at Louisville, in place of WM. H. DAVIDSON, Esq., deceased.

WISCONSIN.—The Bank Comptroller of Wisconsin has sold at public auction, in New-York, the bond securities of the following banks, which have become extinct:

Beloit Savings Bank,	Mechanics' Bank,	Bank of Albany,
Southern Bank,	Oconto County Bank,	Bank of Appleton,
Hall & Brothers' Bank,	Bank of Beaver Dam,	Wood County Bank,
Portage County Bank,	Mercantile Bank,	Waushara County Bank,
Osborne Bank,	Tradesmen's Bank,	St. Croix River Bank,
Reedsburg Bank,	Winnebago County Bank,	Wisconsin Valley Bank.
Bank of Fond du Lac,		

Of the sales of the bonded securities of these Wisconsin banks, Tennessee six per cents realized 42 $\frac{3}{4}$ @ 42 $\frac{3}{4}$; Virginia, 37 $\frac{3}{4}$; Louisiana, 60 $\frac{1}{4}$; Missouri sixes, 44 $\frac{1}{4}$ @ 44 $\frac{3}{4}$; North Carolina sixes, 60 $\frac{1}{4}$ @ 60 $\frac{1}{4}$; Ohio six per cents, 92 $\frac{1}{4}$; Georgia six per cents, 65 $\frac{1}{4}$; Indiana five per cents, 76 $\frac{1}{4}$.

Wisconsin Currency.—A convention of the banks of Wisconsin was held at Milwaukee in November, at which about fifty of the country banks of the State were represented. The following preamble and resolutions were adopted:

Whereas, A few of the bankers of this State have failed to provide for the voluntary redemption of their notes, in accordance with the resolutions of the Bankers' Association in September last, and have given no indications of their intention to comply with the amended banking law, which takes effect on the first of December prox.:

Resolved, That the bankers' committee shall proceed to wind up such banks as fail to make agreements for redemption, according to law, on the first of December next, so as to retire their circulation at par; and that the cost of making up any deficiency of expense that may so arise, be paid out of funds now in the hands of said committee, and out of funds to be provided by an assessment on the other current banks, and that an assessment of one per cent. on the capital of said banks be now required to be paid into the hands of said committee, for the purpose aforesaid.

Resolved, That the notes of all banks now current be received and paid out as currency on an equal footing up to the first of December next, and that after that date the notes of the banks so failing to redeem will be returned to the bankers'

committee, to be retired as above provided—except the notes of the Bank of Portage, Dodge County Bank and Waupun Bank.

Resolved, That if, in the opinion of the bankers' committee, it shall become necessary to make a temporary reduction in the volume of the currency, they are hereby authorized to make a requisition on the banks of the State to retire such a percentage of their currency as may be requisite, and so furnish exchange for the present feverish demand.

Illinois Currency.—The State Auditor of Illinois is making good progress in winding up the defunct banks of that State. The circulation redeemed during the month of October, at the Auditor's office, was \$279,089, for which \$160,419 80 in specie was paid, the value of the notes averaging about 56 per cent. The outstanding circulation of the same banks is \$533,854, so that about 34½ per cent. of the circulation of these banks was redeemed during the month of October. Since the first of November the stocks of several other banks have been sold and dividends declared, the most of them at higher rates than those first wound up.

Effects of Free Banking.—The State Auditor of Illinois is redeeming the notes of the following banks at the rates opposite each:

	Cts.		Cts.
Alisana Bank,.....	55½	Farmers and Traders' Bank,.....	50
American Exchange Bank,.....	51	Frontier Bank,.....	53
Bank of Aurora,.....	53	Garden State Bank,.....	65½
Bank of Benton,.....	58	Grand Prairie Bank,.....	55
Bank of Carmi,.....	54½	Grayville Bank,.....	54
Bank of Chester,.....	54½	Hampden Bank,.....	58
Bank of the Commonwealth,.....	53	Humboldt Bank,.....	56
Bank of Elgin,.....	66	Jersey County Bank,.....	58½
Bank of Naperville,.....	64	Kaskaskia Bank,.....	62
Bank of Pike County,.....	63	Lafayette Bank,.....	57
Bank of Quincy,.....	60	Lancaster Bank,.....	55
Bank of Raleigh,.....	57	Merchants and Drovers' Bank,.....	61
Belvidere Bank,.....	52½	Morgan County Bank,.....	52
Canal Bank,.....	58½	National Bank,.....	60
Citizens' Bank,.....	55	New Market Bank,.....	52
Commercial Bank, Palestine,.....	56	Plowman's Bank,.....	53½
Commercial Bank, New-Haven,.....	54½	Rail-Road Bank,.....	55
Continental Bank,.....	58	Reed's Bank,.....	65
Corn Exchange Bank,.....	60	Rock Island Bank,.....	50
Corn Planters' Bank,.....	54	Shawanese Bank,.....	63½
Douglas Bank,.....	55	Southern Bank of Illinois,.....	56
Farmers' Bank, North Canton,.....	64½	Union County Bank,.....	61
Farmers' Bank of Illinois, Metamora, 61			

Highland Bank will be redeemed about the 20th inst.

The Auditor will soon commence selling the securities of the following banks, and redeem the notes soon after:

American Bank,	Fulton Bank,
Agricultural Bank,	Illinois Central Bank,
Bank of Aledo,	Illinois State Security Bank,
Bank of Brooklyn,	Kankakee Bank,
Bank of Commerce,	Lake Michigan Bank,
Bank of the Federal Union,	Mississippi River Bank,
Bank of Genesee,	Narragansett Bank,
Bank of the Metropolis,	Ohio River Bank,
Bank of the Republic,	Olympic Bank,
Bank of Southern Illinois,	Prairie State Bank,
Bond County Bank,	State Stock Bank,
Bull's Head Bank,	Toulon Bank,
Columbian Bank,	Warren County Bank,
Eagle Bank of Illinois,	Wheat Growers' Bank,
Franklin Bank,	Western Bank.


PRIVATE BANKERS.

RECENT CHANGES AMONG PRIVATE BANKERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES.

<i>State.</i>	<i>Place.</i>	<i>Name of Firm.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Rhode Island,...	Providence,	Charles H. Pope,	Retired.
New-York,.....	Buffalo,.....	A. P. Yaw & Co.,.....	"
"	Cuba,	M. J. Green & Co.,.....	Closed.
"	Lyons,	D. Chapman & Co.,.....	Retired.
"	Niagara Falls,.....	H. White & Co.,.....	Failed.
"	Lyons,	Charles Demmon,.....	New.
Pennsylvania,...	Carlisle,	Ker, Brenneman & Co.,.....	Dissolved.
"	"	Ker, Dunlap & Co.,.....	New firm.
"	Hollidaysburg,	Johnston, Jack & Co.,	
"	Lancaster,	Reed, McGrann, Kelly & Co.,	Dissolved.
"	"	Reed, McGrann & Co.,	New firm.
"	Philadelphia,	Work, Glendenning & Co.,	Dissolved.
"	"	G. F. Work & Co.,	New firm.
"	Shippensburg,	McLean, Wunderlich & Co.,	Dissolved.
"	"	Greason, Wunderlich & Co.,	New firm.
Maryland,.....	Baltimore,	Spurrier, Honeywell & Evans,	Failed.
"	"	Nicholson & Bro.,.....	Retired.
Illinois,	Aurora,	Albert Jenks & Co.,	Failed.
"	"	William Coffin,	New firm.
"	Chicago,	I. H. Burch & Co.,	Failed.
"	"	Granger, Weldon & Co.,	
"	"	W. H. Rice & Co.,	Failed.
"	"	E. I. Tinkham & Co.,	"
"	"	B. F. Carver & Co.,	
"	"	E. H. Hall & Co.,	Dissolved.
"	"	C. H. McCormick,	
"	"	H. J. Perrin & Co.,	
"	"	W. A. S. Van Duzer,	
"	"	White Bros.,	
"	"	A. C. Badger & Co.,	New firm.
"	"	Burkam & Sons,	"
"	"	C. B. Blair,	"
"	"	Brotherton & Nettleton,	"
"	"	J. G. Conrad,	"
"	"	Chapin, Wheeler & Co.,	"
"	"	Kedzie, Alexander & Co.,	"
"	"	C. C. Parks & Co.,	"
"	"	Sol. Sturges & Co.,	"
"	"	Willard & Kean,	"
"	Jerseyville,	A. M. Blackburn & Co.,	Relinquished.
"	Joliet,	T. Hatton & Co.,	
"	"	U. Osgood,	
"	Knoxville,	Smith & Hale,	
"	Monmouth,	Gregg & Hubbard,	Failed.
"	Naperville,	J. Jassoy & Co.,	"
"	Rockford,	Spofford, Clark & Co.,	"
"	"	E. N. Kitchell,	"
"	Shawneetown,	Peoples & Ridgway,	New.
"	Rock Island,	Mitchell & Cable,	Dissolved.

Illinois,.....	Rock Island,.....	Mitchell & Lynde,.....	New.
".....	Sandwich,.....	Castle & Shepard,.....	Dissolved.
".....	Somonauk,.....	".....	"
".....	Sandwich,.....	M. B. Castle,.....	New.
Indiana,.....	Logansport,.....	J. M. Warren & Co.,.....	Failed.
".....	New-Albany,.....	Montgomery & Pepin,.....	Retired.
".....	Vincennes,.....	Blackburn & Swallow,.....	Failed.
Iowa,.....	Anamosa,.....	Winslow & Co.,.....	"
".....	".....	Wight & Hygum,.....	New.
".....	Dubuque,.....	Theo. Gelpcke & Co.,.....	Failed.
".....	".....	J. L. Langworthy & Bro.,.....	"
".....	Davenport,.....	Macklot & Corbin,.....	Dissolved.
".....	".....	Louis A. Macklot,.....	New.
".....	Iowa City,.....	J. H. Gower & Co.,.....	Failed.
".....	Muscatine,.....	Green & Stone,.....	"
".....	Ottumwa,.....	Bonnifield Bros.,.....	New.
Kentucky,.....	Hopkinsville,.....	Bryan & Co.,.....	
".....	Louisville,.....	T. Brown & Co.,.....	Failed.
".....	Winchester,.....	H. G. Poston,.....	Retired.
Michigan,.....	Battle Creek,.....	W. H. Coleman & Co.,.....	Assigned.
".....	".....	W. H. Skinner,.....	"
".....	".....	R. B. Briggs,.....	"
".....	Grand Rapids,.....	Wm. J. Welles,.....	Failed.
".....	".....	Daniel Ball & Co.,.....	"
".....	Kalamazoo,.....	D. A. McNair,.....	"
".....	Niles,.....	Pratt & Perrin,.....	"
Minnesota,.....	Minneapolis,.....	D. C. Groh,.....	Retired.
".....	St. Paul,.....	N. J. L. Dana,.....	
Missouri,.....	Hannibal,.....	T. R. Selmes,.....	
".....	St. Louis,.....	Emigrant Savings Association,	
".....	".....	Wm. Nesbit & Co.,.....	
".....	".....	B. F. Stout & Co.,.....	
Ohio,.....	Bucyrus,.....	Exchange Bank,.....	Suspended.
".....	Cincinnati,.....	C. E. Nourse & Co.,.....	Retired.
".....	".....	J. F. Meline & Co.,.....	Assigned.
".....	Lancaster,.....	Fairfield Savings Association,.	
".....	Portsmouth,.....	Means, Hall & Co.,.....	
".....	Toledo,.....	W. W. Clark,.....	Relinquished.
".....	Wellsville,.....	McCulloch & Co.,.....	"
Wisconsin,.....	Beloit,.....	Wadsworth, Clark & Co.,.....	Failed.
".....	Stevens' Point,....	Huyssen & Scheffer,.....	Failed.

CINCINNATI.—MESSRS. JOSEPH F. LARKIN, THOMAS FOX and GEORGE FOX have established a banking firm at Cincinnati, Ohio, under the style of LARKIN, FOX & BROTHER. Their New-York correspondent is the Park Bank.

 In the MERCHANTS AND BANKERS' ALMANAC for 1862, now in preparation at the office of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, will be contained a correct list of Private Bankers, as nearly as can be ascertained. As only a few extra copies will be issued, those who desire an early copy are requested to send their order without delay. Price \$1 25 each.

Notes on the Money Market.

NEW-YORK, NOVEMBER 25, 1861.

Exchange on London, at sixty days' sight, 109 @ 109½.

THE successful negotiation of the third instalment of the Government loan has given confidence to the money market, and has also given an impulse to business in and around New-York. Secretary CHASE met the banks of the city in convention, with the representatives of those of Boston and Philadelphia, on the 14th and 15th inst. The result of the conference was an agreement to take fifty millions of United States six per cent. bonds, redeemable in twenty years, at a rate equivalent to 7 per cent. Assuming that an early restoration of peace with the South will occur, the new bonds will be more available for use in foreign markets. The new debt of the government will then be in the following shape:

Treasury Notes at 7.30 per cent., dated August 15, 1861,.....	\$ 50,000,000
do. 7.30 do. dated September 15, 1861,.....	50,000,000
United States Bonds at 6 do. dated July 1, 1861,.....	50,000,000
Treasury Notes, payable on demand,.....	50,000,000
	<u>\$ 200,000,000</u>

Leaving fifty millions only to be issued under the act of July 17, 1861.

The popular subscription to the 7.30 loan of \$100,000,000 is, up to this date, about \$42,000,000. The banks have also the third option of \$50,000,000 of three-year 7.30 per cent. Treasury Bonds, from December, proximo, as originally stipulated, to January, 1862. The entire \$50,000,000 of the new stock will, of course, be placed under the single control of a committee of the Associated Banks, not to be sold or otherwise disposed of or distributed until the whole amount is paid for or drawn, and then to be distributed to each bank only on such terms and under such restrictions as may be mutually agreed upon.

We give the highest quotations for United States sixes from 1842 to 1860:

Years.	Price.	Years.	Price.	Years.	Price.
1842,.....	100	1849,.....	118¾	1855,.....	118¾
1843,.....	118¾	1850,.....	122	1856,.....	118¾
1844,.....	115	1851,.....	122½	1857,.....	118¾
1845,.....	114	1852,.....	121	1858,.....	115½
1846,.....	112	1853,.....	124	1859,.....	112
1847,.....	108	1854,.....	123¾	1860,.....	109¾
1848,.....	108				

The business in bill discounting, outside the banks, has gradually been reduced with the trade and commerce of the city, but there is yet a large amount of paper passing through the brokers' hands. While money has been quite abundant during the month "on call," with ample collaterals, business paper, of a good grade, could not be passed under 7 @ 9 per cent. At present such paper is scarce, the minimum prices being 5½ @ 7 per cent., which are merely exceptional quotations. The banks take such at 7 per cent., but where the holders have not banking facilities, they are forced to pay outside prices of 7, 8 @ 9 per cent. It is extremely difficult to quote brokers' rates for second and third rate paper. There is a wide range, and values fluctuating constantly. We annex the ruling rates for business paper at this date, compared with the last week in August, September and October:

	Aug. 24.	Sept. 24.	Oct. 24.	Nov. 25.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Loans on call, State Stock securities,.....	4 @ 5	5½ @ 6	6 @ 7	6 @ 7
" other good securities,.....	6 @ 7	6 @ 7	7 @ ..	6 @ 7
Prime endorsed bills, 60 days,.....	6 @ 7	6 @ 6½	6½ @ 7	5½ @ 7
First class single signatures, 4 to 6 months, ..	7 @ 10	6½ @ 7	8 @ 12	8 @ 10
Other good bills,.....	9 @ 12	10 @ 12	12 @ 15	10 @ 12
Names less known,.....	no sale.	12 @ 15	24 @ 36	18 @ 24

The condition of our foreign trade forbids the advance of sterling bills above par. The importations are about one-half what they were in 1859 and 1860, while the export trade is large beyond precedent. The following is a summary for three years:

Value of Imports for ten months of the calendar years

	1859.	1860.	1861.
First quarter,.....	\$ 59,116,788 ..	\$ 64,702,778 ..	\$ 61,866,400
Second quarter,.....	70,048,086 ..	53,025,288 ..	42,485,400
Third quarter,.....	68,579,300 ..	67,081,000 ..	31,091,400
October,.....	13,617,000 ..	16,787,200 ..	8,583,700
Total imports,.....	\$ 211,361,174 ..	\$ 201,596,216 ..	\$ 143,466,900

Receipts for Customs for ten months of the calendar years

	1859.	1860.	1861.
October,.....	\$ 2,318,721 ..	\$ 2,632,078 ..	\$ 1,672,617
Three months ending September 30,.....	12,002,767 ..	12,039,102 ..	4,870,797
“ June 30,.....	9,541,011 ..	7,584,924 ..	3,507,469
“ March 31,.....	9,971,171 ..	10,754,755 ..	7,077,865
Total,.....	\$ 33,833,670 ..	\$ 33,010,869 ..	\$ 17,128,748

The foreign exchanges, therefore, remain in our favor, although the rates are 1 @ 1½ per cent. higher than in October. The range for bankers' bills on London this month has been 107½ @ 109, the par being ordinarily assumed at 109½. Commercial bills at sixty days, during the month, were 107 @ 108; with bills of lading there were large sales, at 105½ @ 106½, and have now risen to 107½. For the steamer of this week the range for Paris bills at short sight is 5.20 @ 5.17½; sixty days, 5.25 @ 5.22½. There has been an advance, since the close of October, in bankers' bills on Amsterdam, from 40½ to 40¾; Bremen, from 77½ to 79½ cents per rix dollar; on Hamburg, from 35¾ to 36 cents per marc banco; and on Frankfort, from 40¾ to 41 cents per florin.

The annexed summary will show the changes at the close of each month since August last:

	Aug. 24.	Sept. 24.	Oct. 24.	Nov. 21.
London, bankers' bills,.....	107½ @ 107¾ .. 108 @ 108½ ..	107½ @ 108 .. 107½ @ 108 ..	109 @ 109½ .. 109 @ 109½ ..	
“ mercantile bills,....	106½ @ 107¼ .. 107½ @ 108 ..	107 @ 107½ .. 108 @ 109 ..	108 @ 109 .. 107 @ 107½ ..	
“ with bills of lading, 105 @ 106 ..	106½ @ 107 .. 105 @ 106 ..	107 @ 107½ .. 107 @ 107½ ..	107 @ 107½ .. 107 @ 107½ ..	
Paris, bankers' bills,.....	5.40 @ 5.30 .. 5.37½ @ 5.30 ..	5.38½ @ 5.35 .. 5.25 @ 5.15 ..	5.25 @ 5.15 .. 5.25 @ 5.15 ..	
Amsterdam, per guilder,....	39½ @ 40¼ .. 39½ @ 40 ..	40½ @ 40¼ .. 40½ @ 40¼ ..	40½ @ 40¼ .. 40½ @ 40¼ ..	
Bremen, per rix dollar,....	75½ @ 77 .. 76½ @ 77½ ..	77½ @ 77½ .. 79½ @ 79½ ..	79½ @ 79½ .. 79½ @ 79½ ..	
Hamburg per marc banco,...	35 @ 35½ .. 35 @ 35½ ..	35½ @ 35½ .. 35½ @ 36 ..	35½ @ 36 .. 35½ @ 36 ..	
Frankfort, per florin,.....	— @ — .. 40¼ @ 40¼ ..	40¼ @ 43½ .. 41 @ 41½ ..	41 @ 41½ .. 41 @ 41½ ..	

The banking movement at New-York since August is indicated by the following table, the aggregate loans being twenty-seven millions above the amount standing the week before the first loan was taken, (August 17th,) and now nineteen millions below the highest aggregate yet reported, viz., \$156,000,000, October 12:

1861.	Loans.	Specie.	Circulation.	Net Deposits.	Weekly Clearings.	Specie, Sub-Treas.
Aug. 17,....	\$ 103,717,434 ..	\$ 49,733,990 ..	\$ 8,521,426 ..	\$ 92,046,308 ..	\$ 80,172,670 ..	\$ 4,380,239
Aug. 24,....	137,668,988 ..	47,119,481 ..	8,439,714 ..	118,456,307 ..	82,946,028 ..	6,993,296
Aug. 31,....	141,081,474 ..	45,098,113 ..	8,440,155 ..	120,436,010 ..	83,446,771 ..	8,851,608
Sept. 7,....	139,158,230 ..	41,887,230 ..	8,890,581 ..	114,091,061 ..	89,058,896 ..	13,094,909
Sept. 14,....	136,565,624 ..	37,529,412 ..	8,792,620 ..	106,760,876 ..	95,611,078 ..	14,293,222
Sept. 21,....	130,192,258 ..	36,805,177 ..	8,707,693 ..	99,316,831 ..	97,104,420 ..	15,541,307
Sept. 28,....	126,128,326 ..	38,123,552 ..	8,638,780 ..	96,551,898 ..	85,685,514 ..	13,103,484
Oct. 5,....	143,545,488 ..	39,809,901 ..	8,884,056 ..	120,607,549 ..	110,687,377 ..	10,629,098
Oct. 12,....	156,318,914 ..	41,139,606 ..	8,733,090 ..	129,188,487 ..	113,981,352 ..	10,802,803
Oct. 19,....	151,828,438 ..	42,282,384 ..	8,585,673 ..	126,433,063 ..	122,803,544 ..	9,503,649
Oct. 26,....	147,263,646 ..	42,260,616 ..	8,415,643 ..	121,716,954 ..	111,175,226 ..	7,330,763
Nov. 2,....	144,021,020 ..	41,271,080 ..	8,571,946 ..	117,933,529 ..	113,762,469 ..	9,082,835
Nov. 9,....	140,627,660 ..	41,213,993 ..	8,948,897 ..	113,425,895 ..	116,656,518 ..	7,820,914
Nov. 16,....	137,308,635 ..	41,461,833 ..	8,798,675 ..	110,214,604 ..	117,541,065 ..	7,386,266

In the stock market there has been, since the middle of October, a decided improvement. State loans have assumed better values and the Government loans are more firmly held. The wisdom of placing the new public loan in hands where it would be, and remain, above speculation, is fully apparent. These new issues of bonds and Treasury notes do not seek buyers; on the contrary, they are held by the banking institutions of the three cities, who, for the time, act as the channels of investment for the large and small capitalists of the country. These securities are thus firmly held by the original takers, and will be disposed of, on application, only at the original prices.

Ohio State sixes have advanced from 90 to 93½. New-York State sixes are steady, and more buyers than sellers. California seven per cents have recently advanced from 75½ @ 81½ @ 82. The seceding State bonds are likewise better held, although but faint hopes are entertained of their paying their interest for some years to come. Virginia sixes have advanced from the low rate of 45¼ in October, to 47½; Georgia, from 64 @ 67½; North Carolina, from 54½ @ 60; Louisiana, from 55 @ 59; Tennessee, from 42 to 45.

We annex highest cash prices, at the dates named, of the Government and leading State securities in this market:

	Sept. 28th.	Oct. 5th.	12th.	28d.	30th.	Nov. 7th.	14th.	21st.
U. S. 6 per cents, 1881,.....	91½	92	93½	94½	94	94	95½	93½
U. S. 5 per cents, 1874,.....	81	82	82½	84	84	85	86	85½
Ohio 6 per cents, 1886,.....	89	90	91	90	92	92½	94	93½
Kentucky 6 per cents,.....	76	76	76	76	76	70	70	76
Indiana 5 per cents,.....	77½	78½	78	79	78	79	78	79
Pennsylvania 5 per cents,....	79	78	78	80	74½	76	74½	76
Virginia 6 per cents,.....	48½	45½	47	46	46	46	48	47½
Georgia 6 per cents,.....	64	65	65	64½	63½	65	69	67½
California 7 per cents, 1877,...	81	82	81½	81	81½	81½	82½	81½
North Carolina 6 per cents,...	59	59	60½	59½	59	60	60½	60
Missouri 6 per cents,.....	42½	42½	43½	43½	44½	43½	46	43½
Louisiana 6 per cents,.....	55½	56½	56	56	57	59½	59	59
Tennessee 6 per cents,.....	43	42	42	42½	42½	42	45½	45

The Croton Water Board will receive proposals, until Friday, December 20, for \$250,000 Croton Water stock, bearing six per cent. interest. The State of Connecticut invites proposals, until December 20th, for \$1,200,000 Connecticut six per cent. bonds. The bonds are in denominations of \$100, \$500 and \$1,000, are dated July 1, 1861, and payable at the Treasurer's office in twenty years from date, or at any time after the expiration of ten years, at the pleasure of the General Assembly, with six per cent. coupons attached, payable at the same place in January and July of each year. This issue completes the \$2,000,000 authorized by act of the General Assembly at their May session, and, as the State has no public debt, would be met in full by a tax of less than one per cent. on the grand list of the State.

The directors of the Bank of England, on the 7th inst., reduced their rate of discount from 3½ per cent., at which it was fixed on the 19th of September, to 3 per cent. Of this change the *Economist* says: This alteration has exercised no effect in the discount market, the general rate being still much below the bank. During the greater part of the week the best bills could be negotiated at about 2½ @ 2½ per cent., but to-day, owing to some exceptional cause, there was a slightly increased inquiry, and the usual terms for three months' paper were 2½. This afternoon the applications at the bank were more numerous than usual. The small number of commercial bills offering is still the subject of remark, especially as regards inland trade. The following table shows the rates of discount currently charged for first-class paper in London, but the terms necessarily vary at different establishments:

30 days,.....	2½ to 2½ per cent.	3 months,.....	2½ per cent.
60 days,.....	2½ per cent.	6 months,.....	3½ per cent.

The following are the rates of discount in the principal cities of the Continent. In Paris there appears to be rather less pressure:

	Bank Rate. Per cent.	Op. Market. Per cent.		Bank Rate. Per cent.	Op. Market. Per cent.
Paris,.....	6	5	Turin,.....	6½
Vienna,.....	6	5	Brussels,.....	4
Berlin,.....	4	3½	Hamburg,.....	0
Frankfort,.....	4	3½	St. Petersburg,....	2
Amsterdam,.....	3	3		8

The following account shows at a glance the condition of the Bank of France :

LIABILITIES.

Capital,.....	£ 7,300,000	or	\$ 36,500,000	or	frs. 182,500,000
Reserved profits,.....	1,136,890	or	5,634,450	or	23,422,250
Notes in circulation,.....	30,657,589	or	153,237,945	or	766,439,725
Bank drafts,.....	403,568	or	2,017,840	or	10,089,200
Public deposits,.....	2,302,745	or	11,513,725	or	57,568,635
Private deposits, &c.,.....	6,635,838	or	33,179,190	or	165,895,950
Total,.....	£ 48,436,630	or	\$ 242,183,150	or	frs. 1,210,915,750

ASSETS.

Cash, (specie,).....	£ 12,190,448	or	\$ 60,952,240	or	frs. 304,761,200
Commercial bills,.....	23,225,101	or	116,125,505	or	580,627,525
Advances,.....	5,952,102	or	29,760,510	or	148,802,550
Government stock,.....	5,597,091	or	27,985,455	or	139,927,275
Bank property,.....	1,471,888	or	7,359,440	or	36,797,200
Total,.....	£ 48,436,630	or	\$ 242,183,150	or	frs. 1,210,915,750

The following account (in round figures) of the principal items of the Bank of France returns for the last year may not be uninteresting at the present moment. The figures given represent millions of francs, and 25,000,000 francs make £1,000,000 sterling :

	<i>Specie.</i>	<i>Discounts.</i>	<i>Advances on Public Deposits.</i>	<i>Advances on Railway Shares and Bonds.</i>	<i>Advances to the Treasury.</i>	<i>Notes in Circulation.</i>	<i>Accounts Current of the Treasury.</i>	<i>Accounts Current of Private Persons.</i>
	francs.	francs.	francs.	francs.	francs.	francs.	francs.	francs.
October, 1860,	459	519	42	79	35	749	118	213
November, 1860,	434	563	43	81	35	757	133	209
December, 1860,	431	539	39	78	35	747	134	190
January, 1861,	349	608	39	76	35	778	82	207
February, "	353	472	34	64	60	735	64	195
March, "	395	444	27	55	60	722	78	166
April, "	377	453	27	52	60	729	80	144
May, "	392	498	23	61	60	744	120	155
June, "	412	497	29	54	35	713	124	186
July, "	382	543	30	59	30	731	121	201
August, "	394	547	31	56	30	757	136	180
September, "	385	506	30	57	30	757	119	143
October, "	304	579	28	56	30	766	57	145

DEATHS.

AT LOUISVILLE, KY., October, 1861, WILLIAM H. DAVIDSON, Esq., Cashier of the Branch Commercial Bank of Kentucky, at Louisville.

AT MONTREAL, CANADA, on the 8th November, suddenly, JOHN CARTER, Esq., Vice-President of the City Bank of Montreal.

NAMES OF PRIVATE BANKERS

AND OTHERS,

Whose Cards (with their references) may be found on the cover of "The Bankers' Magazine," or "The Merchants and Bankers' Almanac" for 1861.

New-York,.....**Mut. Life Insur. Co.**
 ".....Guardian Life Insurance Co.
 ".....New-York Life Insurance Co.
 ".....Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
 ".....Bk. of British N. A. (Agency.)
 ".....National Bank Note Co.
 ".....American Bank Note Co.
 ".....Bradstreet's Reference Guide.
 ".....D. Plumb & Co's Ref. Guide.
 ".....Coleman & Co., Wm. T.
 ".....Duncan, Sherman & Co.
 ".....Samuel Hallett & Co.
 ".....Peters, Campbell & Co.
 ".....E. Morrison, 17 Nassau.
 ".....Schuchardt & Gebhard.
 ".....Merklee & Thatcher.
 ".....Locke & Craigie, Plumbers.
 ".....Taylor Brothers, Bankers.
 ".....Wm. A. Wheeler.
Geneva,.....Schell & Hemiup, Bankers.

Mass.—Boston,.. **Burnett, Drake & Co.**
 ".....Chickering & Sons.
 ".....Walker, Wise & Co.

Conn.—New-Haven, **W. W. Bacon.**

Pa. Philada.,.... **Davis & Birney.**
 ".....Work, McCouch & Co.
 ".....Peterson & Brothers.
Bradford,.....E. P. Steers & Co.
Pittsburgh,.....N. Holmes & Son.
 ".....Semple & Jones.
Seranton,.....Mason, Meylert & Co.
 ".....Geo. Sanderson & Co.
Towanda,.....Russell & Co., B. S.,

Md.—Baltimore, **Johnston Bros. & Co.**
 ".....McKim & Co.
 ".....Brothers McKim.
 ".....John S. Gittings & Co.

Wash. City **Lewis Johnson & Co.**

Va.—Fred'burg,.. **Franklin Slaughter & Co.**
Richmond,.....William B. Isaacs & Co.
 ".....C. W. Purcell & Co.

Cal.—Sacramento, **Thos. S. Fiske & Co.**
San Francisco,.....Tallant & Wilde.

Ill.—Chicago,.... **A. C. Oertel.**
Chicago,.....A. C. Badger & Co.
Carlinville,.....Chesnut & Dubois.
Moline,.....Gould, Dimock & Co.
Ottawa,.....Eames, Allen & Co.
Quincy,.....Quincy Savings & Ins. Co.
 ".....Moore, Sherman & Co.
Rockford,.....Lane, Sanford & Co.

Springfield,.....**N. H. Ridgely & Co.**
 ".....J. Bunn.

Ind.—Richmond, **Morrisson, Blanchard & Co.**

Io.—Cedar Rapids, **Carpenter, Stibbs & Co.**
Clinton,.....Budd & Baldwin.
Davenport,.....Macklot, Louis A.
Fairfield,.....Bernhart Henn & Co.
Fort Dodge,.....Charles A. Sherman.
Iowa City,.....J. H. Gower & Co.
Keokuk,.....Wm. Thompson & Co.
Sioux City,.....Weare & Allison.

Ky.—Louisville,.. **Tucker & Co.**

Mich.—Battle Ck., **Loyal C. Kellogg.**
Ann Arbor,.....Hale & Smith.
Niles,.....R. C. Paine.

Mo.—Independence, **Thornton & Co.**
St. Louis,.....Allen, Copp & Nisbet.
 ".....Barlow & Taylor.
 ".....Geo. H. Loker & Bro.
 ".....Tesson & Danjen.
 ".....National Insurance Co.
 ".....St. Louis Building Association.
 ".....State Savings Association.

Ohio.—Cin......**Gillmore, Dunlap & Co.**
 ".....Homans & Co.
Dayton,.....Harshman & Gorman.
Sandusky,.....Moss Brothers.
Zanesville,.....Gatrell & Brown.

Oregon.—Portland, **Ladd & Tilton.**

Tenn.—Mem.,.... **Gayoso Sav's Instit'n.**

Tex.—Galveston, **R. & D. G. Mills.**
 ".....E. P. Hunt.
Houston,.....John Dickinson.
Palestine,.....John G. Gooch.
San Antonio,.....John C. French.

Wis.—Fond du Lac, **Exch. Bk. Darling & Co.**
Milwaukee,.....Marshall & Isley.

London,.....**Bank of British N. A.**

Canada,.... **Commer. Bank of Canada.**

TERMS—\$20 per an. (including one year's subscription) for a Card to occupy one-fifth of a page.

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BANKERS who deem the PERFECT SECURITY of their funds against the various arts and devices of the most "Daring Modern Burglar" of paramount importance, will find it for their pecuniary interest to provide themselves at once with

BACON'S New & Improved Burglar-Proof Bank Safe, Made upon an entirely new principle, secured by COVERT'S PATENT PERMUTATION BANK LOCK,

Which has NO KEY OR KEY-HOLE, thereby excluding Burglars, Amateurs, Picks and Powder. This lock is all that could be desired, and will take care of itself.

These Safes and Locks combined are pre-eminently in advance of all others in every respect for the purposes intended, having no rival, are the cheapest, most elegant, and convenient articles extant.

They are more particularly designed to be placed inside of a Vault or Fire Proof Safe, being composed of the FINEST QUALITY OF ENGLISH STEEL (hardened) AND WROUGHT IRON (for a new and peculiar combination of which a patent is secured), the ONLY materials the world has produced as a sure protection against all grades of depredation by "Midnight Visitors," by the use of Jack Screws, Jimmies, Saws, Sledge Hammers, &c., &c.

This Engraving represents a safe with an open door, showing heavy, round, wrought iron bolts, which, with two iron dogs on the back edge of the same, secures it in eight different places. (See engraving.)

My Safes are in use by a very large portion of the principal Banking Institutions throughout this country and, notwithstanding frequent bold attempts by burglars have been resorted to, I challenge the world to produce evidence that a robbery to the amount of a farthing has ever occurred through them.

I manufacture Safes expressly to order, of any desired dimensions; the size, however, more generally adopted by Banks, is four feet high, two feet six inches wide, one foot four inches deep, inside measure—the outside dimensions being about three inches larger. They are the *ne plus ultra* of security,—in a word, they are just the article that every Banker, who desires a good night's rest, without fear of robbery, should possess.

All orders for the above, also for VAULT DOORS AND FRAMES, (an elegant article,) made in a superior manner, of any size required, fitted with locks of various sizes and kinds, shall have prompt attention. For list of sizes and prices of Safes, see Circular.

Address, WILLIAM W. BACON, New Haven, Conn.

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AND

COVERT'S PATENT PERMUTATION BANK LOCK,
WITHOUT ANY KEY OR KEY-HOLE.



This Safe is expressly designed for Banks and Bankers having no Vault. It is perfectly secure against "Fire and Burglars," (see representation of Steel Money Safe at bottom of Engraving,) also convenient, cheap, and elegant free from dampness, and is, in short, the most complete and reliable article in every particular extant.

The walls of the Fire-Proof Safe are about six inches in thickness, and sure against the devouring element.

The Money Safe at the bottom of the Fire Proof is made upon the same principle as the Burglar-Proof above described, and made only of sufficient size to contain the Money, Bills Receivable, Check Books, and other valuables, above which, it is conveniently arranged with Drawers, Pigeon Holes, Spaces for Books, &c., &c.

For List of Sizes, Prices, &c., Bankers are referred to my Circular. Nearly all the principal Banking Institutions in the United States are using my Safes, to whom those desirous of purchasing are respectfully referred.

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